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In an effort to remove barriers that hinder women’s advancement in the workplace, 
legislators have adopted gender quotas and targets to increase the numbers of women on 
boards (WOB).  In 2011, the Davies Review rolled out the guidelines of the United 
Kingdom’s soft law approach for increasing the proportion of WOB in the largest 
publicly listed organizations.  Promoted by advocates and proponents of WOB initiatives, 
the assumption that inequality is perpetuated by men and not women, has resulted in the 
expectation that WOB initiatives are a top-down approach to achieve gender equality in 
the workforce. This study examined the effects of the Davies Review, U.K.’s soft law for 
increasing WOB, on changes in board composition, opportunities for other women in the 
organization, and the gender pay gap.  Using longitudinal data from 2008 to 2016, for 
395 FTSE All Share firms, this study examined the effects of the Davies Review using a 
rigorous research design and methodology. This study’s main analyses used a non-
parametric regression discontinuity design and supplemental tests used growth models.   
Findings of this study provided support for the causal effect of the Davies Review 
on increasing the percentage of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations below the compliance 
 xi 
threshold established by the Davies Review.  Additionally, ignoring differences in power 
and status that favor men in leadership roles, increased numerical representation of WOB 
has gone unchallenged as a measure of gender diversity performance. To test its effect, 
this study used women’s board representation at 20%, 25%, and 30% to test critical mass 
of WOB on organizational indicators of gender equality.  Counter to the assumption that, 
at some point of the representation spectrum, women reach critical mass and influence 
organizational outcomes, this study found no evidence of critical mass of WOB on 
opportunities for other women in the organization or the gender pay gap. At a 
representation of 25% of WOB, a large negative effect was found on opportunities for 
women on executive boards.  In line with previous findings of the effects of WOB 
initiatives on the gender pay gap, this study found that organizations that increased their 
percentages of WOB more aggressively, had a much wider gender pay gap than 
organizations that underwent small changes.  Similarly, it was found that female CEOs 
increase the gender pay gap by 4.33% for each year of tenure, which is consistent their 
primary duty of maximizing profitability for the organization’s shareholders, and with 
how their performance is assessed.  Implications for policy and practice are discussed.   
 
Key words: gender quotas, women on boards, corporate boards, Davies Review, 
gender diversity, equality, regression discontinuity, Lord Davies initiative, Davies Report, 
gender pay gap.
 1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Background to the Problem 
The United Nations defines gender as the social attributes and opportunities 
associated with being male and female and the relationships within and between women 
and men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are 
learned through socialization processes (UN Women, 2018).  Gender determines what is 
expected, allowed, and valued in women or men in a given context.  In most societies 
there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities 
assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-
making opportunities. Often used interchangeably, the terms gender diversity and gender 
equality represent different concepts. Gender diversity represents the gender differences 
between people and groups of people and places positive value on those differences. 
Gender equality refers to the equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for men and 
women (UN Women, 2018).  Gender equality is not only an inalienable basic human 
right, but its achievement is part of the world’s commitment to universal ideals of human 
dignity.  Considering that gender equality is a very broad term that encompasses different 
dimensions in life; for clarity, it should be noted that this study focused on indicators of 
gender equality in the workplace. Indicators of gender equality are numerical indicators 
that represent the progress toward achieving equal contribution of women and men in the 
workplace, also referred to as gender parity.  
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In the developed western world, the first statutes to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of gender emerged in the U.S. with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  A decade later, 
the U.K. Parliament passed the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 (superseded by the 
Equality Act of 2010) formalizing protections for women in employment, training, and 
education.  Equality between men and women is a fundamental value of the European 
Union (EU; European Institute for Gender Equality, 2018).  As an EU member state, the 
United Kingdom has a duty to promote its values, including equality.   
According to the 2017 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, the 
United Kingdom is ranked number 15 in relation to opportunities for women, which 
include economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and political 
empowerment (World Economic Forum, 2017). Compared with the rankings of other 
countries with similar economies, such as the United States (49), Canada (16), and 
Australia (35), the United Kingdom could be considered to be a more progressive country 
in terms of gender equality.  However, current statistics provide evidence of a massive 
disparity in economic participation and opportunity.   
Despite the considerable efforts over the past half a century to achieve gender 
equality in the British workforce, gender disparities persist, and at a sustained rate of 
change would result in gender parity in 61 years (World Economic Forum, 2017).  These 
disparities are measured in function to participation, remuneration, and advancement. In 
the United Kingdom, women occupy only 15% of leadership positions (Credit Suisse, 
2016) and 27% of corporate seats in publicly listed boards (World Economic Forum, 
2017), despite representing 46% of the workforce (Office for National Statistics, 2018), 
and 49.3% of the professional workforce.  The gender gap in advancement starts at the 
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first step of the hierarchy and widens progressively at every organizational level, with 
senior leadership showing the greatest disparity (McKinsey, 2016).  Additionally, the 
existence of a gender pay gap that starts as graduates enter the workforce and widens 
over time was identified in a longitudinal study by the U.K. Department for Education 
(2018).  
In recent years, gender diversity on corporate boards has become one of the 
leading topics in corporate governance and the gender equality discourse (Terjesen, Sealy, 
& Singh, 2009). In 2003, Norway was the first country to implement legislation that 
regulates the gender composition of corporate boards (Engelstad & Teigen, 2012, p.116), 
mandating that listed companies have a minimum 40% representation of each gender by 
2008.  The Norway quota law resulted in an increase in female representation on 
corporate boards from 7% in 2003 to 40% in 2009 (Teigen, 2015).  The apparent success 
of the Norway approach gained considerable attention worldwide, highlighting the 
existence of male dominance at the highest corporate decision-making levels (Bertrand, 
Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2018; Sweigart, 2012; Teigen, 2012).  Driven by the 
slow pace of change in the gender composition of corporate boards (Sweigart, 2012), 
several countries have followed Norway’s lead.  Researchers (Seierstad, Warner-
Soderholm, Torchia, & Huse, 2017) argue that the increased attention to women on 
boards (WOB) initiatives has resulted in their inclusion in political agendas.   
Government bodies employ two competing approaches to increasing board 
diversity, gender quotas and comply or explain approaches.  The first one is the 
legislative approach, which is also referred to as hard law approach, and the second one 
is the voluntary comply or explain approach, also referred to as soft law approach. The 
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legislative approach regulates the gender composition of corporate boards through the use 
of mandatory quotas, and often have penalties for non-compliance.  After the 
implementation of the Norway (2003) quota law, the following countries implemented 
hard law approaches for increasing the representation of WOB, among which are Spain 
(2007), Iceland (2010), France (2011), the Netherlands (2011), Belgium (2011), Italy 
(2013), Germany (2014). Comply or explain approaches encourage organizations to 
promote gender diversity on their boards but do not impose penalties for non-compliance. 
Sweden (2007), Australia (2010), the United States (2010) and the United Kingdom 
(2011) are among the countries that have implemented soft law approaches.  
The EU has played a major role in the inclusion of gender equality in the political 
agendas of its member states (Fagan & Rubery, 2018).  Gender equality is the area of 
social policy where the EU law has had its most significant influence due to its inclusion 
in the original Treaty of Rome (Hyman, 2008), with legal basis for any binding measures 
that aim at enforcing the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment in the 
Article 157(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007).  However, 
scholars (Storvik & Teigen, 2010; Teigen, 2012) argue that it was the Norwegian quota 
law that brought attention to the gender imbalance on corporate boards and inspired the 
quota debate at top levels of the EU system.  As the European Commission deliberated a 
proposal to introduce gender quota legislation for its member states, the U.K. government 
promptly acted to introduce an initiative to address women’s underrepresentation on 
British corporate boards by rolling out the Davies Review (2011).   
The Davies Review recommended a target of 25% female representation on the 
boards of organizations trading in the London Stock Exchange and listed in the Financial 
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Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) indices, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 – collectively FTSE 
350. The Davies Review recommended that FTSE 100 boards achieve the 25% target by 
2015 and FTSE 250 boards aim for the 25% target in a longer timeframe, which was a 
considerable increase from their starting points in 2011 of, 12.5% and 7.9%, respectively. 
Researchers argue that legislation and mandatory regulations such as quota laws are not 
highly regarded in the U.K., and voluntary targets for initiatives involving employers are 
the preferred strategy (Fagan & Rubery, 2018; Goyal, Kakabadse, Morais, & Kakabadse, 
2018; Teigen, 2012).  Consequently, a fundamental difference between the U.K.’s 
approach and the quota approach implemented in most other European nations was that 
the Davies Review was deployed as a comply or explain voluntary effort, which unlike 
mandatory quotas, did not carry sanctions for non-compliance.  Nevertheless, the 
initiative was delivered with the threat of much higher mandated quotas imposed by the 
European Commission if the voluntary targets were not achieved (Davies, 2011).   
The Davies Review (2011) was also the fulfillment of the U.K. coalition 
government’s pledge to promote gender equality on boards in order to counter the many 
barriers to equal opportunity in Britain and help build a fairer society.  Consistent with 
evidence that suggests that gender quotas and targets for WOB are an effective way for 
helping women break into male-dominated positions (Hughes, Paxton, & Krook, 2017; 
Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015), by the end of 2015, the targets set in 2011 had been 
exceeded.  The boards of FTSE 350 organizations had collectively doubled their female 
representation, with FTSE 100 boards at 26.1% and FTSE 250 boards at 19.6%, which 
was reported in the 5 Year Summary (Davies, 2015).    
 6 
Lord Davies indicated that the United Kingdom was a leader and role model on 
the international stage for having achieved such progress under a voluntary approach 
rather than quota legislation (p. 10).   In fact, it was reported that by the 2015 deadline of 
the initiative, using performance indices comparable to the FTSE 100 index, the United 
Kingdom ranked sixth in the world in terms of female membership on corporate boards, 
and was the first one in the ranking that did not rely on mandatory quotas (Davies, 2015, 
p. 11; Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 34).  However, these results were presented as an 
average of the aggregated percentages. Therefore, despite the seemingly obvious success 
of the Davies Review in increasing gender parity on boards of FTSE organizations, 
without proper analysis, negative effects even at the board level, cannot be ruled out. 
Other than the increase in the collective percentage of WOB, very little is known about 
effects of the initiative.   
In the 5 Year Summary, Lord Davies not only celebrated the success of the 
initiative, but he also asked that organizations keep their laser sharp focus on the WOB 
agenda, as in doing so “there is the potential to banish gender inequality in British 
business to the annals of history” (Davies, 2015, p. 27). By 2015, there were 682 director 
positions filled by women on FTSE 350 boards (Davies, 2015), which suggests that the 
initiative targets a very small number of women. Considering that the number of women 
employed in British workforce reaches almost 19 million (Office for National Statistics, 
2018), it is hard to reconcile how an initiative that targets such a small number of women 
can banish gender inequality.  
The theoretical link between women’s representation in decision-making roles 
and the representation of women’s interests (Phillips, 1998) makes it plausible that there 
 7 
was an expectation that targeting WOB would have a positive effect on gender equality in 
British business.  Researchers (Ferreira, 2015; Skaggs, Stainback & Duncan, 2012) have 
suggested that proponents of gender initiatives for corporate boards believe and expect 
that women in high levels of leadership will reduce gender discrimination.  One 
assumption underlying the idea that a small number of women in senior positions will 
help other women in junior positions is that inequality is perpetuated by men and not 
women (cf. Derks Van Laar & Ellemers, 2016).  However, research has provided 
evidence that women in leadership roles may be unable to help other women, face special 
challenges that hinder their ability to advocate for other women (Duguid, 2011; Ellemers, 
Rink, Derks, & Ryan, 2012), or be unwilling to help other women (Bierema, 2005).   
Targeting boards as a way to promote gender equality can be explained by 
principles of representation.  In Norway, the country that triggered the snowball effect of 
WOB initiatives (Teigen, 2012), a central argument to government justification for the 
introduction of the quota reform was that gender-balanced representation in the highest 
economic decision-making levels was essential for the Norwegian democracy (Tiegen, 
2015). Norway’s model of corporate governance relies on industrial democracy (Emery 
& Thorsrud, 2013), requiring employees to be represented on their organization’s board. 
The scope of employee representation was expanded by including gender representation, 
as set forth in the Gender Equality Act of 1999, which was passed by Norwegian 
Parliament in 2003 (Storvik, 2011).  
Based on Norway’s employee board representation’s system, it makes logical 
sense that there was an expectation that women who were appointed to boards would 
look after the interests of the employees they represented.  However, few countries have 
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corporate governance systems that include employee representation.  In the United 
Kingdom, where employees do not have the right to board representation, the role of the 
board is to collectively be responsible for the long-term success of the company, acting in 
what they consider to be the best interests of the company, while ensuring that the 
company’s obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2016, p.7). Therefore, the expectation that WOB in the United 
Kingdom will represent the interests of other women in the organization may not be as 
reasonable in the U.K. context as it is in the Norway context, as their responsibility of 
generating value for the shareholders is their primary duty.  
The two principles of representation that are associated with gender quotas in the 
literature are descriptive and substantive (Phillips, 1998; Young, 2002). Descriptive 
representation indicates fair representation of women in numbers.  Thus, initiatives to 
promote the achievement of gender parity on corporate boards, such gender quotas and 
targets aim to attain women’s descriptive representation.  Substantive representation 
implies that people’s interests are represented by those in decision-making positions.  
Substantive representation of women is not related to their representative’s gender, but to 
the tendency of their representative to advocate for women’s interests.  The link between 
descriptive and substantive representation was hypothesized using the theoretical 
foundation of the politics of presence (Wangnerud, 2009), in which Phillips (1995) 
argued that female representatives were better suited to represent the interests of other 
women.   
Studies have tested the assumption that women who are numerical minorities in 
decision-making roles will advocate for other women, and found this is not always the 
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case. The likelihood of women in high-level positions helping other women is highly 
dependent on a number of contextual variables that influence the relationship (Duguid, 
2011; Ellemers et al., 2012).  Other studies that examined the effects of the Norway quota 
law did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that the reform benefited the larger 
set of women employed in the companies impacted by the quota (Bertrand et al., 2018).  
A study of the Norway quota law found that the initiative created a small elite group of 
women directors but did not have a positive effect on increasing opportunities for other 
women (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011). Further, the gender wage gap did not decrease, except 
at the top of the labor market, which researchers argue could be the result of increased 
demand for women created by the quota law (Bertrand et al., 2018).   
Scholars (Cha & Weeden, 2014; Srivastava & Sherman, 2015) have suggested 
that the gender pay gap is one of the most extensively studied indicators of inequality in 
the workplace.  In the United Kingdom, the Equality Act of 2010 (preceded by the Equal 
Pay Act of 1970 and the Equal Pay Act of 1983) protects employees from employment 
and pay discrimination based, among other categories, on gender.  However, despite 
legislation, the persistence of a pay gap between men and women suggests the existence 
of discrimination.  Diel and Dzubinski (2016) argued that discrimination is now subtle 
and often invisible to both men and women.  In fact, some scholars have argued that 
gender pay gaps are likely to exist in developed societies because both men and women 
consider lower earnings for women to be fair (Auspurg, Hinz, & Sauer, 2017).  
As female representation in leadership roles increased, scholars (Cohen & 
Huffman, 2007) addressed the question of how the increased female representation in 
leadership impacts the gender pay gap.  Thus, adding to the extensive research focused on 
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the effects of organizational characteristics and practices on gender inequality in the 
workplace (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Kalev, 2009), some researchers turned to 
observing the role of leaders. While evidence for the relationship of women in leadership 
and the gender pay gap exists on both sides of the argument. Consistent with the idea of 
women helping women, and literature that suggests that managers influence 
organizational policies, such as wage-setting (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003), some studies 
have found that having women in leadership positions decreases the gender pay gap (Tate 
& Yang, 2015).  Conversely, other studies (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015) have provided 
support for a positive relationship between women leaders and gender disparities in pay 
for similar work at lower hierarchical levels.  
Despite the extensive body of research that has focused on examining WOB 
initiatives, few studies have examined the effects on the initiatives on gender equality 
outcomes other than at the boardroom level.   The Australian Institute of Management in 
partnership with the Australian National Committee for UN Women (Australian Institute 
of Management, 2012) suggested that despite limited evidence, a positive correlation 
between the numbers of WOB and women at the top executive level had been identified.  
However, while some empirical studies have provided some evidence of the relationship 
between WOB and female executive representation (Bilimoria, 2006; Konrad, Kramer, & 
Erkut, 2008; Skaggs et al., 2012); the endogenous nature of board composition suggests 
that there may be other variables that may be influencing that relationship. While it is 
possible WOB may be creating opportunities for women in management, it is also 
possible that a higher supply of women in management is causing more women to rise to 
corporate boards, or that organizations that have a good gender equality strategy promote 
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more women to managerial and board positions.  Therefore, a causal relationship cannot 
be established.   
Nonetheless, policy makers and equality advocates continue to promote 
descriptive representation initiatives to promote gender equality.  In fact, legislation and 
initiatives for WOB are explicitly promoted as a way to improve opportunities for women 
in the workplace (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; Davies, 2011; German Bundestag, 2015). 
Recently, the state of California passed legislation that requires publicly listed 
organizations to meet minimum representation of WOB.  Proponents of the bill claimed 
that the quota law will not only substantially improve profitability, but that WOB would 
open doors for other women, create a safer workplace, improve work-life balance, and 
close the gender pay gap (National Association of Women Business Owners, 2018). The 
expert testimony presented consisted of anecdotal evidence, and the studies used to 
support their claim were not methodologically designed to address causal relationships.   
Keeping in mind that the desired goal is to achieve gender equality, the way in 
which gender diversity and equality initiatives are executed merits thoughtful 
consideration, as research (Ahmed, 2012) has found that certain diversity practices can 
contribute to the creation of a system that overlooks inequality. Scholars (Ellemers et al., 
2012) have argued that promoting women to senior positions simply to increase their 
numbers, without addressing the underlying problem of gender bias and gendered 
leadership beliefs, is a risky strategy that could have a negative impact on career 
opportunities for women.  Additionally, research (Labelle, Francoeur, & Lakhal, 2015) of 
public policy aimed at increasing the number of WOB found that the way in which 
equality initiatives are promoted can have an impact on their outcome.  Furthermore, the 
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theoretical grounding of the justification of the WOB initiative may impact its outcome 
(van Dijk, van Engen, & Paauwe, 2012).  Currently, initiatives for WOB are promoted 
using two different arguments, which based on their theoretical grounding can be 
categorized as: utilitarian, and social justice. 
Utilitarian – or economic - argument. In the majority of countries where 
legislation and policies for WOB have been implemented, the debate has mainly been 
discussed and promoted through the utilitarian argument – also referred to as the business 
case for WOB -, which relies on a causal claim of improved financial performance 
resulting from the inclusion of WOB (Choudhury, 2014).  The business case for WOB 
was originally used as a rebuttal to the concerns of business leaders in Norway (Teigen, 
2015) who feared that the quota reform would negatively impact financial performance. 
However, today, the business case for WOB appears to be the most relied upon argument 
to promote gender diversity on boards.  Amending its initial pledge, in which the 
underrepresentation of WOB was approached as an equality issue, when the Davies 
Review was rolled out, it relied on the economic argument for promoting the WOB 
initiative. The Davies Review justified equality of opportunity for women at the 
corporate board level, on the basis of improved financial performance and improved 
board performance (Davies, 2011, p.7). 
Advocates of WOB initiatives have contributed to the diffusion of the economic 
argument, which has flooded media outlets with the alleged benefits of WOB on the 
bottom line, mainly supported by industry reports (e.g. 2020 Women on boards, 2016; 
Catalyst, 2004, 2007, 2011; Dawson, Kersley, & Natella, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2014; 
Kurth, 2015; McKinsey, 2007).  Catalyst’s (2007) research is arguably the most well-
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publicized study that links WOB to increased financial performance (Dobbin & Jung, 
2011). However, the basic nature of their data analyses – composed of only descriptive 
statistics – does not provide compelling support for a causal relationship of WOB on 
increased financial performance.    
Additionally, mixed findings in peer-reviewed studies do not provide compelling 
support for the claim either. In some studies the relationship was found to be positive 
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Smith, Smith, & 
Verner, 2006), in others, the relationship was negative (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Chapple 
& Humphrey, 2014; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010; Isidro & 
Sobral, 2015; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Shehata, Salhin, & El-Helaly, 2017), and other 
studies found that the relationship was not statistically significant (Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Hussein & Kiwia, 2009; McCann & Wheeler, 2011; Miller & 
Triana, 2009; Rose, 2007; Zahra & Stanton, 1988).   
Recently, Post and Byron (2015) published a meta-analysis of 144 published 
studies in which the relationship of WOB and different measures of financial 
performance was examined.  Their findings indicated that, although positive, the 
relationship of WOB and market performance was almost zero, and the effect size on 
firm financial performance was also small, but positive.  Findings from another meta-
analysis recently published (Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, & Voelpel, 2015), concluded 
that the correlation between percentage of WOB and firm performance was small and 
non-significant. Therefore, while their findings provided stronger evidence of a positive 
relationship of WOB and financial outcomes, the effect sizes were small or non-
statistically significant, which may not compellingly establish a case for gender diversity 
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as a tool to outperform other firms. Additionally, conflicting with claims of proponents of 
WOB used for promoting policy, the effect of gender was not nearly as high as the 42% 
higher returns on sales (Davies, 2011) or 45% higher earnings per share (CA, Senate Bill, 
No. 862). 
Some scholars have criticized that the business case perspective seems to 
substitute the equality rationale (Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop, & Nkomo, 2010), as both 
rationales are grounded on essentially oppositional moral perspectives (van Dijk, van 
Engen, & Paauwe, 2012). Deontology, the theoretical grounding of the social justice and 
equality argument, suggests that the morality of an action should not be based on its 
consequences, but on whether the action itself is right or wrong.  Conversely, the 
business case, theoretically grounded in utilitarianism, represents a conditional argument 
that sees women and minorities as a means to an end (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010).  
Consequently, as the business case does not promote gender diversity in itself but only 
through the potential contributions of women to the bottom line (Noon, 2007), it could 
result in the opposite desired outcome. A negative effect of WOB on financial 
performance would provide moral justification for maintaining a homogeneous 
workforce (van Dijk et al., 2012) and discriminating against women (Ferreira 2015).  
In fact, Fondas (2000) indicated that one of the reasons contributing to the bias 
against WOB is CEOs perceptions toward the value of WOB, in which they quote a CEO 
from a Fortune 500 company indicating that “no study has proved that diversity makes a 
board better” (p.171).  This suggests that as proponents continue to push the business 
case for WOB, evidence of negative or no effect of WOB on financial performance could 
be used against women.   
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Equality argument. The inclusion of the WOB initiative was part of the Equalities 
agenda of the Coalition programme for government (HM Government, 2010), which also 
included the promotion of equal pay and non-discrimination in the workplace.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Government Equalities Office (GEO) leads work on policy relating 
to women’s rights and support the work and implementation of international equality 
measures, including the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Part of the GEO’s commitment to CEDAW 
is to protect women’s human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil, and any other field (CEDAW, 1979).  Women in the British 
workforce have multiple protections from discrimination, including the Human Rights 
Act, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of gender; and the 
Equality Act of 2010 that guarantees equal opportunity in employment and pay. The act 
also includes a clause for its enforcement, which requires that public bodies have due 
regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equal opportunity.   
However, legislation has failed to produce gender equality in the British 
workforce.  A recent study suggested that in British organizations, discrimination against 
women is perceived to be the leading factor associated with the gender disparity on 
corporate boards (Goyal et al., 2018).  Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the gender pay 
gap that starts at graduation (Department for Education, 2018), when no other factor such 
as merit, experience, or education can be used as an explanation for pay differentials, 
provides evidence of gender discrimination in the workplace that favors men.   
Although the Davies Review was an effort to promote gender equality on the 
boards of listed companies, which by definition is a social justice and human rights issue 
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(United Nations, 2015), the initiative was promoted using the business case.  Scholars 
(Ahmed, 2007) have suggested that the business case for equality reinforces the view that 
basic human rights for women are something that still needs to be justified, and weakens 
the case for gender equality.  Furthermore, the incongruence of promoting an equality 
initiative using the business case has contributed to the focus on the effects of WOB 
initiatives on financial-related outcomes (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Lindstaedt, Woff, 
& Fehre, 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011; Zhang, Zhu, & 
Ding, 2013), and the scarcity of research on the effects of WOB on gender equality.  
The challenges that women appointed to high-profile positions experience as 
leaders, particularly in organizations in which leadership expectations are gendered may 
cause those women to distance themselves from other women (Ellemers et al., 2012; 
Mavin, 2006, 2008), which is a factor that the expectation that WOB will help other 
women does not take into account.  Additionally, research has suggested that women who 
rise to positions of power prefer to be recognized for their individual abilities as opposed 
to being representatives of their gender (Mavin, 2008).  Furthermore, making women 
responsible for the advancement of other women would satisfy a utilitarian end; which 
would be counter to promoting WOB as a gender equality cause.  
Scholars have tried to reconcile the utilitarian and the social justice approach to 
gender equality by proposing a utilitarian argument within an organizational commitment 
to social justice (Barmes & Ashtiany, 2003; Maxwell, 2004; Tomlinson & Swabenland, 
2010). However, the potentially conflicting expectations associated with each approach 
make the two approaches particularly difficult to reconcile as equality cannot have 
contingencies (Noon, 2007).  Therefore, seeing WOB initiatives through a social justice 
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and human rights lens, providing women with equal opportunity to positions of power is 
the right thing to do.  However, while initiatives to promote equality should not be 
contingent on their effect on other outcomes, that does not imply that the effects of these 
initiatives should be ignored. 
While this study does not question the need to achieve gender parity on corporate 
boards, it questions the effectiveness of the WOB initiatives as an approach to achieve 
gender equality and improve opportunities for women in the workplace.  Logically, only 
under the most optimistic assumptions, one could expect that an increase of WOB would 
improve opportunities for other women in the organization; specifically, if (a) women 
who rise to those positions are willing to advocate on other women’s behalf, (b) that 
WOB are able to influence the board in their advocacy of gender equality, and (c) that the 
organizational structure and leaders acknowledge the gendered nature of organizations 
and advocate change. 
Under the assumption that women who are appointed to boards are willing to 
advocate on women’s behalf, research about gender and power has demonstrated that 
even in formal positions of power, stereotypes and gender beliefs play an important role 
in the power and influence of women (Ellemers et al., 2012). The concept of critical mass 
- the smallest number (or percentage) of a minority representation that will allow the 
minority to have an impact to the group - (Kanter, 1977) has been identified as the way in 
which women can overcome differences in power in board settings.  In the WOB 
literature, it has been suggested that minimum number women needed in order for 
women to be able to have a significantly impact a board, is three (Konrad et al., 2008; 
Torchia et al., 2011).   
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Critical mass is widely used in the WOB debate and academic literature.  In fact, 
it is critical mass that has informed policy related to WOB by serving as support for 
setting minimum targets (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; Davies, 2011). Numerous studies 
have examined critical mass of WOB on information sharing and perceived influence 
(Elstad & Ladegard, 2010), firm innovation (Torchia et al., 2011), firm performance 
(Joecks et al., 2013); firm reputation (Bear et al., 2010), sustainability (Galbreath, 2011); 
and sustainability reporting (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz-Blanco, 2014), among 
others.  However, the concept of critical mass has not been explored in relation to 
opportunities for other women in the organization or the gender pay gap, which seems to 
be an oversight, as the promotion of WOB initiatives is expected to reduce gender 
inequality in the workplace.  
Statement of the Problem 
Research suggests (Bierema, 2017) that the adding women and stirring strategy is 
not an effective way to achieve gender equality in the workplace because power 
structures in organizations remain intact. Scholars (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) have 
indicated that existing self-reinforcing social mechanisms have prevented women from 
achieving gender parity in the workforce. Gender disparities are only an indicator of a 
structural problem rooted in society (Rhode, 2011). Therefore, legislation and policies, 
however strong, do not tend to deliver equality unless they are supported by well-
established social mechanisms (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005).  However, proponents 
of WOB initiatives continue to successfully campaign for the implementation of policies 
and enactment of legislation for addressing gender disparities in the workplace starting at 
the top (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; Davies, 2011; German Bundestag, 2015).  
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Recently, gender quotas for corporate boards have made their way to the United 
States.  In September of 2018, the California government approved Senate Bill No. 826, 
requiring publicly held corporations located in California to have a minimum number of 
female directors depending on board size. In a similar approach to the Davies Review, the 
California bill claimed that “more women directors serving on boards of directors of 
publicly held corporations will boost the California economy, improve opportunities for 
women in the workplace, and protect California taxpayers” (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826, 
1a).  Evidence cited for their claim included McKinsey (2007) and Credit Suisse (2007) 
reports and other industry reports that used descriptive statistics and their study design 
did not address causality. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence was presented to support the 
claims that increasing the number of women on corporate boards would help other 
women (California Senate, 2017).   
While advocates of WOB initiatives insist that placing more WOB will be 
significantly better for business’ finances, the most rigorous available evidence (i.e. 
Pletzer et al., 2015; Post & Byron, 2015) does not support their claim.  Additionally, 
research (Noon, 2007; Sinclair, 2000) has suggested that the promotion of equality 
initiatives through the business case undermines the legitimacy of the inherent social 
justice and human rights nature of equality.   Furthermore, using the example of the most 
recent WOB initiative in California, while the initiative will likely benefit the members of 
an elite group of proponents (i.e. NAWBO), evidence does not support their claim that it 
will provide opportunities for other women and reduce the pay gap. This is a big cause of 
concern, because legislation continues to be enacted under erroneous assumptions and 
ignoring the limitations of existing academic research.  More importantly, the belief that 
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WOB regulations will result in improved opportunities for women in the workplace and 
close the gender pay gap may obstruct the enactment of initiatives that could address 
those issues.  
Despite the multiple contexts in which quotas and targets for WOB have been 
implemented, the majority of the literature has focused on examining their effects on 
financial measures.  Other than having an effect on the increase of WOB, very little is 
known about the effects of increased female representation on corporate boards (Ferreira, 
2015).  The 5 Year Summary of the Davies Review presented figures of WOB as 
collective percentages and indicated that the United Kingdom was a leader and a role 
model due to the success of the initiative (Davies, 2015). However, while their claim may 
be correct, further studies are needed to fully understand the effects the initiative had on 
FTSE organizations.  Although the Davies Review addressed the problem related to the 
demand for WOB, Lord Davies indicated that part of the challenge of WOB was related 
to supply, since fewer women than men were going up the corporate pipeline to top levels 
in their organizations (Davies, 2011, p.3).  Consequently, the lack of rigorous 
examination of the effects the Davies Review on opportunities for other women in the 
British workforce is a substantive oversight, because the effects of the initiative on the 
supply of women eligible to succeed the women who are currently on boards (Kogut, 
Colomer, & Belinky, 2014) will directly impact the long-term effects of the initiative. 
Furthermore, Ferreira (2015) indicated that while it is believed that smashing the 
glass ceiling at the board level will reduce discrimination at lower levels, empirical 
research is needed on the issue.  In different contexts, studies have evaluated the effects 
of increased female board representation resulting from gender quotas on the gender pay 
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gap (Reberioux & Roudaut, 2016).  To date, the only study that has examined the link 
between WOB and the gender pay gap is the Female FTSE Board Report 2018 (Cranfield 
School of Management, 2018).  However, methodological limitations of their study do 
not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the effect WOB had on the gender 
pay gap, as their analyses consisted of listing the top 10 and bottom 10 companies with 
respect to their percentages of WOB along with listing and averaging their mean gender 
pay gap.    
Taking into account that as board members, a major duty of WOB is to generate 
value for shareholders, and that the promotion of the business case for WOB creates an 
expectation of higher profitability from gender-diverse boards, it seems illogical to expect 
that WOB will reduce gender pay inequality in the workplace. In order to fulfill their 
board duties of distributing as much as possible to shareholders, the board, collectively, 
makes decisions that keep costs down and increase profits.  However, pay equality 
involves raising wages, which raises costs (Acker, 2006). In the United Kingdom, 
research (Bell & Machin, 2016; Draca, Machin, & Van Reenen, 2008) has found that 
profitability is significantly reduced by the increase of wages. Consequently, suggesting 
that WOB will reduce the gender pay gap would lead to the expectation of two opposing 
tasks, increasing profits and promoting pay equity.  
Considering that the implementation of WOB initiatives continues to be debated 
by policy-makers across the globe, the lack of research related to the effects of the Davies 
Review on opportunities for women and the gender pay gap does not contribute to 
evidence-based policy. The Davies Review was a gender equality initiative and part of 
the Equalities agenda of the British government; however, its effects on gender equality 
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have not been examined.  Despite the multiple contexts in which policy and legislation 
for WOB have been implemented, the effects of these initiatives on reduced 
discrimination for women at lower levels have not received much attention in the 
literature.  To that end, Ferreira (2015) suggested the need for more empirical and 
theoretical research on the issue. 
Purpose of the Study 
The study aimed to contribute to the understanding of the effects of government-
sponsored initiatives for increasing the participation on WOB on gender equality in the 
workplace.  To that end, using the case of the Davies Review, the recent initiative for 
WOB in the United Kingdom, this study examined its effects on changes in the board 
composition of FTSE 350 boards.  Additionally, using data from the FTSE All Share 
population, which includes FTSE 350 firms and FTSE Small Cap firms, this study used 
the 25% target set by the Davies Review to test the concept of critical mass of WOB on 
opportunities for other women measured as gender diversity at different hierarchical 
levels and as the gender pay gap. Using a regression discontinuity approach 
(Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960), this study aimed to test the causal claims of its 
findings to fill the gap in the literature for rigorous methodology.  
Theoretical/Conceptual Underpinnings of the Study 
The theories that underpinned the understanding of the elements of this study are 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000), and critical mass theory (Granovetter, 1978; Kanter, 1977, 1987; Torchia et al., 
2011).   
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Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, & 
Paetzold, 2000) underpinned this study’s understanding of the relationship of board 
members to the board and the board to the organization. Originally, this theory was 
conceptualized to help explain the external control of organizations.  The theory was 
expanded to apply to members of boards of directors (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000), and women and minorities (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002). Resource 
dependence theory posits that boards link the organization to external resources of 
organizations to address environmental dependencies.  The principal connections board 
members provide are advice and counsel, channels of communication, and monitoring, 
and counsel and legitimacy.  Theoretically, diverse boards will provide more valuable 
resources which produce better firm performance.   
Although empirical findings testing resource dependence theory have produced 
inconsistent results, in comparison with other leading theories that explain the 
relationship of the board and organizational outcomes, such as agency (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and institutional theory (Bilimoria, 2000, 2006; Fuller, Edelman, & 
Matusik, 2000; Konrad & Linnehan, 1995), resource dependence theory is, perhaps, the 
one that seems to provide a better explanation for contextual variables and is the most 
used by diversity scholars (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008).  This theory 
underpins the hypothetical link of gender as a resource that organizations seek in their 
directors as a way to comply with the Davies Review.  This theory also underpins the 
hypothetical link of female directors as providers of advice and counsel that would 
advocate for gender equality.  
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Critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977) underpinned the study’s understanding of the 
minimum number (or percentage) of WOB required for gender to be a significant 
contributor to the relationship of board resources to organizational outcomes, which in 
the context of this study is opportunities for other women in the organization and the 
gender pay gap.  The political and academic debate about the importance of gender 
diversity to corporate boards, implementation of legislation and policy to increase the 
number of WOB, and expectation of different organizational outcomes resulting from 
women’s appointments to boards raise the question of whether the number of WOB plays 
an important role.  Current statistics of WOB worldwide (World Economic Forum, 2017) 
suggest that women’s representation is far from achieving parity; therefore, critical mass 
indicates the participation of women as a minority on their boards in which they are able 
to influence other members (McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria, & Salipante, 2008); 
however, a minimum of three women was needed for the effect to be significant.  
Consistent with Kanter’s (1977) operationalization of balanced groups as a group with a 
minimum 15% to 40% minority representation, empirical research has found similar 
proportions are enough to reach the tipping point, which represents the point when groups 
move from skewed to balanced.  Research findings have suggested that a minimum of 
three (or 30%) women on corporate boards is required to increase the likelihood of 
women exerting influence on their boards (Arena, Cirilo, Mussolino, Pulcinelli, Saggese, 
& Sarto, 2015; Joecks et al., 2013; Konrad et al. 2008; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper, 
2006; Torchia et al., 2011). Seeing the underlying similarities in men and women’s mode 
of behavior, Kanter (1977) theorized that what appeared to be gender differences were 
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power differences (Witz & Savage, 1992); therefore, these differences could be 
eliminated allowing women to advance to positions in power. 
Research Hypotheses 
The hypotheses have been developed to address shortcomings in the literature and 
increase the understanding of initiatives that promote boardroom gender diversity through 
exogenous events. There are three key predictions in this study: 1) at the micro level, the 
Davies Review caused a change in the board composition of FTSE 350 organizations 
using a comply or explain approach, 2) at the mezzo level, that increased female 
representation on boards that resulted from the Lord Davies initiative would negatively 
impact opportunities for other women within the FTSE 350 organizations, and 3) at the 
macro level, compliance to 25% WOB would not have an effect on the gender pay gap.  
The specific hypotheses are described below. 
The first set of hypotheses, H1a, H1b, and H1c predicted that the Davies Review 
targets would statistically (α =.05) and practically significantly increase the percentage of 
WOB in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 organizations below the compliance threshold.  Taking 
into account that the average growth rate of WOB for publicly listed firms in the United 
Kingdom prior to the Davies Review was about one percentage point per year, a 
cumulative effect size greater than 5% for the five-year duration of the Davies Review 
was considered practically significant; however, for a discontinuous increase, a 3% 
discontinuity would be considered practically significant.  The model for estimating the 
treatment effect is expected to have a medium to large practically significant effect.  The 
treatment effect for FTSE Small boards will not be statistically significant (α =.05).  
Although this is assumed, as to date, no studies have assessed the impact of the initiative.  
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The 2015 Davies Review evaluated the 5-year initiative and indicated that the program 
had been a success and FTSE 350 boards had more than doubled their proportion of 
WOB; however, despite the slow pace of change, corporate boards had already been 
increasing their female representation; thus, it would be inaccurate to measure the effect 
of the initiative as the aggregated difference between pre and post initiative measures.   
The first set of hypotheses were grounded on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978) that posits that organizations seek linkages with the most beneficial 
resources and structure their boards on that basis.  Given that the Davies Review set 
targets for WOB using a comply or explain approach, it is clear that compliance is not 
required.  However, the initiative was delivered with the threat that the EU was debating 
imposing quotas; therefore, although comply or explain approaches had not produced 
significant results in the past, the environment for the Davies Review initiative was more 
conducive to compliance than to explaining.  Other countries in the EU had gone through 
the same process, and after comply or explain approaches failed, quotas were imposed 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).   
Empirical research has suggested that the introduction of quotas has the most 
explanatory power for women’s representation in political systems (Tripp & Kang, 2008).  
Similarly, gender quotas for corporate boards have proven to be an effective tool for 
increasing the proportion of WOB (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012); however, their effects 
appear to be limited to the minimum compliance levels set by the quota. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect an increase in the percentage of WOB for organizations below the 
compliance threshold in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 groups. Conversely, as 
organizations in the FTSE Small Cap were not required to increase their percentages of 
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WOB, the Davies Review should not have an effect on the increase of WOB in FTSE 
Small Cap boards. The first hypothesis predicts:  
H1a:  The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 100 organizations.  
H1b:  The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 250 organizations. 
H1c:  The Davies Review initiative will not impact the percentage of WOB of 
non-compliant FTSE Small Cap organizations. 
The second set of hypotheses, H2a, H2b, and H2c, also relate to board 
composition, and predict that the Davies Review initiative disproportionally increases the 
proportion of non-executive directors in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards, but will have 
no effect on FTSE Small boards.  These hypotheses are grounded on the intersection of 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and gender as status (Ridgeway 
& Bourg, 2004). Despite a recent increase in female representation in FTSE boards, it has 
been established that corporate boards in the U.K. are still male dominated (Davies, 
2015).  Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) posits that organizations 
seek resources that can help the them deal with the environment. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that organizations would hire more women; as their gender provides this 
resource for the organization’s compliance.  
However, as organizations are compelled to hiring more women to meet the 
targets set by the Davies Review, male directors may feel threatened and try to defend the 
status quo (Kray, Howland, Russell, & Jackman, 2017).  The theoretical perspective of 
gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004) suggests that men’s gender is associated with 
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higher status, and has allowed men access to resources and positions of power. The 
motivation of maintaining a better place in a social hierarchy results in the rationalization 
of status disparities (Croft, Schmader, & Block, 2015; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004).  
System justification reflects a fundamental need to see the social system as just and fair 
(Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994).  In support of that notion, research has found 
that managers’ perceptions of initiatives to promote WOB is that they bypass the merit 
principle (Dahlerup, Friedenvall, Stolt, Bivald, & Persson-Weiss, 2008) and reduce the 
quality, ability, and achievement of boardroom members (Singh, Terjesen, & 
Vinnicombe, 2008).  
Consequently, faced with the need of the female gender as a resource for the 
organization’s compliance, and assuming that there is a belief that the Davies Review 
unfairly favors women who are not as qualified as men, board members may want to 
reserve the less influential board positions for women.  Directors’ level of influence to 
the organizational strategy depends on their position on the board as executive or non-
executive directors (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). Evidence suggests that non-executive board 
members rarely initiate the substantive content of strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). 
In fact, executive directors are the ones that know the business best, understand the 
challenges of delivering the organizational strategy, and are the strongest candidates for 
chief executive succession (Odgers-Berndtson, 2018).  Status creates the belief of 
superiority and justifies the systems that perpetuate the inequality (Ridgeway, 2014). 
People in positions of status and power try to hold on to those positions (Jost & Kay, 
2005; Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004); therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that as men 
dominate board membership, they may want to hold on to that advantage and hire female 
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board members for non-executive positions, disproportionately increasing non-executive 
female board appointments. Therefore: 
H2a:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 100 boards.  
H2b:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 250 boards. 
H2c:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE Small Cap 
boards. 
Continuing the study’s predictions related to changes in board composition 
resulting from the Davies Review, the third set of hypotheses predict that the initiative 
will not have an effect in the increase of women to CEO and chairperson positions.  
These hypotheses have theoretical support in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000) and expectation states theory of 
gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004). Through a resource dependence theory lens, 
the female gender is seen as a resource that helps organizations deal with compliance 
with the Davies Review.  However, the Davies Review indicated that women should be 
appointed to boards without setting guidelines for anything other than the percentage of 
the total board size. Based on the environmental need resulting from the Davies Review, 
appointing women to boards satisfies that need without appointing them to CEO or 
chairperson position.  Expectation states theory of gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 
2004) posits that expectations of competence are associated with gender; thus, in order to 
preserve their status, the dominant group perceives the lower-status group as less 
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competent.  Status beliefs intensify in-group bias (Lewis & Simpson, 2012) and create a 
systematic incentive to associate with others who are well-positioned, possess good 
connections, and are perceived as higher status members because this affects an 
individual’s own situation (Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012; Thye, 2000).   
Furthermore, the implementation of the Davies Review, an equal opportunity 
initiative, through the business case for WOB made it evident that women’s equal rights 
still need to be justified.  In the absence of overt discrimination, systematic 
discrimination is masked as with seemingly fair practices (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000); 
ignoring the effects of the systematic bias against women that lingers from a society 
created on patriarchal values (Rao, 2017), organizations use merit to justify the 
systematic discrimination against women (Castilla & Benard, 2010).   
Throughout most of the FTSE organizations’ annual reports, the leaders of the 
largest organizations in the United Kingdom, state their commitment to diversity by 
means of their diversity statement and gender metrics for their corporate boards.  Their 
justification for the low representation of women in leadership roles often invoked merit.  
Denial of gender discrimination is by definition sexism (Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 
1995), as it conceals the barriers women face, hinders their advancement (Stephens & 
Levine, 2011) and places the burden on women to overcome those concealed barriers 
(Kelan, 2009).  Ahmed (2012) performed an analysis of the diversity policies of higher 
education institutions, and argued that part of the problem was that diversity was seen as 
an image problem rather than an institutional problem. Therefore, diversity is reduced to 
compliance, as compliance to the 25% of WOB would suffice for the organizational 
image, as that is the measure of good performance set by the Davies Review. 
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Empirical evidence from examinations of government-led initiatives for WOB 
also provide support for the third set of hypotheses. A study of the effects of the Norway 
quota law on board composition found that, despite the significant increase of female 
members on corporate boards, the quota law did not have an effect on increasing female 
CEOs and chairpersons (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).  The authors of the study concluded 
that the unaffected low percentages of female CEOs and chairpersons indicated that the 
quota law had not changed the perceptions of business women in Norway.  Peterson and 
Philpot (2007) found that women were less likely to be assigned to executive committees 
solely based on their gender. Other studies found that there was a relationship between 
WOB and CEO gender because CEOs were inclined to select candidates who were 
demographically similar to them (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  
Considering that the majority of CEOs are male, and that the Davies Review set the target 
for WOB at 25%, it is likely that most women on FTSE boards are still the minority 
group and still subject to systematic bias in selection to positions of influence such as 
CEO and chairperson.  Therefore, the third set of hypotheses predict that the Davies 
Review will not have a significant effect on the increase of women to CEO and 
chairperson positions.  Therefore, the third set of hypotheses predicts: 
H3a:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female 
executive directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE 350 boards.  
H3b:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female 
non-executive directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE 350 
boards. 
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H3c:  The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female executive 
directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE Small Cap boards. 
H3d:  The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female non-executive 
directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE Small Cap boards. 
Shifting the focus of the predictions to the effects of increased female 
participation on boards that resulted from the Davies Review on opportunities for women 
at different organizational levels and on pay differentials attributed to gender. The fourth 
set of hypotheses, H4a, H4b, and H4c, predict that the Davies Review initiative for WOB 
will negatively impact women’s opportunities at other organizational levels. The Davies 
Review (2015) 5 Year Summary indicated that the initiative had been successful and was 
celebrated.  At that time, there were 682 director positions filled by women on the boards 
of FTSE 350 corporations (Davies, 2015), which suggests that the initiative increased 
opportunities for a very small number of women in the British workforce.  
Davies annual reviews reported the progress toward the goal for achieving gender 
parity on boards. In these reviews, FTSE 350 organizations were ranked based on their 
percentages of WOB. Organizations with the highest percentages of WOB were praised 
and regarded as “leading the way” in gender equality (Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 
33).  Scholars have argued that diversity works as public relations (Ahmed, 2012), that is, 
that it is only addressed in terms of its impact to the image and reputation of the 
organization.  Consequently, as the Davies Review put the gender inequalities of FTSE 
boards under public scrutiny, organizations responded to the problem in a way that would 
present the best image of the organization. 
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Furthermore, existing literature has indicated that the belief of the existence of 
gender-neutral practices can create an illusion of fairness (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000) 
and trump the development of other women in the organization (Bierema, 2017), which 
could cloud the need for addressing inequality.  Therefore, as these reviews categorized 
organizations that reached the 25% target for WOB as gender-balanced and publicly 
acknowledged their gender equality efforts, they may have created the belief of gender 
equality. The numerical target associated with the Davies Review can be explained 
through the concept of critical mass, which widely used in the WOB literature and WOB 
policies (CA Senate, 2007; Davies, 2011).   
Critical mass of WOB has been examined on a number of different outcomes; 
however, in relation to gender equality outcomes, the relationship remains unexplored. It 
should be noted that the hypothetical link between critical mass of WOB and their ability 
to influence the board in a way that would result in improved opportunities for other 
women would require the assumption that women who rise to corporate boards want to 
represent the interests of other women. This assumption has been criticized by scholars 
(Lewis & Simpson, 2012; Mavin, 2008), as it places emphasis in numerical 
representation, ignoring gender bias and leadership beliefs that associate masculine 
characteristics with competence and disadvantage women in leadership roles.  
Furthermore, previous empirical research that examined how female leaders help 
reduce discrimination for other women found that for a number of reasons women tend to 
be less supportive of advancement of other women (Garcia-Retamero & Lopez-Zafra, 
2006), and are less supportive of policies that promote equal opportunity (Ng & Chiu, 
2001).  Findings of a study (Bierema, 2005) that examined women’s networks that 
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included the top female executives in a Fortune 500 organization suggested that, while 
female executives were highly aware of gendered power relations, they were sometimes 
unable or unwilling to take action to change them.  
When the Davies Review was rolled out, Lord Davies indicated that research had 
demonstrated the need of three women to change boardroom dynamics and that the 
environment for women in senior roles improved once they reached one third or 30% 
participation, according to the concept of critical mass (Davies, 2011, p. 8). However, 
when the Davies Review set the target of WOB at 25% of representation, it provided the 
opportunity to test the theory of critical mass of WOB at 25%.  Although literature has 
indicated that the tipping point for WOB is three women or 30% (Torchia et al., 2012), 
the tipping point for WOB as it relates to their effect on reducing gender inequality in the 
workplace remains unexplored.   
Research suggests that the belief that current practices address discrimination 
against women creates silence around gender-related issues (Korvajarvi, 2011), and 
decreases opportunities for other women in organizations (Ellemers et al., 2012).  
Gender-discrimination in organizations is now subtle and entrenched with cultural beliefs 
and societal norms that linger from a patriarchal society. Therefore, discriminatory 
practices are often invisible to both men and women (Diehl & Dzubinski, 2016).  The 
existing gender disparity on boards is only a symptom of a deep structural problem in 
society (De Beaufort & Summers, 2014; Rhode, 2011).  Scholars (Eagly & Karau, 2002) 
have theorized that women’s underrepresentation in leadership roles is caused to 
prejudice and discrimination against women. Hence, as the Davies Review focused on 
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addressing the consequence (i.e. underrepresentation of WOB), it did not address the 
cause of the problem. 
Lord Davies suggested that the efforts for increasing the percentage of WOB 
continue through 2020, that “in doing so, there is the potential to banish gender inequality 
in British business” (p. 27).  However, banishing gender inequality through the increase 
of women’s participation on corporate boards lacks empirical support.  Ahmed (2007) 
argued that changes in equalities legislation in the United Kingdom have contributed to 
equality work becoming another measure of organizational performance. As with any 
measure of organizational performance, the framework and measurement of the 
organizational performance are defined (Dess & Robinson, 1984), which in this case was 
the target set by the Davies Review of 25% of WOB.  As a measure of organizational 
performance, it makes logical sense that achieving the target of 25% of WOB may appear 
as gender equality.   
Additionally, it may reinforce the belief that organizations with higher 
proportions of WOB are gender neutral.  Empirical studies (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011; 
Vernos, 2013) have found that targeting boards for gender diversity initiatives creates 
opportunities only for a small group of women.  Furthermore, research suggests that 
promoting more women to top leadership positions without addressing the gender bias 
and gendered leadership beliefs could have a negative impact on career opportunities for 
women (Ellemers et al., 2012). Consequently, it is reasonable to question if compliance 
to the targets set by the Davies Review (above the 25% target) could have unintended 
consequences for women by creating blindness around existing issues that systematically 
disadvantage women. 
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Additionally, it is noteworthy to mention that the promotion of the business case 
for WOB may threaten the achievement of equality-related outcomes.  Research (Ahmed, 
2007) has found that commitment to equality efforts depends on how diversity is 
promoted to organizations. Therefore, the promotion of the business case to support equal 
opportunity for women, rather than promoting the social justice argument may not be an 
effective way to achieve gender equality, as it does not create awareness of the 
disadvantages and discrimination that put women in a subordinate position.  Instead, 
inequality could become concealed by the same measure designated to represent diversity 
(i.e. percentage of WOB), and function as a mechanism for reproducing inequality (Deem 
& Morley, 2006).   
Furthermore, without promoting awareness of the disadvantages women face, 
equal opportunity initiatives could be perceived as unjust in favor women.  Women could 
be perceived as taking men’s jobs, which could result in high scrutiny of women’s 
performance (Bierema, 2017), and cause women to distance themselves from other 
women (Ellemers et al., 2012).  Consequently, the fourth set of hypotheses predict that 
being compliant to Davies Review target of 25% of WOB will have a negative impact on 
leadership opportunities for the women working within those firms; however, it will not 
impact women’s participation in employment.  
H4a:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will 
decrease the percentage of women in executive boards of FTSE All Share 
organizations.  
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H4b:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will 
decrease the percentage of women in senior management of FTSE All 
Share organizations. 
H4c:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
impact the percentage of women in the workforce of FTSE All Share 
organizations. 
A variation of the fourth set of hypotheses relates to the fact that, prior to the 
announcement of the Davies Review initiative, several organizations were close to or 
over the 25% threshold set by the Davies Review; therefore, the high percentages of 
women on their boards may not be attributed to the Davies Review.  This may indicate 
that those organizations differ in some ways to those that achieved the 25% female board 
representation to meet the targets set by the Davies Review.  Previous research provided 
evidence for the positive relationship of endogenous gender diversity on boards and 
corporate social responsibility (Bear et al., 2010; Boulouta, 2013; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; 
Margaretha & Isnaini, 2014); which could indicate that those organizations have more 
egalitarian practices than those that increased their percentage of WOB as a result of an 
exogenous event – Davies Review.  Therefore, these hypotheses will account for the 
increase of WOB in the duration of the initiative.  A contradictory finding would indicate 
that a 25% of WOB constitutes critical mass. 
Finally, the fifth hypothesis of this study follows the logic of the previous 
hypotheses in examining the effect of gender-balanced boards as determined by the 
Davies Review on equality of treatment, measured as the gender pay gap.  Decades of 
anti-discrimination legislation in the U.K. (Equal Pay Act of 1970; Equal Pay Act of 
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1983; Equality Act of 2010; Sex Discrimination Act of 1975) have failed to produce 
gender equality in the workforce, which is evidenced by current statistics that revealed 
that women are underrepresented in managerial and leadership roles (McKinsey, 2016; 
World Economic Forum, 2017), and by existing pay differentials explained by gender 
(Else, 2018).  
Empirical studies suggested that legislation is not likely to have an impact on the 
gender pay gap (Chevalier, 2007).  In fact, an examination of the effects of the quota law 
on the gender pay gap in France, found that it increased the pay gap by 5% (Reberioux & 
Roudaut, 2016). In Norway, the quota law increased the representation of WOB to almost 
40%; however, it did not have an effect on the gender pay gap.  According to the Work 
Economic Forum (2017), in Norway – ranked 3 on the Global Gender Gap Index –, for 
every $1 a woman earns, a man earns $1.27 in average. This evidence is contradictory 
with the idea promoted by the U.K. coalition government, of targeting corporate boards 
as a way to build a fairer society.  It is also contradictory with Lord Davies’ claim that 
increased numbers of WOB can potentially banish gender inequality in British business 
(Davies, 2015). This evidence also contradicts previous studies that have found that 
women in leadership positions behave differently than men and tend to be more 
benevolent leaders (Adams & Funk, 2012), who are concerned with promoting the 
interests of disadvantaged groups (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2014; Mendelberg & 
Karpowitz, 2016).  
Furthermore, evidence from the effects of WOB on the gender pay gap is also 
inconsistent with critical mass theory, which posits that when women reach critical mass 
– three women on a board –, despite being the minority group, they can overcome the 
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effects of asymmetrical power and effect change (Kanter, 1977, 1987; Torchia et al., 
2011).  Unless, despite having critical mass, WOB do not wish to advance the gender 
equality cause, or are not aware of the discriminatory practices causing the disparity.  
This could indicate that the logic behind targeting corporate boards as a way to promote 
gender equality for other women in organizations is flawed. The assumption that WOB 
represent other women’s interests ignores important differences among women (Childs & 
Krook, 2006).  Furthermore, the belief that inequality is perpetuated only by men and not 
women ignores empirical evidence that has found that women who have raised to 
leadership positions in gender-biased contexts tend to differentiate themselves from other 
women and do not identify with them (Derks et al., 2011; Ely, 1994; Faniko, Ellemers, 
Derks, & Lorenzi-Ciodi, 2017).  
The Davies Review initiative did not address the systematic discrimination and 
gender bias in organizations; therefore, it is unlikely that even after reaching critical mass, 
WOB will have a negative effect on the gender pay gap.  Further, despite massive gender 
pay gaps, organizations have been regarded as “leading the way” in the gender equality 
efforts (Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 33) due to their large percentages of women on 
board.  Prasad and Mills (1997) call this technique “the showcase of exemplars”, which 
refers to the superficial level of treatment in the celebration of diversity efforts of some 
organizations, without much regard to what lies beneath the surface. Therefore, this 
study’s final hypothesis predicts that being compliant to 25% WOB targets will not 
reduce the gender pay gap.  Additionally, a large increase in the percentage of WOB will 
increase the gender pay gap: 
 40 
H5a: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
decrease the gender pay gap mean in FTSE All Share organizations.   
H5b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations. 
H5c: A large increase (Increase>12%) in the percentage of WOB resulting 
from the Davies Review will increase the gender pay gap median in FTSE 
All Share organizations.   
Design of the Study 
The study was designed to examine the effects of the Davies Review in two 
phases.  Phase I tested the effect of the Davies Review on changes in board composition 
of FTSE 350 boards.  Phase II tested the effect 25% of WOB as critical mass on 
opportunities for women in the workforce and the gender pay gap on FTSE All Share 
organizations. The study applied a sharp regression discontinuity design (RD) approach 
to test the existence of a causal relationship in the variables of phase I and phase II of the 
study.  The RD approach is a quasi-experimental design that relies on an assignment 
variable and a cutoff score to assign participants to treatment and control groups to 
determine the effects of a treatment and provide evidence of causality (Scochet, Cook, 
Deke, Imbens, Lockwood, Porter, & Smith, 2010; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
The estimated treatment effect is calculated from observations within the limits on each 
side of the cutoff score, also referred to as the non-parametric approach, which is the 
preferred approach in regression discontinuity designs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 
2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Van der Klaauw, 2008).  
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Population and Participants  
The population of this study was FTSE ranked organizations in the FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250, and FTSE Small cap, collectively known as FTSE All Share.  The sample for 
this study consisted of FTSE All Share organizations in the years 2008 to 2016 that were 
listed and indexed in the year the Davies Review was rolled out, 2011, excluding 
investment trust institutions, which are subject to different rules and tend to not have 
employees.  To identify the available sample, this study started with the list of all 
publicly listed companies trading in main market of the LSE in 2011 (N=1419).  To 
identify the FTSE All Share index constituents on the LSE list, historical data from the 
FTSE Russell website was used.  The FTSE All Share constituents in 2011 consisted of 
612 organizations.  Considering the relatively small number of observations, 11 
additional organizations that were trading in the LSE but entered the FTSE index within a 
few months of the initiative roll out and remained in the index through 2016 were 
included in the analyses. Excluding investment trust institutions, and delisted institutions 
for which reports were not available for 2011, 413 organizations were available for the 
baseline sample.  However, after attrition due to delisting, mergers, and acquisitions in 
the 2011 to 2016 period, the final baseline sample for FTSE 100 (n=96), FTSE 250 
(n=189), and FTSE Small Cap (n=110), collectively FTSE All Share, consisted of 395 
organizations.  
Significance of the Study 
Bringing attention to the pervasiveness of gender stratification in society, the 
#metoo movement and #timesup campaign have sparked a change of pace in the demand 
for equality (Callahan, 2018).  Accordingly, equality advocates continue to put pressure 
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on policy-makers to implement regulations that promote equality (Seirstad et al., 2017; 
Terjesen et al., 2015).  However, proposed regulations to address inequality are being 
blindly enacted due to the misinterpretation or disregard of existing research, and limited 
examination of the effects of existing WOB regulations.  The risk of these actions is in 
that they threaten the achievement of equality. Overall, this study has implications and 
significance for research, theory, policy, and practice.  
This study contributed to research by filling one of the gaps in the literature of 
rigorous research methodology that allows claims of causality. Responding to a call for 
exploring quantitative methods to help enact critical HRD (Callahan & Connor, 2015) 
and a call for scientific rigor for evidence-based policy (Eagly, 2016) and practice 
(Gubbins & Russeau, 2015), this study used a quasi-experimental regression 
discontinuity approach.  Methodologies employed in most existing studies related to 
gender diversity on corporate boards have produced simple descriptive statistics that 
prohibit causal claims. Research has provided evidence for the inferential quality of 
regression discontinuity designs (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive 2010; 
Chambers, 2016; Lee, 2005).  Hence, findings of this study allow causal inferences about 
the effects of WOB initiatives on opportunities for other women and the gender pay gap, 
for evidence-based policy-decisions and practice.   
Another contribution to research of this study was that it was designed to provide 
the most accurate and robust findings possible. The study collected the most accurate data 
from multiple sources, reconciled and standardized the measurement of the different 
reported gender metrics of the organizations included in the sample.  The database that 
was produced from the rigorous data collection process allowed a fair comparison of 
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variables across organizations. Also, the study’s analyses followed the strictest 
recommendations in the literature by testing all the assumptions for internal validity.  
Treatment effects were estimated using unconditional and conditional models at various 
bandwidths.  Additionally, multiple robustness tests provided additional evidence of the 
causal claim of the findings.  Finally, this study contributes to research by providing the 
data set and syntax used in this study to allow replicability of the analyses.  
Among the main theoretical implications of the study is its contribution to 
resource dependence theory and critical mass theory.  This study contributes to body of 
literature of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977), which posits that 
organizations seek valuable resources and those resources produce better outcomes for 
the organization. Multiple studies testing the theory have produced conflicting findings 
(e.g., Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Hussein & Kiwia, 2009; McCann & 
Wheeler, 2011; Miller & Triana, 2009; Rose, 2007; Zahra & Stanton, 1988).  This study 
tested the theory hypothesizing that organizations below the Davies Review threshold 
were more likely to seek gender as a resource.   
This study contributes to the critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977).  Critical mass 
theory has been used to support the minimum number or percentage of WOB for the 
different laws and policies that regulate the gender composition of corporate boards.  
Although critical mass of WOB has been examined in a corporate governance context, 
the majority of studies examine the duty of the board to its shareholders.  However, there 
are existing gaps in the literature concerning the duty of the board to one of its 
stakeholders, employees.  Consequently, this study contributed to the body of literature 
related to critical mass by examining the effects of changes in board composition 
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resulting from the Davies Review on opportunities for other women in the organization 
and the gender pay gap. 
The main contribution of this study is to policy and practice, as it provides 
evidence of the effects of the Davies Review initiative in the United Kingdom that can 
inform evidence-based policy. This study provides evidence that can inform the related to 
the implementation of WOB regulations to promote gender equality.  The global 
proliferation of quotas and government-led initiatives for WOB has extended across the 
globe (Choudhury, 2014). Recently, the California law 862 was passed, supported by 
claims that increasing the number of WOB would have a highly significant economic 
impact, improve opportunities for women, close the gender pay gap, and result in benefit 
the population of women employed (California Senate, 2017).  The evidence used to 
promote a law that will impact the women of the 5th largest economy in the world was 
suboptimal and partial to suit the goal of the proponents of the bill. Furthermore, only 
anecdotal evidence was presented to support the claims that increasing the number of 
women on corporate boards would help other women (California Senate, 2017).  
Although evidence of the effects of WOB initiatives on gender-diversity-related 
outcomes is not abundant, existing evidence suggests that addressing gender disparities 
by simply increasing numbers in top layers can have negative effects for women 
(Bierema, 2017; Ellemers et al., 2012).  However, in pursuit of their goals, advocates 
sometimes ignore scientific research (Eagly, 2016).  
Therefore, to contribute to the discussion of the effects of WOB initiatives on 
other women employed in the organization, this study presents causal evidence of effects 
the Davies Review initiative had on the women employed in FTSE organizations. 
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Additionally, the U.K.’s gender pay gap reporting requirement has provided an 
unprecedented opportunity for measuring the effects of an initiative that addresses 
gender-related issues in the workplace (Davies Review for WOB), on a gender-related 
problem (gender pay gap).  Increasing the understanding of such approach could help 
inform policy and practice in countries with similar corporate governance and liberal 
market economies, including the United States, Canada, and Australia (Hall & Gingerich, 
2009).   
The study has implications for practice as it provides evidence for practitioners of 
the unintended effects of increasing WOB as a way to promote gender equality in the 
workplace.  This study aimed to bring awareness to HRD practitioners in organizations 
that through different approaches – legislation, comply or explain, or organizational 
strategy – focus on increasing leadership at the highest, most visible levels, of the 
potential impact it could have on the women of the organization (Ellemers et al., 2012).  
The appearance of success around gender diversity issues promoted by the multiple 
organizations that target the increase of WOB (e.g., Catalyst, The 30% Club, 2020 
Women on Boards) can create an illusion of fairness and gender-neutrality (Meyerson & 
Fletcher, 2000), trump the development of other women in the organizations (Bierema, 
2017), and cloud the need for addressing long-existing disparities like leadership 
development and the gender pay gap. 
Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made for the present study. First, organizations 
are accurately reporting their gender composition and gender pay gap metrics. Second, 
considering that organizations report gender metrics in binary terms, this study assumed 
 46 
that the gender metrics reported reflect individuals’ self-identification as male or female, 
without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.  Third, as gender refers to the 
social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female, this study 
assumes that the gender individuals identify with is congruent with how others perceive 
their gender.  For example, individuals who self-identify as women, but are socially 
categorized as men based on the socially constructed attributes associated with men and 
women, would not have the same barriers as individuals who are socially categorized as 
women. Fourth, an assumption that this study made in order to test critical mass of WOB 
is that female directors are willing to advocate for gender equality in their organizations. 
Finally, this study assumed that organizations publicly listed intend to continue trading in 
the London Stock Exchange and operating in the United Kingdom.  
Limitations 
This study has several limitations that should be considered when considering the 
contributions found in this study.  First, the population of this study was only publicly 
listed firms; therefore, their findings may not be generalizable to private firms.  Also, the 
threat of imposed quotas from the EU, may have resulted in a higher likelihood of 
compliance; therefore, results of the initiative may be more similar to quotas than other 
comply or explain approaches.  Second, the study was not able to include organizational 
characteristics related to diversity strategies and diversity policies that may have an 
impact in future gender equality outcomes.  The third limitation of this study is that it was 
not able to examine the intersectionality of gender, race, and class (socio-economic 
background), which may limit the understanding of the changes to board composition as 
a result of the Davies Review and the impact of those changes. Furthermore, the sample 
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was very racially homogenous, which may not be representative of other contexts. The 
fourth limitation of this study was that political affiliation of directors in the sample was 
not collected.  The fifth limitation of the study was that it did not collect data related to 
the organization’s merit policy for the full sample, which may provide a better 
understanding of organizational practices that may contribute to gender inequality.  The 
sixth limitation of the study was that the findings rely on the quality and trustworthiness 
of data supplied on annual reports by the organizations in the sample.  The final 
limitation of the study was related to missing data for the pay gap variables.     
Definition of Terms 
Agentic traits - Traits that are associated with the male gender role, such as decisive, 
assertive, competitive, dominant (Eagly & Karau, 2002).   
Business case for WOB – The business case for women on boards refers to the claims 
used for promoting WOB initiatives, which focus primarily on recruiting women 
into corporate boards as a way to increase financial performance.  
Communal traits -  Traits that are associated with the female gender role, such as, 
friendly, emotionally expressive, nurturing, and supportive (Eagly & Karau, 
2002).   
Comply or explain – The comply or explain approach refers to business-led voluntary 
efforts for gender achieving gender parity on corporate boards.  This approach 
usually includes the disclosure of policies and efforts for achieving an outcome. 
Critical mass – Kanter’s (1977) concept of critical mass is widely used in the gender 
literature.  In the context of this study, it refers to the minimum female board 
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representation required for women to be able to contribute to a board.  Literature 
indicates that critical mass on corporate boards is at least three women. 
Descriptive representation – The concept of descriptive representation refers to the 
numbers of women on corporate boards.  Gender quota laws are an approach used 
to achieve women’s descriptive representation.  
Discrimination - The act of treating someone unfairly based on one’s prejudice (Colin, 
2006).  
Enacted ambition - The construct that captures the behavioral efforts associated with 
attaining a leadership position. The construct is operationalized as the extent to 
which an individual is engaged in behavioral attempts associated with gaining 
management positions (Tharenou & Terry, 1998). 
Equal opportunity – Equal opportunity is an approach to equality, which upholds the idea 
that all workers within an organization should be entitled to and have access to all 
of the organizations facilities at every stage of employment, including the pre-
employment phase.  This includes equal opportunities for training, development, 
and promotion while employed by the organization.  The Equality Act of 2010 
promotes equal opportunity and prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
sexual orientation and gender, among others. 
Equal treatment – Equality of treatment is a principle that requires that all persons are 
treated in the same manner in comparable situations. Equal treatment is supported 
by the concept of freedom from discrimination, which is a fundamental human 
right (Equality and Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Act, 1998).  Equal 
treatment encompasses equal opportunity and equal outcome.  
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Equal outcome – Equality of outcome is an approach to achieve equality in which 
through legislation, equality is guaranteed.  This approach aims to eliminate 
systematic discrimination by ensuring that employers do not discriminate on the 
basis of gender. Gender quota laws are an example of equal outcome. 
Female  – This study uses the term female not in the biological sense, but in the context 
of gender.  Female means an individual who self-identifies as a woman, without 
regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.  
FTSE  – The Financial Times Stock Exchange “FTSE” is an organization that ranks and 
groups publicly listed companies in share indices based on market capitalization.   
FTSE 100 - The FTSE 100 is a share index of the top 100 ranked organizations (large 
cap).  
FTSE 250 - The FTSE 250 is a share index of the organizations ranked 101 to 350 
(medium cap).  
FTSE 350 - The FTSE 350 is a share index of the top 350 ranked organizations, including 
FTSE and FTSE 250.   
FTSE Small Cap – Small capital organizations are ranked following the FTSE 350 index.  
The FTSE Small Cap group do not have a set number like the FTSE 100 or FTSE 
250, instead they are the remaining organizations of the total indexed 
organizations, also known as FTSE All Share. 
Gender – Unlike biological sex, gender refers to the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that 
a given culture associates with a person’s biological sex. Behaviors that are 
compatible with cultural expectations are referred to as gender-normative; 
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behaviors that are viewed as incompatible with these expectations constitute 
gender non-conformity.   
Gender diverse boards - The term gender diversity is very loosely used in the literature.  
This study’s definition of gender diversity is consistent with critical mass theory, 
which requires a minimum of 40% female representation in order to achieve a 
gender balanced group, which represents three women considering an average 
board of eight members.  
Gender quotas – Also referred to as “quota laws” refer to legislation that regulates the 
gender composition of corporate boards, usually by imposing a minimum 
percentage of female participation. 
Gender roles - The collection of both descriptive and injunctive expectations associated 
with men and women (Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
Glass ceiling - The invisible barriers to advancement of minorities and women within 
corporate hierarchies, blocking career progressions before they reach the top 
(Browne, 1995; Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995). 
Index – Index is used throughout this study when referring to FTSE index. 
Leadership - The ability to influence a group toward the achievement of a vision or a set 
of goals.  The source of this influence may be provided by a managerial rank in an 
organization.  Managerial rank; however, does not necessarily translate into 
leadership qualities, performance, or identity (Robbins & Judge, 2012).  
Davies Review –The Davies Review is the document authored by Lord Davies of 
Abersoch containing the recommendations for increasing the percentage of 
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women on FTSE 350 boards.  The recommendations set a target of 25% FTSE 
350 boards and a deadline of 2015 for FTSE 100.  
Prejudice - An unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be 
a member of that group (Jones, 1997). 
Role incongruity - Characteristics associated with women are perceived to be 
incompatible with those associated with leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002).  
Sex – The term sex refers to a person’s biological status and is typically categorized as 
male or female.  Sex is usually determined by biological indicators. 
Substantive representation – In the context of this study, substantive representation refers 
to women’s interests being represented by those in leadership positions. 
Women on boards (WOB) – The term women on boards refers to the participation of 
women on the corporate boards.   
Summary of the Chapter and Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 presented the background to the problem, a statement of the problem, 
the purpose of the study, as well as the theoretical underpinnings of the study and 
research hypotheses.  It also presented the design of the study, significance to research, 
theory, policy, and practice, and its limitations.  The chapter concluded with a definition 
of terms used throughout this paper.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature relevant to this study, which 
consisted of the historical evolution of women in the workforce; the construction of 
gender and theories that explain gender differences; the gender system in the United 
Kingdom, corporate governance and theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship 
of gender diversity to the board of directors and board of directors to organizational 
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outcomes; gender diversity on corporate boards, the different arguments used to promote 
WOB initiatives and the different approaches of WOB initiatives; a description of the 
Davies Review initiative; as well as the relationship of WOB to different organizational 
outcomes; including opportunities for other women and the gender pay gap; and support 
for the hypotheses of the study. The chapter concludes with a summary highlighting 
critical pieces of the literature related to this study.  
Chapter 3 contains the following sections: introduction, purpose of the study, 
research hypotheses, design of the study, description of the population and sample, 
details about the data collection procedures, description of group comparisons, treatment 
of missing data and data analysis procedures. The chapter also discusses the key 
assumptions of the study for the internal validity of the regression discontinuity analyses, 
and consequently, for the ability to make causal inferences. A discussion of the approach 
for hypotheses testing and delimitations of the study are also included. The chapter 
concludes with a summary.  
Chapter 4 presents the results from the analyses prepared in support of this study. 
The chapter presents the results of data collection and participants of the study, including 
group comparisons and descriptive statistics. It continues with a discussion of the 
treatment of missing data and data imputation process.  It presents results of the statistical 
assumptions tests and tests of the internal validity of the RD approach. It provides a 
thorough description of the hypotheses test results and robustness tests.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the study’s hypotheses and a chapter summary. 
Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the findings and conclusions from the study.  It 
begins with an introduction.  It continues with a discussion of the results and their 
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relationship to existing literature.  Conclusions and implications for theory, research, 
policy, and HRD practice are presented.  The chapter discusses the study’s limitations 
and provides a number of recommendations for future research.  The chapter concludes 
with a summary. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to exploring the domains associated 
with gender disparities on corporate boards, gender equality initiatives, and the Davies 
Review initiative for WOB.  Scholars in organizational and social sciences often use a 
piecemeal approach to understanding women’s underrepresentation in leadership (Diehl 
& Dzubinski, 2016). The artificial separation of the variables that contribute to the 
disparity without considering the invisible processes that produce the underlying gender 
structure (Diehl & Dzubinski, 2016; Huttges & Fay, 2015) does not contribute to the 
understanding of the problem. Scholars suggest that what can contribute to the 
understanding of structures that interact with gender is examining the influences of 
context and history (Knapp, 2005). Therefore, to illuminate the understanding of gender 
in today’s British society, this literature review includes a historical review of the events 
that have impacted women’s standing in the workforce.  
This literature review is organized into eight sections. The first section presents an 
introduction.  The second section describes the historical evolution of women in the 
workforce. The third section presents the construction of gender and theories that explain 
gender differences. The fourth section contains the gender system in the United Kingdom. 
The fifth section contains a review of literature related to corporate governance, 
theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship of gender diversity to the board of 
directors and board of directors to organizational outcomes.  The sixth section presents 
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literature related to gender diversity on corporate boards, the different arguments used to 
promote WOB initiatives and the different approaches of WOB initiatives. This section 
also presents a description of the Davies Review initiative, as well as the relationship of 
WOB to different organizational outcomes, including opportunities for other women and 
the gender pay gap.  The seventh section presents support for the hypotheses of the study. 
The chapter concludes with a summary highlighting critical pieces of the literature related 
to this study.  
To conduct this literature review, The Robert R. Muntz Library and The 
University of Texas at Tyler was used. The following databases were searched: Business 
Source Complete, ScienceDirect, Education Source, British Library Document Supply 
Center Inside Serials and Conference Proceedings, Psych Info, ProQuest, and ERIC.  
Additionally, Googleâ Scholar was used to complete a more comprehensive review. The 
following primary search terms were included: women in leadership, gender diversity, 
glass ceiling, female leaders, WOB, gender quotas, Davies Report, Davies Review, Lord 
Davies initiative, boards in the U.K., critical HRD, diversity, feminist theory and 
leadership, social roles, boards of directors, women and discrimination, quota laws, 
critical mass and boards. 
Historical Evolution of Women in the British Workforce 
In the United Kingdom, women’s role in society and their participation in the 
workforce have significantly evolved.  Women’s position in society and the workforce 
today is a result of multiple changes that snowballed from the industrial revolution (1760-
1840).  The industrial revolution transformed the society and economy of Britain (Wells, 
2015). Historians disagree on whether this time was beneficial for women, because while 
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it increased the number of women in the paid workforce (Pinchbeck, 2013), it also 
contributed to the gender wage gap (Burnette, 1997, 2004; Johnson, 2010; Verdon, 2002). 
In pre-industrial times, women from lower and middle class families had traditionally 
contributed to their families’ economies (Pinchbeck, 2013).  However, their contributions 
were not noted, as most of their work was done from home (Nicholas & Oxley, 1993).  
Industrialization created a clear differentiation of work and home roles (Myrdal & Klein, 
2003).  The rise of Britain as the workshop of the world and the increase in the number of 
factories, resulted in a significant demand for labor and opportunities for women entering 
the paid-workforce. Records from 1833 indicate that women represented 57% of the total 
factory workforce (British Parliamentary Papers, 1834). As heavy machinery replaced 
hand dexterity for the making of goods, men’s greater physical strength made them more 
valuable for some occupations.  Women’s lower physical strength made them compete 
with child laborers for factory positions.  Consistently, a wage gap between men and 
women started to appear (Burnette, 2004; Johnson, 2010; Verdon, 2002). Evidence of the 
time demonstrates that work was segregated on the basis of gender (Hartmann, 1976), 
women were grouped for certain factory functions like shirt making and shoe stitching, 
while men were in charge of supervising. Although much of the factory work was not 
segregated, the wage gap also existed in non-segregated occupations, which resulted from 
the belief that men had family responsibilities; therefore, they needed “breadwinning” 
wages (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015; Walsh, 2017, p. 78).  
Similarly, a major change of the industrial revolution’s movement of work into 
factories for women was the difficulty of combining work and childcare responsibilities.  
The rigidity of factory schedules forced women to accept 12 to 13 hour shifts. 
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Consequently, factories preferred to hire young unmarried women (Atkinson, 2012). In 
addition to women’s contribution to their families’ economies, they were also responsible 
for childcare and household work, which is something that lingers in today’s world 
(Karkoulian, Srour, & Sinan, 2016; Myrdal & Klein, 2003; Thebaud & Pedulla, 2016).  
The division of household labor is so weaved into the British culture that it is still 
considered one of the culture-related disadvantages of women in the workforce (Sullivan, 
2015).  However, 19th century women’s struggles with wage disparities and poor working 
conditions contributed to women’s awareness of male dominance (Burnette, 2008; Walsh, 
2017) and their exercise of agency by shaping their roles in the workforce and home 
(Morgan, 2013).  Despite bearing the domestic and childcare burden by themselves, 
women continued their participation in the paid workforce, providing evidence of their 
rejection of the centrality of domesticity associated with their gender (Schwarzkopf, 
2018).   
Despite the stereotype that portrays Victorian (1837-1901) women as fully 
dedicated to their domestic family lives withdrawn from any economic activities; 
evidence shows that that was hardly the case (Harrison, 2013; Gordon & Nair, 2003; 
Vicinus, 2013).  Although cultural Christian values of the time that promoted a view of 
women as pillars of morality, motherhood, and domestic prowess, the majority of women 
of Victorian Britain were not ladies of leisure (Gordon & Nair, 2003).  Middle-class 
women were active contributors to the economy of the time, involved in trades regarded 
as suitable for women, such as governesses, inn-keeping, bookkeeping and were involved 
in their family businesses (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015). However, notwithstanding 
their contribution to the British economy, laws of the time were not favorable to women 
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(Walsh, 2017). Single women were under the protection of their fathers and married 
women under the protection of their husbands (Braunstein & Folbre, 2001).   
The belief that women needed the protection of men was linked to the belief of 
men being more competent than women (Sultana, 2012). During the late 19th century, the 
inquiry into women’s presumed inferior intellectual ability, made its way to the natural 
sciences.  Although moral philosophical arguments had justified women’s subordinate 
position in society (Hegel, 1975; Kant, 2017), physicians of the time tested the 
hypothetical inadequacies or imperfections of women’s brains and through different 
scientific measurement methods (e.g., measuring the sizing of the brain), concluded that 
women were, in fact, inferior to men (Shields, 1975), which provided support for the 
scientific case for sexism. Women’s inferiority was believed to be universal and natural 
(Sultana, 2012); therefore, laws that did not allow married women to own a business or 
any kind of property in their own right (Braunstein & Folbre, 2001) were a reasonable 
consequence. Moreover, they were thought to be a benevolent approach that reflected 
women’s need for protection, which extended to the strong link between gender, 
competence beliefs, and occupational roles.   
Further, gender roles based on clearly distinct concepts of masculinity and 
femininity were intrinsic of Victorian middle class, in which the separation between the 
sexes was one of the fundamental features of society (Vickery, 1993).  The belief that 
women’s proper role was that of a wife or mother was so embedded in society, that 
literature, art and records of that time paint a picture of women’s status in society 
(Myrdal & Klein, 2003). The professionalization of certain occupations resulted in the 
exclusion of women from services they had previously provided (Hakim, 2004).  For 
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example, the professionalization of medicine made it impossible for women to enter that 
field, as the Royal College of Physicians only admitted graduates from male-only schools 
(McCarthy, 2018).  Teaching young children was reserved almost exclusively for women.  
Women preachers were common in the Methodist church of England; however, the 
professionalization of the clergy excluded women from those jobs.  This time period was 
critical for the association of gender with certain occupational roles (Hakim, 1994, 2004), 
particularly jobs that were associated with status such as such as doctors, leadership such 
as business owners, and influence, such as the clergy, were all associated with men.   
An ambitious entrepreneurial middle class had superseded aristocracy as the most 
powerful group in the country, dominating the economy, politics, and creating a new 
structure in society, replacing the aristocratic social structure (Daunton, 1989; Miles & 
Savage, 2013).  In addition to the creating of distinctions between home and work, 
starting the gender pay gap, and the association of gender with certain occupational roles, 
the 19th century also confirmed a change in the social structure of the time.  After 
centuries of a concentration of wealth in the land-owning aristocracy, the creation of 
wealth in cities through economic activities such as manufacturing and trading, 
challenged the legitimacy of power through distinctions of birth (Daunton, 1989; Miles & 
Savage, 2013).   
By the end of the 19th century, in light of a changing society, empowered groups 
of women advocated their rights.  This period is known as first-wave feminism, which 
refers to feminist activity that focused primarily on achieving women’s right to vote.  
During this period, the London Society for Women’s Suffrage was formed, the Married 
Women’s Property Act was passed allowing married women to own property and own 
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businesses. Also, the first women’s guild was founded to spread the knowledge of the 
benefits of collaboration to improve women’s working condition.  It is also during this 
period that women in Britain went on strike for the first time in protest of low wages and 
hazardous working conditions. During the early 20th century, women continued to fight 
for their rights, which resulted in small wins, achieving the Qualification of Women Act, 
which gave women’s right to be elected into office (U.K. Parliament, 1918).  The 
National Federation of Women Workers was formed in 1906, which played a major role 
in advocating for women’s wages.  Despite the World War I (WWI) period (1914-1918), 
women continued focused on their fight for voting rights and societal fairness, with 
thousands of women gathering in rallies and marches (Crossley, Edwards, Harries, & 
Stevenson, 2012).  By 1918, women over 30 were granted the right to vote (U.K. 
Parliament, 1918).   
It should be noted that women were not alone in their fight.  Many men supported 
women in their fight for equal rights.  The Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage, was a 
group of men who were instrumental allies in helping women achieve the right to vote. 
These men used their visibility and influence, without appropriating women’s cause. The 
government was openly hostile toward men supporters of the suffragette movement; 
however, they risked their lives, their wealth, their reputation, and their freedom to help 
in the achievement of equal rights.  One of the most notable allies was Frederick Pethick 
Lawrence, as the government decided to make an example of him, by imprisoning him, 
force-feeding, and causing him to end up bankrupt. Decades later, toward the end of his 
life, then knighted, Lord Pethick Lawrence, on his essay titled The Men’s Share (John & 
John, 2013), wrote:  
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“All down history women have supported men in their fight for liberty. They have 
toiled with them, suffered with them, died with them. There is nothing surprising, 
therefore, in the fact that in the militant struggle of British women for their own 
emancipation, some men stood with them in the fight.” (p.154). 
With the support of allies, women continued to advocate for social justice causes. 
Women’s advocacy for social fairness resulted in the Rent Restriction Act (U.K. 
Parliament, 1928), which changed the housing system across the country, prohibiting 
landlords from profiteering during war years in which housing demand was high (Wilson, 
2017). During the 1920s several laws protecting women were passed, among them, in 
1928, giving all women in Britain equal voting rights with men (U.K. Parliament, 1928).   
During the following two decades, women accomplished several small victories 
in the equality battle; however, World War II (WWII) (1941-1945) shifted the focus of 
policy-makers toward other more immediate needs.  After the war, the introduction of the 
National Health Service (NHS) provided free access to healthcare to all citizens, which 
was an effort that promoted an egalitarian society (National Health Service, 2018). In the 
1950s, legal reforms promoted equal pay for teachers and civil servants.  The 1960s were 
essential for women, as they gained rights toward their reproductive health.  Another 
major milestone was the appointment of Barbara Castle, Minister of Transport, as First 
Secretary of State, becoming the first woman to be appointed to a leadership position at 
such high level (Perkins, 2003).  Barbara Castle was instrumental in helping British 
women advance their rights.  In 1968, she intervened in a highly publicized strike. 
Women working for Ford as sewing machinists went on strike demanding equal pay as 
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their male counterparts.  Her intervention resulted in a pay increase for women working 
at the Ford factory to the equivalent of 92% of what their male counterparts received.  
The 1970s decade brought forth major changes for women in Britain.  Mrs. Castle 
was instrumental in promoting equal pay for women and in 1970, she put through the 
Equal Pay Act of 1970 (U.K. Parliament, 1970), which prohibited employers from paying 
women lower wages than men for similar work.  The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 
made it illegal to discriminate against women in work, education, and training.  The 
Employment Protection Act introduced maternity provisions that made it illegal for 
employers to dismiss an employee on the basis of pregnancy.  The Domestic Violence 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act offered protections from domestic violence for women 
and children.  In 1977, the UN Federal Assembly formalized International Women’s Day.  
In 1978, the “Feminist Review” journal was founded, which played a significant role in 
preserving women’s rights and feminism in the public discourse.  In 1979, Margaret 
Thatcher, the first woman Prime Minister took office, breaking the glass ceiling at the 
highest political layer in Britain (Griffin, 2013).  However, Prime Minister Thatcher did 
not help advance women’s rights (Smith, 2000).  Denying existing disadvantages for 
women, Mrs. Thatcher did not promote women’s interests or advance women’s rights 
(Smith, 2000).  Providing some evidence that even at the highest decision-making roles, 
inequality is not only perpetuated by men and but also by women (Derks et al., 2016).  
Social role theory suggests that occupational roles may easily override gender roles; 
therefore, it is possible that men and women in the same occupational role behave 
similarly (Eagly, 1987, p. 34). 
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Over the past few decades the U.K. government has passed multiple laws that 
provide women equal rights as men. The advocacy efforts for equal rights have resulted 
in legislation for equality of opportunity in education, access to health, economic and 
political participation.  However, despite achieving legislation and policy changes 
through decades of hard-won battles, efforts have failed to produce gender equality (Rao, 
2017).  For example, protections contained in the Equal Pay Act of 1983 (previously 
Equal Pay Act of 1970) (Department of Employment, 1983) ensure equal pay for the 
same work; however, statistics reveal that women get paid 67% of what men earn for 
equal work (World Economic Forum, 2017).  The Equality Act of 2010 (previously, the 
Sex Discrimination Act of 1975) protects women from discrimination on the basis of 
gender; however, women are still underrepresented in decision-making roles.  
Today, women are allowed to compete with men in political, corporate, and 
academic arenas.  However, their underrepresentation in decision-making roles raises 
some questions.  In fact, reflecting on the achievements of women in the British 
workforce, Lord Davies raised the question about whether board recruitment was, in 
practice, based on skills, experience and performance (Davies, 2011, p. 2).  
The Division of Labor  
The division of labor by sex has its origins in evolved physical differences 
between males and females (men’s greater size and strength, reproductive roles), as they 
are factors that interact with people’s social and economic environment. The interaction 
of these physical differences and people’s social and economic environments indicates 
that one sex performs certain tasks more efficiently and generates constrains for the other 
sex. Men’s physical strength allows them to hunt, plow, and perform physically 
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demanding tasks more efficiently than women. However, women’s reproductive role 
(childbearing, lactation) acted as constraints that prevented them from fully participating 
in similar activities (Huber, 2007).  
Association with gender and occupational roles became salient during industrial 
times, when the migration of work to factories created a clear separation of home and 
work, which represented an additional struggle for women, who in addition to having the 
responsibility of contributing to their families’ economies, were fully responsible for 
childcare and domestic work at home (De Vries, 1994; Seccombe, 1995).  Similarly, the 
professionalization of certain occupations that were notorious for their power and status, 
such as medicine, mathematics, natural sciences, accountancy, and the clergy, which 
excluded women, created an association of gender with occupational roles.  For example, 
the Royal College of Medicine only admitted graduates from Cambridge and Oxford, 
which did not admit women.  The prestige and status associated with those professions, 
which were occupied by men only, contributed to the belief that men were more 
competent, superior or better suited for those positions.  
Additionally, English’s common law, which was built on Anglo-Saxon and 
Norman traditions, of patriarchal predominance, led to the creation of laws that were not 
beneficial for women.  Under English law, married women were subject to coverture, 
which means that they did not have separate legal existence.  They were covered under 
their husband’s legal existence, which resulted in them not being able to obtain credits, 
own property, or enter into economic contracts (Bailey, 2002).  Before 1870, year in 
which the Married Women’s Property Act was passed in the U.K., women’s property, 
including their earnings, belonged to their husbands.  This was a major step toward 
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women’s emancipation in a system in which women themselves were seen as their 
husbands’ property (Dolin, 2016). 
Patriarchy is the system of male oppression of women, which enable men to 
control women using social hierarchical relations between men, and solidarity among 
them (Hartmann, 1982). Some scholars suggest that patriarchy arose from increased 
activity in the economic environment (Eagly & Wood, 2011; Miles, 2014), while others 
propose that a patriarchal system in which men controlled the labor of women and 
children in their families was already in place, and that is how men learned the techniques 
of control and hierarchical organization (Hartmann, 1982). Despite the lack of consensus 
regarding what factor influenced the other, existing literature consistently shows a 
connection among the division of labor, patriarchy, and the economic environment 
(Eagly & Wood, 2011; Hartmann, 1982; Mackintosh, 1981). 
Research suggests that gender role beliefs contribute to the inequality of the 
division of household labor (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Coltrane & Ishii-
Kuntz, 1992; Presser, 1994) and although the division of labor in today’s British society 
is not as extreme as it used to be centuries ago (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014) women still 
hold the weight of the majority of domestic labor (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; 
Chesley, 2011). The self-perpetuating nature of the division of labor is a critical 
contributor to the scarcity of women in leadership and decision-making roles, as gender 
role construction grows out of observations of the existing division of labor between men 
and women, which develop normative or prescriptive attributes, become expectations, 
and logically, reinforces the division of labor itself (Barker, 2016). Furthermore, these 
expectations that result from the division of labor exist today in society and organizations 
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that legitimize the inequality and reinforce subtle discriminatory practices.  Informal 
practices are modeled after patriarchal structures in which women are seen as wives and 
mothers who are unable to perform at the same level as men in the workplace (Rao, 
2017). For example, in many organizations, staying long hours is seen as a sign of 
commitment and a determinant for promotions (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000; Rao, 2017). 
These informal practices run deep in organizational structures, which behind unbiased 
formal policies and an illusion of fairness, reinforce discriminatory norms (Rao, 2017). 
The Construction and Socialization of Gender 
Unlike sex, which refers to biological differences, gender is a social construction 
that aims to explain sex differences in behavior (Eagly, 2009; Wood & Eagly, 2012). To 
that end, biologists, evolutionary psychologists, economists and sociologists have 
contributed with numerous theories from their disciplinary perspectives. Sex differences 
have been attributed to hormones, adaptive reproductive strategies, hierarchical structures, 
contributions to the economy, and socialization experiences (Eagly & Wood, 2011). 
Although there is no one discipline that provides an absolute answer that explains the 
complexities of sex differences, this paper discusses the two most salient arguments in 
the literature, evolutionary and social explanations. 
Evolutionary psychologists Buss and Schmitt’s (1993) Sexual Strategies Theory 
proposed that genes predispose behavior and suggest that gender differences are the result 
of adaptive reproductive strategies. These strategies are sexually dimorphic adaptations 
associated with sexual accessibility, fertility assessment, commitment seeking and 
avoidance, resource procurement, assessment of mate value, and parental investment. 
According to this perspective, men look for partners that are healthy and physically 
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attractive, because attractiveness features in women are indicators of fertility. Women are 
concerned with finding a partner who can provide resources. Therefore, women are more 
likely to advertise physical attractiveness and men are more likely to perform behaviors 
that will allow them to be better providers of resources (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). 
Buss and Schmitt’s (1993) empirical study also explains the development of 
agency and communion as survival mechanisms, which are explained to have evolved 
from the need to compete for positions in the social hierarchy (agency) and to form 
alliances for preservation (communion) (Buss, 1995; Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Although 
the evolutionary psychology approach has had considerable support, it has also been 
criticized. The conceptualization of the theory did not satisfactorily discount alternative 
explanations for their predictions. For example, the study found that the marital system of 
man who was a good provider with a younger woman who was a good domestic worker 
was the result of sexual selection preferences on humans. However, their analysis failed 
to consider the alternative explanation of the finding being the result the social structure 
(Wood & Eagly, 2002). Another deficiency of the theory is that the theory is a post hoc 
explanation of gender differences in social behavior; however, the theory does not have 
predictive validity (Cornell, 1997). Furthermore, the theory did not address some types of 
differentiated behavior that are important in society (leadership) (Eagly, 1997). 
From a social perspective, two approaches are reviewed: structural and cultural. 
Structural approaches explain that members of social groups experience common 
situational constraints because they tend to have similar social positions within their 
organizations or families (Eagly, 1997). Cultural approaches explain that members of 
social groups acquire common beliefs and values because of the socialization pressures 
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they experience. Eagly and Wood’s (2011) social role theory proposed a structural 
approach to explaining sex differences, in which behavior reflects gender role beliefs that 
in turn represent the people’s perceptions of men’s and women’s social roles in their 
society. Ridgeway and Bourg’s (2004) expectation states theory used a cultural approach 
to explaining gender as an institutionalized system of practices in which status beliefs and 
gender stereotypes create inequality. 
Originally, social role theory was conceptualized using a structural approach. It 
suggested that sex differences that stem from differing social positions pertaining to work 
or family life (Eagly, 1997). According to this theory, gender roles and stereotypes are 
generated from people’s observations of the behaviors of men and women, particularly 
from the division of labor at home and work (Eagly, 1997). A fundamental argument of 
this theory was that influences arising from adult social roles are more directly relevant to 
sex differences in adult social behavior than prior socialization or biology (Eagly, 1987). 
Therefore, observations of the social position of men and women contribute more 
strongly to sex differences than the beliefs that may be learned during childhood 
socialization (Eagly, 1987). 
Ridgeway (1981, 1984) demonstrated that based on men’s greater access to 
societal resources and power, their gender itself is associated with status.  Sex differences 
have produced beliefs about men being superior to women, which have resulted in men’s 
greater influence in groups. Therefore, gender is described as an institutionalized system 
of social practices for establishing men and women as different in socially significant 
ways; thus using those differences to systematize inequality (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 
1999).   
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The Gender System in the U.K. 
The gender system in society is knitted into the social hierarchy and leadership 
because of gender roles, gender stereotypes, and gender status belief systems that 
associate greater competence with men than women (Ridgeway, 2001). According to 
correspondent inference principle (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), people infer traits from their 
observations of behavior. Consequently, gender stereotypes and gender roles stem from 
observations of women’s and men’s behavior in different settings, mainly from 
observations of the division of labor (Hartmann, 1982; Holter, 1970).  Gender beliefs are 
deeply engrained in the societal structure. In fact, in a given society, gender determines 
what is expected, allowed and valued in women or men (United Nations, 2018).  A recent 
publication of five different studies that sampled married male managers in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, found that marriage structure of men, specifically men 
who are married to women who are not in the workforce, is a strong predictor of 
discrimination toward women in the workplace (Desai, Chugh, & Brief, 2014). 
Consequently, it is important to understand the mechanisms in society that may be 
contributing to women’s lower standing in the workplace, because organizational 
practices mirror societal norms (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000). 
Gender Roles 
Gender roles are defined as the collection of both descriptive and injunctive 
expectations associated with men and women (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Early 
conceptualizations of gender roles stemmed from the sociological and psychological 
perspectives of role theories (e.g., Goffman, 1959; Parsons, 1951), which linked persons 
to their social environment. One of the seminal studies in gender roles, Parsons and 
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Bales’s (1955) theory of role differentiation in the family, provided a comprehensive 
analysis of female and male roles on the basis of their group interactions. The study 
reported that men demonstrated task-oriented behaviors (instrumental traits) and women 
demonstrated socioemotional behaviors (expressive traits), and concluded that their 
behaviors were complimentary and such role differentiation was functionally necessary 
for a harmonious society (Parsons & Bales, 1955). 
Several scholars have found deficiencies in Parson and Bales’s (1955) analysis, 
some of which stem from the terminology used to describe gender role expectations 
(expressive and instrumental) (Crano & Aronoff, 1978; Laws, 1979). Similarly, social 
role theory questions Parsons and Bales’ (1955) interpretation of the need of role 
differentiation and argues that observations of groups’ roles determine stereotype content. 
For example, the stereotype of African Americans being more athletic stems from the 
disproportionate representation of African Americans in sports (Koenig & Eagly, 2014). 
Therefore, using observations of men and women in a traditional division of labor context, 
with men being the breadwinners and women the homemakers, creates not a role 
differentiation, but a gender stereotype (Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000; Eagly & Wood, 
2011). Further, Eagly and Wood (2011) pointed out that role structures are malleable; 
hence, expectations of behavior from males and females could not be fixed in the 
observations made in a particular society at a given time. 
Social role theory’s malleability of expectations of behavior has been criticized 
due to the fact that despite the significant changes in women’s roles in society and the 
workforce, gender stereotypes have remained unchanged (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, 
& Phelan, 2012). For the past three decades, women have represented about half of the 
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British workforce (Office for National Statistics, 2018), and more than ever before, 
women see themselves in more agentic terms (Derks, Ellemers, van Laar, & de Groot, 
2011; Faniko et al., 2017; Lückerath-Rovers, de Bos, & de Vries, 2013; Spence & 
Buckner, 2000). Therefore, as predicted by social role theory, a change in gender 
stereotypes should have occurred. However, research findings suggest that gender 
stereotypes about communal women and agentic men linger in Western societies 
(Lueptow, Garovich, & Lueptow, 1995; Rudman et al., 2012; Spence & Buckner, 2000), 
as does the stereotype of men being a better fit for leadership roles than women (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002; Koenig & Eagly, 2014; Rudman et al., 2012). 
In response to Rudman (2012) and her colleagues’ critique of social role theory, 
Koenig and Eagly (2014) conducted four studies with the purpose of establishing the 
validity of social role theory and correcting the misunderstanding that social role theory 
predicts that all changes in groups’ roles would change their stereotypes. Their findings 
confirmed the validity of social role theory, in that stereotypes stem from observations of 
the typical social roles enacted by group members (Koenig & Eagly, 2014). Additionally, 
an experimental study confirmed that perceivers who observed what the typical roles of a 
group would be in the future, changed their projected stereotypes for that group (Koenig 
& Eagly, 2014). Also, communal attributes are now associated with leadership (Dasgupta 
& Asgari, 2004; Eagly & Wood, 2011; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011), 
therefore, as leadership roles become more androgynous, the likelihood of perceiving 
women as less qualified than men should decrease (Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
Similarly, in support of social role theory, a growing number of studies have 
found generational differences in attitudes toward women. Younger generations hold 
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more favorable attitudes toward women in leadership (Mostafa, 2005) and more 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles (Donelly, Twenge, Clark, Shaik, Beiler-May, & 
Carter, 2016). Other studies found that having more women in leadership positions 
increases the likelihood of other women competing for the positions and attaining them 
(Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009). Gender-role cognitions 
about gender-stereotyped occupations play a role in individual’s occupational interests 
(Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2002). An experimental study that used a sample of children, 
adolescents and adults to examine the relationship of gender and occupational interests 
demonstrated that the expectation of gendered occupations plays a causal role in shaping 
job interests. Thus, observing who occupies a position influences an individual’s 
likelihood of developing an interest for that position (Weisgram, Bigler, & Liben, 2010).  
Furthermore, in relation to women in leadership, an experimental study used 
random assignment of gender quotas in villages in India to examine the relationship of 
exposure to female representation in power positions and leadership ambition in young 
women. The study found that exposure to women in leadership positions caused a rise in 
young women’s leadership ambition and increased the likelihood of women applying to 
such positions (Beaman, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2012). Thus, providing evidence of 
that gender stereotypes at the social and individual levels are influenced by their 
observations of roles of men and women (Koenig & Eagly, 2014).  However, despite 
women aspiring to those roles, the likelihood that they will achieve them is dependent on 
the opportunities and experiences for leadership development (Reichard & Avolio, 2005).  
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Agency, Communion and Gender Stereotypes 
According to correspondent inference principle (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), people 
infer traits from their observations of behavior.  These observations represent the 
descriptive attribute of gender roles, which are also called gender stereotypes.  Therefore, 
gender stereotypes are not necessarily arbitrary, neither are they completely inaccurate 
(Eagly & Wood, 2011).  They are simply the result of an unintentional, spontaneous, 
cognitive process of social inference (Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008).  
Consequently, stereotype-related literature identified that people’s beliefs about men and 
women fit into two groups: agentic and communal.  These terms were first introduced by 
Bakan (1966) to characterize fundamental modalities in people’s existence.  Agency, for 
the existence of an individual as an individual and communion, for the participation of 
the individual in some larger group of which the individual is a part of (Bakan, 1966).  
Individualism (Tocqueville, 1946; Mead, 1967) and collectivism are terms that also been 
used to refer to the same constructs (Triandis, Bontempo & Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 
1988).   
Because agency reflects a concern for the self, it is associated with individualism 
and separating self from others.  It is described as instrumental, traditionally masculine 
traits such as self-assertion, decisiveness, competitiveness, dominance, and self-
enhancement.   Despite an individual’s gender, agency has been found to be instrumental 
in acquiring leadership status (Eagly & Karau, 2002).  Also, in individualistic societies, 
displaying agency is necessary for success (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).  Conversely, 
communion reflects a concern for others; therefore, it is associated with forming 
connections with others, and collectivism.  Communion includes traditionally feminine 
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traits such as group participation, expressiveness, cooperation, facilitating harmonious 
relationships, and being emotionally expressive, friendly, and nurturing. 
A considerable amount of research has been done on gender differences in agency 
and communion since Bakan (1966) coined the terms over half a century ago. It is 
irrefutable that women display more communal traits and men display more agentic traits 
(Eagly & Wood, 2011); thus the gender stereotypes attributing communal traits to women 
and agentic traits to men.  Evidence indicates that gender stereotypes contribute to the 
gender inequality in terms of associating greater competence with agentic than communal 
traits (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Williams & Best, 
1990).  Consequently, irrespective of their level of competence, women are 
disadvantaged by gender stereotypes that associate them with being less competent than 
men. 
In the 1970s, researchers became interested in exploring gender roles as an 
explanation for gender-related differences in leadership (Coder & Spiller, 2013).  To that 
end, using samples of business students, researchers administered surveys in which 
students were asked to rate the characteristics of what they imagined a good manager 
would have.  Results indicated that perceptions of good managers were not associated 
with feminine or androgynous –possessing both masculine and feminine characteristics- 
traits.  Their findings (Powell & Butterfield, 1979, 1984; Powell, Butterfield, & Parent, 
2002) indicated that a good manager was described in masculine terms.  Other studies 
(Kent & Moss, 1994; Kolb, 1999) that examined the association of gender roles with 
leadership emergence found that masculinity was associated with leadership emergence, 
unlike femininity.  Conversely, other studies have found that while the typical manager 
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was perceived in masculine terms, the ideal manager was perceived as androgynous 
(Maier, 1993), and that androgynous styles may be better for organizations (Park, 1997). 
Taking into account that existing research (Helson & Moane, 1987) has found that 
gender role perceptions change as people age, students’ perceptions of ideal leaders may 
differ from the workforce’s perceptions of ideal leaders.  Consequently, researchers 
(Coder & Spiller, 2013) have questioned that the majority of research related to gender 
roles and leadership has relied on convenience samples of students, which pose a concern 
to the generalizability of the findings. Nonetheless, studies continue to produce mixed 
findings; thus, scholars (Hoyt & Murphy, 2016; Seo & Huang, 2017) continue to explore 
the relationship of gender roles and leadership.   
The Internalization of Gender Roles   
Research suggests that stereotypical expectations of societal gender roles become 
internalized (Eagly, 2009).  This suggests individuals’ attitudes and gender identities are 
influenced by the cultural or societal connotation associated with their sex (Eagly, 2009).  
Current research provides evidence for internalization of gender roles at two different 
levels: a) at the social level as societal attitudes and b) at the individual level as self-
concepts.   
Consistent with social role theory, society’s descriptive beliefs and normative 
expectations are the essence of gender roles.  Public opinion research regarding 
agreement with different political attitudes found that at a societal level, the partition of 
women’s communal and men’s agentic traits was evident.  The study found that women 
were more favorable than men on compassion issues such as helping the poor and 
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disadvantaged, while men were more favorable than women on issues involving the use 
of force (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986).   
Society’s behavioral expectations for each gender and the cultural conditioning 
starts with gender stereotypes introduced from childhood (Lawson, Crouter, & McHale, 
2015).  Starting with how parents commonly dress their baby girls in pink and baby boys 
in blue, evidence shows that this seemingly innocuous behavior conditions young girls to 
have preference for the color pink and avoidance of the pink color by boys (LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2011).  Differences in communal and agentic traits are also reinforced at a 
young age, for example, in children play, when boys display strong, violent behavior, the 
typical reaction is “boys will be boys” (Bhana, 2009, p.327); conversely, girls are 
expected to play in ways they show their nurturing, compassionate traits by playing with 
dolls (Blaise, 2012).   
Differences in self-reported traits and behaviors for men and women provide 
evidence for the internalization of gender roles as self-concepts (Canter & Meyerowitz, 
1984; Spence & Helmreich, 1979).  Using some of the examples above, the effect of 
society’s expectation on how women should dress, play with can become part of an 
individual’s identity (Eagly & Wood, 2011).  Numerous studies have demonstrated girls, 
more than boys, are more aware of gender stereotypical expectations (Poulin-Dubois, 
Serbin, & Derbyshire, 1998; Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colbourne, Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001; 
Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993), which are influenced by gendered marketing that 
segregates children using stereotype-based toys that reinforce communal and agentic 
expectations such as girls like princesses and boys like superheroes (Cahill & Adams, 
1997; Freeman, 2007).  By the age of five, girls are able to categorize “girl appropriate” 
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and “boy appropriate” toys, games, and have rigid definitions of how they are expected to, 
and should behave (Martin & Ruble, 2004; Freeman, 2007).  Throughout people’s lives, 
society reinforces these behavioral expectations, which become part of an individual’s 
identity (Eagly & Wood, 2011).  However, as occupational roles are more salient, studies 
related to the behavior of leaders have indicated that in high-level roles, men and 
women’s behavior were more similar than different (Keshet, Kark, Pomerantz-Zorin, 
Koslowsky, & Schwarzwald, 2006), which could be related to the expectation of 
masculine attributes associated with leadership (Eagly & Wood, 2011).  Consistently, 
previous studies have indicated that women in leadership roles see themselves as more 
masculine than other women (Faniko, Ellemers, & Derks, 2016) and in some cases, more 
masculine than men (Luckerath-Rovers, de Bos, & de Vries, 2013). 
Corporate Governance 
The growing complexities of businesses that resulted from the industrial 
revolution, led to the development of corporate boards. As businesses grew, shareholders 
increased in number, creating a separation of ownership and management.  Boards of 
directors are comprised of independent and non-independent members, whom as a 
collective, have a responsibility to mitigate the risks inherent in the separation of 
ownership from management, and to protect the wellbeing of the organization and its 
shareholders.  Boards of directors are at the highest organizational decision-making level 
and their roles are regulated by corporate governance codes and laws.  The U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code (CGC), published by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 
is the primary governance code in the United Kingdom, applying to companies with a 
premium listing of equity shares on the London Stock Exchange, regardless of whether 
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they are incorporated in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. The importance of corporate 
governance lies on the influence of corporations on society.  Current statistics show that 
69 of the world’s top 100 economies are corporations (Global Justice Now, 2016), and 
the 500 largest corporations control 37.8% of the world’s economic output (Fortune 500, 
2016); therefore, the impact of corporations on society cannot be ignored.  
Over the past couple of decades, multiple developments have put corporate boards 
under much scrutiny (Glass & Cook, 2016).  Fairly recently, scandals in American 
companies contributed to a corporate governance reform with the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  In European countries, gender equality become part 
of political agendas, partly as a result of pressures from the European Commission to put 
an end to male-dominance on corporate boards. One of the founding principles of the EU 
is equality between women and men.  At the time of this study, the United Kingdom 
remains part of the EU; therefore, the EUs principles signed in the Treaty of Rome apply 
to the United Kingdom. However, it is noteworthy to mention that the U.K. system of 
corporate governance is more similar to the U.S. system than those of other European 
countries, particularly, in the context of placing the interests of the shareholders above 
those of other stakeholders (i.e., employees) (Armour, Deakin, & Konzelmann, 2003).  
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that U.K. boards may behave differently than those 
of other European countries. 
A fundamental aspect of the corporate governance process in organizations is the 
measurement and disclosure of important metrics and information (Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2017). Recent updates to the U.K. CGC mandate transparency in the selection and 
recruitment of board directors, through disclosure and reporting guidelines in which 
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publicly listed organizations are required to provide gender statistics of their boards, 
senior management, and total workforce (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). Voluntary 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility and sustainability efforts started during the 
1960s and 1970s, which were decades that created awareness of corporations’ 
responsibility to society and the environment.  In the 1990s, following environmental 
disasters produced by oil companies (Rezaee, Szendi, & Aggarwal, 1995), the United 
Nations Environmental Program promoted the establishment of Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI).  
The GRI sustainability reporting provides guidelines for the disclosure of 
economic, environmental and social performance metrics. Worldwide GRI data from 
2017 indicates that 37% of sustainability reports received were from European countries 
(GRI, 2012). However, despite increased societal pressures, the U.K. CGC has adopted 
reporting guidelines at a much slower pace than other European nations (Martin & 
Hadley, 2008).  Currently, publicly listed U.K. corporations are required to disclose 
financial metrics, and very few social performance metrics, such as gender composition 
at different organizational levels (Financial Reporting Council, 2016).  Although several 
FTSE ranked organizations voluntarily disclose environmental and social performance 
metrics (Clark & Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995a; Habek & Wolniak, 
2016), in addition to the mandatory disclosures, the lack of formal reporting guidelines 
(Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995b) makes it impossible to examine 
the data at an aggregated level.  Therefore, with very few exceptions, the current 
governance code is not conducive to the holistic understanding of the effects of board 
membership characteristics on a number of non-financial outcomes.  
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The Board of Directors 
The board of directors is central to corporate governance.  Directors of a corporate 
board provide the linkage between the external environment to the board, and between 
the board to the organization.  The board is the link between shareholders and 
management.  The role of the board is to promote the long-term sustainable success of the 
company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to wider society (CGC, p. 4).  
The CGC states that board appointments and succession plans “should be based on merit 
and objective criteria and, within this context, should promote diversity of gender, social 
and ethnic backgrounds, cognitive and personal strengths” (p. 8).  Additionally, a 
provision of the CGC states that the annual report should describe the policy on diversity 
and inclusion, how it has been implemented, and progress on achieving the objectives. To 
that end, organizations are required to disclose gender balance of their board members, 
those in senior management and their direct reports. 
Theoretical Perspectives about Corporate Boards 
Several theoretical perspectives link corporate boards to organizational outcomes 
(Chambers, Harvey, Mannion, Bond, & Marshall, 2013). However, due to the historical 
male dominance in leadership, including corporate boards, across the globe, these 
theories have defined in function of observations of the occupants of those positions 
(Coder & Spiller, 2013).  Also, the masculine rationality used to associate good 
leadership with male roles (Powell & Butterfield, 1979, 1989; Schein & Davidson, 1993, 
Schein, Mueller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996) has contributed to people’s preconceived notions 
of leaders and implicit leadership theories.  These implicit leadership theories influence 
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leadership occupancy, as well as the evaluation and perception of leaders (Forsyth & Nye, 
2008).  
Additionally, theoretical perspectives that link the individuals to the board do not 
take into account differences in power and status associated with gender.  Consequently, 
it is unclear whether they would apply in a context of gender balance or female 
representation of any kind.  Multiple studies have tried to fill the gap in the literature by 
incorporating different theoretical perspectives in order to explain women’s contributions 
to the organization.  These theoretical perspectives can be grouped into two groups based 
on their focus: individual and organizational.  
Individual to Board 
The following theories help the understanding of women and the board of 
directors.  Social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011), social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004), and critical mass theory 
(Kanter, 1977). 
Social role.  Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011) explains the relationship 
of directors to boards on the basis of sex differences, in which behaviors reflect gender 
role beliefs. Through social role’s theoretical lens, different outcomes from a board to the 
organization stem from the different behaviors and expectations from men and women. 
Traditionally, corporate board seats have been occupied by men. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that people ascribe masculine attributes to their idea of someone such a 
position of leadership (Heilman, 1995; Schein, 2001).  Similarly, literature associates 
leadership with agentic traits such as decisiveness, aggressiveness, risk-taking, 
assertiveness, ambition, which are also associated with men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; 
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Heilman, 1995; Schein, 1975, 2001; Vinkenburg, Van Engen, Eagly, Johannesen-
Schmidt, 2011). Consequently, communal characteristics, commonly associated with the 
female gender are perceived to be incongruent with those expected of leaders.  This 
suggests that women who exhibit communal traits may be less likely to be perceived as 
having potential for a board position (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; Miner, 1977) which 
may result in prejudiced executive selection (Oakley, 2000) and those who have 
internalized gendered leadership beliefs may be less likely to pursue director positions 
(Weisgram, Dinella, & Fulcher, 2011). 
In the context of social influence (Schlenker & Leary, 1982), as would apply to 
the micro level, social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) posits the internalization of 
gender roles at the individual level has an effect on individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviors at the implicit level (Danes, 1994).  Women’s under-evaluation of their own 
abilities, which is referred to as the psychological glass ceiling, is a gender-based 
leadership barrier that has been found to contribute to gender differences in leadership 
role occupancy (Diehl & Dzubinski, 2016; Ely & Rhode, 2010).  A recent meta-analysis 
of 95 studies that evaluated the impact of gender on perceived leadership effectiveness 
found no overall differences in the perceived effectiveness of men and women (Paustian-
Underdahl, Walker, & Woehr, 2014). However, there were differences with regard to 
self-ratings or other-ratings.  Others rated women as more effective leaders than men in 
organizational settings.  In contrast, for self-ratings men rated themselves significantly 
higher than women in lower level and senior leadership positions.  
Social identity. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) posits that 
individuals are drawn to others who are similar to themselves in function of social 
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categories. Social identity theory proposes that role identification is a perception of 
belonging to a group or social category that individuals self-classify into (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2010; Tajfel, 2010). This self-categorization or social identity leads to 
behaviors that are congruent with the identity of the group.  It also enables the individual 
to define herself in her social environment (Ashford & Mael, 1989). For example, a 
woman in a corporate board position may define herself I am woman; I am a leader. 
Under this theoretical framework, each social identity is a perception that stems from 
self-categorization and categorization of others. Due to the different social groups an 
individual may categorize into, it is expected that her social identity consists of a 
combination of multiple identities, which if complementary could increase well-being 
(Dixon & Baumeister, 1991), and if incongruent could create a role conflict (Brook, 
Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Downie, Koestner, ElGeledi, & Cree, 2004).  Gender and race 
are salient social categories.  This theoretical framework has been used to explain 
women’s inclusion and exclusion from different groups.  It has been established that 
corporate boards are overwhelmingly composed of men; therefore, when women enter a 
board of directors composed primarily of white men (Parker, 2017), they are vulnerable 
to categorization as members of an out-group (Eagly, 2016; Ridgeway, 2014).  
Additionally, they are susceptible to prejudiced views toward women due to the lower 
status associated with the female gender (Eagly & Wood, 2011).   
Gender as status. Expectation States Theory (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004) explains 
the mechanisms behind social inequality in which gender is an attribute associated with 
status.  This theoretical perspective underpins the proposition that status stabilizes the 
inequality of resources and power and creates a system justification that aims to preserve 
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the status quo.  Empirical studies provide evidence that status beliefs favor men in board 
interactions (He & Huang, 2009) and shape the behavior and perception of leaders within 
an organization (Cook & Glass, 2015; Ding, Murray, & Stuart, 2013).  Individuals have 
an essential need to view a social system positively; therefore, they tend to rationalize the 
status quo (Glick & Fiske, 2001). When in the presence of a threat of disruption of the 
status quo in which men enjoy more status and power than women (Ridgeway & Correll, 
2004), men tend to show stronger identification with their high status group increasing 
their defense of the gender system as fair and just. (Kray et al., 2017) 
Critical mass. Critical Mass Theory (Kanter, 1977) was conceptualized 
borrowing a concept of the field of physics, which defines critical mass as the smallest 
amount of fissile material needed for a sustained nuclear chain reaction.  From a liberal 
feminist perspective, Kanter (1977)’s work brought light to hidden dimensions of 
gendered power in organizations.  Her seminal work Men and Women and the 
Corporation provides the framework for the understanding of how numerical group 
compositions have different effects on organizational group processes (Lewis & Simpson, 
2012). Her focus on representation in numbers reflects her emphasis in the underlying 
similarities between men and women. Therefore, women’s subordinate position in 
organizations is not the product of a particular social or cultural context (Witz & Savage, 
1992). Kanter described men as the dominant group and women as the minority group, 
which depending on their numbers can be categorized as tokens. The heightened 
visibility that springs from their difference (i.e., being a woman in a male-dominated 
group) can make them the target of performance pressures causing them to over perform 
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or could make them try to reduce their exposure and visibility causing them to eliminate 
their impact on group processes (Lewis & Simpson, 2012).   
Critical mass suggests that men’s numerical dominance in work groups has 
allowed them access to power and status (Kanter, 1977).  Kanter theorized that different 
minority proportions have different levels of voice and influence (Van der Walt & Ingley, 
2003).  A balanced group is a group in which women have at least 15% to 40% minority 
representation.  Multiple studies have tested this theory in different contexts to identify 
what critical mass is in those specific contexts.  Empirical evidence suggests that the 
number of women required to achieve critical mass is three (Arena, Cirilo, Mussolino, 
Pulcinelli, Saggese, & Sarto, 2015; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; 
Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011).   
Some scholars have found that critical mass depends on the context.  Elstad and 
Ladegard (2010) could not assert that three board members were the minimum to achieve 
critical mass, but concluded that women ratio is positively related to the perceptions of 
women directors in relation to information sharing, social interaction and influence. De 
Cabo and colleagues (2011) found that in Spain, the presence of female directors was 
enough for women to have an effect on board performance.  However, despite the 
numerous studies that have tested this theory (Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011), it 
has received much criticism (Celis, Cilds, Kantola, & Krook, 2008; Childs & Krook, 
2006). 
An essential argument of critical mass is that it assumes that women’s 
disadvantages are not caused by gendered hierarchies, but from differences in 
underrepresentation and differences in organizational structures.  Thus, Kanter’s 
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proposition that an increase in women’s numbers to make a group more gender balanced 
can help women overcome their disadvantages. Critical mass overlooks the existence of 
gender biases that favor agentic – masculine – traits for positions of leadership and power, 
which according to role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002), are at the core of the problem of women’s underrepresentation in 
leadership positions.  This perspective also overlooks historically rooted social and 
cultural constructions that privilege masculine and devalue feminine attributes, which 
according to the theoretical perspective on gender beliefs and social relations (Ridgeway 
& Correll, 2004), are a core component of the gender system.  Moreover, the theory 
focuses on the minimum number of women required in a group assuming it will allow 
them to form alliances. However, that suggests an underlying assumption of women 
helping women (Mavin, 2008), which has been challenged by researchers that suggest 
that women who rise to positions of power in male-dominated cultures tend to assimilate 
into the culture rather than challenge it (Derks et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, in the context of women who are appointed to positions of power as 
a result of initiatives that require minimum targets, such as quotas, research has suggested 
that they may be seen as taking men’s jobs. Consequently, high scrutiny is placed on their 
performance (Bierema, 2017).  In those contexts, women tend to distance themselves 
from other women (Ellemers et al., 2012; Mavin, 2008).  Moreover, allowing some 
women opportunities to positions that may not have been available to them otherwise, 
may help those individual women; however, it only reinforces asymmetrical gender 
relations as the basic structure of the organization remains unchanged (Bierema, 2017).    
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Board to Organization 
At the organizational level, theoretical perspectives explain the contribution of the 
collective board to the organization. Among the most widely used theories in the study of 
corporate governance are Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory and Pffefer and 
Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004).  
Agency. Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) conceptualizes the link 
between the board and the organization, highlighting the importance of conformance.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the risks of poor management or self-serving 
managerial decisions on organizational performance. The theory posits that the board’s 
monitoring function coupled with corporate practices of reporting and external auditing, 
is likely to reduce the risks that stem from poor management. Most of the empirical 
literature related to corporate governance has attempted to understand the link between 
the board of directors and organizational performance taking an agency theory approach 
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008). However, this theory has received 
considerable criticism due to its low predictive validity on financial performance (Carter 
et al., 2013).  Agency theory’s “closed system” (p. 475) approach posits a rigid link 
between board practices and performance that disregard the environment in which 
organizations function (Aguilera et al., 2008).  
Empirical studies have found that expectations imposed by boards can intrude on 
high level managers’ autonomy, and increase the likelihood negative organizational 
outcomes, such as financial fraud (Shi, Connelly, & Hoskisson, 2017), suggesting that 
agency theory ignores the complexity of individual motivations.  Similarly, agency 
theory fails to account for the role of diversity on boards.  According to agency theory, 
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monitoring increases performance; however, empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
increasing the number of women on a corporate boards improves monitoring and has a 
negative impact on financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Zhu, Small, & 
Flaherty, 2010).  Furthermore, multiple studies have failed to produce support for the 
theory due to its failure to predict organizational outcomes in a context of board diversity 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2013; Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagne, 
2008).  
Resource dependence.  Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
provides a framework for the understanding of the relationship between the board, as a 
collective, and the organization.  The theory posits that organizations are a combination 
of tangible and intangible assets and capabilities that depend on strategic resources for 
their survival.  Boards are seen as strategic resources that add value to the organization 
due to the resources they can provide, such as expertise, advise, and counsel.  According 
to resource dependence theory, in addition to providing counsel, the main role of the 
board is to provide legitimacy and communication channels.  This theory very 
convincingly explains the relationship of external factors and the role of a governing 
board (Hung, 1998). Expanding the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), scholars suggest 
that directors’ different types of human and social capital provide different resources 
beneficial to the firm, suggesting that a more diverse board results in better organizational 
performance (Hillman et al., 2000).  
Resource dependence theory was conceptualized with underpinnings from the 
fields of economics and organizational sociology (Chambers, Harvey, Mannion, Bond, & 
Marshall, 2013).  The theory uses an “open-system” (p. 475) approach, in which 
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organizational features, diversity, and environmental changes are interdependent 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). In the diversity and corporate governance literature, this theory 
has been used to underpin a number of studies on board diversity (Hillman, Withers, & 
Collins, 2009; Terjesen et al., 2009).  However, the theory has found support mainly 
when used to identify characteristics of organizations that would most likely have more 
WOB rather than organizational outcomes of having more WOB.  For example, using 
panel data of the largest 1,000 U.S. firms in terms of sales, organizational predictors of 
WOB were examined on Hillman, Shropshire, and Canella (2007). Their findings 
revealed that organizational size, industry, total number of directors, average female 
employment in the industry, and connections to other boards with female directors were 
statistically significant predictors of the presence of female directors on a corporate board.  
Peterson and Philpot (2007) found evidence of a systematic bias in director 
assignment to top board committees.  Their study found that the female gender decreased 
the likelihood of being assigned to executive committees; their findings also provided 
evidence that boards evaluate their resource dependence differently for men than for 
women.  Also, some studies found a positive effect in the relationship between gender 
and corporate social responsibility performance (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Hafsi & 
Turgut, 2013; Margaretha & Isnaini, 2014). Although this could indicate that 
organizations with more WOB perform in a more socially responsible manner, it could 
also indicate that socially responsible firms have more gender neutral selection practices.  
A recent meta-analysis that examined the relationship between WOB and financial 
performance combining the results of 140 studies found that the relationship was near 
zero and the relationship was positive in countries with greater gender parity (Post & 
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Byron, 2015). Another meta-analysis recently published (Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, & 
Voelpel, 2015) found similar, near-zero results.  
However, in the context of gender diversity as a source of more valuable 
resources to a board and its effect on organizational performance, empirical studies found 
no support for the theory (Carter et al., 2003; Gregory-Smith, Main, & O-Reilly, 2014; 
Mandala, Kaijage, Aduda, & Iraya, 2017; Ntim, 2015).  
Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards 
Given that globally, men occupy a disproportionally high number of corporate 
seats, governments throughout the world have attempted different measures to address 
the disparity.  Achieving parity in corporate boardrooms derives from the principle of 
equality of treatment.  In this context, equality of treatment requires that individuals are 
treated in the same manner irrespective of their gender and prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination.  Throughout the world, governments and organizations have attempted to 
address gender disparities on corporate boards using different approaches: hard law 
(equal outcome) and soft law (equal opportunity).   
However, it is noteworthy to reiterate that while gender diversity indicators 
represent progress toward achieving equal contribution, they do not represent equality.  
Consequently, gender diversity on corporate boards does not indicate equality between 
men and women on boards, neither does it indicate gender equality in the observed 
organizations or the workforce. Furthermore, research (Ahmed, 2007) has indicated that 
in enacting policy and legislation for equality, it can be assumed that equality is achieved 
in the act.  However, policy and legislation cannot substitute action, as what they say 
does not automatically bring them into existence.  Additionally, research on diversity in 
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organizations (Ahmed & Swan, 2006) has identified that diversity initiatives can be used 
as a mechanism for perpetuating inequality in organizations.   
Hard Law – Equal Outcome 
Equal outcome strategies aim to guarantee gender parity by regulating the gender 
composition on boards through the implementation of legislation mandating minimum 
gender representation. This approach focuses on the end result rather than the means for 
achieving it. In 2003, Norway was the first country to implement legislation to increase 
women’s participation on corporate boards by regulating the gender composition through 
quotas.  Norway’s quota reform required a minimum 40% representation of each gender 
on the boards of publicly listed companies, with sanctions for non-compliance.  The 
quota law gained considerable attention worldwide, bringing a spotlight to male 
dominance at the highest level of corporate decision-making roles (Sweigart, 2012).  
Several countries have followed Norway’s lead and implemented quota laws to increase 
the percentage of women in corporate boards.  Among the countries that have 
implemented similar regulations are Spain (2007), Iceland (2010), France (2011), the 
Netherlands (2011), Belgium (2011), Malaysia (2011), Italy (2013), and Germany (2015).   
Quotas have proven to be an effective tool for increasing the proportion of WOB; 
however, their effects are limited to the minimum compliance levels set by the quota.  
Scholars argue that the diffusion of quotas on corporate boards was sparked by the 
Norway quota law, which was unique at the time of its introduction (Teigen, 2012).   
Therefore, to inform the understanding of the use of government initiatives for WOB as a 
way to promote gender equality, the Norway case is discussed. Norway has a long history 
of gender quotas and positive action arrangements to promote gender balance (Teigen, 
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2011).  In fact, the first gender quotas for political party representation were instituted in 
1974, and multiple others have targeting different groups have been instituted since then 
(See Appendix A).  Paradoxically, despite Norway’s history of gender equality policies, 
and balanced gender representation in other dimensions of society, prior to the quota law, 
a vertically gender segregated business sector had resulted in a massive gender disparity 
in top leadership and corporate boards (Niskanen, 2011). After failed attempts to increase 
women’s representation on corporate boards of listed companies, addressing the disparity 
became a pressing political issue (Teigen, 2015).  After months of public debate on how 
to remedy the lack of women in business leadership, in 2002, the Norway quota law was 
imposed.  Although gender quota policies had been used in Norway, there was much 
resistance and opposition to their adoption in the business sector, mainly from business 
leaders, and employer organizations, with claims of negative economic consequences 
(Hoel, 2008).  
Soft Law - Equal Opportunity  
This approach is concerned with the means for achieving a result rather than the 
outcome.  In the United Kingdom, the Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination in 
recruitment, selection, and employment for several protected characteristics, including 
gender.  Equal opportunity strategies for WOB, also referred to as comply or explain aim 
to address disproportionate gender representation through recommended targets. Among 
the countries have implemented this type of approach are Australia (2011), Canada 
(2015), the U.S. (2010), and the U.K. (2010, 2012), all of which have liberal market 
economies (Hall & Gingerich, 2009).  Through regulation of the corporate governance 
codes or disclosure regulation, these governments’ formal approach to achieving gender 
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parity on corporate boards include mandating publicly listed organizations’ disclosure of 
their board diversity policies and director selection practices. Equal opportunity 
approaches rely on voluntary measures and do not have sanctions for non-compliance.  
Until the United Kingdom announced that the Davies Review (2015) comply or explain 
approach had been successful, such approaches had produced increases in participation of 
WOB at a much slower pace than quotas.  Several countries resorted to the imposition of 
quotas after voluntary measures did not produce desired results. 
Assumptions of WOB Initiatives 
The underlying assumption behind targeting boards as a way to promote gender 
equality was grounded on principles of representation.  When the quota reform was 
proposed in Norway, the government asserted that gender-balanced representation on 
boards was essential for the Norwegian democracy (Tiegen, 2015).  It makes logical 
sense that the democratic principle was used in Norway to justify the quota reform 
because Norway’s corporate governance code gives employees the right to representation.  
Employee representation on corporate boards is grounded on adherence to workplace 
democracy (Teigen, 2012) and protected by the Norwegian corporate governance code 
(Oslo Stock Exchange, 2018: Private Limited Liability Companies Act of 1997; Public 
Limited Liability Companies Act of 1997).  The scope of employee representation was 
expanded by including gender representation, as set forth in the Gender Equality Act of 
1999, which was passed by Norwegian Parliament in 2003 (Storvik, 2011).  One key 
difference between Norway and several other countries, including the United Kingdom 
and the United States (See Appendix A for a comprehensive list) is that Norway’s 
corporate governance code is designed to include employee-elected board members who 
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represent the employees’ collective interests (Engelstad & Teigen, 2012).  Under the U.K. 
CGC, employees do not have a right to board representation.  Although board directors 
have a duty to promote the success of the company, considering, among other matters, 
the interests of the company’s employees (Companies Act 2006, section 172), 
organizations do not report how that is done.  Currently, there is a reform proposal to the 
U.K. CGC intended to require all companies to explain how their directors comply with 
that requirement.  
The two principles of representation that are associated with gender quotas in the 
literature are descriptive and substantive (Phillips, 1998). Descriptive representation 
indicates fair representation of women in numbers.  Thus, initiatives to promote the 
achievement of gender parity on corporate boards, such gender quotas and targets aim to 
attain women’s descriptive representation.  Substantive representation implies that 
people’s interests are represented by those in decision-making positions.  Substantive 
representation of women is not related to their representative’s gender, but to the 
tendency of their representative to advocate for women’s interests.  Several researchers 
have indicated that there is an expectation that an increase of women’s numbers on 
corporate boards (descriptive representation) will result in reduced discrimination for 
women in lower levels (substantive representation) (Ferreira, 2015; Ellemers et al., 2012). 
However, inconsistent findings of empirical studies demonstrate that the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation of women in the workforce is not compellingly 
established.  
The link between descriptive and substantive representation was hypothesized 
(Wangnerud, 2009) using theoretical foundation of the politics of presence, in which 
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Phillips (1995) argued that female representatives were better suited to represent the 
interests of other women.  Scholars have indicated that there is an expectation that an 
increase of women as minorities in high level groups – such as corporate boards – will 
help other women (Duguid, 2011; Ferreira, 2015). This argument has been challenged by 
scholars who suggest that ascribing interests to women in a top down manner ignores that 
women’s interests are not universal or static, but rather contextual and changeable (Celis, 
2007; Childs & Krook, 2006). In studies related to the substantive political representation 
of women, scholars have argued that instead of a critical mass of women, both women 
and men may seek to promote women’s concerns (Celis, 2009; Celis & Childs, 2008; 
Chaney, 2006).  Nonetheless, legislative action has resulted in the increase of WOB and 
an expectation of reduced discrimination at lower levels.  
Consequently, research has tested the link between their descriptive and 
substantive representation.  To that end, studies that examined the effects of the Norway 
quota law did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that the reform benefited the 
larger set of women employed in the companies impacted by the quota (Bertrand, Black, 
Jansen, & Lleras-Muney, 2018).  A study of the Norway quota law found that the 
initiative created a small elite of women directors but did not have a positive effect on 
opportunities for other women (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011). Further, the gender wage gap 
did not decrease, except at the top of the labor market, which researchers argue could be 
the result of increased demand for women created by the quota law (Bertrand et al., 2018).   
Scholars have suggested that despite the lack of evidence, most proponents of 
quotas believe that breaking the glass ceiling at the board level will lessen discrimination 
for other women at lower organizational layers (Ferreira, 2015).  Policy makers and 
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equality advocates continue to promote descriptive representation initiatives to promote 
gender equality (Ferreira, 2015).  The Australian Institute of Management in partnership 
with the Australian National Committee for UN Women (AIM, 2012) suggested that 
despite limited evidence, a positive correlation between the numbers of WOB and women 
at the top executive level has been identified.  Similarly, using data from Fortune 500 and 
Fortune 1000 organizations, empirical studies have provided some evidence of the 
relationship between WOB and female executive representation (Bilimoria, 2006; Konrad, 
2008; Skaggs et al., 2012).  Accordingly, proponents of quotas suggest that women at the 
board level will have a trickle-down effect that will result in increased opportunities for 
women (AIM, 2012).  However, the link between WOB and increased opportunities for 
women has resulted in mixed findings (Matsa & Miller, 2011; Seirstad & Opshal, 2011).  
Furthermore, most of the evidence that links senior women to the creation of 
opportunities for junior women does not address endogeneity (Blau & DeVaro, 2017; 
Dezso et al., 2015; Giuliano et al., 2005).  For example, according to Antonakis and 
colleagues (2014), the effect on an outcome can be caused by an unobserved variable.  
Not knowing the independent variables are exogenous and not instrumenting them with 
truly exogenous variables poses a threat to understanding the direction of a relationship.  
Consequently, while WOB may be creating opportunities for women in management, it is 
also possible that a higher supply of women in management is causing more women to 
rise to corporate boards, or that organizations that have a good gender equality strategy 
promote more women to managerial and board positions.  
Additionally, studies that provided evidence of a positive relationship used data 
from boards that had increased their percentages of women endogenously (Carter et al., 
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2010; Erhardt et al., 2003), without the influence of government initiatives.  Therefore, 
those findings may not be generalizable to boards in which gender composition has 
resulted from an exogenous event.  Further, scholars have argued that promoting women 
to senior positions simply to increase their numbers, without addressing the underlying 
problem of gender bias and gendered leadership beliefs is a risky strategy that could have 
a negative impact on career opportunities for women (Ellemers, Rink, Derks, & Ryan, 
2012).   
Utilitarian argument.  In the majority of countries where legislation and policies 
for WOB have been implemented, the debate has mainly been discussed and promoted 
through the utilitarian argument – also referred to as the business case for WOB -, which 
relies on a causal claim of improved financial performance resulting from the inclusion of 
women on corporate boards (Eagly, 2016).  Advocates of WOB initiatives have 
contributed to the diffusion of the economic argument, which has flooded media outlets 
with the alleged benefits of WOB on the bottom line (e.g. Catalyst, 2007; McKinsey, 
2007). However, a wide-range of research findings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; He & 
Huang, 2011; Pletzer et al., 2015; Post & Byron, 2015) do not provide compelling 
support for that claim.   
Initially, when the Norway quota law was proposed, it faced opposition from 
business leaders, who argued that reduced competency and lack of authority resulting 
from the quota law would have severe financial consequences that would damage the 
country’s economy (Hoel, 2008).  The Norwegian government claimed that as public 
sector boards had achieved a proportion of women at 40%, the quality of the boards had 
increased (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, consultation document, 1999, p. 58).  
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Some scholars have suggested that the use of the business rhetoric made the quota reform 
proposition appear more convincing (Teigen, 2015).   
The business case for WOB was originally used as a rebuttal to the concerns of 
business leaders in Norway (Teigen, 2015) who feared that the quota reform would 
negatively impact financial performance. However, today, the business case for WOB 
appears to be the most relied upon argument to promote gender equality on boards.  In a 
change from its initial pledge that approached the WOB initiative as an equality issue, the 
Davies Review, relied on the economic argument for promoting the WOB initiative, 
which justified equality of opportunity for women on corporate boards on the bases of 
improved financial performance and improved board performance (Davies, 2011, p.7).  
The promotion of the business case for WOB has resulted in research that focuses 
almost exclusively on the effects of WOB on measures of financial performance. 
McKinsey (2007) and Catalyst (2007) are two of the most popular studies that examine 
the effect of WOB on financial performance. Their findings provided support for the 
Davies Review initiative (Davies, 2011, p.4).  Using a sample of 89 European listed 
companies, McKinsey (2007) found that compared with industry averages, organizations 
with more gender diverse management teams had higher return on equity, earnings before 
interest and tax, and stock price growth (McKinsey, 2007, p. 14).  The study included 
organizations from different European countries, including Norway; however, it failed to 
control endogenous variation. Similarly, using a sample of 520 Fortune 500 companies, 
Catalyst (2007) found a positive relationship between WOB and financial performance.  
In their study, Catalyst grouped organizations into quantiles based on their gender 
diversity on boards and examined differences between the top quartile comprised of 132 
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companies and the bottom quartile comprised of 129 companies and indicated that 
companies in the top quartile have higher return on investment, return on sales, and return 
on invested capital.  However, the statistical analyses used in those reports are not 
methodologically designed to observe correlations, much less to address causality 
(Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014). Although these findings provide some 
evidence of a positive association between WOB and financial performance, the basic 
nature of their data design and analyses – composed of only descriptive statistics – does 
not provide compelling support for the business case.   
Several peer-reviewed studies found a positive association between gender 
diversity on boards and financial performance outcomes.  Using US-based samples, 
studies found a positive relationship between the presence of WOB and return on assets, 
and Tobin’s Q –ratio of firm’s market value to its book value of assets– measures (Carter 
et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003).  Using a sample of 638 Fortune 1000 firms, Carter and 
colleagues (2010) found that the presence of WOB had a statistically significant positive 
effect, 1.68 (SE=.85; p<.05) on Tobin’s Q.  Their model, which included a vector of 
multiple explanatory variables, was practically significant (R2=.26). Erhardt and 
colleagues (2003) also found a correlation of WOB and return on investment, (r=.21, 
p<.05). Controlling for a number of explanatory variables, a positive effect of WOB on 
return on investment was found, which was not statistically significant, -.32 (p>.05) but 
was practically significant (R2=.09).  
Similarly, other studies found a positive association between the percentage of 
WOB and financial performance outcomes using samples in the EU (Arena et al., 2015), 
Germany (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Lindstaedt, Woff, & Fehre, 2011), Norway 
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(Torchia, 2011), The Netherlands (Luckerath-Rovers, 2010), Denmark (Smith et al., 
2006), and Mauritius (Mahadeo, Soobaroyem, & Hanuman, 2012).  However, in many of 
those studies, the positive link was only found when women’s board representation was 
higher than 30% (Joecks et al., 2013; Lindstaedt et al., 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012; Torchia, 
2011; Zhang et al., 2012), which provide evidence of critical mass of WOB and financial 
outcomes.   
Conversely, other studies found a negative relationship between WOB and 
financial outcome variables using samples from the US (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; He & 
Huang, 2011; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997), and Norway (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; 
Bohren & Strom, 2010). Using a sample of 1290 non-financial Norwegian listed firms in 
the 1989 to 2002 period, Bohren and Strom (2010) found that increasing the ratio of 
gender diversity by one standard deviation (.08) from the sample mean (.049) decreased 
the firm’s Tobin’s Q from 1.428 to 1.378 (3.5%).  The effect was statistically (p<.05) and 
practically significant (R2=.041).   
Using a sample of U.S.-based manufacturing firms from 2001 to 2007, He and 
Huang (2011) provided evidence of a negative effect of gender diversity on boards and 
financial performance.  Results for the seven models tested ranged from -.091 to -.103 
(p<.10); however, they were not statistically significant at the .05 level and the effect size 
was very small (r=.14).  Miller and Triana (2007) examined the effect of board gender 
diversity on firm innovation, and found a statistically significant .049 (p<.05); however, 
the effect size was small (r=.09). Their study also examined the relationship of board 
gender diversity and firm reputation (.39, p>.10, r=.003) and firm performance (.27, 
p>.10, r=.007); however, the results were neither statistically nor practically significant. 
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Carter and colleagues (2010) examined a sample of S&P 500 firms over a five-year 
period from 1998 to 2002. Their findings indicated that the effect of WOB on Tobin’s Q 
was near zero and non-statistically significant (.01; p=.19).  Additionally, they found the 
relationship of WOB and firm financial performance appeared to be endogenous.  
Although most of those studies did not provide evidence of a causal link, Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) provided evidence of a negative causal 
effect.  Adams and Ferreira (2009) used the connections of WOB to male directors of 
other boards as the basis for an instrumental variable approach to identify the effect of 
endogenous board gender diversity on different measures of board effectiveness and 
performance. Using a sample of 1939 U.S.-based publicly-traded firms in the 1996 to 
2003 period, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that the effect of WOB on firm 
performance was initially positive (.221, p<.10); however, when controlling for firm-
fixed effects, the relationship became negative (-.135, p<.10) and was practically 
significant (R2=.11).   Ahern and Dittmar (2012) took advantage of the exogenous 
increase of WOB that resulted from the introduction of the quota law in Norway, as a 
natural experiment, to identify causal effects of the board gender diversity on financial 
outcomes.  
Using a difference in differences approach, their study provided compelling 
causal evidence of a drop in Tobin’s Q resulting from the exogenous increase WOB 
resulting from the gender quota. Their estimates indicated that a 10% increase in the 
population of WOB led to a decline in Tobin's Q of 0.19 (p<.001), which in relation to 
the mean of 1.53 across all firms and years, represented a large effect. However, one of 
the weaknesses of the study was that it did not control for board independence in their 
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analyses. Ferreira (2015) found it surprising that changes in the board independence were 
not being mentioned in studies related to the effects of legislation and policies for WOB 
on board performance. Another limitation in the Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) study was 
that there was no natural control group to compare their findings to. Under the 
assumption that investors may anticipate quota laws in other countries, their placebo tests 
included organizations from Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United States, which 
may not represent good counterfactuals for Norwegian firms (Ferreira, 2015).  The 
methodological limitations and conflicting findings of most existing studies supporting 
the utilitarian argument indicate that the business case for WOB cannot be compellingly 
established. 
Further, other studies found that a higher percentage of WOB or inclusion of 
WOB did not have an effect on financial outcomes using samples from the US (Carter et 
al., 2010; Miller & Triana, 2009; Siciliano, 1996), Denmark (Rose, 2007), Sweden (Alm 
& Winberg, 2016), Scandinavia (Radoy, Thomsen, & Oxelheim, 2006), Spain (Campbell 
& Minguez-Vera, 2008), the United Kingdom (Haslam et al., 2010; Gregory-Smith et al., 
2013; Pasaribu, 2017), and Norway (Vob, 2015).  Gregory and colleagues (2014) 
examined the relationship of WOB, shareholder returns, and the gender pay gap for board 
members, using data from FTSE 350 boards in the United Kingdom in the 1996 through 
2011 period.  Their study found no evidence of significant effect of WOB on shareholder 
return, -.079 (p>.10). Additionally, their study revealed a gender pay gap for executive 
directors, however, they found evidence of a pay gap in remuneration of non-executive 
directors.  The estimated discriminatory pay gap was around 7%-8%.  The study reported 
a practical significance of R2=.54.  Furthermore, they found evidence of discrimination in 
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the appointment of board members, which indicated that women were more likely to be 
appointed to a board after the exit of another woman, .179, (p<.001).  
The mixed findings found in the literature have compelled researchers to perform 
meta-analyses to try to reconcile the findings. To that end, Post and Byron (2015) 
recently published a meta-analysis in which they analyzed 144 published studies.  Their 
findings provided support of a positive relationship of WOB on firm performance, r=.03, 
CI (.022, .045), p<.01; market performance, r=.014, CI (.002, .031), p<.001; and 
accounting returns, r=.047, CI (.033, 061), p<.001; however, the effect sizes were very 
small.  Similarly, Pletzer and colleagues (2015) performed a meta-analysis using data 
from 20 published studies.  Their findings indicated that the relationship of WOB on firm 
performance was small and non-statistically significant r=.01, CI =-.04, .07, p=.77.   
The risk in using the utilitarian argument is that it could be argued for and against.  
This means that the promotion of the initiative through the business case provides moral 
justification for discrimination against women if the outcome contradicts the business 
case claim. Some scholars have criticized that the business case perspective seems to 
substitute the equality rationale (Zanoni et al., 2010), as both rationales are grounded on 
different moral perspectives that oppose each other (van Dijk, van Engen, & Paauwe, 
2012).  Others have raised their concerns about the business case not promoting diversity 
in itself but only through its potential contributions to the bottom line (Noon, 2007). Thus, 
the business case represents a conditional argument that sees women and minorities as a 
means to an end (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010).  Consequently, the promotion of 
the business case could have the opposite effect, as a negative outcome would provide 
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moral justification for maintaining a homogeneous workforce (van Dijk et al., 2012) and 
discriminating against women (Ferreira 2015).  
Scholars have argued that promoting equality initiatives through the business case 
undermines the legitimacy of the social justice argument (Noon, 2007; Sinclair, 2007). 
Furthermore, the promotion of the business case ignores that the case for non-
discrimination does not need to be argued, but defended and enforced. Women, as a 
group, have historically been oppressed, disadvantaged, and discriminated against.  
Therefore, legislation has been put in place to discourage discrimination against women, 
and promote equality (Equality Act, 2010).  However, ignoring that gender disparities on 
corporate boards are the result of a history of oppression and covert discrimination that 
exists today; contributes to the reproduction of discriminatory practices. Consequently, as 
the business case for WOB reinforces the view that basic human rights for women are 
something that still needs to be justified (Ahmed, 2007), it weakens the case for gender 
equality.  
Social justice argument. The social justice argument is grounded in deontology – 
sometimes described as duty or obligation ethics -, which is an ethical theory that posits 
that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or 
wrong (Manners, 2008).  The nine normative principles of the EU are sustainable peace, 
freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable 
development and good governance (Official Journal of the EU, 2012).  Therefore, 
equality is not only a basic human right, but also one of the normative principles of the 
EU.  As a member state, the United Kingdom has a duty to promote these principles.  
Consequently, equality initiatives are by definition issues of social justice, and their 
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justification is that they are the right thing to do.  The promotion of equality initiatives – 
such as the Davies Review – using a contingent argument of financial gain is not only 
unethical (Zanoni et al., 2010), but incongruent with the expected outcome (cf. Lorbiecki 
& Jack, 2000).   
By promoting the WOB initiative through the business case, the Davies Review 
disregarded that gender equality is an issue of social justice, and like several policies that 
aim to promote gender equality, it was instrumentally subordinated to another agenda.  
Losing the focus of equality to an economic agenda poses a risk to the achievement of 
equality.  This is particularly risky when the contingency is not compellingly established.  
To that end, scholars have argued that several policies are implemented with no analysis 
of contradictions with other policies that aim to reduce the gender pay gap or gender 
segregation (Fagan & Rubery, 2018). 
Despite the multiple protections against discrimination for women in the British 
workforce, including the Human Rights Act, which prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of gender; and the Equality Act of 2010, women in the British 
workforce still experience discrimination, as evidenced by indicators on the Global 
Gender Gap Report.   Scholars suggest that discrimination runs so deep in society that its 
subtlety has created blindness around the issue (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000).  In fact, 
evidence suggests that in British organizations, discrimination against women is the 
leading factor associated with the gender disparity on corporate boards (Goyal et al., 
2018).  Thus, it is fair to question whether supporting the Davies Review initiative for 
WOB with the business case is an indicative that in British society women’s basic human 
right to equality needs to be justified.  After all, non-discrimination is an inherent right to 
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all persons. Therefore, the business case for equality reinforces the view that basic human 
rights for women are something that still needs to be justified (Ahmed, 2007), and 
weakens the case for gender equality.  
The Davies Review 
In the United Kingdom, the CGC contains a comply or explain measure that was 
amended following a recommendation of the Davies Review (2011).  The U.K.’s CGC 
allows organizations to design and implement their own gender diversity policies to 
address disproportionate gender representation.  It also requires organizations to provide 
explanations for failure to achieve diversity targets.  The targets provided by the Davies 
Review recommended a minimum 25% of women on corporate boards of the FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 company and included a deadline of 2015 for FTSE 100 companies, and 
indicated that FTSE 250 boards were expected to reach the target in a longer timeframe.  
The Davies Review 5 Year Summary (Davies, 2015) revealed that collectively, 
FTSE 100 companies had exceeded the target and had an average of 26.1% WOB, and 
FTSE 250 companies were well on their way to achieving their target at 19.6% WOB at 
the time of the evaluation.  It can be argued that what differentiated the U.K.’s successful 
approach from other countries that used similar comply or explain approaches (Australia, 
Canada, United States) and were not successful was the U.K.’s political environment of 
the time.  Specifically, in addition to government mandated disclosure and minimum 
targets for WOB, the U.K.’s comply or explain approach was introduced with a “threat” 
of much higher gender quotas imposed by the EU – which the United Kingdom was a 
member of, at the time – if the voluntary targets were not reached.  
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The success of the Davies Review initiative and progress toward gender parity on 
corporate boards increased confidence in the comply or explain approach as a way to 
achieve gender parity targets; therefore, after the Davies Review, another initiative was 
rolled out.  In 2016, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills tasked Sir Philip 
Hampton and Dame Helen Alexander with building on the success of the Davies Review.  
The Hampton-Alexander Review raised the target of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations to 
33% to be achieved by 2020.  Furthermore, it extended the scope of the initiative beyond 
corporate boards by including minimum targets for executive committees and direct 
reports to executive committees to 33% (Hampton & Alexander, 2016).  
Providing evidence that the approach for achieving gender equality continues to 
reflect a preference for a top-down style.  The Hampton-Alexander Review is tasked with 
measuring and reporting the progress of the initiative during its duration, from 2016 
through 2020. However, the Financial Reporting Council amended the U.K. CGC to 
mandate disclosure of gender composition of executive committees and direct reports 
metrics in 2018, which posed a challenge to the monitoring and evaluation of the 
Hampton-Alexander Review in the 2016-2018 period.  
The Davies Review and the Hampton-Alexander Review are examples of the new 
equality regime in the United Kingdom, which Ahmed (2006) argued was part of a 
broader cultural shift, where diversity and equality were becoming performance measures.  
In her research of institutions of higher education, Ahmed identified that institutions that 
had received an exemplar ranking by the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU) in their 
evaluation of their written diversity policies made reference, with pride, to their exemplar 
rank in diversity reports.  In that sense, being perceived as good at diversity can take the 
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form of organizational pride and block the recognition of inequalities in organizations.  In 
a similar way, the Davies Review ranked organizations in function to their percentage of 
WOB.  Organizations with higher percentages of WOB were praised and categorized as 
“leading the way”.   However, if organizations appear to be good at diversity through a 
measure of performance (i.e. percentage of WOB), that same measure can become the 
mechanism for concealment and reproduction of inequality (Deem & Morley, 2006).  
Consequently, an examination of the effects of the Davies Review on other measures of 
gender equality in the workplace may uncover unintended effects of the equality initiative. 
The reasoning for testing the effects of the Davies Review on the increase of 
WOB, despite the seemingly obvious effect lies in the identified need for scientific rigor.  
It is known that FTSE 350 boards doubled their female representation in the five-year 
duration of the initiative, with FTSE 100 boards from 12.6% to 26.1% and FTSE 250 
boards from 7.9% to 19.7%.  However, in the same period, FTSE Small Cap boards also 
doubled their female representation from 6.4% to 13.8%.  Similarly, in the US, Fortune 
500 boards increased their female representation from 15.7% to 27.3%. Consequently, it 
is reasonable to question the extent to which the Davies Review initiative contributed to 
the increase of women on FTSE 350 boards.  
Few studies have examined the effects of WOB in a U.K. context.  The extant 
literature predominantly examines financial outcomes.  Studies that have examined the 
effects of WOB on financial outcomes of FTSE indexed firms, before and after the 
Davies Review initiative, found that the presence of WOB did not have an effect on 
financial outcomes (Gregory-Smith et al., 2013; Pasaribu, 2017).   Mathew, Ibrahim and 
Archbold (2016) found that the presence of WOB of FTSE 350 organizations was 
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negatively related to firm risk, -.0009 (p>.10).  Their findings indicated that the presence 
of WOB had a non-statistical, near-zero effect size on growth opportunities (r=-.014; 
p>.10).  Their findings were similar to those of a previous study in New Zealand (Van der 
Walt, Ingley, Shergill, & Townsend, 2006) that did not find support for the effect of 
board gender diversity on corporate decision quality.  Conversely, a recent study 
examined the effects of WOB in FTSE 350 resulting from the Davies Review on firm’s 
risk and found a statistically significant effect between board gender diversity and firm 
risk measured as stock volatility.  For each percentage point of WOB, stock volatility 
decreased by -.23 (p<.01), and the effect was practically significant (R2=.45).  Similarly, 
using a dummy variable to indicate the presence of two or more WOB, the effect on stock 
volatility was statistically -4.77 (p<.01), and practically significant (R2=.44). The authors 
suggested that their findings provided support for the positive effect of WOB on reducing 
firm risk (Jizi & Nehme, 2017).  
Additionally, research that studied the effects of WOB in a U.K. context 
examined the influence of WOB of the National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trusts 
on social performance outcomes and found that there were no discernible benefits on 
board performance resulting from higher female representation of female executive 
directors (β=.018, p=.624), or non-executive directors (β=-.021, p=.538); however, 
female chairs (β=-.065, p=.064) and chief executives (β=-.098, p=.007) resulted in 
significant reductions in negative social outcomes (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015), 
providing evidence of existing differences among leaders in decision-making roles. 
Qualitative research has aimed to addressed questions of whether board members have 
different experiences and perceptions of their contributions to board effectiveness and 
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found that current models and theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship of 
directors to the board do not explain the lived experiences of non-executive directors on 
corporate boards (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005).  At the time of this literature review, 
there were no existing studies that examined the effects of the Davies Review initiative 
on changes in board composition on the basis of directorship type. 
Relationship of Quotas and Targets on Board Composition 
Theoretical support for the effects of government-sponsored initiatives, such as 
quotas or targets on increased participation of women on corporate boards is provided by 
resource dependence theory.  Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
posits that organizations seek linkages with the most beneficial resources and structure 
their boards on that basis.  In the case of mandatory quotas, sanctions associated with 
non-compliance make gender a highly valuable resource for corporate boards.  Unlike 
quotas, comply or explain approaches do not have sanctions associated with them; 
however, the Davies Review was delivered in conjunction with the threat that the EU was 
debating imposing quotas, which could be seen as a form of a sanction for non-
compliance; therefore, although comply or explain approaches had not produced 
significant results, the environment for the Davies Review initiative was more conducive 
to compliance than to explaining.  It is noteworthy to mention that 59% of FTSE 350 
boards were below 25% female membership, and 37% of FTSE 350 boards were below 
20%.  As these organizations were not in compliance, per the U.K. CGC, they needed to 
explain the reasons they were not in compliance.  The recurrent theme in the FTSE 350 
annual reports of organizations that were below the compliance threshold was that board 
appointments were made on the basis of merit.  Despite not achieving a homogenous 
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increase across FTSE 350 boards, the Davies Review (2015) used the collective average 
percentages to declare the initiative a success.  The U.K. was the only country in which a 
comply or explain approach had delivered positive results (Davies, 2015).  
One of the issues with attributing the Davies Review initiative with doubling 
women’s participation on corporate boards of FTSE 350 organizations is that a simple 
calculation of mean differences between the percentages of WOB pre and post the Davies 
Review, does not address endogeneity bias, which can cause incorrect estimates 
(Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017).  Ignoring endogenous variation potentially leads to 
erroneous inferences (Antonakis et al., 2010), which sometimes can cause so much bias 
that “we may not even get the sign of the coefficient right” (Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017, 
p.1).    
A study of the gender composition of FTSE 100 boards prior to the Davies 
Review, indicated that in the 1999 to 2005 period, FTSE 100 boards increased their 
percentage of WOB from 4.9% to 10.5% (Grosvold, Brammer, & Rayton, 2007). Notably, 
a negative correlation in the year-on-year changes in proportion of WOB and board size 
was found -157 (p<.01), which indicated that boards were not increasing their board size 
to add women, but that women were replacing male directors.  The proportion of women 
on corporate boards and at different levels of leadership has consistently been increasing, 
therefore, as the Davies Review initiative had a duration of five years, it is likely that that 
the percentage of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations would have continued to rise 
endogenously in that time period had the Davies Review not been rolled out.  Similarly, 
Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) found an upward trend in the appointments of women to 
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FTSE 100 boards in the 2004 to 2010 period, in which the proportion of unique female 
directors increased from 5.1% in 2004 to 6.5% in 2010.  
Furthermore, while changes in the percentages of WOB in FTSE 350 firms are 
being monitored, neither the Davies Review (Davies, 2015) nor the Hampton-Alexander 
Review (Hampton & Alexander, 2016) have reported how those changes compare to 
other publicly listed organizations that were not impacted by the comply or explain 
approach.  Additionally, research has suggested that the number of WOB has been 
increasing due to pressure from investors and society (Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009).  A 
study that compared variation in the gender composition of corporate boards found that 
after the Norway quota law was announced in Norway, the threat of similar legislation 
introduced in other European countries may have had a placebo effect on other countries.  
In fact, an accelerated growth in female board representation of the largest publicly listed 
firms in the United Kingdom in the 2001 to 2005 was reported, increasing from 6.4% in 
2001 to 10.5% in 2005 (Grosvold et al., 2007).  Similar findings were discovered for 
boards in Finland, where the percentage of WOB increased from 12.8% in 2003 to 23.8% 
in 2005; and in Sweden, where the percentage of WOB increased from 10.8% in 2001 to 
20% in 2005 (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013).  Placebo effects are usually present in natural 
experiments on natural control groups, to which treated organizations should be 
compared to (Dunning, 2011).  Consequently, while the Davies Review and Cranfield 
Female FTSE Board Reports have reported the growth in female representation on FTSE 
350 boards, spillover effects to other FTSE firms or any other comparison groups have 
not been reported.  
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Countries that have relied on quota initiatives to increase the participation of 
WOB have been successful to the degree in which they meet minimum compliance.  To 
that end, it can be seen that only minimum targets are being met, which may indicate an 
adherence to compliance rather than a commitment to creating a diverse workforce.   
Additionally, changes have only occurred at the board level, which is the only level 
directly targeted by the initiatives.  To that end, different studies have provided evidence 
of the different legislation and policies have only impacted the director gender 
proportions, but have not had an effect on changes to positions of power in those 
organizations, such as CEOs or chairpersons, which continue to be male dominated 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that despite the 
increase in the appointment of WOB, they are not getting appointed to influential 
positions within a board (Bozhinov et al., 2017).  Theoretically, those changes to board 
composition can be explained through the lens of gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 
2004). The type of position that women are being appointed to may be related to the 
association of their gender with lower status.   
As organizations appoint more female directors to meet the targets set by the 
Davies Review, male directors may feel threatened and try to defend the status quo (Kray 
et al., 2017). Gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004) suggests that men’s gender is 
associated with higher status, which has allowed them access to more resources than 
women.  Therefore, their motivation for keeping their position in the social hierarchy 
may result in the disproportionate appointments of women directors to positions of lower 
influence.  Consistent with social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012) and gender as status 
(Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004), empirical evidence has suggested that women’s perceived 
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lower value in leadership roles compared to men (Brescoll, 2016).  A recent study 
examined differences in tenure of board members of FTSE organizations and found 
statistically significant gender differences in tenure, indicating that female directors face 
a higher risk of dismissal from their positions than their male counterparts (Main & 
Gregory-Smith, 2018).  
Research has demonstrated that women and minorities are perceived as less 
competent, capable and worthy of leadership positions compared to white men (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002; Carton & Rosette, 2011; Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008).  Compared 
to men in leadership roles, women tend to have their performance more highly 
scrutinized than men and experience more negative evaluations (Thompson & 
Sekaquaptewa, 2002).  Consistently, with regard to career progression, scholars have 
argued that women executives may accept more challenging or even precarious 
leadership positions out of fear that other opportunities may not be available in the future 
(Ryan & Haslam, 2007).  Consequently, there is a lower supply of women for the most 
influential board roles, executive director roles.  
One of the reasons for the slow change may be attributed to gender matching 
(Tinsley, Wade, Main, & O’Reilly).  Empirical evidence suggests the existence of gender 
matching effects in director selection, which represent the strong likelihood that board 
members are replaced with new members of the same gender (Tinsley et al., 2017).  
Tinsley and colleagues (2017) found that although the probability of women being 
appointed to a board are related to women exiting a board (.69, p<.001), when firm fixed 
effects are included, the probability of appointing a female director increases sharply 
after another woman exits (1.22 p<.01), providing evidence of gender matching.    
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Previous studies have found that CEOs tend to recommend the appointment of 
people who are demographically similar to them (Tinsley et al., 2017; Westphal & Zajac, 
1995). Thus, group dynamics in the composition of a board that has occurred 
endogenously are different to those where the composition has been influenced by an 
external event, such as quotas or targets. In a board of directors, the level of influence of 
each member to the organizational strategy depends on their position on the board as 
executive (operational) or (independent) non-executive directors (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). 
Empirical evidence (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013) suggests that quotas have an effect on 
increasing non-executive directors, .046 (p<.001); however, they have a negative, non-
significant effect on increasing executive directors, -.039 (p>.10).  Similarly, the effect of 
comply or explain approaches had on increasing non-executive populations was .033 
(p<.001); however, the effect on non-executive directors was almost negligible and non-
significant, .01 (p>.10).  Non-executive directors are thought to be better monitors of 
management, often bring unique perspectives to the board, and provide connections to the 
external environment (Financial Reporting Council, 2016, p. 9). However, they are not 
knowledgeable of the day-to-day challenges of delivering the corporate strategy.  
Evidence suggests that non-executive board members rarely initiate the substantive 
content of strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  
Empirical evidence had suggested the existence of systematic bias in director 
assignment that disadvantages women as they do not get assigned to executive 
committees. However, Peterson and Philpot (2007) analyzed a sample of Fortune 500 
firms and a wide range of organizational, director-personal, and environmental 
characteristics to find if such gender bias in director appointment existed. Their study 
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found no evidence of bias, which was consistent with resource dependence theory, 
organizations seek the linkages they need for their desired outcomes.  Research has 
indicated that CEO appointment is strongly linked to the relationship of candidates with 
the existing CEO and their organizational tenure (Wiersema, Nishimura, & Suzuki, 2018).  
In fact, according to a leading international executive search organization, members of 
executive boards who get appointed to the executive committee of a board are the 
strongest candidates for a chief executive succession (Odgers-Berndtson, 2018).  A study 
(Elsaid & Ursel, 2011) that analyzed CEO successions of 679 American firms, and found 
that the likelihood of appointment a female CEO increased with a greater percentage of 
women on the board, .099 (p<.05).  Furthermore, literature has found that different roles 
within boards, such as chairperson, executive director, and non-executive director impact 
within group dynamics (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005) and have different effects on 
organizational outcomes irrespective of the total percentage of women on the board 
(Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015).   
The reform in the U.K. CGC has resulted in a need for balanced boards in relation 
to their independence; therefore, the number of executive directors has considerably 
decreased in the past decade (Alkalbani, 2017). However, the introduction of the Davies 
Review may also impact the proportion of executive and non-executive directors.  
Evidence from the Norway quota law suggests that the initiative had an impact on the 
disproportionate appointments of independent non-executive directors.  In the time period 
between the announcement of the Norway quota law (2003) and the time of its 
enforcement (2008), board independence on Norwegian boards increased from 46% to 
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67%, which was directly related to the fact that 84% of female directors are independent, 
compared with 50% of male independent directors (Bohren & Staubo, 2013).  
Research that evaluated the effectiveness of quotas and comply and explain 
approaches using data from 40 countries, 29 of which were OECD, including the United 
Kingdom, found a statistically significant (p<.001) and practically significant (R2=.27 for 
full sample, R2=.36 for OECD-only sample) positive effect of quotas and comply or 
explain initiatives on the increase of women’s representation on corporate boards.  
Quotas resulted in a 5.22 (p<.01) percentage points increase (5.48 percentage points for 
the OECD-only sample) and comply or explain measures resulted in 2.15 (p<.01) 
percentage points increase (2.31 percentage points for OECD-only sample).  However, 
findings could not confirm any trickle down effects of either initiative on other levels of 
management and suggested that more detailed analyses of those effects were needed 
(Fortin, Bell, & Bohm, 2017). 
Board Homogeneity and Critical Mass 
In order to hypothesize the effect of WOB on any organizational outcomes, one 
must assume that there are differences between women and men in those positions.  In 
fact, much of the literature reviewed in this study focuses on differences based on gender. 
Some empirical studies have found that differences do exist between men and women at 
the board level.  Adams and Funk (2012) found that women tend to be more benevolent 
and universalistic than men, which is consistent with social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 
2012), as those are communal characteristics.  Similarly, studies found that women are 
more likely to be compassionate for vulnerable groups (Huddy, Cassese, & Lizotte, 2008).  
Women have also been found to be more supportive of addressing economic inequalities 
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that favor disadvantaged groups (Crowder-Meyer, 2007).  Conversely, some studies 
found that women in top positions of leadership are more agentic behaviors even than 
men (Luckerath-Rovers et al., 2013). However, their agentic behavior was suggested to 
be the response to discrimination that women may experience in male-dominated 
organizations (Derks et al., 2016).   
Consistent with role incongruity theory of female leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002), 
the association of gender to leadership roles disadvantages women as they are perceived 
as being less deserving of positions of power, which are associated with men.  Research 
suggests that there are negative effects associated with being a member of a perceived 
lower status out-group, such as lower support, lower evaluations (Hoyt & Simon, 2016; 
Rice & Barth, 2016), and being excluded and marginalized (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 
2014), which can impede women’s contributions (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn,1999).  To 
that end, empirical evidence has suggested that despite higher numerical representation, 
at any percentage of representation, women speak substantially less than men in 
deliberative groups.  An experimental study (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, & Shaker, 2012) 
that examined the effects of women’s descriptive representation on their voice and power 
found that at different levels of representation, in deliberative groups, women spoke 
significantly less than men.  Using a sample of 470 participants, divided into groups in 
which women were represented in numbers from 0 to 5, where participants, in average 
deliberated for 25 minutes, the average participant’s proportion of speech was .207 
(p<.001).  In most mixed-gender group combinations, women’s proportion of speech was 
significantly lower than men’s (.084, p<.001), except when they were a large majority in 
a group with several women (.011, p<.10), or in an all-female group (.051, p<.10). The 
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gender gap in speech was directly linked to the gender gap in influence and authority. 
Group participants who held the floor for a greater percentage of time in the deliberation, 
were perceived as more influential.  The gender gap in speech participation was 
statistically, 1.443 (p<.01) and practically significantly (R2=.15) related to the gender gap 
in influence (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, & Shaker, 2012).  Consequently, it is unclear how 
women’s increased minority representation would help them overcome biases and 
expectations associated to their gender.   
Researchers have evaluated the conditions in which women can overcome the 
social identity threat that women experience in a male-dominated environment.  
Acknowledging that the factors that enable WOB to impact their organizations are not 
well known, scholars have examined the influence of token women and critical mass of 
WOB to evaluate if the effects of WOB stem from numerical differences.  To that end, 
theoretically grounded on critical mass theory, empirical studies have examined board 
dynamics when one, two, and three or more women served on boards and found that it 
takes three women on a corporate board for women to not be seen as outsiders and be 
able to influence board processes and discussions more substantially (Konrad, Kramer & 
Erkut, 2008; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011).  Empirical 
evidence of a positive relationship between critical mass of WOB and different financial 
(Joecks et al., 2013) and non-financial outcomes (Skaggs et al., 2012; Torchia et al., 
2011; Zhang et al., 2012) provide some evidence that supports the premise that three 
WOB constitute critical mass.   
Konrad and colleagues (2008) interviewed 50 Fortune 1000 female directors to 
understand the experiences and inquire whether representation in numbers made a 
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difference.  The authors concluded that from the directors’ perspective, three or more 
women constituted critical mass.  Their findings indicated that with two women on a 
board, women tend to keep their distance from each other due to concerns of being 
perceived as conspirators.  However, those concerns disappeared with three or more 
women, as women felt more comfortable being associated with one another and felt more 
comfortable raising issues.   Analyzing a sample of 838 German firms grouped in 
function of their percentage of WOB, Joecks and colleagues (2013) found support for a 
non-linear relationship of WOB and return on equity. Their findings showed that the 
group of 394 firms with all-male boards had an average 9.6 return on equity.  The group 
of 360 firms with female representation up to 20%, had a statistically significantly lower 
return on equality, 7.7 (p<.05) compared to the all-male group.  Conversely, groups with 
WOB in the range of 20% to 40% (n=79) and greater than 40% (n=5), had average 
returns of 12.3 and 12.4, respectively.  Controlling for a vector of covariates, the authors 
concluded that the statistically significant effect of the quadratic regression coefficient 
(21.14, p<.10), which was a different sign from the linear term (-18.21, p<.10), provided 
support for a curved relationship of the variables.  The turning point of the curve was at 
around 10% of WOB and the increase in return on equity started at around 30% of WOB, 
indicating that 30% was critical mass. 
Torchia and colleagues (2011) conducted tests on a sample of 317 Norwegian 
firms, to identify the effects of one, two, and three women on organizational innovation 
and board strategic tasks.  Their findings provided support for the effect of three women 
as critical mass of WOB on organizational innovation, which was found to be statistically 
(.50, p<.05) and practically (R2=.09) significant.   Their study also provided support for 
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the relationship of WOB and board strategic tasks, which was statistically (.72, p<.01) 
and practically (R2=.15) significant.  However, the effects on organizational innovation of 
one (.28; p>.10, r=-.03) and two (.31; p>.10; r=.03) WOB were neither statistical, nor 
practically significant.  Similarly, the effects on board strategic tasks of one (.28; p>.10; 
r=.01), and two (.17; p>.10; r=.09) WOB were neither statistical, nor practically 
significant.  
Cook and Glass (2017) examined the relationship of gender composition on 
boards and corporate social responsibility indicators (i.e., community strengths, corporate 
governance strengths, product strengths, and environmental strengths) using a sample of 
Fortune 500 firms over the 2001 through 2010 period. Results of their study indicated a 
statistically significant linear relationship of WOB on three measures of CSR examined, 
community (.54, p<.05), corporate governance (.86, p<.01), and environment (.72, 
p<.001).  The relationship of WOB and product (.42, p>.05) was not statistically 
significant.   However, Pearson correlations for the four measures of CSR, community 
(r=.30, p<.01), corporate governance, (r=.23, p<.01), product (r=.16, p<.01), and 
environmental (r=22, p<.01), indicated that the relationships were practically significant.  
The authors compared the findings of effect of boards with one or two women to all-male 
boards on the four CSR measures, and found that boards with one or two women 
performed significantly better than all male boards on community (.47, p<.05), corporate 
governance (.84, p<.01), and environment (.76, p<.001).  Furthermore, the authors tested 
differences between the effects of one and two to the effect of critical mass (i.e., three 
women) on the four CSR measures, and found that greater number of women enhanced 
the effect on community (.30, p<.05) and corporate governance (.30, p<.05) indicators; 
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however, it did not enhance the effect on the environmental indicator (.02, p>.05).  Their 
findings underscored the importance of female representation on boards to CSR, and 
challenged the assumption that token women are unable to influence their organizations 
differently than in critical mass representation.   
Similarly, Luckerath-Rovers (2013) examined the financial performance of 99 
listed Dutch organizations with and without women on their boards in the 2005 to 2007 
period.  Their findings indicated that the presence (i.e., dummy variable) of WOB had a 
positive effect on return on equity (10.2, p<.01), and a large effect size (r=.34).  The 
percentage of WOB was also found to be statistically (50.6, p<.05) and practically 
significant (r=.33).  The study also tested return on sales, return on invested capital and 
earnings before interest and tax; however, p-values greater than .10 indicated that WOB 
did not have a statistically significant effect on any of them. Additionally, bivariate 
correlations ranging from .05 to .17 were not statistically significant, suggesting weak 
relationships of the variables. Although their findings provided some evidence of the 
linear relationship of WOB and return on equity, which suggests that the effect increases 
in relation to the proportion of WOB, the statistical significance of the dummy variable 
for WOB indicated that even token women had an effect on the outcome. However, a 
weakness of their study is that it did not control for board independence, organizational 
characteristics, or any director characteristics other than gender. 
Relationship of WOB and Opportunities for Other Women 
Scholars have suggested that there is a belief that women in top leadership 
positions will reduce gender inequality in lower levels (Ferreira, 2015; Skaggs et al., 
2012).  This belief is founded on the assumption that inequality is perpetuated by men but 
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not women; thus, the expectation that women in leadership will help their juniors (Derks 
et al., 2016).  However, existing literature has produced mixed findings.  Some studies 
found support for a positive relationship between women’s representation among 
corporate boards and executive leadership, and employees’ perceptions of lower 
workplace gender segregation (Stainback, Kleiner, & Skaggs, 2016).  Similarly, in a 
South Korean context (N=1596), Stainback and Kown (2012) found support for the 
relationship of women in management and lower levels of gender segregation (b=-.187, 
p<.01), suggesting that as women’s managerial representation increases, gender 
segregation declines. However, the opposite effect was found in the relationship of 
women in lower management and segregation at lower levels (b=.066, p<.10). 
Controlling for a number of organizational and environmental control variables, their 
model was practically significant (R2=.33).  Overall, their findings provided some support 
for the assumption that women’s representation in managerial may help reduce gender 
inequality in lower levels. Other studies have suggested a positive influence of WOB on 
managerial representation. Using a sample of 81 Texas-headquartered Fortune 1000 firms, 
with 5679 establishments, Skaggs and colleagues (2012) found that WOB were positively 
associated with women’s managerial opportunities, particularly when representation 
exceeds 15%.  At the mean representation of WOB (i.e., 10%), compared to men, women 
were .11 times likely to have a managerial job; however, at the maximum value of WOB 
(i.e., 35%), the likelihood of women getting managerial jobs increased to .386 (p<.01).  
Multiple studies have found a positive relationship between women in leadership 
and increased opportunities for other women in lower ranks. Using data for 744,531 
individual observations from over 4000 private sector firms in Norway, a study found 
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that greater female representation in top layers of leadership narrowed the gender gap in 
promotions at lower ranks (Kunze & Miller, 2015).  Kunze and Miller’s (2015) study 
tested the effects the proportion of women at the next higher rank and the proportion 
female peers on the likelihood of promotions for women.  Their findings suggested that a 
higher proportion of women in the next higher rank had a statistically and practically 
significant effect on increasing the likelihood of external, .015, p<.001, R2=.088, and 
internal, .016 (p<.001), R2=.75, promotions for women.  However, the proportion of 
female peers had a negative effect in the likelihood of internal, -.067 (p<.01), and 
external, .060 (p<.001), promotions for women.  
Similarly, using data from publicly traded S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2009, 
Matsa and Miller (2011) examined the relationship of WOB and the gender of the top 
five executives for the firms in the sample.  Their findings indicated that for each 10 
percentage-point increase of non-executive female directors, the likelihood of having any 
women in top-five executives of the firm increased by .86 (p<.01), and for each 10 
percentage-point increase of WOB, including executive and non-executive directors, the 
likelihood of having women in the top five executives increased by 1.5 (p<.01). Both 
relationships were practically significant (R2=.65).  Similarly, the likelihood of 
appointing a female CEO increased by .16 (p<.05) percentage points for each 10 
percentage-point increase of non-executive WOB, and by .40 (p<.001) percentage points 
for each 10-percentage point increase of WOB. The effect size for both relationships was 
large (R2=.76).  Their findings suggested a positive effect from WOB on opportunities for 
women at the executive level, their findings also revealed differences in the influence of 
non-executive and executive directors.  Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012) reported 
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in an analysis of over 20,000 large private sector firms from 1990 to 2003 that an 
increase in the percentage of female top managers was associated with subsequent 
increases in the percentage of women in midlevel management.  The cumulative effect in 
the six-year period was .088 (p<.001), and the effect was small (R2=.021). 
Conversely, Blau and DeVaro’s (2007) study found a negative relationship 
between women’s representation in higher organizational levels and the advancement of 
women in lower positions.  Using cross-sectional survey data from 1826 individuals in 
U.S. organizations, their findings revealed that women had lower promotion rates than 
men (.-22 - .31, ps<.05).  Compared with the mean 9% promotion rate, an effect of 2.2% 
to 3.1% was found to be practically significant.  Additionally, the probability was not 
significantly affected by the interaction of the employee’s and supervisor’s genders (Blau 
& DeVaro, 2007). Similarly, using data from a large retail organization in the United 
States, a study (Giuliano, Levine, & Leonard, 2005) found the managers’ gender did not 
have an effect on promotion opportunities for women in the organization (.976, p>.10).  
Moreover, some studies have found that when women are in a context in which 
they are underrepresented, they do not only refrain from supporting policies that benefit 
women, but actively impede the upwards advancement of other women (Derks et al., 
2011; Kaiser & Spalding, 2015). Derks and colleagues (2011) examined a sample of 94 
female executives in The Netherlands.  Their findings indicated that female executives 
reported their perception of other women’s career commitment as compared to their own 
career commitment to be much lower, B = −0.31, SE = .11, (p=.005), the effect was 
practically significant (r2=.07).  Notably, women who reported large differences between 
them other women also reported a larger degree that they had experienced discrimination 
 126 
due to their gender, B = 0.60, SE = .16, (p<.001).  Kaiser and Spalding (2015) used a 
sample of 42 individuals in U.S.-based educational institution to conduct an experimental 
study about the role of gender identification in women’s support for other women.  Their 
findings indicated that gender identification predicted whether women were more likely 
to kick or to lift their fellow women, b=.26, t(39)=2.08, p=.044. In a context in which 
women were underrepresented, relative to strongly identified women, weakly identified 
women were more likely to hinder the advancement of other women.  Gender 
identification also positively predicted greater helpfulness toward female relative to 
subordinates, b=.25, t(91) = 2.02, p=.046.  
Additionally, when it comes to women’s issues, including attitudes toward equal 
roles in business, government, and industry, women and men’s opinions were found to be 
quite similar (Clawson & Oxley, 2012, p. 205).  Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
gender differences depend on the social context (Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994).  
An experimental study that examined similarities and differences of gender and status on 
the use of power strategies and demonstrated in high status positions men and women 
used similar power strategies (Keshet et al., 2006), which indicates that in senior 
leadership, men and women are more similar than different. Keshet and colleagues 
(2006) examined differences in between men and women in high and low status roles in 
relation to a number of power strategies (i.e., coercion, reward, reciprocity, information, 
expertise, and dependence).  Their findings revealed that gender difference in power 
usage was significant for low status, t(72) = 2.49, p<0.05, but not for high status t(72) = 
0.38, p>.10. The authors concluded that gender differences and similarities were 
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situationally contingent, which is consistent with social role theory that suggests that 
occupational roles override gender roles (Eagly & Wood, 2000).  
One of the reasons women may not help other women advance is that both 
women and men are sometimes in denial of the existence of discrimination against 
women (Stephens & Levine, 2011).  Research has demonstrated that not all women 
acknowledge the existence of discrimination (Crosby, 2017), as women who have 
achieved success in their career may not have had the same experiences most women 
have had (Radke, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2016).  Furthermore, scholars have suggested that 
to a great degree, directors are not representative of the population (Ferreira, 2015). 
Consequently, their personal experiences make it more difficult for them to understand 
the barriers faced by other women (Stroebe, Ellemers, Barreto, & Mummendey, 2009).   
Stroebe and colleagues (2009) conducted two studies using a population of 
students in The Netherlands.  Their study found that participants who had experienced 
rejection (M=4.18, SD=1.27) admitted significantly more personal threat than those who 
experienced acceptance (M=3.40, SD =1.09), F(1, 73)=8.07, p<.01, h2= .10.  Also, t-tests 
indicated that when personal and group-level treatment were incongruent (i.e., 
acceptance/group disadvantage), participants attributed personal acceptance to their 
personal characteristics rather than their group, t(18)=4.94, p< .001. Moreover, their 
gender differentiation tests indicated that participants in the acceptance condition 
(M=4.57, SD =1.27) differentiated themselves more from the in-group than rejected (M 
=3.13, SD=1.42) participants, F(1, 73)=25.45, p<.001, h2=.26.  Furthermore, participants 
in the acceptance/group advantage condition, differentiated themselves more from the in-
group than those in the rejection/group disadvantage condition, t(73)= 4.32, p< .001.  
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Their findings provided evidence in support that people differentiate themselves more 
from their group when there is a positive personal outcome for them.  
Moreover, interaction with people from different social groups has been 
associated with reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006); however, it also reduces 
group identification of members of the historically disadvantaged group, as well as their 
perceptions of injustice and hinder their collective action (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & 
Durrheim, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).  Consequently, it is plausible that WOB 
interaction with other board members may reduce their perception of discrimination 
against women and cause them to not advocate on their behalf.  Studies have found that 
while some women are not aware of gendered structures, the majority of women are 
aware; however, they are either unable or unwilling to act on them (Bierema, 2015).   
The belief that status in society is the result of merit causes individuals to find 
differences with others so that they can justify the status inequalities (McCoy & Major, 
2005).  In positions of high power, women tend to look at the differences between them 
and other women and perceive themselves as non-prototypical (Faniko et al., 2016).  
Compared to men, women leaders tend to have more gender-biased perceptions of other 
women’s commitment to their careers, which causes them to distance themselves from 
other women (Ellemers, Van Den Heuvel, Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004; Mavin, 2008).  
A recent publication of two studies performed in Switzerland found that women leaders 
did not identify with women who prioritized their families.  Additionally, they perceived 
themselves as being more masculine than them, and were unwilling to promote measures 
to support them (Faniko et al., 2016). Women leaders’ belief that the system is fair, and 
that other women have not achieved the success they have achieved because other 
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women are less committed can cause them to be less supportive of programs that promote 
gender equality (Ng & Chiu, 2001).  
Studies that examined the effects of WOB that were the result of a quota or target 
have provided mixed findings for the link of higher female representation and lower 
gender inequality for other women (Matsa & Miller, 2011; Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011).  
Evaluations of the Norway quota law did not find robust evidence that the quota reform 
benefited other women in organizations subject to the quota. Bertrand and colleagues 
(2018) found that the reform did not introduce a systematic improvement in female 
representation in the C-suites of corporations, and that any improvements for women 
were concentrated among the women directly affected by the reform, that is female board 
directors. Similarly, a study that evaluated the effects of different quotas and comply or 
explain approaches that targeted corporate boards, found that they had a significant effect 
on the increase of WOB, but did not have an effect on the increase of other women in 
management (Fortin et al., 2017).  Furthermore, using data from S&P 1500 organizations, 
a recent study found evidence of the existence of implicit quotas for women in top 
management (Dezso, Gaddis-Ross, & Uribe, 2015).  Dezso and colleagues (2015) found 
that the presence of a woman in top management was negatively associated with the 
contemporaneous presence of another woman in top management in that organization (-
51%, p<.05).  Additionally, their findings indicated that women in top management had 
negative spillover effects for women in top professional positions (52.29%, p<.05).  
Consequently, the authors concluded that it appeared that organizations made an effort to 
keep a small number of women in top, visible, positions; however, their efforts were 
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significantly smaller or there was even resistance to improve women’s representation in 
lower levels.  
Relationship of WOB and the Gender Pay Gap 
The gender pay gap is one of the areas in which the EU has had the most 
legislative influence (Fagan & Rubery, 2018).  Fulfilling the Coalition Government’s 
pledge of promoting equal pay (HM Government, 2010, p. 18), and facing pressures from 
the EU to improve transparency of the gender pay gap, in 2015, the British Prime 
Minister set out his objective to “end the gender pay gap in a generation” by announcing 
compulsory gender pay gap reporting for all employers with more than 250 employees, 
effective April 2017.  Part of the reasoning behind the initiative was that making the 
gender pay gap reports public would create pressure on employers and drive women’s 
wages up (Prime Minister, July 11, 2015).  Research has suggested that accountability 
can help reduce gender bias (Foschi, 1996).  Moreover, when people are aware that their 
actions are being monitored, it can help reduce discriminatory behavior (Castilla, 2008). 
The increased representation of WOB, through the intervention of the 
government-backed Davies Review, was an effort to help build a fairer society, and 
“banish gender inequality” (Davies, 2015, p. 27). However, after almost half a century of 
legislation that prohibits discrimination in wages on the basis of sex (Equal Pay Act, 
1970), the gender pay gap still exists today. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in 
France over the 2006 to 2014 period, Reberioux and Roudaut (2016) examined the effects 
of the gender quota on the gender pay gap for directors.  Their findings revealed that the 
gender quota resulted in an increase in the gender pay gap from 3.5% (p<.001) before the 
quota to 5.7% (p<.001) after the quota.  Additionally, in Norway, the quota law increased 
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the representation of WOB to almost 40%; however, it did not have an effect on reducing 
the gender pay gap.  According to the Work Economic Forum (2017), in Norway – 
ranked third on the Global Gender Gap Index –, for every $1 a woman earns, a man earns 
$1.27 in average. Those statistics indicate that since the enforcement of the quota law, 
women are now more disadvantaged in terms of pay, than they were almost ten years ago.  
These studies raise some questions related to the legitimacy of women’s representation at 
the board level as a way to address gender inequality beyond descriptive representation 
for women in the workforce. 
Similarly, other studies have examined the boards of FTSE indexed organizations 
in the 2001 to 2012 period in the United Kingdom found strong evidence of a gender pay 
gap in the remuneration of non-executive directors (Goh & Gupta, 2016), which supports 
the argument of a perceived lower value of women on the basis of gender.  Goh and 
Gupta (2016) found that within firm variation in the pay of non-executive directors 
explained by gender. Female non-executive directors earned 5% (p<.001) less than their 
male counterparts, which was a practically significant effect size.  A similar effect was 
found between firms, .05 (p<.001). Similar findings were reported using a sample from 
111 German publicly listed firms in the 2009 to 2016 period (Bozhinov, Koch, & Schank, 
2017).  Bozhinov and colleagues (2017) examined pay differentials of employee board 
representatives by gender, and found evidence of a 16% (p<.001) gap. The effect of the 
unconditional model for the gender pay gap explained only by gender was practically 
significant (R2=.136).  After controlling for committee membership and organizational 
characteristics, findings revealed that men were more likely than women to be appointed 
to presidential (.139, p<.001), audit (.276, p<.001), compensation (.207, p<.001), strategy 
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(.111, p<.001) and mediation (.162, p<.001) committees.  Women were only more likely 
to be appointed to the nomination committee (-.018, p>.05), however the effect was small 
(i.e., less than 2%) and not statistically significant.  Including the different committees to 
the model explained only by gender, the variance explained by the model increased 
(R2=.795). The study provided evidence that in addition to a gender pay gap, women 
were being appointed to less important board positions. Examining the effects of women 
in leadership on the gender wage gap in U.S. organizations, Srivastava and Sherman 
(2015) found evidence that the female gender explained a variance of 16% (p<.05) in 
salary, and that reporting to a female manager decreased wages by an additional 4.4% 
(p<.05) for men and women. Women who reported to women earned 1.4% (p<.05) less 
than other employees.  Additionally, relative to men who switched from working for a 
female manager to a male manager, women who made the same switch were predicted to 
earn 1.4% (p<.05) less than men.  The authors attributed this finding to competitive or 
collective threat women in leadership may experience from other women’s career 
ascension.  
Some studies have found support for the relationship of women in management 
and the reduction of the gender pay gap.  In U.S.-based firms, greater representation of 
women in management was associated with a reduction of the gender pay gap, moderated 
by rank, where the presence of women in higher ranks strengthen the reduction of the 
gender pay gap (Cohen & Huffman, 2007). Using a U.S. data, Cohen and Huffman 
(2007) examined differences in the gender pay gap in function of female representation in 
higher ranks in the restaurant industry.  Their findings indicated a higher proportion of 
female managers in high status positions increased gender wage equality (r=.42, p<.05); 
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however, female managers in low status positions decreased gender wage equality (r=-
.11, p>.10). Additionally, their study found that the effect of gender on the pay gap was -
12% (p<.001), indicating that women made approximately 88% of men’s wages.  Their 
study found that the percentage of female managers had a negative effect on the wage 
gap (.02, p>.05). However, differences between low (-.27, p<.001) and high (.327, 
p<.001) status of female managers indicated that status had a moderating role in the 
relationship of the percentage of women in management and wage parity, indicating that 
higher representation of women in high status management changed the direction of the 
relationship.  
Other studies have also suggested that women in management may help reduce 
the gender pay gap. Matsa and Miller (2011) found that women in top leadership earned 
significantly higher salaries in organizations with a female CEO in large U.S.-based 
organizations (.016, p<.05), and the female share of pay for executives increased at a 
higher rate than the increase in the share of female board members.  The rate of increase 
of women non-executives was .022 (p<.001) and the rate of increase in female executives’ 
pay was .025 (p<.001), which indicated that a higher proportion of non-executive WOB 
may be contributing to closing the pay gap at the executive level. Similar findings for all 
WOB indicated that the total increase of WOB, .039 (p<.001) was lower than the increase 
in pay for female executives explained by the total percentage of WOB, .059, (p<.001). 
The authors suggested that the convergence in the pay gap for top executives may be 
attributable to the increase of WOB.  Similarly, using data from the Italian workforce, a 
study (Flabbi, Macis, Moro, & Schivardi, 2014) found a positive influence of female 
CEOs on reducing the gender pay gap for female employees in the upper quartile of a 
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distribution, 7.2% (p=.027) and increased the gender pay gap for employees in the bottom 
quartile, -3.6% (p=.10).  The percentage of women in top leadership resulted in an 
increase on wages for employees the higher ranks but a decrease in wags for employees 
in lower ranks.  The sample was divided in deciles based on wages.  Findings indicated 
that for each 10% of female representation in the executive level, an increase of 7.9% in 
wages was found, which indicated that for the mean of 26.2% of female representation in 
executive leadership, an increase of 20.7% (p<.001) in wages for the upper decile could 
be expected.  However, a decrease of 3% (p=.10) was found for the lowest decile. The 
impact of female CEOs or female executives was only positive in the upper part of the 
wage spectrum. The mixed findings with regard to the effects of women in management 
roles on the gender pay indicate that the relationship is not well-understood.    
Hypotheses Support 
Natural Experiments 
Natural experiments are observational studies in which the experiment and control 
conditions happen either by nature or other factors outside the researcher’s control. They 
represent an opportunity for improving causal inferences in the social sciences, 
particularly as research design innovations, such as RD, create situations that are as good 
as random true experiments (Dunning, 2011). In natural experiments it is the research 
design, rather than the statistical modelling that makes them compelling (Dunning, 2011).  
In natural experiments, quantitative analysis can be simple and transparent. Such is the 
case of the regression discontinuity (RD) design, in which to estimate the causal effect, a 
comparison of the average outcomes of the treatment and comparison group suffices. 
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However, detailed qualitative information on the circumstances that created the natural 
experiment is essential for natural experiments to be fully compelling. 
Regression Discontinuity Design  
Regression discontinuity (Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960) designs are a type of 
natural experiment in which individuals – or any other type of unit – are assigned to 
treatment and comparison groups based on whether they are above or below a given 
threshold on an assignment variable, also known as forcing variable. Although group 
assignment in RD designs is not random, there is an expectation that around the threshold, 
assignment is as good as random.  As good as random assumptions require that 
observations around the threshold are equal in their expectation of potential confounders.  
In practice, researches may seek to control for potential confounders in research-design 
choices, or with statistical controls.   
For example, a study that used an RD design to estimate the effects of extended 
benefits on unemployment duration.  Lalive (2006) hypothesized that the Austrian 
government’s initiative to increase unemployment benefits, in certain regions, from 30 
weeks to 209 weeks for job seekers aged 50 or older would increase the duration the 
individuals remained unemployed.  To test their hypothesis, using a population of 
individuals who were entering unemployment, Lalive (2006) used age as the assignment 
variable with age 50 being the threshold to compare differences in unemployment 
duration between individuals above and below the threshold.  However, one cannot 
simply assume that differences between groups were caused by extended benefits for 
unemployment duration.   
 136 
Regression discontinuity designs must control for potential confounders in the 
design and through statistical controls (Dunning, 2011). Differences between the 
treatment and comparison groups could be caused by confounding factors – such as 
industry, the economic environment of the time.  For example, in the design of the study, 
the authors focused on the non-steel industry because the industry was going through 
restructuring at the time; thus, it had different unemployment insurance regime.  
Additionally, employees that had been laid off from a steel plant and lived close to the 
plant but away from another city may not have the same opportunities to find 
employment as individuals who live close to a border with another city.  Similarly, 
individuals may not be equal in their expectation of receiving benefits as extended 
benefits were only available for individuals who had not exhausted their unemployment 
benefits prior to that. Consequently, all those factors were controlled in the design by 
excluding unemployed individuals who were laid off form the steel industry, cities that 
were isolated that not close to another city were also excluded.  Additionally, statistical 
controls were used in the study by including gender, family situation, education, skill 
level, and previous industry experience.  
Consequently, differences at the threshold can compellingly establish a causal 
relationship, as the design controls for potential confounders and statistical controls are 
included.  Multiple studies have successfully used RD designs to establish causal effects 
of a treatment in similar manners, in education (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Papay, Murnane, 
& Willett, 2014), corporate governance (Black, Hang, & Kim, 2006; Flammer, 2015; 
Mullins, 2014; Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2014).  The equivalence across potential 
confounders or baseline covariates indicates that at the threshold differences between 
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outcomes for individuals in the treatment and comparison groups can be attributed to the 
treatment.  This is particularly the case in non-parametric designs, in which the estimated 
treatment effect is calculated from observations within the limits to each side of the 
threshold or cutoff score, which is the preferred approach in regression discontinuity 
designs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Van der 
Klaauw, 2008).  
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition Hypotheses 
The first set of hypotheses are theoretically underpinned by Resource Dependence 
Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that posits that organizations seek the best resources 
for the organization.  Therefore, as the Davies Review created a need for women to reach 
the 25% target, gender became a valuable resource for organizations.  Empirical studies 
in different contexts have provided support for the positive effects of quotas and targets 
in increasing the proportion of WOB (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bertrand et al., 2018; 
Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2018; Fortin et al., 2017).  Previous research evaluated the 
effectiveness of quotas and comply and explain approaches using data several countries, 
including the United Kingdom.  Their findings indicated that from 2006 to 2009, comply 
or explain approaches resulted in a 2.31% increase of WOB, and quotas resulted in a 
5.48% increase higher than countries that did not have any type of initiatives for 
increasing WOB (Fortin et al., 2017).   
Although the Davies Review only targeted FTSE 350 organizations, previous 
studies found evidence of placebo effects from quotas on groups that were not directly 
targeted by WOB initiatives (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; 
Grosvold et al., 2007). This was attributed to the expectation or assumption that quotas or 
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targets may target other groups.  After the quota law was introduced in Norway, a 
dramatic increase in the percentage of WOB was identified in Sweden and Finland prior 
to 2007, where boards doubled percentage of WOB without the introduction of 
legislation (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013).  Similarly, in the United Kingdom, an 
acceleration in the increase of female appointments to FTSE 100 boards was identified in 
the 2001 to 2005 period (Grosvold et al., 2007).   However, placebo effects were not 
found across other European countries. In fact, those were exceptions to the slow increase 
of female representation experienced in other countries.  Furthermore, empirical evidence 
suggests the existence of gender matching effects in director selection, which indicate 
that board members are likely to be replaced with new members of the same gender 
(Tinsley et al., 2017). Therefore, as the FTSE Small Cap group is the natural control 
group for the initiative, it is plausible that the introduction of the Davies Review on FTSE 
350 boards had a placebo effect on FTSE Small Cap boards. However, empirical 
evidence indicates that board male board members are likely to be replaced with other 
male directors.   
Accordingly, the first set of hypotheses predicted that the Davies Review would 
increase the percentage of WOB for FTSE 350 boards.  Additionally, to test for the 
presence of a placebo effect from the Davies Review, the FTSE Small Cap group was 
tested.  
H1a:  The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 100 organizations.  
H1b:  The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 250 organizations. 
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H1c:  The Davies Review initiative will not impact the percentage of WOB of 
non-compliant FTSE Small Cap organizations. 
The second set of hypotheses predicted a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors.  Grounded on expectation states 
theory (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004), gender as status explains that inequalities are 
perpetuated through those in power who seek to hold on to their advantage by keeping 
women in lower status roles.  Therefore, this theoretical perspective underpins the study’s 
predictions for the appointment of women to positions of less power.  Empirical findings 
of an examination of the effects of the Norway quota law found that board independence 
on Norwegian boards increased from 46% to 67% in the quota law period, which was 
directly related to the fact that 84% of female directors are independent, compared with 
50% of male independent directors (Bohren & Staubo, 2013). Similarly, other studies 
found that female directors were less likely to be appointed to less important positions on 
corporate boards (Bozhinov et al., 2017). The Norwegian quota resulted in a considerable 
increase of board independence that was directly related to the appointment of women to 
non-executive roles to meet the quota (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).   
H2a:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 100 boards.  
H2b:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 250 boards. 
H2c:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE Small Cap 
boards. 
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Empirical studies have found support for disproportionate increases of WOB less 
influential positions (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bozhinov et al., 2017; Steirstad & Opshal, 
2011).  Seirstad and Opshal (2011) found that despite the dramatic increase (i.e., more 
than 30 percentage points) in the percentage of WOB resulting from the Norwegian quota 
law, the percentage of female chair persons increased by less than one percentage point.  
Similarly, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) found that the Norwegian quota law decreased the 
proportion of women executive-directors and did not produced changes in appointments 
of women to CEO positions.  Similarly, other studies have found that CEO appointments 
are strongly linked to tenure (Wiersema et al., 2018) and the strongest candidates for 
those appointments are executive directors (Odgers-Berndtson, 2018).   
Accordingly, considering the limited supply of executive directors and empirical 
evidence that demonstrate that, in other contexts, the introduction of quotas has not 
increased the appointments of female CEO or chairpersons, this study hypothesized that 
FTSE 350 boards would increase their proportions of female directors disproportionately 
to the appointment of female CEOs and chairpersons.  The hypothesis was also tested in 
FTSE Small Cap boards; however, the prediction for that group was not expected to be 
significant, as they were not required to increase their number of female directors. 
H3a:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female 
executive directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE 350 boards.  
H3b:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female 
non-executive directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE 350 
boards. 
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H3c:  The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female executive 
directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE Small Cap boards. 
H3d:  The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female non-executive 
directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE Small Cap boards. 
Effects of Davies Review on Opportunities for Women Hypotheses 
The fourth and fifth sets of hypotheses are theoretically underpinned by critical 
mass theory (Kanter, 1977), which refers to the minimum amount of a women needed in 
a group for them to be able to overcome their minority status.  The hypotheses predict 
that critical mass of WOB will improve opportunities for other women in the 
organization and will reduce the gender pay gap.  These hypotheses rest on two 
assumptions; the first assumption is that women’s numerical representation is linked to 
their ability to influence organizational outcomes. Theoretically, in organizations and 
work groups, critical posits that heightened visibility from numerical minority status – 
women-  can produce a reaction.   
Empirical studies have provided evidence of a link between higher numerical and 
proportional representation of women in a group and their ability to influence a group 
(Karpowitz et al., 2012). Multiple research findings in the gender and corporate 
governance literature indicate that the minimum number of women needed for women to 
have influence on a board is about three women or 30% share (Joecks et al., 2013; 
Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011).  However, other studies have found that 
women’s influence on a board is not dependent on their numerical proportions; thus, even 
as tokens, women can and do influence boards (Cooks & Glass, 2017; Luckerath-Rovers, 
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2013).  The Davies Review provided the context for exploring if 25% constitutes critical 
mass in FTSE 350 boards.  
The second assumption for testing critical mass of WOB on opportunities for 
other women is that WOB intend to advocate on other women’s behalf.  Empirical 
evidence linking female representation on boards with opportunities for women at lower 
levels has produced mixed findings.  Several studies have found support for a positive 
link between WOB and managerial opportunities for women (Matsa & Miller, 2011; 
Skaggs et al., 2012).  Other studies have provided evidence for a positive association of 
women in leadership roles and increased opportunities for women at lower levels (Kunze 
& Miller, 2015; Kurtulus & Tomasovic-Devey, 2012). 
Conversely, findings of a study that examined the effects of the Norway quota law 
indicated that the quota law created a small elite of women directors but did not have a 
positive effect on opportunities for other women (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011). Existing 
literature has found that women in high status positions may not identify with other 
women (Faniko et al., 2016).  Particularly, in situations in which women see their group 
as disadvantaged, they tend to differentiate more from their group if their differentiation 
has a positive outcome for them (Stroebe et al., 2017). Additionally, some women in 
positions of power tend to have gender-biased perceptions about the career commitment 
of other women, and justify status differences on their perceived higher commitment to 
their career than other women’s. Consistently, some studies (Blau & DeVaro, 2007, 
Dezso et al., 2015; Giuliano et al., 2005) have found a negative relationship link between 
women’s representation in higher organizational levels and the advancement of women in 
lower positions.  Furthermore, studies have provided evidence that in some instances 
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women actively impede the advancement of other women (Derks et al., 2011; Kaiser & 
Spalding, 2015).   
The mixed findings related to what number or percentage of WOB constitutes 
critical mass indicate that there is not one definitive answer.  The Davies Review has 
provided the opportunity to explore critical mass of WOB at 25% representation.  
However, as empirical evidence has not provided strong relationship of the positive effect 
of women helping women, it is unlikely that at low levels of minority representation 
women may advocate for other women.  The prediction was tested on the pooled FTSE 
All Share sample.   
H4a:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will 
decrease the percentage of women in executive boards of FTSE All Share 
organizations.  
H4b:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will 
decrease the percentage of women in senior management of FTSE All 
Share organizations. 
H4c:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
impact the percentage of women in the workforce of FTSE All Share 
organizations.   
Effects of Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap Hypotheses 
Literature has demonstrated that British society values the labor of women lower 
than men by providing evidence of a longitudinal study in which a gender pay gap was 
identified at the time graduates entered the workforce, and increased as the careers 
progressed (Department for Education, 2008).  One of the reasons that contributes to 
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existence of this kind of discrimination is that it is tolerated by women (Auspurg et al., 
2017).  Empirical findings of a large study in U.S. organizations found that in addition to 
the existence of a pay gap explained by gender, reporting to a female manager increased 
the gender pay gap even more, the pay gap grew even more when women reported to 
women (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015).  Existing literature related to the effects of WOB 
on the gender pay gap has yielded mixed findings. Evidence from the quota law in France 
indicated that the quota law increased the gender pay gap for directors (Reberioux & 
Roudaut, 2016).  Additionally, despite a decade after achieving 40% of female 
representation in Norwegian corporate boards, the gender pay gap in Norway has 
increased (World Economic Forum, 2017).   
Studies have found that female CEOs and female executives were associated with 
reducing the gender pay gap only for employees in high ranks (i.e., top 10%); however, 
they were associated with increasing the gender pay gap for employees in low ranks (i.e., 
bottom 10%) (Flabbi et al., 2014). Similarly, in Norway, empirical studies have indicated 
that the introduction of legislation for increasing WOB in Norway did not decrease 
gender wage gap, except at the top of the labor market, which researchers argue could be 
the result of increased demand for women created by the quota law (Bertrand et al., 2018).  
Therefore, the predictions in the fifth set of hypotheses reflect the findings in 
existing literature that revealed a negative effect from WOB initiatives on the gender pay 
gap, and despite the gender gap narrowed in higher ranks, at lower ranks, the gap 
increased.  The fifth set of hypotheses tested the effect of 25% of WOB on the gender pay 
gap on the pooled FTSE All Share sample.  Additionally, it tested the effect of a large 
increase of WOB on the gender pay gap.  
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H5a: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
decrease the gender pay gap mean in FTSE All Share organizations.   
H5b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations. 
H5c: A large increase (Increase>12%) in the percentage of WOB resulting 
from the Davies Review will increase the gender pay gap median in FTSE 
All Share organizations. 
Summary of the Chapter 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provided a historical background of several 
events that have contributed to the current standing of women in British society.  
Theoretical perspectives related to gender systems were reviewed.  Additionally, theories 
related to corporate governance and gender diversity in corporate boards were reviewed. 
The literature review included different types of initiatives for increasing gender diversity 
on corporate boards and the rationales behind it.  This chapter also reviewed literature 
related to hypothesized relationships in this study and provided support for them. The 
chapter also included a review of literature that provided support for the methodology 
used in this study. An effort was made to provide a comprehensive review in terms of 
theoretical backgrounds, prior empirical research and issues associated with existing 
literature.  
The literature review revealed that women’s lower standing in the British 
workforce is the product of a long history built on patriarchal values, which have shaped 
their society.  It should be emphasized that several of the events and actions that 
produced the inequality were the result of what was believed to be just and right.   
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The fight for women’s rights and equality in the United Kingdom was not fought 
by women alone. The literature review identified that some men have also fought for the 
achievement of equality. Conversely, while some women in decision-making roles have 
used their power and influence to help other women; other women have rejected the 
existence of discrimination, for example Ms. Barbara Castle and Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, respectively. Additionally, despite their awareness of gendered structures, 
while some women are unable to advocate for other women, some women are unwilling 
to advocate for other women (Bierema, 2005).  Furthermore, empirical evidence has 
suggested that compared to men, women in leadership tend to have more gender-biased 
perceptions of other women’s commitment to their careers (Ellemers et al., 2004; Faniko 
et al., 2016).  However, researchers have challenged the expectation that women should 
help other women, and the responsibility placed on women leaders to help junior women, 
as it undermines women in leadership and perpetuates the status quo (Mavin, 2008).   
Several decades of legislation and advocacy for gender equality in society and the 
workplace have not resulted in gender parity. Therefore, policy-makers have targeted 
corporate boards to achieve gender equality using a top-down approach.  The assumption 
behind it is that inequality is perpetuated by men; therefore, adding more women to top 
positions will decrease discrimination for women in lower levels. However, despite the 
multiple countries that have enacted legislation, the assumption does not appear to be 
challenged. Although blatant discrimination has been almost eradicated through 
legislation that protects women from such cases, systematic discrimination, though subtle, 
continues to exist, and is masked with seemingly benevolent practices (Meyerson & 
Fletcher, 2000).  
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The lack of awareness of the effects of systematic bias in the workplace has 
contributed to discriminatory practices in which men are promoted more than women on 
the basis of merit. Multiple annual reports reviewed justified their low numbers of 
women claiming their selection process was based on merit (See Appendix B for excerpts 
from annual reports).  It is likely that they believe that because of the association of men 
with leadership, which makes men appear as better candidates for positions of power 
(Eagly & Karau, 2011). The fact that the Davies Review used the business case for WOB 
to argue the case for equal opportunity for women, which had already been won in the 
United Kingdom with the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) and internationally with the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission (1979), provides a snapshot of women’s 
lower standing in British society. Particularly, in a society in which traditionally, and 
historically, status and asymmetric power disadvantage women.  
Advocates promote WOB initiatives with support of the business case claiming 
that WOB will increase profitability and improve opportunities for other women 
(California Senate, 2017; Davies, 2011).  However, their claims distort or ignore 
scientific findings, thus they pose a risk to the achievement of the gender equality. Claims 
of increased financial performance resulting from the different measures of board 
diversity (percentage of women, number of women, presence of women) have 
inconsistent results, with some studies showing a positive relationship. However, the 
most rigorous studies have found that the relationship of WOB on financial performance 
is near zero (Pletzer et al., 2015; Post & Byron, 2015).  The risk of promoting an equality 
case through a contingent economic argument is contradictory to the theoretical 
grounding of social justice and may undermine the case for equality (Noon, 2007; 
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Sinclair, 2000).  Additionally, it provides moral justification for discrimination against 
women. Furthermore, it does not promote awareness of the discriminatory factors that 
have created the inequality.   
The targets for minimum representation of WOB can be explained by critimal 
mass theory (Kanter, 1977). Critical mass has been extensively explored in the corporate 
governance literature; however, numerical representation ignores asymetrical power and 
lower status associated with the female gender (Eagly & Karau, 2002), and it ignores 
differences in the positions within a board (Odgers-Oberton, 2018).  However, despite 
achieving critical mass of WOB, it is plausible, that consistent with literature, women at 
the highest leadership roles may conform to the masculine expectation of leadership 
(Ellemers et al., 2012; Luckerath-Rovers et al., 2013; Derks et al., 2011) and not 
represent the interests of other women (Derks et al., 2016). It is also plausible that, 
consistent with social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011), women have the same biases 
and attitudes toward women.   
Currently, the U.K. Government (Hampton-Alexander, 2016), organizations (30% 
Club, 2016), and the media are praising organizations for their diversity efforts by 
looking at gender composition at corporate boards level.  However, despite the 
importance of gender parity at boardroom level, directors of corporate boards represent a 
very small percentage of the population.  Measuring diversity in organizations looking at 
the top, most privileged layer ignores the existing disparities that affect the lives of 
millions of people in the workforce.  Evidence is not consistent with the expectation that 
a higher proportion of WOB will improve gender diversity efforts in the organization. 
Research has suggested that legislative efforts do not deliver equality unless they are 
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supported by well-established social mechanisms (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005).  
Changing social mechanisms would require a major transformation, which is uncommon, 
and requires activism. Nonetheless, social transformation has been seen in the past (Equal 
Franchise Act, 1928; Sexual Offences Act, 1967; Slavery Abolition Act, 1833).  What 
can be done organizationally, to move closer towards achieving gender equality would 
require restructuring, which requires acknowledging the gendered nature of the 
organization (Bierema, 2017).  Human resource development (HRD) is an applied field 
(Passmore, 1997; Turnbull, 2002), therefore its responsiveness to human and 
organizational needs should not be overlooked. 
 150 
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the design of the study.  It contains the following sections: 
introduction, purpose of the study, research hypotheses, design of the study, description 
of the population and sample, details about the data collection procedures, description of 
group comparisons, treatment of missing data, data analysis procedures, statistical 
assumptions, description of internal validity of the RD approach, hypotheses testing, and 
limitations. The chapter concludes with a summary.  
Purpose of the Study 
The study aimed to contribute to the understanding of the effects of government-
sponsored initiatives for increasing the participation on WOB on gender equality in the 
workplace.  To that end, using the case of the Davies Review, the recent initiative for 
WOB in the United Kingdom, this study examined its effects on changes in the board 
composition of FTSE 350 boards.  Additionally, using data from the FTSE All Share 
population, which includes FTSE 350 firms and FTSE Small Cap firms, this study used 
the 25% target set by the Davies Review to test the concept of critical mass of WOB on 
opportunities for other women measured as gender diversity at different hierarchical 
levels and as the gender pay gap. Using a regression discontinuity approach 
(Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960), this study aimed to provide causal claims of its 
findings to fill the gap in the literature for rigorous methodology.  
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Research Hypotheses 
The hypotheses have been developed to address shortcomings in the literature and 
increase the understanding of the effects of initiatives that promote boardroom gender 
diversity through exogenous events. There are three key predictions in this study: 1) at 
the micro level, the Davies Review increased female participation and changed the 
composition of FTSE 350 boards using a comply or explain approach, 2) at the mezzo 
level, that the Davies Review negatively impacted opportunities for other women within 
the FTSE 350 organizations, and 3) at the macro level, compliance to the Davies Review 
target for WOB has not had an effect on the gender pay gap. The specific hypotheses to 
be tested are listed below. 
H1a:  The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 100 organizations.  
H1b:  The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 250 organizations. 
H1c:  The Davies Review initiative will not impact the percentage of WOB of 
non-compliant FTSE Small Cap organizations. 
H2a:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 100 boards.  
H2b:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 250 boards. 
H2c:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of non-
executive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE Small Cap 
boards. 
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H3a:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female 
executive directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE 350 boards.  
H3b:  The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female 
non-executive directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE 350 
boards. 
H3c:  The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female executive 
directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE Small Cap boards. 
H3d:  The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female non-executive 
directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE Small Cap boards. 
H4a:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will 
decrease the percentage of women in executive boards of FTSE All Share 
organizations.  
H4b:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will 
decrease the percentage of women in senior management of FTSE All 
Share organizations. 
H4c:  Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
impact the percentage of women in the workforce of FTSE All Share 
organizations. 
H5a: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
decrease the gender pay gap mean in FTSE All Share organizations.   
H5b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not 
decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations. 
 153 
H5c: A large increase (Increase>12%) in the percentage of WOB resulting 
from the Davies Review will increase the gender pay gap median in FTSE 
All Share organizations.    
Design of the Study 
The study applied a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design (Thistlethwaite & 
Campbell, 1960) to test the existence of a causal relationship between the Davies Review 
and increased female representation in FTSE 350 boards, and to estimate treatment 
effects of the initiative on opportunities for women at other organizational levels and on 
the gender pay gap.   To that end, the study was implemented in two phases.  The first 
phase tested the effect of the targets set by the Davies Review on changes in board 
composition for FTSE 350 organizations.  The second phase tested the effects of 
compliance to the Davies Review on increased opportunities for other women in the 
organization and on the gender pay gap.  The main analyses of both phases used RD 
designs. 
The RD approach is a quasi-experimental design that simulates experimental 
conditions and provides evidence of causality (Shadish et al., 2002).  Unlike experimental 
designs, RD does not rely on random assignment, but on the use of an assignment 
variable to identify a cutoff point, which is used to determine subject placement into 
treatment and control groups (Murnane & Willet, 2010).  Suppose that X is the 
assignment variable, with the cutoff score of X=0, so that observations with X ³ 0 are 
assigned to the treatment group denoted by T=1 and observations with X<0 are assigned 
to the control group denoted by T=0.  Each observation i has two individual potential 
outcomes, one resulting from the observation being assigned to the treatment group (Yi1) 
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and one resulting from the observation being assigned to the control group (Yi0). Under 
the assumption that Ȳ1(x) and Ȳ0(x) are continuous functions of X, at X=0, the average 
effect of treatment can be estimated as: 
 ! " | " = 0 = lim
)→+,
-. " − lim
)→+0
-+ "  (1) 
The estimated treatment effect that results from the equation above is calculated 
from observations within the limits to each side of cutoff score, also referred to as the 
non-parametric approach, which is the preferred approach in regression discontinuity 
designs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). However, a 
parametric version of the model can also be estimated using the entire sample: 
 -1 = 	3("1) +	!(71	) + 8 (2) 
Regression discontinuity was originally used in Thistlethwaite and Campbell 
(1960)’ study of two groups of students, one of which received certificates of merit and 
one that did not.  The scores used for awarding the certificates of merit were used to 
estimate the effect of receiving the certificate on the students’ likelihood to receive 
scholarships. Their study provided the initial evidence for using a single treatment that 
divides two similar groups and observe treatment effects, which at the cutoff point can 
produce effects that are as good as random.  
Similarly, RD has been used to evaluate educational interventions such as the 
effect of class size on student achievement (Angrist & Lavy, 1999); the effect of financial 
aid on college enrollment (Van der Klaauw, 2002); the effect of remedial education on 
student achievement (Jacob & Lefgren, 2004; Martorell & McFarlin, 2011) among many.  
In the gender literature, RD has been used to estimate the effect of electoral gender 
quotas on the election of female politicians (Casas-Arce & Saiz, 2015); the effect of 
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gender quotas on women empowerment (Campa & Bagues, 2017); the effect of gender 
quota on public expenditure (Campa, 2011), among others.  
Potential Confounders 
To ensure that this study’s analyses capture the changes in board composition as 
an effect of the Davies Review targets, an investigation of other variables, including 
legislative, policy changes, government-backed recommendations, and political 
environment in the United Kingdom around the time of the initiative was performed.  
Potential confounders associated with the forcing variable were also examined.    
Brexit. In a referendum on June of 2016, the British electorate voted to leave the 
EU (Brexit), and on March of 2017, in an unprecedented event, the U.K. Government 
invoked Article 50 of the Treaty of the EU, starting the formal and legal process for the 
U.K.’s separation from the union.   The potential impact of Brexit on FTSE 350 board 
composition lies in the comply or explain format of the initiative, which does not require 
compliance. However, when the Davies Review initiative was rolled out, it was 
introduced with a threat of consequences if target organizations failed to comply. Lord 
Davies indicated that “These targets are considerably lower than those currently being 
deliberated by the European Commission and lower than those set by countries that have 
opted for legislation and quotas” (Davies, 2011, p. 19); and “European Commission 
Vice-President Viviane Reding is expected to publish a Green Paper on boardroom 
diversity in 2011. She has made it clear that she would prefer companies to take action 
themselves but, if there was no progress over a certain period of time, then she is 
prepared to introduce targeted measures to improve the representation of women in senior 
positions.” (Davies, 2011, p. 23).   
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The U.K.’s exit from the EU removes the potential of imposed legislation by the 
European Commission.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that Brexit may have an 
impact on the long-term effects of the Davies Review initiative, which are now monitored 
by the Alexander-Hampton Review. To that end, to avoid the potential confounding 
effect of Brexit on the study’s outcomes, the analyses of this study was restricted to 
observations prior to the announcement of Brexit, June 2016.  
FTSE index.  The FTSE index rank was used by the Davies Review to determine 
the organizations that were subject to meeting minimum targets of WOB.  The FTSE U.K. 
index is designed to represent the performance of British companies and serves as a 
gauge of the health of the country’s economy.  Publicly listed organizations with 
premium listings of equity shares on the LSE are eligible for inclusion into the FTSE 
index based on how their rank by full market capitalization, which is determined by 
market share value.  The FTSE 100 includes the 100 largest publicly listed organizations, 
representing about 81% of the entire market capitalization of the LSE.  Organizations in 
the FTSE 250 index are the next 250 largest organizations trading in the LSE. Periodic 
quarterly and annual reviews are performed in order to add or delete organizations from 
the index.  However, some flexibility is allowed, in order to maintain the index stability. 
For example, an organization that is in the FTSE 100 must fall to the 111th position or 
below to be moved from the FTSE 100 to FTSE 250. Similarly, organizations in the 
FTSE 250 index must fall below the 376th position to be moved from the FTSE 250 to the 
FTSE Small Cap.   
FTSE indices of 100, 250 and 350, Small Cap, and All-share use cutoff scores 
that allow the index to capture certain percentages of the full total value of British 
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companies that trade in the LSE and are eligible for inclusion in the FTSE index.  The 
indices have historically been used for tracking funds, as a performance benchmark, and 
as a measure of investability.  The nature of the FTSE index, which ranks firms and 
determines inclusion of constituents on the basis of market capitalization, indicates that 
group assignment is not under the participants’ control.  
At the time the Davies Review was rolled out, mean differences in the percentage 
of WOB between FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 already existed. As mentioned previously, 
organizations are ranked based on their market capitalization, which suggests that there 
may be a relationship between the size of the organization and the percentage of WOB, or 
perhaps because the FTSE 100 index is a measure of the U.K.’s financial health, FTSE 
100 boards are constantly in the public eye and under much scrutiny (Ryan & Haslam, 
2005). Therefore, it is plausible that FTSE index may be a confounder in the increase of 
WOB, as larger organizations may be more likely to hire more women.  
FTSE index would likely be a problem in an RD design using the entire sample 
and looking at discontinuities between groups.  Discontinuities at the threshold using 
parametric design would not produce credible estimates of causal effects as significant 
differences existed prior to treatment.  The assumption of continuity in baseline 
covariates would be violated, invalidating the results of the RD estimates. Therefore, as 
recommended in existing literature, potential confounders can be controlled for in design 
choices or statistical controls (Dunning, 2011).  The design of this study controlled for 
the influence of FTSE index by not using the FTSE rank of organizations as the forcing 
variable.  Statistically, the sample was be tested to detect if observations around the 
threshold are equal in their expectation of being in a particular FTSE group.  
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Additionally, the variable identifying the Index of each organization was included 
in the tests to control for any potential effect on the outcome. Additionally, groups were 
compared to see if organization’s size, which is the variable that would most likely be 
related to FTSE Index, influenced the likelihood of being in the treatment or comparison 
groups.  
Assignment Variables and Cutoff Scores 
Phase I. Although the FTSE index uses ranking and cutoff scores for their indices, 
the determination of the cutoff score for the Davies Review initiative was done arbitrarily.  
The Davies Review recommendations were rolled out in 2011, the report indicated that 
the FTSE 350 organizations had been chosen because they were considered a good 
starting point for gender diversity initiatives on British corporate boards.  The report 
could have targeted the FTSE 100 or the FTSE All-Share organizations.  It is plausible 
that the driver for targeting the top 350 public organizations was that the Davies Review 
was developed, monitored, and evaluated with the support of a team from Cranfield 
University School of Management.  The Cranfield team issues the annual Female FTSE 
Board Reports, a benchmarking report of women’s participation on FTSE 100 boards 
(since 1998), and FTSE 250 boards (since 2006).  The cutoff scores for the Davies 
Review initiative were set at two different points, at the 100 (FTSE 100) and 350 (FTSE 
250) marks on the ranking of the FTSE index.   
However, the finite nature of the FTSE indices allows only a set number of 
organizations in each group, which indicates that FTSE rank is a discrete, non-continuous 
variable.  When the variable determining treatment X is discrete, conditions for the 
estimation of treatment effects using non-parametric models are not satisfied (Lee & Card, 
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2008); therefore, a parametric regression would have to be estimated.  However, one 
cannot simply assume that the parametric form is the correct approach.  In fact, literature 
indicates that non-parametric RD designs yield more precise estimates (Jacob, Zhu, 
Sommers, & Bloom, 2012; Hahn et al., 2001; Lee & Lemieux, 2010).  Although there are 
techniques that can be used to improve the inferential quality of parametric designs, like 
computing clustered standard errors (Lee & Card, 2008), non-parametric models are still 
preferred.  Additionally, while FTSE rank may appear to be the most obvious assignment 
variable, it is not the most appropriate to estimate the effect of the Lord Davies initiative 
on increased representation of WOB, which was the intended outcome of the initiative.  
The Davies Review used a comply or explain approach for targets for WOB.  This 
suggests that the initiative is about compliance with the targets established for minimum 
female representation on boards.  At the time the initiative was rolled out, there were 
organizations that were already compliant with the minimum targets, which indicates that 
they were not required to increase their percentage of female directors.  Therefore, from a 
compliance perspective, the effects of the Lord Davies initiative can be measured by 
using the percentages of WOB at the time the initiative was rolled out (WOBPC2011).   
It is noteworthy to reiterate that there were mean differences in the percentage of 
WOB by Index when the Davies Review initiative was rolled out; therefore, groups 
(FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap) were examined separately. Previous studies 
have run separate regressions to isolate the effects of a treatment on separate groups, such 
as ethnicity (Gormley, Gayer, Phillips, & Dawson, 2005), race (Ludwig & Miller, 2007), 
school grade (Jacob & Lefgren, 2005), year (Ludwig & Miller, 2007), gender and 
education level (Lemieux & Milligan, 2008) among others. Therefore, the variable 
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WOBPC2011 was used as the forcing variable to estimate the effect of the Davies Review 
on the variable Increase, which indicates the Increase in the percentage of WOB in the 
2011 to 2016 period.   
The first phase of this study split each sample into a group already Gender-
balanced and a Non-balanced group in which organizations need to increase their WOB 
percentage to meet the minimum targets set by the Davies Review.  The diagram shown 
in Figure 1 represents phase I’s study design for that will be applied to the FTSE 350 and 
FTSE Small Cap groups separately: 
 
Figure 1. Design of the Study for Phase I - FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap. 
Note. WOBPC2011=percentage of women on boards in 2011; WED=women executive directors; 
WNED=women non-executive directors. 
where the assignment or forcing variable is WOBPC measured in December 2011, the 
cutoff is the target set by the Davies Review, which is set at 25% for FTSE 100 boards, 
22% for FTSE 250 boards, and 19% for FTSE Small Cap boards.  Organizations above 
the cutoff were assigned to the Gender-balanced (comparison) group, indicating that they 
































assigned to the Non-balanced (treatment) group, which is the group that needs to increase 
their percentage of WOB to achieve the targets set by the Davies Review.  The outcomes 
for this phase of the study were changes in board composition measured on June of 2016.  
Although the same 25% target was provided to all FTSE 350 organizations, only 
the FTSE 100 firms were expected to reach a minimum of 25% by 2015. The deadline for 
the target was calculated assuming an annual 14% board turnover, and implementing a 
one third female new appointments rule.  The Davies Review indicates that FTSE 250 
organizations should apply the same one third female new appointments rule.  Using a 
similar calculation, it was reasonable to conclude that FTSE 250 organizations were 
expected to achieve a 22% female representation on their boards by 2015. A cutoff of 
19% was estimated for the FTSE Small Cap group using the same calculation used for 
the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 groups; however, since the initiative was not targeted 
towards FTSE Small Cap firms, this group was tested separately.  
Phase II. For the second phase of the study, the focus shifted to examining the 
effects of the new board composition that resulted from the Davies Review.  To that end, 
this study used the percentage of WOB post-Davies Review, June of 2016. The cutoff 
point was the target set by the Davies Review, 25% WOBPC, which was used to separate 
the total sample into two groups; one group categorized as Compliant, and the other one 
as Non-compliant.  The reasoning behind this is that the percentage determined by the 
Davies Review (25%) did not have any theoretical or empirical support in the literature 
reviewed; therefore, it was unclear if female representation on boards at that threshold 
would have any effect on organizational outcomes.  
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Existing literature related to gender in corporate governance provided support for 
the concept of critical mass (Karpowitz & Melderberg, 2014; Mendelberg, Karpotwitz, & 
Goedert, 2014). The number of women needed for achieving critical mass in a corporate 
board is three (Torchia et al., 2011).  However, it is intriguing whether the percentage of 
WOB set by the Davies Review has any significance. Further, when the Lord Davies 
initiative was rolled out, the report indicated that a critical mass of 30% or more women 
at the board level produces the best results (Davies, 2011, p. 8).  The report also indicated 
that a study of FTSE-listed boards had found that at the threshold of at least 20% of 
female board members (cf. Bhogaita, 2011), organizations had significantly increased 
share price performance.  However, when targets were recommended, the threshold was 
set at 25%, which provided an opportunity for testing whether 25% of female 
representation on boards constitutes critical mass.  
Consequently, this study used the variable WOBPC2016, which is the June of 2016 
WOBPC value as the forcing variable for Phase II of this study. The cutoff point that 
separated the sample into treatment and comparison groups was the percentage set by the 
Davies Review (c=25), which determined if boards were Complaint (WOBPC2016>25), or 
Non-compliant (WOBPC2016<25) to the initiative. The diagram shown in Figure 2 
explains the quasi-experimental design of the study.  
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Figure 2. Design of the Study for Phase II - FTSE All Share 
Note. WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards in 2016; WExecPC=percentage of women 
executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of 
women employed.  
 
 
The forcing variable WOBPC2016, determined group assignment to the Compliant 
(treatment), or Non-compliant (comparison) groups. To examine whether the 25% WOB 
target set by the Davies Review constitutes critical mass, the treatment was the 
achievement of the 25% WOB. The outcomes observed were opportunities for women in 
the organization measured as the percentage of female population of the total executive 
board (WExecPC), senior management (WSMPC), and company-wide (WEmpPC).  A 
finding that at the 25% of female representation on boards, the Compliant group has a 
statistically and practically significantly higher population of women on executive boards 
and in senior management than the Non-compliant group, would provide evidence of 
critical mass at 25%.   
Gender pay gap figures for 2017 reported to the British government prior to April 
of 2018 were another outcome tested in this phase of the study. The gender pay gap 





























favor men; therefore, a positive value indicated that men earned more than women.  A 
statistically significant negative value in the difference between the gender pay for the 
Compliant and Non-compliant groups would provide that 25% constitutes critical mass.  
 
 
Figure 3. Design of the Study for Phase II – FTSE All Share 
Note. Increase=increase in the percentage of women on boards in the 2011 to 2016 period; 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed 
 
 
Alternatively, as shown in Figure 3, the variable Increase, which represents the 
increase in the percentage of WOB from 2016 to 2011 was used to determine group 
assignment.  This design was hypothesized based on existing literature that examined the 
effect of the Norway quota law.  Ahern and Dittmar (2011) found that organizations that 
were closer to the target when the quota laws were announced were required to make 
smaller changes than those that were a long distance from compliance.  Large increases 
of female representation on boards could represent a massive reorganization, as any 
changes in board composition are substantial (Ahern & Dittmar, 2011).  Therefore, the 




























of WOB to achieve compliance and organizations that had a Small increase in their 
WOBPC, cannot be ignored. Consequently, using the median Increase as the cutoff point 
(c=12%), organizations over the cutoff were assigned to the Large increase (treatment) 
group and organizations below the cutoff were assigned to the Small increase 
(comparison) group.  
Treatment  
Phase I. The Davies Review initiative provided minimum targets, which 
represent the basis for treatment (T) given to the study’s participants.  Organizations in 
the treatment group must increase their percentage of WOB to comply with the minimum 
targets set by the Davies Review.  The treatment variable is represented by a dummy T Î 
{0,1}.  Therefore, T=1 if WOBPC2011<c, and T=0 if WOBPC2011>c. 
Phase II. The Davies Review published annual reviews of the progress that FTSE 
350 boards were making towards achieving the targets for WOB.  Each report ranked 
organizations based on their percentages of WOB, praised the progress of some 
organizations, and labeled organizations with the highest percentages as “leading the way” 
in gender equality (Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 33).  Therefore, the treatment is the 
public acknowledgement of being Compliant to the Davies Review targets.  The 
treatment variable is represented by a dummy T Î {0,1}.  Therefore, T=1 if 
WOBPC2016>c, and T=0 if WOBPC2016<c.  Additionally, to explore if having a Large 
increase in the percentage of WOB has an effect on opportunities for other women and 
the gender pay gap, the variable Increase is used to split the FTSE All Share sample into 
Large increase and Small increase groups. The treatment variable is represented by a 
dummy T Î {0,1}.  Therefore, T=1 if Increase>c, and T=0 if Increase<c.   
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Outcome Variables 
Phase I. For the first phase of the study that examines the effects of the Davies 
Review as a comply or explain initiative on changes in gender composition of FTSE 
boards.  The first outcome variable is Increase, which represents the increase of WOB 
calculated as the difference between the percentage of WOB in June 2016 and the 
percentage of WOB in 2011.   Another outcome variable of this phase of the study is the 
type of directorship women occupy, executive (WED) vs. non-executive (WNED). Finally, 
the final outcome for this phase of the study are CEO gender (CEOGnd), and chairperson 
gender (ChairGnd), measured as of June 2016. 
Phase II. The outcome variables for the second phase of the study, which 
examines the effects of being categorized as having a gender-balanced board on 
opportunities for other women in the organization, are: percentage of women in executive 
leadership (WExecPC), percentage of women in senior management (WSMPC), 
percentage of women in the organization (WEmpPC), measured as of June 2016.  
Additionally, the outcome variables gender pay gap mean (PayGapMean), gender pay 
gap median (PayGapMedian) as of 2017 were also be examined as outcome variables.  
Covariates 
In order to rule out alternative explanations of the effects of the Davies Review on 
the outcome variables of this study, a number of covariates were examined. Table 1 
shows the complete list of the organizational variables of this study, and Table 2 shows 
the individual female director variables that were used for this study, including all 
identified covariates.  These covariates have been selected because existing literature has 
indicated that they have an effect on the study’s outcome variables.  For example, in 
 167 
studies in which WOB was the outcome variable, the organizational variables of firm size, 
board size, and industry were found to have a significant effect (Hillman et al., 2007).   
Studies that examined different organizational outcomes associated with WOB 
found that director age and experience had an effect on the relationship of the observed 
variables (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). When examining women’s influence on boards, 
literature suggests that critical mass (three women or more) is essential for them to be 
able to have a voice and effect change (Arena, Cirilo, Mussolino, Pulcinelli, Saggese, & 
Sarto, 2015; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & 
Hooper, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011).  Bilimoria (2006) that the proportion of WOB was 
positively related to the proportion of women in senior management.  Research linked the 
inclusion of WOB to CEO gender, as CEOs were found to select candidates who were 
demographically similar to them (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).   
Additionally, one important covariate that included in the second phase of the 
study is Increase. Several organizations were above the threshold or very close to it at the 
start of the initiative, therefore, the percentage of WOB may not be related to the Lord 
Davies initiative.  Similarly, organizations that were close to the threshold set by the 
Davies Review faced smaller constraints than those organizations that had to double or 
triple female representation on their boards to meet the target.  Therefore, the covariate 
Increase is expected to be a significant covariate.  Existing literature indicated that 
government-interventions for the increase of WOB resulted in high demand of women 
directors creating a small group of women on several boards (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011; 
Vernos, 2013).  Similarly, annual reports of the organizations included in this study’s 
sample indicated that competition for women directors created by the Davies Review 
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initiative made it difficult for them to recruit women directors for their boards.   
Consequently, it is reasonable to foresee that high demand for women directors may also 
have an impact on some demographics of female directors newly appointed to boards.  
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) found that the gender quota for WOB in Norway impacted the 
average age and experience of female board members; therefore, those covariates were 
examined to understand their significance to the study’s outcomes.  
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Table 1  
Organizational variables collected for every year in the 2008-20161 period 
Variable name Description Source 
Firm Numeric value from 1 to 395 assigned to each company Generated value 
EPIC Code representing the LSE standard abbreviation of a security’s name FTSE Russell  
Name Company name FTSE Russell 
Company 
Number  Company registration number  
Annual reports, 
gender pay gap 
service 
Industry Industry group according to the LSE FTSE Russell 
Sector Industry sector group according to LSE FTSE Russell 
MCap Market capitalization according to LSE FTSE Russell 
Index FTSE index (FTSE 100, FTSE 250 or FTSE Small Cap).  FTSE Russell 
Rank FTSE index ranking based on All Share ranking. Generated value based on MCap 
Board Total number of board directors Davies annual reviews, annual reports 
WOB Total number of women on the board Annual reports 
WOBPC Percentage of women on boards Davies Reviews, Generated values 
WED Number of women executive directors Annual reports 
WEDPC Percentage of women executive directors Generated value 
WNED Number of women non-executive directors Annual reports 
WNEDPC Percentage of women non-executive directors Generated value 
ChairGnd Chairperson gender. Dummy {0=Male, 1=Female} Annual reports 
CEOGnd CEO gender. Dummy {0=Male, 1=Female} Annual reports 
Exec Total number of executives on the executive board (operational board/c-suite) Annual reports 
WExec Number of women on executive board Annual reports 
WExecPC Percentage of women on the executive board Generated value 
SM Total number of senior managers Annual reports 
WSM Number of women in senior management Annual reports 
WSMPC Percentage of women in senior management Generated value 
Emp Total number of employees in the organization Annual reports 
WEmp Number of women employees in the organization Annual reports 
WEmpPC Percentage of women of the total employee population Generated value 
GPGMean2 Gender pay gap mean Pay gap service 
GPGMedian2 Gender pay gap median Pay gap service 
Note. 1All figures are year-end figures with the exception of 2016, which represents data as of 
June 2016.  2The gender pay gap mean and medium metrics are only available for one year, 2017. 
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Table 2  
Individual characteristics of female directors within the firm-years 2008-2016* 
Variable name Description 
Name Director name 
Position 
Type of directorship ED for executive director, NED for non-
executive director 
CEO Occupies CEO position. Dummy variable. 1=Yes, 0=No 
Chair Occupies chair position. Dummy variable. 1=Yes, 0=No 
Age Age 
Appointment year Year appointed to board 
Race/Ethnicity 
White (European), Black, Asian (including Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi), Middle Eastern (including Jewish), Hispanic (including 
Spaniards).  
Race Dummy variable for race/ethnicity. 0=White, 1=Non-white 
Tenure Generated value. Number of years in current position.    
Education 
Highest level of education attained. 0=High school, 1=Bachelor’s 
degree, 2=Master’s degree, 3=Professional degree (MD/JD), 
4=Doctoral degree. 
Education major 
Education major (accounting, business, engineering, medicine, 
physics, etc.) 
CEOExperience Dummy variable. 1=Yes, 0=No 
Industry Experience Previous industry experience 
Expertise 
Area of expertise (finance, HR, marketing, IT, strategy, 
communications) 
Note. *These variables were collected from annual reports for each female board member for 
each year in the 2008-2016 period. 
 
Population and Sample 
The population of this study is publicly listed organizations trading in the London 
Stock Exchange.  The Davies Review initiative for WOB applied to the FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 organizations during the years of 2011 to 2015.  However, to identify the 
effect of the initiative on gender diversity in organizations, this study collected data from 
the FTSE All Share constituents, which includes FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small 
Cap organizations. Ranked right after the FTSE 350 organizations, the FTSE Small Cap 
index constituents served as a comparison group for the study’s phase I analyses, as the 
Davies Review targets did not apply to them.  
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Although the Davies Review targets for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards was 
rolled out in 2011, the U.K. coalition government pledged to promote gender equality on 
corporate boards in 2010.  Therefore, this study assumes that the pledge was an informal 
announcement of forthcoming government intervention targeting gender composition of 
corporate boards. Consequently, to provide a comprehensive picture of the transformation 
of FTSE 350 boards, names of all organizations that traded in the LSE and were indexed 
in the FTSE All Share anytime from 2008 to 2016 were collected, which covered three 
years prior to the formal announcement of the initiative and the year after the deadline for 
achieving the target.  However, for the main tests, this study restricts its inquiry to the 
organizations that were listed in 2011, which is the year that the Davies Review was 
rolled out, and the year used for participant assignment to control and treatment groups 
for the first phase of the study. 
The sample for this study consisted of FTSE All Share organizations in the years 
2008 to 2016 that were listed and indexed in 2011, excluding investment trust institutions, 
which are subject to different rules and tend to not have employees.  To identify the 
available sample, this study started with the list of full set of publicly listed companies 
trading in main market of the LSE in 2011 (N=1419).  To identify the FTSE All Share 
index constituents on the LSE list, historical data from the FTSE Russell website was 
used.  The FTSE All Share constituents in 2011 consisted of 612 organizations.  
Considering the relatively small number of observations, 11 additional organizations that 
were trading in the LSE but entered the FTSE index within a few months of the initiative 
roll out and remained in the index through 2016 were also included. After excluding 
investment trust institutions, and delisted institutions for which reports were not available 
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for 2011, the 2011 sample for FTSE 100 (n=96), FTSE 250 (n=189), and FTSE Small 
Cap (n=110) consisted of 395 organizations.  Table 3 reports the annual breakdown of the 
full sample for this study by FTSE index, which consists of a total of 3541 firm year-
observations over 2008 to 2016 for 395 unique organizations.  Within the firm-year 
observations, the total number of female-director-year observations is 4207.  
Table 3  
Sample Observations by Year and Index 
Index 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
FTSE 100 - Firms 94 95 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Female directors 122 125 137 160 192 207 247 269 266 
FTSE 250 - Firms 181 186 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Female directors 88 103 120 151 204 247 289 320 323 
FTSE Small - Firms 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Female directors 42 45 49 62 69 78 86 98 108 
Firms (n) 385 391 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 
Female directors (n) 252 273 306 373 465 532 622 687 697 
Note. n=sample size. *All figures represent year-end metrics, except 2016.  The 2016 sample 
represents metrics as of June 2016.  
 
The data pay gap reporting requirement was implemented in 2017.  Organizations 
with more than 250 employees were required to disclose their gender pay gap data for 
2017 by April of 2018. Although, an attempt was made to collect gender pay gap data for 
each of the 395 firms in the baseline sample, only 318 of them were available.  Table 4 
provides a breakdown of sample available for the gender pay gap analyses. 
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Table 4  
Gender Pay Gap Data Sample 
Index n Gender Pay Gap Mean* 
Gender Pay Gap 
Median* 
FTSE 100 90  23.39   20.89  
FTSE 250 152  20.22   15.56  
FTSE Small Cap 76  18.74   17.11  
Pooled sample  318  20.76   17.44  
Note. n=sample size; *mean percentages for each group. 
 
Data Collection Procedures 
The Companies Act 2006, the main piece of legislation that governs company law 
in the United Kingdom, mandates that all companies registered in the United Kingdom 
provide annual reports, which are publicly available. In 2012, as a result of the Davies 
Review, the U.K. CGC was amended to include provisions for FTSE 350 to include a 
separate section in their annual reports describing the board’s diversity policy and 
including gender metrics. Although most companies complied with this guideline, not all 
of them included a full disclosure of their gender metrics at different organizational 
levels; therefore, some missing data were expected.  
To identify the effect of the Davies Review initiative in relation to this study’s 
hypotheses, a database was built using several sources.  To build the database containing 
all the variables that were used in the study’s analyses (Table 1 and Table 2), data from 
the FTSE Russell website, annual Davies Reviews, company annual reports, and the 
gender pay gap service from the national archives were collected.  First spreadsheets 
containing the names of FTSE All Share constituents for each year of the 2008 to 2016 
period were be downloaded from the FTSE Russell website.  Next, data for FTSE 350 
organizations, at the aggregate director-level by organization were collected from the 
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reported Lord Davies annual reviews.  Specifically, for every year in the 2011 to 2015 
period, available data for the variables: company name, sector, percentage of WOB, 
number of women board members, and total board size were collected from the Lord 
Davies annual reviews.   
Annual reports for the years in the 2008 to 2016 period for the organizations 
identified as the study’s sample were downloaded from the FTSE Russell website, 
corporate websites and Companies House database.  Next, corporate governance and 
gender diversity sections from each annual report were printed and data from printouts 
were used for validating data collected from the annual Davies Reviews.  Annual reports 
were used to populate the database for FTSE Small Cap organizations for the years 2011 
through 2015, and for the entire sample organizations for the years 2008 through 2010, 
which were prior to the announcement of the Davies Review.  Annual reports were also 
used to collect data for 2016. 
Similarly, annual reports were used to collect information for each female board 
member, female CEO, and, where available, executive committee members. For each 
female board member, executive committee members, CEO, and chairperson, names, 
gender, ethnicity, age, title (executive vs non-executive), education, prior experience, and 
year first elected to the board were collected.  Initially, this study had planned to follow 
the method used in Ahern and Dittmar (2012) for gathering gender information about 
board members, which consisted in using the photo of the director in the annual report to 
identify their gender.  However, as a result of the gender metrics reporting requirement 
published in the 2012 amendment to the U.K. CGC, organizations disclose the gender of 
each board director and in most cases, gender of the members of their executive boards.  
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Therefore, the gender of each board member and executive board member was collected 
from annual reports. 
Data for the gender pay gap were downloaded from the gender pay gap service 
website. The gender pay gap data is delivered by the National Archives and is subject to 
open government license (Appendix C), which allows the public to copy, publish, 
distribute and transmit the information contained in document.  This study collected the 
variables company number (used as matching field), gender pay gap median and gender 
pay gap mean for all available organizations identified in the sample. Disclosure of 
gender pay gap data was mandatory for organizations that have 250 or more employees in 
the United Kingdom, therefore, there are organizations in the sample for which gender 
pay gap data was not available because they were not required to disclose it; however, not 
all organizations that were subject to this requirement complied; therefore, there were 
missing values for the pay gap variables.   
Records for each organization were examined for missing values. For missing 
data, the Companies House database was used to populate the study’s database.  When 
discrepancies were found between two data sources, data from the Companies House 
database prevailed.  In cases in which data were not reported on annual reports and were 
not available on the Companies House database, they were left blank in the study’s 
database.  
Data Validation 
The need for using every annual report in the study (n=3541) (See Table 3 for 
detailed breakdown) for validating data collected from the Lord Davies Reviews, and re-
generating the figures collected from their reviews arose from finding several mistakes on 
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the numbers reported in the Davies Reviews and inconsistencies in reporting on annual 
reviews (See Appendix D).  The data used by the Lord Davies Reviews is sourced by 
Boardex and Cranfield School of Management (Davies, 2011).  Although Boardex data is 
used in multiple academic publications, they do not make any warranty with respect to 
the accuracy or reliability of their data (Boardex, 2017).   The multiple inaccuracies 
found in the Lord Davies Reviews compelled the study’s researcher to validate the data 
more thoroughly in order to obtain accurate estimates for the study’s analyses. The 
review of annual reports revealed mistakes and inconsistencies in reporting gender 
metrics.  Additionally, multiple organizations reported their board diversity percentages 
including the company secretary to the number of board members; however, when 
reading individual director profiles, they disclosed that company secretary was not a 
director appointed to the board.  Therefore, for consistency, percentages had to be re-
computed based on the actual number of directors on the board. The same procedure was 
followed for generating the gender split of executive committees.  For senior 
management and company-wide gender metrics, the total number of female employees at 
each level was divided by the total number of employees at their respective level in order 
to generate gender split metrics for senior management and company-wide. 
To ensure accuracy of the study’s collected data, each year were validated 
separately and changes in gender composition of each board were accounted for by 
matching the data that contained the total number of WOB by organization, with the 
names collected for each year. For example, if in 2011, a board had 2 women, and 2012, 
it had 4 women, the database containing the individual names of board members had to 
contain two additional names in 2012 than it did in 2011. Every discrepancy with the 
 177 
Davies Review data was double checked to ensure that the most accurate data was kept 
for analyses. As a result of the data validation process, the most accurate database on 
FTSE boards was developed and used for the study’s analyses. 
Sample Representativeness  
The universe of organizations trading in the main market of the LSE includes over 
1400 firms in any given year, about half of which are ranked in the FTSE indices.  In 
2011, 631 firms were included in the FTSE All Share index. After excluding investment 
trust firms, and removing organizations that have merged, been acquired, or delisted, and 
adding 11 organizations that were added to the FTSE index within months of the 
initiative rollout, the total the baseline sample is 395 organizations.  The pre-test post-test 
design of the analyses do not make it feasible for analyses to include organizations that 
entered the index in subsequent years; hence, the sample includes organizations that were 
included in the 395 baseline sample, 285 of which were FTSE 350 constituents.  This 
means that despite data availability, there are organizations excluded from the analyses 
because they were not part of the baseline sample.  
Group Comparisons 
The FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap samples were split into treatment 
and comparison groups based on the three forcing variables and cutoff scores described 
previously. To ensure that any treatment effects resulting from the RDD analyses were 
attributed to the treatment, first the samples on treatment and comparison groups were 
tested on their equivalence across several variables. Additionally, a comparison of 
industries was performed to identify industries that were more likely to have WOB.  
Fisher’s exact tests of the differences in the distribution of industries by treatment 
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assignment were performed to identify if there were statistically significant differences in 
the likelihood of any organizations to be in any particular industry based on their 
treatment assignment.  
Chi-square tests were performed to compare the distribution of the sample in 
relation to the number of board members, number of employees, FTSE index, market 
capitalization, number of female CEOs, and number of female chairpersons, as applicable 
for the phase of the study.  However, considering the small sample size, Fisher’s exact 
tests were performed as well, as literature indicates that Fisher’s exact test is more 
sensitive to small samples and provides more precise estimates than the chi-square test 
(Kim, 2017; McHugh, 2013).  Practical significance tests were computed as well, 
Cramer’s V statistics were reported to indicate the effect size, and odds ratios were 
reported to indicate the odds of an organization to be in a particular group based on the 
examined variable.  
Correlations.  As mentioned previously, when the Davies Review initiative was 
rolled out, there were differences among organizations in the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and 
FTSE Small Cap groups.  Therefore, taking into account the nested nature of the data, 
correlations were computed using a multilevel analysis by Index to identify within group 
and between group correlations. These correlations were analyzed to identify correlations 
within groups that may indicate a risk of collinearity, and correlations between groups 
that may suggest the need for clustering standard errors (Thompson, 2011). 
Treatment of Missing Data 
Although every effort has been made to obtain annual reports for the 395 
organizations in sample for every year in the 2008 to 2016 period, for multiple reasons, 
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data for each variable was not available for every observation in the dataset.  The most 
frequently used treatment of missing data in RD designs in the current literature seems to 
be removing observations with missing values from the analyses (Chen & Shapiro, 2007; 
Dong, 2015); which is also the most widely used method for dealing with missing data in 
the social sciences (Schlomer & Bauman, 2010).  Scholars have pointed out that dealing 
with missing data using listwise, pairwise, or mean substitution can produce biased 
estimates, distort statistical power, and result in erroneous conclusions (Acock, 2005; 
Honaker & King, 2010).   When missing values are present, deleting the row of data, 
under the most optimistic assumptions causes estimates that are a standard error farther 
from the truth (King, Honaker & Joseph, & Scheve, 2001).  
Considering the loss of power that would result from a smaller sample (McKight, 
McKight, Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007), loss of precision of the estimates that would result 
from removing rows with missing values (King et al., 2001), and following the 
dissertation committee’s recommendation, a method for missing data imputation was 
implemented.  The Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) R package was 
used to generate missing values.  Literature supports the multiple imputation method, as 
it uses a predictive model to generating data and improves precision of estimates 
compared to listwise deletion (Honaker & King, 2010).   
Phase I variables had virtually a full dataset.  The FTSE 350 sample (n=285) had 
full sets of values every variable in the years 2010 to 2016.  Values for ten organizations 
in 2008 and four organizations in 2009 were unavailable due to those organizations not 
being listed in those years.  However, the baseline year for phase I was 2011, therefore 
data imputation for phase I was not necessary.   
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The baseline year for phase II of the study was 2016.  Four variables used in the 
hypotheses tests of this phase of the study contained missing values. The variable 
indicating the percentage of women on executive boards (WExecPC) had 107 missing 
values (27%). The variable indicating the percentage of women in senior management 
(WSMPC) had 63 missing values (16%).  Variables that represented the mean and median 
gender pay gap values ( PayGapMean, PayGapMedian) had 77 missing values each 
(20%). Therefore, the following data imputation process was followed to generate 
imputed data for the missing values for those variables.   
Identification of Missing Data Mechanism 
Prior to engaging in the process of data imputation, an evaluation of the feasibility 
of data imputation was performed.  The amount of missing values to be imputed seemed 
to be high; however existing literature indicates that in quantitative research missing data 
are a rule rather than an exception (Dong & Peng, 2013).  In the social sciences, it is not 
uncommon to see missing rates of 20% (Enders, 2003); however, in about 97% of studies 
that report missing data, listwise or pairwise deletion is used, which are associated with 
biased estimates (Dong & Peng, 2013; King et al., 2001; Schafer, 1997).  Studies have 
compared estimates of imputed data at different rates of missingness (i.e., 20%, 40% and 
60%) indicated that identifying the missing data mechanism and using the right 
imputation method is more important than the amount of missing data (Dong & Peng, 
2013).   
Newgard and Haukoos (2007) examined the effect of sample size on multiple 
imputation estimates. Their analyses contrasted the results of a small sample (n=110); a 
large sample (n=1015) and a very large sample (n=38354) for which imputed values had 
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been generated in 10% increments up to 70%.  Their results suggested that estimates 
using the imputed values for the large datasets were stable throughout the spectrum (i.e., 
up to 70% of imputed values).  However, the small data set started to show bias for 
imputed values at above the 30% missingness rate.  Therefore, considering that, a) 
missingness rates for the variables to be imputed were reasonable, and b) that evidence 
has not indicated that at those missing rates the sample size would pose a problem, data 
for those values were imputed. 
Scholars suggest that identifying the process that created the missing data impacts 
the way in which data should be examined.  Tests for identifying data patterns of missing 
values can help in the process.  However, often, the cause of missing values in a dataset is 
unknown; therefore, assumptions must be made in order to help determine the reasons for 
missingness (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010).  Multiple tests for identifying 
the pattern of missing data for each variable were performed.   
Prior to the amendment of the U.K. CGC in 2012, organizations were not required 
to disclose their gender metrics; therefore, there is a considerable amount of missing data 
in several variables. After the amendment, the lack of a clear definition of senior 
management resulted in the disclosure of only executive board membership by some 
organizations, only senior management by others, and disclosure of all levels of 
management membership by others.  Therefore, the missing values for WExec and 
WSMPC are due to the lack of clarity in reporting, rather than omission.  Conversely, the 
gender pay gap reporting requirement was mandatory for all organizations with 250 or 
more employees.  In the study’s sample, 77 organizations did not disclose their gender 
pay gap; however, only 26 of them had fewer than 250 employees.    
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Following the recommendations in the literature, assumptions were made in order 
to understand the underlying reasons for the missing data.  It was reasonable to assume 
that data for the WExecPC and WSMPC variables were missing at random.  However, 
considering the nature of the PayGap data, it was likely that the missing values did not 
happen randomly.  Previous studies have found that the most problematic type of missing 
data are missing not at random (MNAR), for which non-response or missingness is 
related to the value that would have been observed (Sinharay, Stern, & Russell, 2001).  A 
common example of missing values on survey data is income, because individuals with 
high or low income tend to not disclose that information.  The PayGap data may present 
a similar problem.  The disclosure requirement mandated by the U.K. Government may 
have acted as a deterrent for organizations that would not have reported their gender pay 
gaps voluntarily.  However, the 77 missing values for the PayGap variables represent a 
20% non-response rate, which appeared to not be missing at random.  
When missing data are MNAR, there is not a universal method of handling the 
missing values (Donders, Van Der heijden, Stijnen, & Moons, 2006).  Existing literature 
provides multiple techniques for imputation of MNAR models (Albert & Follmann, 
2009; Little, 2009).  Under MNAR, the model fitted to the observed cases is only correct 
for the observed cases and incorrect for the missing cases, thus, it cannot be used for the 
imputation.  Additionally, estimating the amount of error would be impossible without 
the use of external data.  
Although it is possible to use the predictive information in the observed data to 
impute missing values and perform post-processing imputations, it is not possible to test 
MNAR data because data needed for such tests are, by definition, missing (Van Buuren 
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& Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010). Therefore, data for all missing values were imputed; 
however, imputed values for the PayGap variables were only available for use had the 
non-parametric RDD analyses required more observations. 
Data Imputation Process 
Scholars have argued that in existing research in the social sciences, an often 
neglected requirement in data imputation approaches is that the imputation model for 
generating imputed values must be as rigorous as the analysis model (Ludtke, Robitzsch, 
& Grund, 2017).  Others have suggested that electing a fixed effects imputation model to 
a mixed effects multilevel imputation model is the tradeoff of rigor for simplicity, which 
can produce substantial bias (Drechsler, 2015).  Therefore, in an effort to ensure a 
rigorous data imputation process, and taking into account the clustered nature of the data, 
a multilevel imputation method was used to generate data for missing values. Following 
the recommendations in Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2010) for data MAR and 
MNAR imputation, the variables WExecPC and WSMPC were imputed using two 
different methods.  The two-level Bayesian linear regression, with heterogeneous within-
group variances method (2l.norm), and the predictive mean matching method (2l.pmm).  
The variables PayGapMean and PayGapMedian were imputed using a two-level 
Bayesian linear regression, with heterogeneous within-group variances, with post-
processing adjustment increasing imputations for the PayGap variables.  
While it is recommended to include as many predictors as possible in order to 
have minimal bias in the imputation, Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (1999) 
suggest that for imputation purposes, no more than 15 to 25 variables be used.  Therefore, 
predictor variables for data imputation were used based on their predictive relation to the 
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selected outcomes.  Regressions and correlations were performed on the outcome 
variables to identify the most significant predictors.  Predictor selection for generating 
missing values was initially done using the covariates identified in existing literature; 
therefore, non-statistically significant covariates that were included in the equations for 
hypothesis tests were not removed from the predictor matrix.  The predictor matrix 
indicated the dependent variable, class variable, and predictors for fixed and random 
effects for each variable to be imputed.  
Five sets of data were generated, pooled and tested.  Multiple diagnostics tests 
were used to identify problems in the imputation process or with the imputed datasets. 
After obtaining satisfactory results from all diagnostic tests, the pooled data were 
extracted and appended to the study’s database.  
Data Analysis Procedures 
The first announcement of the U.K. coalition government in 2010 indicating that 
it would target corporate boards was an unexpected pledge that resulted by a change in 
government from the Labour to the Conservative-Democratic Liberal parties; therefore, 
the exogeneity of the Davies Review initiative is assumed. The increase in female board 
representation on FTSE 350 boards from a 3.1% in the six years prior to the initiative 
compared to a 12.5% increase in the five-year duration of the intervention (Davies, 2015) 
provides some evidence of the exogenous event.  However, it would be misleading to 
attribute the Lord Davies initiative with causing FTSE 350 boards to more than double 
their female participation without first properly assessing if there is a causal relationship 
and measuring its impact.  After all, women’s representation at different levels of 
leadership has been slowly but consistently increasing over the past few decades.  
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Therefore, endogenous variation was measured by observing annual variation from 2008 
to 2011 and comparing it with the variation after the announcement of the Davies Review 
(i.e., 2011 – 2016).  Data from FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap organizations 
were used to measure variation by index. 
When using different thresholds in RD designs, the most common approach is to 
normalize and pool scores from all groups into one sample (Cattaneo, Keele, Titiunik, & 
Vazquez-Bare, 2016).  Studies that estimated the effect of state-sponsored pre-
kindergarten programs for which admission was determined based on a cutoff date 
pooled data from different states by transforming the assignment variable by centering it 
at the cutoff point (Barnett, Lamy, & Jung, 2005; Dickert-Conlin & Elder, 2010; 
McCrary & Royer, 2011; McEwan & Shapiro, 2008; Skibbe, Connor, Morrison, & 
Jewkes, 2011).  For example, if state A has a cutoff date of July 31, and state B’s cutoff 
date is August 31, applicants whose date of birth is August 15, in state A would be 
admitted and placed in the treatment group with a score of 15; however, in state B that 
date of birth would place an applicant in the control group with a score of -16. Centering 
the samples in this way allows pooling the data into one sample for a single cutoff RD 
analysis, which can provide unbiased estimates of an average effect of the treatment 
across samples (Wong, Steiner, & Cook, 2013).   
Statistical Assumptions 
The centering and pooling data approach into one single treatment and single 
control group assumes that the samples being pooled are similar in terms of their shape. 
That is, the relationship of X and Y must be similar across groups.  Therefore, to satisfy 
 186 
that assumption, data were evaluated for linearity. Additionally, in order to test if the data 
was suited for parametric tests, normality, and homoscedasticity were also tested.  
As mentioned previously, this study uses three different assignment variables, 
WOBPC2011, WOBPC2016, and Increase.  The outcomes tested in the RD analyses were 
Increase, WExecPC2016, WSMPC2016, WEmpPC2016, PayGapMean, and PayGapMedian.  
In order to satisfy the assumption of a similar relationship between X and Y for pooling 
the data into one sample, the study’s forcing variables and outcomes were regressed 
according to the hypothesized relationships.  Distributions of the forcing variable were 
plotted to identify discontinuous patterns around the cutoffs and relationships of X and Y 
were plotted to help in the determination that across groups the predictor and outcome 
had similar relationships. 
Additionally, taking into account that the data included several dummy variables 
that were important to the observed relationships, a test of multivariate normality was not 
used.  Instead, the assumptions were tested using the gvlma package, Global Validation 
of Linear Model Assumptions (Pena & Slate, 2014).  Diagnostic plots were generated to 
help evaluate the assumptions. The residuals vs. fitted plots were examined to ensure that 
residuals were linearly distributed across the 0 line with no other discernable pattern.  
Outliers were identified and their influence to the regression line was assessed on the 
residuals vs. leverage plot based on their distance from the Cook’s line.  
Although, literature recommends the removal of outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; 
Judd & McClelland, 1989); the removal of legitimate outliers has arguments for and 
against (Osborne & Overbay, 2004).  Therefore, to ensure accuracy, identified outliers 
were examined against the original source of the data, and legitimate outliers were kept in 
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the dataset and not removed from the sample. However, it is noteworthy to mention that 
in non-parametric regression discontinuity designs, the extreme parts of the range of the 
forcing variable are not used in the effect estimation, therefore, the impact of outliers is 
minimized (Visser & de Leeuw, 1984). 
Internal Validity of the RD approach 
To test exogenous variation in women’s board participation that resulted from the 
Davies Review and to verify that gender composition of FTSE 350 boards was not 
impacted at the time of the Davies Review announcement, the full dataset from 2008 to 
2016 was examined. A panel study was performed to identify the effects of time on the 
outcome variable WOBPC and to identify if there were differences in the interaction of 
time and FTSE Index.  As noted previously, although slow, women’s participation on 
corporate boards followed an upwards trend.  Therefore, to ensure that the increase in the 
percentage of WOB was not simply the effect of time, the pooled FTSE All Share sample 
was used.  Since the Davies Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, differences between 
FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap boards after the announcement of the Davies Review 
were expected.  Longitudinal data from 2008 to 2016 were analyzed in a mixed effects 
regression model for repeated measures data.   
Furthermore, there are conditions under which causal inferences from an RD 
analysis can be as credible as those from a randomized experiment, and under which the 
validity of the RD design can be tested by detecting a discontinuity in any outcome 
variable at the assignment variable’s threshold (Lee, 2008).  As mentioned previously, a 
critical assumption underlying causality through RD is that the group of participants 
around the cutoff point are equal in expectation on all dimensions, other than exposure to 
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treatment in the participants of the treatment group.  However, there are two threats to the 
validity of this assumption. The first threat relates to the impact of any underlying 
relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable on estimated treatment effects 
and the second one relates to the actions of the participants themselves that may impact 
group assignment.  This study addressed both threats to the validity of causal inferences 
of this study as explained below. 
Relationship Between the Outcome and Forcing Variable 
If such a relationship exists, the treatment observed effect or the discontinuity 
may stem from the forcing variable rather than from the impact of the treatment that was 
available on one side of the cut-off and not on the other. Several tests were conducted to 
examine the relationship of the forcing variable and outcomes.   
First, an investigation of any potential incentives or programs that may be 
available for organizations based on their percentage of WOB that may influence the 
outcome was performed. In the timeframe of the initiative (2011- 2016), there were 
organizations that promoted the increase of WOB, the most popular being the 30% club. 
Although the 30% club may influence some boards to increase their percentage of 
women, the participation is voluntary and only a small percentage of FTSE boards have 
pledged to reach that target.  In fact, the Davies Review may have influenced boards to 
join the 30% club rather than the other way around, as the Davies Review was rolled out 
prior to the 30% club started recruiting organization members.  
Additionally, at the time of this study (2018), UBS announced that it would 
launch a fund that would only invest in organizations with good gender diversity indices.  
Similarly, in the U.S., the SHE index, a gender diversity ETF, only invests in 
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organizations that have a good gender diversity index, meaning that they have a greater 
gender diversity within senior leadership than other organizations in their sector. 
Although those funds were launched outside of the time window of this study, they 
represent a potential confounder for future evaluations of gender diversity increases on 
corporate boards.  
To rule out the assignment variable as the source for the discontinuous jump in 
the outcome, Ludwig and Miller (2007) proposed that one way to strengthen the claim 
that their RD design provides an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the treatment. 
In their study, they examined the causal impact of the Head Start program on improved 
health and educational outcomes for children.  To strengthen their causal claim, they 
examined a pseudo-outcome, per-capita social spending (Ludwig & Miller, 2007).  Had a 
discontinuity in their pseudo-outcome been identified, then their claim of causal effects 
from the head start program would have been jeopardized.  
Therefore, for every causal claim of this study, that is when the treatment effect is 
statistically significant, this study tested other variables that should not have been 
impacted by the treatment such as board size, pseudo-outcomes.  If the increase in the 
percentage of WOB is due to an adjustment in board size rather than a real increase in 
women’s participation, then a discontinuity would be present at the threshold and the 
increase of gender diversity on boards as a result of the Davies Review would have to be 
ruled out.  Additionally, pseudo-cutoffs were also tested.  Pseudo-cutoffs are one of the 
most widely used robustness or falsification tests used in RD studies (Ludwig & Miller, 
2007).   
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Integrity of the Forcing Variable 
The second threat concerns actions by participants themselves that may threaten 
the integrity of the forcing variable. If organizations are aware that the forcing variable is 
used for assignment to treatment and control groups, they may be able to transfer 
themselves from one side of the cut-off to the other, jeopardizing the exogeneity of the 
assignment process and undermines the assumption of equality of expectation for those of 
the assignment process and undermines the assumption of equality of expectation for 
those in the treatment and control groups. However, assignment to participants to the 
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE, 350, FTSE Small, and FTSE All Share is done strictly 
based on market capitalization of publicly listed companies that trade in the LSE, which 
is something controlled by the market, not the organization.  Additionally, when the U.K. 
coalition government pledged to promote gender equality on corporate boards, they did 
not announce what organizations they would focus on.  In the same way they could have 
focused only on FTSE 100 organizations, they could have rolled out the initiative for the 
FTSE All Share boards.   
Phase I. The targets set by the Davies Review were arbitrary and constructed in a 
way that would make it an achievable goal.  The calculation used to arrive at those targets 
used aggregated data for each FTSE index.  Organizations below the target were required 
to increase their participation of WOB to reach the minimum target.  Prior to the Lord 
Davies initiative, gender composition on FTSE boards is assumed to be endogenous.  The 
nature of board appointment in publicly listed organizations makes it highly unlikely that 
FTSE boards manipulated their percentage of WOB prior to the intervention.  For 
publicly listed companies, the U.K. CGC recommends that a nomination committee, 
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which usually consist of independent non-executive directors, should lead the process for 
board appointments and make recommendations to the board. If the board supports the 
appointment, it has to be confirmed by shareholders by way of ordinary resolution at the 
next annual general meeting following the appointment (Financial Reporting Council, 
2016). Therefore, observed differences between treatment and control groups are not 
likely to be impacted by participants’ actions related to group assignment.   
Phase II. The Davies Review evaluated the outcome of the initiative on October 
2015.  As indicated previously, the forcing variable WOBPC2016 was used to assign 
organizations to the treatment and comparison groups.  Using the target set by the Davies 
Review as the cutoff point (c=25%) organizations over the threshold were placed into the 
Compliant (treatment) and Non-compliant (comparison) groups.  The public 
acknowledgement through the Davies Review provided to organizations that were 
progressing toward the 25% goal or achieved it represents the treatment.  Organizations 
that reached or exceeded the goal were recognized as being compliant with the initiative.  
However, organizations had knowledge that they were expected to reach their targets by 
the end of 2015.  Although it is unlikely that organizations manipulated their percentages 
of WOB to receive recognition in their gender diversity efforts, there are a couple of 
situations in which some manipulation may have occurred.  For example, organizations 
that had a higher proportion of male directors throughout the year, delayed the 
replacement of a male director to the beginning of 2016, thus appeared to have a higher 
WOBPC at the end of 2015, and female directors that were leaving the organization may 
have stayed through the end of 2015.  In an examination of the annual reports of 2015, a 
total of 15 organizations that fit the cases aforementioned were identified, which 
 192 
represents 10% of the group. Furthermore, as these observations are so close to the 
threshold, they would have a direct impact on the non-parametric estimates.  Therefore, 
to minimize the potential impact to the internal validity of the study, the forcing variable 
used for testing these hypotheses was measured as of June of 2016, WOBPC2016.  
Organizations over the 25% threshold were placed in the Compliant (treatment) group, 
and organizations below the threshold were placed in the Non-compliant (comparison) 
group.   
Regression discontinuity designs do not require a pre-test and post-test 
measurement, but only that the assignment variable is independent of the outcome.  For 
example, using cross-sectional data, Angrist and Lavy (1999) used data from a natural 
experiment to examine whether being in a large class size (c=40) had an effect on student 
achievement. Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) examined the effects of the minimum 
drinking age (c=21) on mortality rates.  Therefore, using the effect of the minimum target 
set by the Davies Review as critical mass (c=25%) on opportunities for women in the 
organization and the gender pay gap seems reasonable as the cutoff was determined 
independently from the outcomes being observed.  
Similarly, the second assignment variable of phase II, Increase, was used tested as 
alternative explanation to the previous tests.  In the case of this assignment variable, 
organizations had no control over it.  Although the Davies Review set a target that 
organizations adopted, all organizations had different starting points.  Therefore, the 
levels of increase of WOBPC were different across the sample. Additionally, the cutoff 
point used for splitting the sample is completely exogenous, as it is the median Increase 
achieved by the pooled sample.  Furthermore, organizations that were not included in the 
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treatment group in the previous tests may be included in the treatment group in these tests. 
For example, organizations that had no women on their boards at the start of the initiative 
and strived to achieve 25% of WOB but only reached 20%, would be included in the 
Large (treatment) group.  Organizations that had more than 25% at the start of the 
initiative and did not increase their percentage of WOB would be placed in the Small 
(comparison) group.  
To test this assumption and rule out manipulation of the assignment variable, the 
McCrary density test (McCrary, 2006, 2008) were performed for each group for every 
assignment variable.  Results for every group demonstrated that there was no 
manipulation of the assignment variables WOBPC2011, WOBPC2016 and Increase.  
Continuity Assumption and Local Randomization 
In the RD literature, researchers often invoke local randomization to justify the 
validity of their designs (Dunning, 2008, p. 289).  However, local randomization is 
neither required, nor sufficient for the interpretation of causal effects in RD designs 
(Cattaneo et al., 2015).  Local randomization occurs when participants have imprecise 
control over X, thus the probability of treatment status is randomized around the threshold, 
which can produce “as good as random” group assignment (Lee & Lemieux, 2010, p. 
282).   However, it is possible that the forcing variable can appear to be randomized 
around the threshold and yet influence the outcome variable in such a way that it violates 
the continuity assumption (De la Cuesta & Imai, 2016).  An example of the continuity 
assumption violation despite apparent randomization of the forcing variable around the 
threshold was observed with the data for this study.  Initially, this study intended to use 
FTSE Rank as the forcing variable; however, tests revealed that despite the seemingly 
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random assignment of organizations to FTSE indices around the cutoff, the influence that 
FTSE rank has on the outcome variable of this study violated the continuity assumption 
despite local randomization.  Unlike the continuity assumption, local randomization is 
not required for RD designs (Cattaneo et al., 2015; Skovron & Titiunik, 2015).  
The most important condition for identification in RD design is the continuity 
assumption of the conditional expectation of counterfactual outcomes in the forcing 
variable. This means that for observation i, there are two potential outcomes, which are 
conditional to what side of the threshold i falls onto based on its score on the assignment 
variable.  The continuity assumption for the entire sample is required for parametric 
designs, which assumes that there is continuity on all covariates, except for the treatment; 
therefore, in the presence of treatment, a jump in the regression line represents the 
treatment effect.  McEwan and Shapiro (2007) suggest that for causal interpretation of 
RD estimates, at the very least, we must satisfy the assumption that the score on the 
forcing variable, near the cutoff line does not introduce sharp differences in unobserved 
variables that affect the observed outcome.  To test this assumption, the smoothness of 
baseline covariates across cutoffs must be examined (McEwan & Shapiro, 2006). When 
available, pre-test scores of the outcome variable must be regressed on the forcing 
variable to observe if discontinuities were present prior to the treatment (Moss & Yeaton, 
2006; McCrary, 2006, 2008).   
Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) established minimal continuity 
assumptions for identifying treatment effects in the RD using non-parametric designs by 
estimating the average outcome for observations slightly below the cutoff score as a valid 
counterfactual for the observations slightly above the cutoff score (Lee, 2007).  Therefore, 
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to test if the data available for this study can yield valid estimates using non-parametric 
RD, this study tested the smoothness of covariates for pooled sample and by each 
individual group for each assignment variable.  
Although the smoothness of covariates at the cutoff satisfied the continuity 
assumption for a non-parametric RD approach, data were tested for normality, linearity, 
and homoscedasticity, which are required for valid parametric estimates (Lee & Card, 
2006). The study anticipated that the relationship between the predictor and the outcome 
variables: percentage of WOB, percentage of non-executive directors, percentage of 
executive directors, women in executive leadership, women CEOs, women in senior 
management, and female representation company-wide, was not perfectly linear; 
therefore, to estimate effects, a non-parametric design was used.  Bandwidth selection 
was calculated using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth calculation, 
and several alternative bandwidths were estimated as well. 
Hypotheses Testing  
The study tested five set of hypotheses that were nested within two phases of the 
study.  The two-phase design was done in function of the baseline observations.  The first 
phase used 2011 observations as the baseline sample, as that was the year that the Davies 
Review was rolled out.  Phase I of the study tests three set of hypotheses that predict an 
effect of the Davies Review on changes to the board composition of FTSE 350 boards 
(n=295).  Although the Davies Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, the first phase 
also tests FTSE Small Cap (n=110) boards to identify if placebo effects of the Davies 
Review spilled over to that sample. 
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The second phase of the study uses 2016 observations as the baseline sample.  
The Davies Review initiative targets were officially reached in 2015 (Davies, 2015).  
Therefore, the baseline sample captured the changes to board composition resulting from 
the Davies Review and, as previously discussed, it reduced the risk of manipulation of the 
assignment variable that may have been present in 2015.  Hypotheses in this phase of the 
study tested the effects of 25% of WOB on opportunities for other women in the 
organization and on the gender pay gap. This phase of the study used the pooled FTSE 
All Share (n=385) sample to examine if 25% of WOB constitutes critical mass.  To that 
end, the pooled sample was split into two groups in function of their percentage of WOB 
on the baseline sample. Organizations with more than 25% of WOB were placed into the 
treatment group (n=153) and those below the threshold into the comparison group 
(n=242).  Additionally, as a competing explanation to critical mass of WOB, the 
percentage of increase of WOB was used to split the sample into organizations with a 
large increase (n=186) and small increase (n=209).  Detailed explanations for each 
hypothesis are provided below.  
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition 
To test the first set of hypotheses, a sharp RD approach was used.  The Davies 
Review initiative was delivered as a comply or explain approach with the objective of 
increasing the proportion of women on corporate boards.  The initiative was rolled out 
targeting FTSE 350 boards and providing minimum targets of female representation.  The 
compliance component of the initiative suggested that organizations that were over the 
minimum target set by the Davies Review at the time it was announced, were already 
compliant; therefore, they were not required to increase their proportion of WOB.  Using 
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that logic to separate the sample into treatment and comparison groups, this study’s first 
hypothesis predicted that organizations over the threshold established by the Davies 
Review would not increase their percentage of WOB as much as the treatment group, 
which was below the threshold.  The effect of the Davies Review initiative on increasing 
the percentage of the non-compliant group was predicted to be statistically significant at 
the alpha level of 0.05 (a=0.05). However, due to the limitations of sample size, findings 
at the alpha level 0.10 (a=0.10) may be suggestive of a significant effect that warrants 
further study (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012).   
Taking into account that the Davies Review set targets that were outside of the 
participants’ control, the threshold should not have any significance to organizations.  
Without the intervention of the Davies Review, there were no identified reasons for the 
upwards trend in the increase of WOB to come to a stop at the 25% mark for FTSE 100 
or at the 22% mark for FTSE 250 boards.  However, when the Lord Davies Review 
established its targets, it created an artificial vision of what gender-balanced boards were.  
Consequently, boards that were already above the target that may have continued their 
upwards trend had no need to continue to increase their female membership.  The lack a 
valid reason for discontinuous increase of WOB in organizations that were below the 
threshold set by the Davies Review would make any discontinuity practically significant, 
as it would provide evidence that the transformation of boards was not the result of 
commitment to gender equality, but compliance to the targets.  However, the practical 
significance for this hypothesis was set at an effect greater than 3%, which was consistent 
with the rate of growth for five years for comply or explain approaches identified by 
previous research (Fortin et al., 2017). The unprecedented increase provides the 
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expectation of a practically significant result for the full sample; however, a finding at the 
threshold would indicate the effect of the Davies Review as compliance. 
The equation used to estimate the treatment effect of the Davies Review on the 
increase of WOB included covariates that were identified in the literature as having a 
potential impact on the increase of WOB. Bilimoria (2006) found a positive relationship 
between higher proportion of WOB and women’s representation in management; 
therefore, the covariates representing the mean percentages of women in executive 
leadership are included in the equation.  Consistent with social categorization theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), previous research suggested that CEOs attempt to select 
candidates who are demographically similar to them (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1995); thus, CEO gender and chairperson gender are included in the 
equation.  Additionally, board size has been used as control variable in studies that 
examine gender in the corporate governance literature (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Carter et 
al., 2003; Luckerath-Rovers, 2010); therefore, that variable is also included as a control 
in the estimation of the effects of the Davies Review on the increase of WOB on the non-
compliant group.  Equation 4 was used to predict the increase in female board 
representation as a result of the Davies Review.  
 9:;<=>?= = 	@+ + 	@.ABCDEF+.. + 	@F7 + @GCH><I +		@JEKBL:I
+	@MEℎ>O<L:I + @PQ=;RH<.ST + @U9:I=" + 		8 
(3) 
where Increase is the increase in the percentage of female board representation 
calculated as the difference between WOBPC2016 and WOBPC2011 scores, b0 is the 
intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the forcing variable, WOBPC2011 is the transformed 
percentage of WOBPC2011 in 2011 centered at the cutoff, b2 is the coefficient for the 
treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates whether an organization was 
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in the non-balanced (T=1) or gender-balanced (T=0) group based on the cutoff score for 
its group, b3 is the coefficient for the variable Board, Board is the total number of 
directors in a board, b4 is the coefficient for female CEO, CEOGnd is the binary indicator 
of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b5 is the coefficient is the coefficient for female chairperson, 
ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b6 is the 
coefficient for the variable Sector, Sector is the industry sector for the organization, b7 is 
the coefficient for FTSE index, Index indicates the FTSE index the organization is listed 
under, and e is the residual error.   
Following recommendations in the literature, the unconditional model was first 
tested (Frolich & Huber, 2017). To identify the correct functional form of the regression, 
quadratic, and cubic functions were tested (Jacob et al., 2012; Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002). After the functional form was identified, covariates were added and the 
optimal bandwidth was calculated using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth 
test. As research indicates that keeping non statistically significant terms in the model 
would yield unbiased coefficients, non-significant terms were kept in the RD models 
used in this study.   In addition to the optimal bandwidth estimates, alternative 
bandwidths were tested.  The optimal bandwidth was narrowed and widened and 
estimates were compared with the optimal bandwidth estimates.  Coefficients for all the 
variables in the best model were provided and results were interpreted.   
The effect of the Davies Review on the increase of the percentage of WOB for 
FTSE 350 boards was estimated using a non-parametric approach.  A similar estimation 
method was used for estimating the placebo effect on the FTSE Small Cap group.  The 
local average treatment effect (LATE) was estimated as the difference in the mean 
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Increase of organizations within the bandwidth to the right and left of the cutoff point. 
Equation 5 describes the calculation used for obtaining the effect of the Davies Review: 
 K33=;RVWX1YZ = lim[\Y↑^ 9:;<=>?=
+|ABCDEF+.. − lim[\Y↓^
9:;<=>?=.|ABCDEF+.. (4) 
As mentioned previously, any causal claim resulting from a statistically 
significant treatment effect in the RD analyses was followed by robustness tests that 
consisted of pseudo-outcomes and pseudo cutoffs. Additionally, as one of the advantages 
of RD analyses is their transparent way of graphically showing how the treatment effect 
is identified (Lee & Lemieux, 2010), plots of the regression lines were provided for each 
test.   
The second and third set of hypotheses of this study also relate to changes in 
board composition resulting from the Davies Review.  Specifically, changes in the 
appointment of non-executive directors as compared to executive directors, and the 
appointment of women to CEO and chairperson positions. A regression discontinuity 
approach was not feasible for testing the variation in the proportion of women executive 
directors and non-executive due to the small variation of women executive directors in 
the 2011 (n=59) to 2016 (n=63) period, compared to the women non-executive directors 
in the same period, 2011 (n=314) to 2016 (n=634). Therefore, observations for the pooled 
sample (FTSE All Share) from 2011 to 2016 were used in panel study to model the 
growth of the proportion of female executive directors and female non-executive 
directors in relation to the total number of female directors in the Davies Review period.   
The variation of female CEOs in the 2011 (n=14) to 2016 (n=14) period, and 
women chairpersons from 2011 (n=7) to 2016 (n=16) has been limited. Therefore, the 
RD analysis was not feasible.  In an attempt to test the third set of hypotheses, t-tests 
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were performed to compare mean differences in the populations of CEOs and 
chairpersons compared to the populations of WED and WNED for each FTSE index 
group.  Additionally, women’s representation on corporate boards was very limited prior 
to the Davies Review initiative, averaging less than a woman per board.  Therefore, 
following Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) example, the annual mean of each variable was 
reported to show the trend in their variation pre and post-Davies Review.  Additionally, 
growth models of the proportion of female CEOs in relation to the total number of 
executive directors in the 2011 to 2016 period were computed.  Similarly, growth models 
of the proportion of female chairpersons in relationship to the total number of non-
executive directors in the 2011 to 2016 period were performed.  The statistical 
significance of these hypotheses tests were set at an at alpha level of .05 due to the large 
sample that results from including firm-year observations.  The practical significance was 
set above 5% for the cumulative effect of change in the Davies Review period. 
Although the design of this study relied on RD designs for the main analyses of 
the study, fitting the data to the wrong model may yield wrong estimates or wrong 
interpretations.  The purpose of running different analyses using longitudinal data was to 
show changes in non-executive/executive director characteristics during the sample 
period of this study. The importance of changes in the proportion of non-executive and 
executive director to this study lies in the link of director type to power and status, which 
are fundamental to the expectation that WOB will help other women in the organization. 
Effects of Davies Review on Opportunities for Women 
The fourth and fifth set of hypotheses examined the effects of compliant boards –
defined as being above the 25% WOB target set by the Davies Review – on opportunities 
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for other women and on the gender pay gap.  To test fourth set of hypotheses, gender split 
metrics reported on annual reports for executive leadership, senior leadership, and 
company-wide were used. However, the Davies Review (2011) acknowledged that part 
of the challenge in increasing women’s participation on corporate boards was around 
supply, specifying that fewer women than men rise to top levels of their organizations 
(Davies, 2011, p. 3).  Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the lower supply of 
women rising to corporate boards may be a related to the low representation of WOB.  
Although the Davies Review set a minimum target of WOB, resource dependence theory 
posits that organizations seek resources they need; therefore, it is reasonable to suggest 
that for the long-term success of the initiative, organizations should be preparing their 
senior leaders in order to take on board roles. Therefore, finding support for the fourth set 
of hypotheses, could indicate that the scarcity in the supply of women for director roles 
will persist, which could threaten the achievement of true gender parity at the highest 
decision-making levels. 
Tests of the effects of the WOB on opportunities for women were performed on 
the pooled sample.  Although the non-parametric tests reduced the sample size for the 
different tests, statistically significance set at the alpha level of 0.05 (a=0.05). However, 
for narrower bandwidths, sample size may pose a limitation; therefore, findings at the 
0.10 alpha level (a=0.10) may be indicative of a significant effect that warrants further 
study (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012).  Predictions related to critical mass at 25% and 
opportunities for other women lack empirical support.  Furthermore, in the RD design, 
what is being hypothesized is the discontinuous jump in the regression line at the 
threshold. Therefore, practical significance is set based on the average rate of increase 
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women in executive and senior management roles of less than 1% per year.  Therefore, a 
cumulative effect of 3% would indicate a practically significant effect.  
As indicated previously, the forcing variable WOBPC2016 was used to assign 
organizations to the treatment and comparison groups.  Using the target set by the Davies 
Review as the cutoff point (c=25%) organizations over the threshold were placed into the 
Compliant (treatment) and Non-compliant (comparison) groups.  The following equations 
predicted opportunities for women at other levels of the organization, measured as the 
women’s percentage of the total population of executive board, senior management, and 
company-wide.  
 AK"=;DEF+.P = 	@+ + 	@.	ABCDE + @F7 + @G9:;<=>?= + @JE<ORO;>` + @MAKa
+ @PEKBL:I + @UEKB7=:b<= + @cEℎ>O<L:I + @TEℎ>O<7=:b<=
+ @.+AQdDE + @..AKefDE + @.FQ=;RH<.ST + @.G9:I=".SF + 8 
(5) 
 
where, WExecPC2016 is the percentage of women in executive leadership, 
measured as the proportion of women in relation to the total number of people in 
executive leadership as of June 2016, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the 
assignment variable, WOBPC is the percentage of WOB in 2016, where the cutoff (c=25), 
b2 is the coefficient for the treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates 
whether an organization was in the treatment (T=1) or control (T=0) group based on the 
cutoff score for its group, b3 is the coefficient for the variable Increase, Increase is the 
increase in the percentage of WOB measured as the difference between 2016 and 2011 
measures, b4 is the coefficient for variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that 
indicates that a board has three or more women (Critical=1) or less than three women 
(Critical=0), b5 is the coefficient for variable WED, WED is the number of women 
executive directors in the board, b6 is the estimate for CEO gender, CEOGnd is the 
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binary indicator of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b7 is the coefficient for CEO tenure, 
CEOTenure is the number of years a female CEO has been in her position, b8 is the 
coefficient is the gender of the chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the 
chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b9 is the coefficient for Chair tenure, ChairTenure is the 
number of years a female chairperson has been in her position, b10 is the coefficient for 
WSMPC, WSMPC is the percentage of women in senior management, b11 is the 
coefficient for WEmpPC, WEmpPC is the percentage of women employed in the 
organization, b12 are the coefficients for the industry sector, Sector is the industry sector 
of a given organization, b13 are coefficient for FTSE Index, Index is the index of the 
organization, and e is the residual error.   
 AQdDEF+.P = 	@+ + 	@.	ABCDE + @F7 +	@G9:;<=>?= + @JE<ORO;>` + @MAKa
+ @PEKBL:I + @UEKB7=:b<= + @cEℎ>O<L:I + @TEℎ>O<7=:b<=




where, WSMPC2016 is the percentage of women in senior management, measured 
as the proportion of women in relation to the total number of people in senior 
management as of June 2016, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the assignment 
variable, WOBPC is the percentage of WOB in 2016, where the cutoff (c=25), b2 is the 
coefficient for the treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates whether an 
organization was in the treatment (T=1) or control (T=0) group based on the cutoff score 
for its group, b3 is the coefficient for the variable Increase, Increase is the increase in the 
percentage of WOB measured as the difference between 2016 and 2011 measures, b4 is 
the coefficient for variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that indicates that a 
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board has three or more women (Critical=1) or less than three women (Critical=0), b5 is 
the coefficient for variable WED, WED is the number of women executive directors in 
the board, b6 is the estimate for CEO gender, CEOGnd is the binary indicator of CEO 
gender (F=1, M=0), b7 is the coefficient for CEO tenure, CEOTenure is the number of 
years a female CEO has been in her position, b8 is the coefficient is the gender of the 
chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b9 is 
the coefficient for Chair tenure, ChairTenure is the number of years a female chairperson 
has been in her position, b10 is the coefficient for WExePC, WExecPC is the percentage 
of women in executive boards, b11 is the coefficient for WEmpPC, WEmpPC is the 
percentage of women employed in the organization, b12 are the coefficients for the 
industry sector, Sector is the industry sector of a given organization, b13 are coefficient 
for FTSE Index, Index is the index of the organization, and e is the residual error. 
 AKefDEF+.P = 	@+ + 	@.	ABCDE + @F7 + @G9:;<=>?= + @JE<ORO;>`
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(7) 
 
where, WEmpPC2016 is the percentage of women employed in the organization, 
measured as the proportion of women in relation to the total number employees as of 
June 2016, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the assignment variable, WOBPC is 
the percentage of WOB in 2016, where the cutoff (c=25), b2 is the coefficient for the 
treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates whether an organization was 
in the treatment (T=1) or control (T=0) group based on the cutoff score for its group, b3 is 
the coefficient for the variable Increase, Increase is the increase in the percentage of 
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WOB measured as the difference between 2016 and 2011 measures, b4 is the coefficient 
for variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that indicates that a board has three or 
more women (Critical=1) or less than three women (Critical=0), b5 is the estimate for 
CEO gender, CEOGnd is the binary indicator of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b6 is the 
coefficient for CEO tenure, CEOTenure is the number of years a female CEO has been in 
her position, b7 is the coefficient is the gender of the chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary 
indicator of the chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b8 is the coefficient for Chair tenure, 
ChairTenure is the number of years a female chairperson has been in her position, b9 is 
the coefficient for WExePC, WExecPC is the percentage of women in executive boards, 
b10 is the coefficient for WSMPC, WSMPC is the percentage of women in senior 
management, b11 are the coefficients for the industry sector, Sector is the industry sector 
of a given organization, b12 are coefficient for FTSE Index, Index is the index of the 
organization, and e is the residual error. 
To estimate the treatment effect of compliance to the Davies Review targets on 
opportunities for other women in the organization, the following equations were used: 













where the effect of compliance to the 25% WOB target set by Davies Review on 
the participation of women at the executive leadership, senior management, and 
company-wide levels, is calculated as the difference between the average estimates of the 
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regressions to the left and right of the 25% compliance cutoff.  The estimate is limited to 
a number of observations that lie close to the cutoff point and within the selected 
bandwidth.  As in previous hypotheses, the Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth (Imbens & 
Kalyanaraman, 2012) estimation method was used to identify the optimal bandwidth for 
the data.  Additionally, the optimal bandwidth was increased and decreased to compare 
estimates at different bandwidths.  Results for the multiple bandwidth tests were reported.  
Effects of Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap 
To test the final hypothesis of this study, gender pay gap data from the U.K. 
Government gender pay gap service was used.  According to the U.K. coalition 
government, the objective of increasing female representation at the highest decision-
making levels was to build a fairer society and help promote equal opportunity for 
women.  Therefore, after achieving the targets set by the Lord Davies initiative; it is 
reasonable to test the effects of increased female participation on the gender pay gap.  
Theory and multiple empirical studies suggest that to effect change, a lower status group 
needs critical mass, which is the equivalent of three women.  Previous studies found that 
in France, the quota law for WOB increased the gender pay gap (Reberioux & Roudaut, 
2016), other studies found that legislation did not have an effect on the gender pay gap 
(Chevalier, 2017), and recent statistics from the Global Gender Gap report, revealed that 
in Norway, the gender pay gap in Norway has increased since the introduction of the 
quota law for WOB.  In 2008, when the quota law was officially enforced in Norway, 
women earned 85% of what men earned for similar work (Ministry of Children and 
Equality, 2008).  In 2017, almost ten years after achieving 40% representation on 
corporate boards, the gender pay gap has increased and women now earn 79% (World 
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Economic Forum, 2017) of what men earn for similar work.  Therefore, the fifth set of 
hypotheses predicted that Compliant boards did not decrease the gender pay gap.   
To test those predictions, assignment variables were used in the same way as in 
the analyses for the previous set of hypotheses. The study design for these analyses is 
shown on Figure 2. The sample size for the last hypothesis is reduced due to the rules for 
the gender pay gap reporting that only mandates organizations with 250 employees or 
more to disclose their pay differentials by gender.  Currently, of the 2016 sample of 395 
organizations, gender pay gap data was available for 302 organizations.  The effect of 
25% female representation on FTSE All Share boards on the gender pay gap was not 
predicted to be statistically significant at the alpha level of 0.05 (a=0.05).  The prediction 
was supported based on empirical evidence that did not find evidence that WOB had an 
effect on decreasing the pay gap at lower levels (Bertrand et al., 2018; Reberioux & 
Roudaut, 2016).  A significant finding would indicate that 25% of WOB constitutes 
critical mass. The practical significance for this hypotheses was set at 3 percentage points 
as that is the difference explained by gender that starts at graduation (Department for 
Education, 2018).   
Predictions related to the gender pay gap in this study relate to the gender pay gap 
median. Because it is known that leadership is male-dominated, the salaries of high 
earners – usually men – may skew the mean and result in misleading results; therefore, 
although the PayGapMean estimates are reported, PayGapMedian estimates may provide 
a more accurate representation of the gender pay gap that is more representative of 
general workforce in the United Kingdom. The significance of these results lies in the 
fact that organizations in the sample used for this study employed 7.7 million people in 
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the year 2016, which represents about 23% of the total workforce in the United Kingdom.  
Therefore, effects on gender pay gap are consequential to the British society.  The 
following equation represents the predictive model for the impact of the gender-balanced 
boards on the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations. 
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(11) 
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where, PayGapMean and PayGapMedian are the 2017 gender pay gap mean and 
median for women in the observed organization, a positive number indicates that the 
median earnings for men are higher than for women, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the 
coefficient for the assignment variable, WOBPC is the percentage of WOBPC2016, where 
the cutoff is set 25 (c=25), , b2 is the coefficient for the treatment effect and T is the 
dummy variable that indicates whether an organization was in the treatment (T=1) or 
control (T=0) group based on the cutoff score for its group, b3 is the coefficient for the 
variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that indicates that a board has three or 
more women (Critical=1) or less than three women (Critical=0),  b4 is the coefficient for 
Increase, Increase is the increase in the percentage of WOB measured as the difference 
between WOBPC2016 and WOBPC2011 measures, b5 is the estimate for CEO gender, 
CEOGnd is the binary indicator of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b6 is the coefficient is the 
gender of the chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the chairperson gender 
(F=1, M=0), b5 is the coefficient for industry sector, Sector is the industry sector of the 
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observed organization, b7 is the coefficient for percentage of WExecPC, WExecPC is the 
percentage of female employees in the organization with relation to the total number of 
employees, b8 is the coefficient the percentage of women in senior management and 
WSMPC is the percentage of women in senior management in relation to the total number 
of people in senior management, b9 is the coefficient for the mean value of variable Race, 
Race is the mean of the binary indicator for Race for each female board member, which 
is 0 for white female board members and 1 for minority, b10 is the coefficient for mean 
Tenure, Tenure is the number of years a female board member has been on the 
organization’s board, b11 is the coefficient the mean for variable Age, Age is the mean age 
of female board members in the organization’s board, b12 are the coefficients for Sector, 
Sector is the industry sector group for the organization, and e is the residual error.  To 
estimate the treatment effect compliance to the 25% WOB targets on the gender pay gap, 
the following equations were used: 













where the effect of Compliance with the 25% target set by the Davies Review on 
the participation of women at the executive leadership, senior management, and 
company-wide levels, is calculated as the difference of the average estimates of the 
regressions to the left and right of the cutoff point determined by the Davies Review 
(c=25).  The estimate is limited to a number of observations that lie close to the cutoff 
 211 
point.  As in previous hypotheses, the Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth (Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman, 2012) estimation method was used to identify the optimal bandwidth for 
the data.  Additionally, bandwidth was increased and decreased and estimates for 
multiple bandwidths were reported.  
Previous studies found positive link between organizations with socially 
responsible policies and the presence of WOB (Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; 
Margaretha & Isnaini, 2014), which could impact the proportion of women at other 
leadership levels; however, this study has not collected data related to social 
responsibility policies of the organizations in the sample; therefore, it cannot control for it.  
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that organizations that had to increase the 
percentage of WOB by doubling or tripling their pre-initiative numbers experienced more 
constrain than those that were close to or over the threshold.   
Therefore, as an alternative explanation to the critical mass at 25% of WOB, the 
variable Increase was used as predictor of differences on the gender pay gap.   The 
reasoning for this is that if the Davies Review caused a statistically significant increase in 
the proportion of WOBPC, the variable Increase must be ruled out as the cause of 
changes that are related to the variable WOBPC.  Ruling out rival explanations for the 
statistical relationship between the observed a treatment and an outcome is essential for 
the internal validity of a quasi-experimental design (Murnane & Willet, 2011). To that 
end, using a cutoff score of 12 (c=12), which is the median increase in the percentage of 
WOB for the total sample, the variable Increase was used to split the sample into two 
groups, one group that had a Large increase of WOBPC and one that had a Small increase 
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of WOBPC.   Equation 15 describes the model for predicting the gender pay gap median 
for the pooled sample. 
 D>lL>fd=IO>:
= 	@+ + 	@.	9:;<=>?= + @F7 + @GABCDE + @JAK"=;DE
+ @MAQdDE + @PAKefDE + @UEKB7=:b<= + @cEℎ>O<7=:b<=
+ @TE<ORO;>` + @.+Q=;RH< + 8 
(15) 
 
As in previous hypotheses, the treatment effect was estimated as a local average 
treatment effect (LATE) using observations that lie within the selected bandwidth as 
shown on Equation 16.  Therefore, the estimate of the effect of a Large increase in the 
percentage of WOB in the 2011 to 2016 period the PayGapMedian was estimated as 
follows:  








Two delimitations existed for the present study.  First, data were limited to 
publicly listed organizations constituents of the FTSE All Share index; therefore, findings 
may not be generalizable to privately owned organizations.  Second, potential 
confounding effect of Brexit was taken into account.  It was determined that Brexit may 
have an impact on changes to board composition and may impact the long term effects of 
the initiative; therefore, observations were limited to the 2008 – June 2016 period (prior 
to the Brexit announcement).  
Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter 3 provided an outline for the design and methodology of the proposed 
study. The chapter discussed the purpose of the study, the research hypotheses, the 
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population and sample, the design of the study, a review of regression discontinuity 
design, data collection procedures, data analysis procedures, an identification of threats to 
validity and hypotheses testing. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the 
delimitations of the proposed study. 
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Chapter 4 - Results 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results for the study, which are divided into five 
different sections.  The first section provides a description of the collected data, 
participants of the study, group comparisons, and correlations. The second section 
presents a description of the treatment of missing data, identification of the missing data 
mechanism and data imputation process.  The third section reports the results of the tests 
of statistical assumptions and internal validity. The fourth section reports the hypotheses 
test results and robustness tests for the validity of causal claims.  The fifth section 
provides a hypotheses summary and a summary of the chapter.  
Data Collection and Participants 
Initially, this study intended to analyze the data published in the Davies Reviews, 
which consists of gender metrics for organizations in the FTSE 350 index. However, 
inconsistencies were found, which were compelling enough to warrant re-collection and 
validation of the data.  Similarly, it was noted that the Davies Reviews reported metrics 
of FTSE 350 organizations irrespective of their year of entry into the index.  For example, 
within 18 months (September 2014 to February 2016), four organizations with female 
CEOs entered the FTSE 250 index; however, their appointment took place when those 
organizations were private; therefore, the increase of female CEOs could not be attributed 
to the Davies Review.  Realizing that including those organizations in the analyses would 
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impact the findings, this study used a baseline sample of organizations indexed in the 
FTSE All Share in 2011 and remained listed through 2016. 
A database containing annual data for the organizations of the baseline sample 
was built using a spreadsheet. To populate the database, annual reports for each year in 
the observation period were downloaded from the London Stock Exchange website and 
the corporate websites of the organizations in the baseline sample.  Each report was used 
to populate the database built for this study.  Initially, this study had planned to follow the 
method used in Ahern and Dittmar (2012) for gathering gender information about board 
members, which consisted in using the photo of the director in the annual report to 
identify their gender.  However, as a result of the gender metrics reporting requirement 
published in the 2012 amendment to the U.K. CGC, organizations disclose the gender of 
each board director and in most cases, gender of the members of their executive boards.  
Therefore, the gender of each board member and executive board member was collected 
from annual reports.  When discrepancies were found between two sources, data from the 
Companies House database prevailed.  In cases in which data were not reported on 
annual reports and were not available on the Companies House database, they were left 
blank in the study’s database.   
The baseline sample consisted of 395 unique organizations listed in the FTSE All 
Share index in 2011 and remained in the index through 2016.  Data from 2008 through 
2010 were also collected to identify the effects of time on changes in gender composition 
on boards. Although every effort was made to obtain annual reports for each organization 
for every year observed in this study, 2008 reports for ten organizations included in the 
baseline sample were not available, and 2009 reports for four organizations were not 
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available. A total of 3541 annual reports were collected, which comprised 2551 reports 
from FTSE 350 firms, which were subject to the Davies Review targets, and 990 reports 
from FTSE Small Cap firms.  
Table 5 presents cross-sectional mean values of organizational and board 
characteristics between 2008 and 2016.  The average size of FTSE 100 boards was 
around 11, which was relatively constant for the observed years. The average board size 
of FTSE 250 boards was around 8.5 members in the observed years.  The average board 
size of FTSE Small Cap was around 7 members.  The mean percentage of WOB in the 
FTSE 100 sample increased from 11.57 in 2008 to 25.58 in 2016.  The FTSE 250 sample 
increased their mean percentage of WOB from 5.36 in 2008 to 20.65 in 2016. The 
collective increase in the share of WOB for FTSE Small Cap boards was from 5.16 in 
2008 to 13.88 in 2016.   The relatively constant board size suggests that over the course 
of the observed period, organizations replaced male directors with female directors, 
rather than adding female directors to their existing boards to comply with the targets set 
by the Davies Review.  However, despite the increase in the percentage of WOB, the 
number of female CEOs across organizations in all FTSE indices remained relatively 
stable in the observed period. The total number of female CEOs in FTSE 350 firms rose 
from 10 (3.6%) in 2008 to 13 (4.6%) in 2016.  Conversely, the number of female 
chairpersons in FTSE 350 boards had an increase from 4 (1.4%) in 2008 to 12 (4.2%) in 
2016. 
Table 6 reports individual characteristics of the 4207 observations for female 
directors in the 2008 to 2016 period.  Across the three FTSE indices, individual 
characteristics were similar.  The average age of female directors on FTSE 100 boards 
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increased from 55.06 in 2011 to 57.18 in 2016.  Similarly, the average age of female 
directors on FTSE 250 boards increased from 51.87 in 2011 to 55.22 in 2016, and from 
51.65 in 2011 to 54.39 for FTSE Small Cap boards. The average tenure of FTSE 100 
female board members in 2016 was 3.49 compared to 3.27 in 2011.  Female directors of 
FTSE 250 boards had an average tenure of 3.37 years in 2016 compared to 2.65 in 2011.  
Tenure for female directors in FTSE Small Cap boards decreased from 3.40 in 2011 to 
3.01 in 2016.  The lowest average tenure for FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap boards was 
in 2013, and the lowest average tenure for FTSE 100 boards was 2014, which consistent 
with the increasing numbers of directors indicates that those in those years, there was an 
increase in the recruiting female board directors. 
Educational attainment levels decreased for FTSE 100 boards, from 59.63% of 
directors with a Master’s degree or above in 2011 to 53.39% in 2016.  Conversely, the 
educational attainment of female directors of FTSE 250 boards increased from 38.41% of 
directors with a Master’s degree or above in 2011 to 45.20% in 2016. Educational 
attainment for the FTSE Small Cap group remained stable for directors with Master’s 
degrees or above from 43.55% in 2011 to 45.38% in 2016. The most noticeable change 
for the FTSE Small Cap group was the population of directors with high school education, 
which decreased from 22.58% in 2011 to 9.26% in 2016. Across the sample, the majority 
of the population was identified as white. In 2016, the FTSE 100 group had the most 
racial/ethnic diversity of all year-group observations, with 89.47% of white female 
directors.  The second most represented racial/ethnic group was Asian, representing 
6.02% of the FTSE 100 female directors and 5.56% of the FTSE Small Cap female 
director population.    
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Table 5  
Board Characteristics Parameter Means for the Sample by Index  
Index 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FTSE 100 
Board  11.19 11.09 10.95 11.24 11.25 11.04 11.24 10.96 10.67 
WOBPC 11.57 11.94 12.94 14.66 17.74 19.34 22.79 25.20 25.58 
WED  0.18 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.26 
WNED 1.12 1.16 1.24 1.46 1.78 1.96 2.36 2.56 2.51 
CEOGnd1 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 
ChairGnd1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
WExecPC 11.24 11.17 14.68 13.74 12.56 14.76 14.81 17.59 17.88 
WSMPC 16.26 15.82 20.11 21.88 23.47 20.56 21.57 21.91 22.99 
WEmpPC 37.57 35.97 38.16 34.28 36.71 36.36 36.89 36.01 35.87 
FTSE 250  
Board  8.51 8.49 8.43 8.57 8.66 8.58 8.61 8.45 8.27 
WOBPC 5.36 6.22 7.39 9.10 12.37 15.22 17.77 19.97 20.65 
WED  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14 
WNED 0.37 0.43 0.51 0.67 0.93 1.16 1.37 1.53 1.57 
CEOGnd1 7 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
ChairGnd1 2 1 1 2 4 5 6 9 10 
WExecPC 8.79 9.06 11.54 11.63 12.07 15.32 14.29 15.87 14.65 
WSMPC 9.26 6.98 27.25 27.97 22.60 19.82 19.81 21.00 22.84 
WEmpPC 55.39 49.56 38.71 38.38 35.01 35.54 35.96 35.60 36.11 
FTSE Small Cap 
Board  7.31 7.29 7.24 7.33 7.16 7.02 7.06 7.05 6.96 
WOBPC 5.16 5.56 6.06 7.41 8.83 10.08 11.01 12.46 13.88 
WED  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
WNED 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.68 0.78 0.88 
CEOGnd1 3 3 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 
ChairGnd1 0 0 1 4 4 5 4 4 4 
WExecPC 8.40 8.53 7.76 7.99 7.31 11.93 13.06 14.94 15.60 
WSMPC - 16.67 17.56 17.80 27.58 20.54 19.24 20.78 21.02 
WEmpPC 35.00 38.23 36.71 35.88 38.67 33.63 35.31 35.95 36.10 
Firms (n) 385 391 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 
Board (n) 3397 3436 3441 3505 3504 3453 3484 3424 3353 
WOB (n) 252 273 306 373 465 532 622 687 697 
WED (n) 50 50 54 59 62 57 61 66 63 
WNED (n) 202 222 252 314 403 474 561 621 634 
Note. 1Represents the total number of women for the variable.  n=sample size; Board=board size; 
WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WED=women executive directors; WNED=women 
non-executive directors; CEOGnd=female CEOs; ChairGnd=female chairpersons; 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed in the firm. 
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Table 6  
Female Director Characteristics by Index 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FTSE 100 
WOB (n) 122 125 137 160 192 207 247 269 266 
Avg. age 54.10 55.30 55.20 55.06 55.30 55.59 55.90 56.71 57.18 
Avg. tenure 3.15 3.66 3.64 3.27 3.14 3.11 2.84 3.12 3.49 
Education 
         HS 6.56 6.40 5.84 4.38 3.13 3.38 3.64 3.35 4.14 
Bachelor 36.89 33.60 32.85 36.25 39.06 41.55 42.51 43.87 42.48 
Master 40.16 42.40 44.53 46.25 45.83 43.00 41.30 40.15 40.98 
Professional 6.56 6.40 5.11 5.00 4.69 5.80 6.07 5.20 4.14 
Doctoral 9.84 11.20 11.68 8.13 7.29 6.28 6.48 7.43 8.27 
Race 
         White 90.16 89.60 90.51 90.00 92.71 91.79 89.88 89.59 89.47 
Black 4.10 4.80 4.38 3.75 2.60 3.86 4.05 3.72 3.38 
Hispanic 1.64 0.80 0.73 0.63 1.04 0.48 1.21 1.12 1.13 
Asian/ME 4.10 4.80 4.38 5.63 3.65 3.86 4.86 5.58 6.02 
FTSE 250 
WOB (n) 88 103 120 151 204 247 289 320 323 
Avg. age 50.61 51.15 51.76 51.87 52.29 52.96 53.35 54.47 55.22 
Avg. tenure 3.00 3.03 3.00 2.65 2.38 2.29 2.45 2.77 3.37 
Education 
         HS 7.95 11.65 10.00 9.27 12.25 10.12 9.34 8.13 7.74 
Bachelor 46.59 50.49 51.67 52.32 48.04 47.37 48.44 48.13 47.06 
Master 34.09 28.16 27.50 29.80 30.39 33.20 33.22 34.69 36.22 
Professional 1.14 0.97 1.67 0.66 1.96 3.24 2.42 2.81 2.48 
Doctoral 10.23 8.74 9.17 7.95 7.35 6.07 6.57 6.25 6.50 
Race 
         White 95.45 96.12 95.83 94.70 95.59 95.95 94.81 95.00 95.05 
Black 1.14 0.97 0.83 0.66 0.98 1.21 1.73 1.25 1.24 
Asian/ME 3.41 2.91 3.33 4.64 3.43 2.83 3.46 3.75 3.72 
FTSE Small Cap 
WOB (n) 42 45 49 62 69 78 86 98 108 
Avg. age 49.64 50.56 51.49 51.65 52.22 52.67 53.15 53.97 54.39 
Avg. tenure 3.40 4.02 4.00 3.40 2.74 2.38 2.59 2.50 3.01 
Education 
         HS 21.43 22.22 24.49 22.58 17.39 16.67 13.95 12.24 9.26 
Bachelor 35.71 33.33 30.61 33.87 40.58 38.46 43.02 43.88 45.37 
Master 30.95 33.33 32.65 32.26 26.09 32.05 33.72 34.69 37.04 
Professional 4.76 4.44 6.12 4.84 5.80 2.56 1.16 1.02 0.93 
Doctoral 7.14 6.67 6.12 6.45 10.14 10.26 8.14 8.16 7.41 
Race 
         White 92.86 93.33 93.88 93.55 94.20 93.59 94.19 93.88 94.44 
Asian/ME 7.14 6.67 6.12 6.45 5.80 6.41 5.81 6.12 5.56 
WOB (n) 252 273 306 373 465 532 622 687 697 
Unique names 210 224 248 304 377 430 501 552 562 
Note. n=sample size; WOB=women on boards; HS= high school; ME=middle eastern.  
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As Table 7 shows, organizations in the baseline sample had a similar distribution 
across all FTSE indices.  The three sectors with the highest concentration of observations 
were finance, consumer services, and industrial, representing 56.4%, 62.4%, and 80.4% 
of organizations in the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap groups, respectively. 
Table 7  
Sample Distribution by Sector by Index  
 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap 
Sector n  % n % n % 
Consumer Goods 9 9.4% 17 9.0% 11 10.0% 
Consumer Services 17 17.7% 45 23.8% 23 20.9% 
Energy 9 9.4% 8 4.2% 3 2.7% 
Financials 22 22.9% 36 19.0% 16 14.5% 
Health Care 4 4.2% 6 3.2% 4 3.6% 
Industrials 14 14.6% 47 24.9% 45 40.9% 
Materials 11 11.5% 15 7.9% 3 2.7% 
Technology 2 2.1% 10 5.3% 4 3.6% 
Telecommunications 3 3.1% 3 1.6% 1 0.9% 
Utilities 5 5.2% 2 1.1% 0 0.0% 
Total by Sector 96 100.0% 189 100.0% 110 100.0% 
Note. n=Sample size. Percentages based upon group totals. 
 
Group Comparison 
Phase I. Using the targets set by the Davies Review, organizations were split into 
two groups (i.e., treatment and comparison) based on their percentage of WOB in 2011 
(baseline).  The threshold used for FTSE 100 boards was 25%, for FTSE 250 boards, the 
threshold used was 22%, and for FTSE Small Cap, the threshold used was 19%.  These 
thresholds are in line with the targets recommended by the Davies Review (2011, p. 19).  
Organizations that had a percentage of WOB higher than the threshold set by the Davies 
Review were placed in the gender balanced (comparison) group, and organizations below 
 221 
the threshold were placed in the non-balanced (treatment) group.  Although the Davies 
Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, tests were performed on the FTSE Small Cap 
boards in order to identify differences between organizations that were subject to 
minimum targets and organizations that were not.  Table 8 reports the distribution of the 
treatment and comparison groups across different demographic variables. 
Table 8  
 
Distribution of Treatment and Comparison Groups for Phase I  
 
Variable Non-balanced  Gender-balanced  
  n % n % 
Index 
    FTSE 100 81 23.48 15 30.00 
FTSE 250 170 49.28 19 38.00 
FTSE Small Cap 94 27.25 16 32.00 
Sector 
    Consumer Goods 30 8.70 7 14.00 
Consumer Services 70 20.29 15 30.00 
Energy 20 5.80 0 0.00 
Financials 67 19.42 7 14.00 
Health Care 10 2.90 4 8.00 
Industrials 97 28.12 9 18.00 
Materials 27 7.83 2 4.00 
Technology 13 3.77 3 6.00 
Telecommunications 5 1.45 2 4.00 
Utilities 6 1.74 1 2.00 
Board 
    Large (>9) 171 49.57 24 48.00 
Small (<9) 174 50.43 26 52.00 
Emp 
    Small (<1000) 88 25.51 13 26.00 
Medium (>1000, <10000) 154 44.64 20 40.00 
Large (>10000) 103 29.86 17 34.00 
MCap 
    1st quartile 83 24.06 16 32.00 
2nd quartile  89 25.80 10 20.00 
3rd quartile 89 25.80 9 18.00 
4th quartile 84 24.35 15 30.00 
Note. n=Sample size; Forcing variable = WOBPC2011. Cutoff point [FTSE100=25%, FTSE 
250=22%, FTSE Small Cap=19%]. 
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Subsequently, the baseline sample was analyzed to identify if there were industry 
sectors that were more likely to be in the gender-balanced group.  Table 9 reports the 
distribution of the baseline sample’s treatment and comparison group by FTSE index.  
The total number of observations in the treatment group was 345 and the total number of 
observations in the comparison group was 50.  Fisher’s exact different test found that 
across indices, groups were not statistically significantly different from the rest of the 
sample (p>.05).    Similarly, the odds ratio statistic ranged from 0.72 to 1.58, which 
suggested that the odds for the observations to fall into treatment or comparison group 
were similar across all indices.  
 
Table 9  
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Index – Phase I  
  Non-balanced Gender-balanced       		
Index n % n % Diff. p-value 95% CI V 
FTSE 100 81 23.36 15 30.00 -6.52 0.377 0.36, 1.49 0.04 
FTSE 250 170 49.28 19 38.00 11.28 0.173 0.83, 3.09 0.07 
FTSE Small Cap 94 27.25 16 32.00 -4.75 0.501 0.41, 1.62 0.03 
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval; V=Cramer’s V 
 
To further examine differences between the treatment and control group in the 
pooled sample, an analysis of the likelihood of the study’s observations to fall within any 
particular industry sectors was performed. Table 10 reports the results of the Fisher’s 
exact test of the difference in the distribution of industry sectors, which yielded non-
statistically significant p-values that ranged from .09 to 1.  The Cramer’s V values ranged 
from <.001 to .070, which indicated that differences between the treatment and 
comparison groups across industry sectors were not practically significant.  Furthermore, 
p-values ranging from .29 to .94 on Fisher’s exact test indicated non statistically 
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significant differences between groups across the variables board size, number of 
employees, FTSE index and market capitalization, reported on Table 11. The Cramer’s V 
values ranged from <.001 to .09, indicating that differences were not practically 
significant. After establishing that the treatment and control groups were comparable, the 
data were deemed adequate to proceed with the analyses of phase I of the study. 
Table 10  
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Sector  – Phase I 
		 Non-balanced Gender-balanced       
Industry Sector n % n % p-value 95% CI Cramer's V 
Consumer Goods 30 8.70% 7 14.00%  0.29  0.23, 1.68 0.047 
Consumer Services 70 20.29% 15 30.00%  0.14  0.30, 1.24 0.069 
Energy 20 5.80% 0 0.00%  0.09  0.73, Inf 0.070 
Financials 67 19.42% 7 14.00%  0.44  0.62, 4.07 0.030 
Health Care 10 2.90% 4 8.00%  0.09  0.09, 1.57 0.070 
Industrials 97 28.12% 9 18.00%  0.17  0.81, 4.33 0.067 
Materials 27 7.83% 2 4.00%  0.56  0.48, 18.21 0.034 
Technology 13 3.77% 3 6.00%  0.44  0.16, 3.48 0.018 
Telecommunications 5 1.45% 2 4.00%  0.22  0.06, 3.82 0.035 
Utilities 6 1.74% 1 2.00%  1.00  0.10, 40.69 0.000 
Observations 345   50         
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval; Forcing variable=WOBPC2011. 
 
Table 11  
 
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Organizational 
Characteristics – Phase I 
 
Variable  χ2 df p-value Fisher's p-value Cramer's V 
Board size  0.003   1   0.96   0.94   0.00  
Employees  0.464   2   0.79   0.79   0.03  
Index  2.279   2   0.32   0.29   0.08  
Market capitalization  3.311   3   0.35   0.35   0.09  
Note. Board size was split into above average and below average.  Number of employees was 
split into three groups, small (<1,000), medium (>1,000, <10,000), and large (>10,000).  Market 
capitalization split the sample into quartiles.   
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Correlations for phase I variables. Table 12 reports the within group 
correlations that were computed grouped by Index.  As expected, multiple variables were 
correlated.  The variable that indicated the number for women directors, WOB, was 
highly correlated with the variable that indicated the percentage of women directors 
WOBPC (r=.93) due to the latter one being a generated value computed using the 
variable WOB divided by the total number of board members.  The variable WOBPC was 
highly correlated with the variable Increase due to the fact that the for the entire sample 
the variable Increase represented the increase in the percentage of female directors in the 
duration of the Davies Review.  The variable that represented the percentage of female 
non-executive directors, WNED, was highly correlated with the variable WOB because 
the majority of female directors were non-executives.  The objective of performing 
correlations of the variables was to identify relationships that were not expected.  
However, all correlations appeared to be reasonable. 
The between group correlations and their probability, reported in Table 13 and 
Table 14, indicated that there were statistically significant differences among groups in 
the relationship of variable WNED with WOB (p<.001).  Another notable statistically 




Table 12  
Within Group Correlations for Phase I Variables for the Pooled Sample 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Sector 1.00 
          2. Increase 0.05 1.00 
         3. Board -0.12 -0.04 1.00 
        4. WOBPC -0.17 -0.51 0.09 1.00 
       5. WOB -0.18 -0.46 0.35 0.93 1.00 
      6. WED -0.12 -0.25 0.07 0.44 0.42 1.00 
     7. WNED -0.14 -0.37 0.35 0.79 0.88 -0.06 1.00 
    8. Emp -0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.17 1.00 
   9. CEOGnd -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 0.28 0.28 0.55 0.02 0.00 1.00 
  10. ChairGnd -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.08 1.00 
 11. Treatment2 0.05 0.39 0.05 -0.68 -0.60 -0.37 -0.47 0.00 -0.26 -0.12 1.00 
FTSE 100 (n=96) 
M  4.50 10.92 11.24 14.66 1.67 0.21 1.46 58287 0.04 0.01 0.84 
SD 2.47 9.20 2.75 8.36 1.00 0.48 0.95 99516 0.20 0.10 0.36 
FTSE 250 (n=189) 
M 4.33 11.55 8.57 9.10 0.80 0.13 0.67 8788 0.04 0.01 0.90 
SD 2.26 10.77 2.09 8.93 0.79 0.38 0.71 15804 0.20 0.10 0.30 
FTSE Small Cap (n=110) 
M 4.38 6.47 7.33 7.41 0.56 0.14 0.43 2734 0.02 0.04 0.85 
SD 2.09 11.79 1.48 9.66 0.76 0.34 0.64 4355 0.13 0.19 0.35 
Note. Unless noted, all variables are from the 2011 year-end cross-section. Sample was grouped 
by FTSE Index. Increase = increase in percentage of women on boards;  n=sample size; M=mean; 
SD=standard deviation; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WOB=women on boards; 
WED=women executive directors; WNED=women non-executive directors; Emp=number of 





Table 13  
Between Group Correlations for Phase I Variables for the Pooled Sample 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Sector 1.00 
          2. Increase -0.06 1.00 
         3. Board 0.78 0.58 1.00 
        4. WOBPC 0.84 0.48 0.99 1.00 
       5. WOB 0.86 0.46 0.99 1.00 1.00 
      6. WED 0.98 0.13 0.88 0.93 0.94 1.00 
     7. WNED 0.84 0.49 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 
    8. Emp 0.91 0.35 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.00 
   9. CEOGnd 0.03 1.00 0.65 0.56 0.54 0.22 0.57 0.43 1.00 
  10. ChairGnd -0.06 -0.99 -0.67 -0.59 -0.57 -0.25 -0.59 -0.46 -1.00 1.00 
 11. Treatment -0.86 0.56 -0.35 -0.45 -0.47 -0.75 -0.45 -0.58 0.49 -0.46 1.00 
Note. Unless noted, all variables are from the 2011 year-end cross-section. Sample was grouped 
by FTSE Index. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WOB=women on boards; 
WED=women executive directors; WNED=women non-executive directors; Emp=number of 
employees; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female chairperson; Treatment=dummy variable 
[1=non-balanced; 0=gender-balanced}. 
 
Table 14  
Probability of Between Group Correlations for Phase I Variables  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Sector 0.00 
          2. Increase 0.96 0.00 
         3. Board 0.43 0.61 0.00 
        4. WOBPC 0.36 0.68 0.07 0.00 
       5. WOB 0.35 0.69 0.09 0.02 0.00 
      6. WED 0.12 0.92 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.00 
     7. WNED 0.37 0.67 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.00 
    8. Emp 0.27 0.77 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.00 
   9. CEOGnd 0.98 0.06 0.55 0.62 0.64 0.86 0.62 0.71 0.00 
  10. ChairGnd 0.96 0.08 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.84 0.60 0.69 0.02 0.00 
 11. Treatment 0.34 0.62 0.77 0.70 0.69 0.46 0.71 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.00 
Note. Unless noted, all variables are from the 2011 year-end cross-section. Sample was grouped 
by FTSE Index. Increase = increase in percentage of women on boards; WOBPC=percentage of 
women on boards; WOB=women on boards; WED=women executive directors; WNED=women 
non-executive directors; Emp=number of employees; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female 




Phase II. Using the percentages of WOB in 2016, the pooled sample was split 
into two groups (i.e., treatment and comparison).  The threshold used for determining 
group allocation was 25%, which was the recommended percentage of WOB set by the 
Davies Review (Davies, 2011). Organizations that had a percentage of WOB higher than 
the 25% threshold were placed in the gender-balanced (treatment) group, and 
organizations below the threshold were placed in the non-gender balanced (comparison) 
group.  The analyses in this phase of the study aimed to identify if 25% of female board 
membership constitutes critical mass and improves opportunities for other women in the 
target organizations.  The total number of observations in the gender-balanced group was 
153, while organizations in the non-balanced group totaled 242.   
Table 15 reports the distribution of the Compliant and Non-compliant groups for 
phase II of the study, across different demographic variables.  Results of Fisher’s exact 
difference tests that were performed to compare the Compliant and Non-compliant 
groups across multiple variables are reported on Table 16.  The p-values for the variable 
Index suggested statistically significant differences, which stemmed from the majority of 
organizations in the FTSE 100 being in the Compliant group, the majority of the FTSE 
Small Cap firms being in the Non-compliant group, and the FTSE 250 group being more 
evenly distributed and representing about 48% of the Compliant and 48% of the Non-
compliant group.  However, those differences should not have an impact on the outcome 
as the literature review did not find that Index has been theoretically or empirically linked 
to opportunities for women in the workplace. There were statistically significant 
differences in the female CEO and female Chair differences; however, the populations 
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were so small that one person would make a difference; therefore, those findings were 
not a cause of concern; however, they were included as controls. 
Table 15  
 
Distribution of Non-compliant (Comparison) and Compliant (Treatment) Groups for 
Phase II 
 
  Non-compliant  Compliant   
Variable n % n % 
Index 
    FTSE 100 39 16.12 57 37.25 
FTSE 250 116 47.93 73 47.71 
FTSE Small Cap 87 35.95 23 15.03 
Sector 
    Consumer Goods 25 10.33 12 7.84 
Consumer Services 43 17.77 42 27.45 
Energy 18 7.44 2 1.31 
Financials 40 16.53 34 22.22 
Health Care 7 2.89 7 4.58 
Industrials 68 28.10 38 24.84 
Materials 22 9.09 7 4.58 
Technology 12 4.96 4 2.61 
Telecommunications 5 2.07 2 1.31 
Utilities 2 0.83 5 3.27 
Board 
    Large (>9) 103 42.56 71 46.41 
Small (<9) 139 57.44 82 53.59 
Emp 
    Small (<1000) 56 23.14 21 13.73 
Medium (>1000, <5000) 28 11.57 25 16.34 
Large (>5000, <10000) 95 39.26 39 25.49 
Large (>10000) 63 26.03 68 44.44 
CEOGnd 
    Male 238 98.35 143 93.46 
Female 4 1.65 10 6.54 
ChairGnd 
    Male 238 98.35 141 92.16 
Female 4 1.65 12 7.84 
Note. Forcing variable = WOBPC2016. Cutoff point = 25%.  n=[Non-compliant=242, 
Compliant=153] 
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Table 16  
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution – Phase II  








      FTSE 100 16.12 37.25 -21.14 0.00 0.20, 0.53 0.23 
FTSE 250 47.93 47.71 0.22 1.00 0.66, 1.54 0.00 
FTSE Small Cap 35.95 15.03 20.92 0.00 1.85, 5.56 0.22 
Board 
      Large (>9) 42.56 46.41 -3.84 0.47 0.56, 1.31 0.03 
Small (<9) 57.44 53.59 3.84 0.47 0.76, 1.79 0.03 
Emp 
      Small (<1000) 23.14 13.73 9.42 0.03 1.07, 3.45 0.11 
Medium (<5000) 11.57 16.34 -4.77 0.18 0.36, 1.26 0.06 
Large (<10000) 39.26 25.49 13.77 0.01 1.18, 3.03 0.14 
Very large (>10000) 26.03 44.44 -18.41 <.001 0.28, 0.69 0.18 
CEOGnd 
      Female 1.65 6.54 -4.88 0.02 1.17, 18.44 0.11 
Male 98.35 93.46 4.88 0.02 0.05, 0.86 0.11 
ChairGnd 
      Female 1.65 7.84 -6.19 0.00 1.49, 21.87 0.14 
Male 98.35 92.16 6.19 0.00 0.05, 0.67 0.14 
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval. Forcing variable = WOBPC2016. Cutoff point = 25%.  
n [Non-compliant=242, Compliant=153], Board=board size, Emp=number of employees, 
CEOGnd=CEO gender, ChairGnd=chairperson gender. 
 
The sample distribution was analyzed to identify if there were industry sectors 
that were more likely to be in the compliant group.  Table 17 reports the distribution of 
the sample’s treatment and comparison group by sector.  Fisher’s exact difference test 
found that organizations in the consumer services sector increased the likelihood of 
organizations being above the threshold, -9.68, CI 95%(.34, .96), p=.03. The Cramer’s V 
value (V=.11) indicated a low level of practical significance. Conversely, the energy 
sector decreased the likelihood of organizations being in the non-compliant group, 6.16, 
CI 95% (1.41, 54.46), p=.01.  The difference had a low level of practical significance 
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(V=.12) Despite the low practical significance, the potential bias that those group 
differences could introduce to the study compelled further investigation.  
As  
Table 18 reports, an examination of the total proportion of women employed in 
the consumer services and energy sectors revealed that compared to the total sample, 
consumer services consistently employed more women in the 2010 to 2016 period.  
Conversely, the energy sector consistently had lower rates of female employment.  
Similarly, as reported on Table 19 the percentage of WOB, which is the variable used for 
placing observations into treatment and comparison groups, has consistently been higher 
for the consumer services sector and lower for energy sector than the rest of observations 
in the sample.  Therefore, t-tests were performed to analyze if the mean differences in the 
female employment rates for the consumer services and energy sectors to the rest of the 
sample during the 2008 to 2016 period were statistically or practically significant. 
Table 17  





% Diff. p-value 
95% CI Cramer's 
V 
Consumer Goods 10.33 7.84 2.49  0.48   0.63, 3.06  0.03 
Consumer Services 17.77 27.45 -9.68  0.03   0.34, 0.96  0.11 
Energy 7.44 1.31 6.13  0.01   1.41, 54.46  0.12 
Financials 16.53 22.22 -5.69  0.19   0.40, 1.20  0.01 
Health Care 2.89 4.58 -1.68  0.41   0.18, 2.12  0.03 
Industrials 28.10 24.84 3.26  0.49   0.73, 1.94  0.03 
Materials 9.09 4.58 4.52  0.11   0.83, 5.92  0.07 
Technology 4.96 2.61 2.34  0.30   0.57, 8.41  0.04 
Telecommunications 2.07 1.31 0.76  0.71   0.26, 16.92  0.01 
Utilities 0.83 3.27 -2.44  0.11   0.02, 1.54  0.07 
n 242 153         
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval; forcing variable=WOBPC2016 
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Table 18  
 
Female Employment Percentage Rates in the Consumer Services and Energy Sectors for 
the Pooled Sample 
 
Sector 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
All industry sectors 38.11 36.61 36.12 35.27 36.01 35.79 36.05 
Consumer Services 48.70 47.74 46.29 47.25 49.57 48.51 49.21 
Energy  22.08 20.98 28.86 27.02 24.88 24.90 25.56 
Note. Percentages shown are based on observed values. 
 
 
Table 19  
Percentage of WOB in the Consumer Services and Energy Sectors for the Pooled Sample 
Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
All industry sectors 6.82 7.42 8.37 9.98 12.69 14.79 17.11 19.15 19.97 
Consumer Services 9.13 10.42 11.20 13.32 15.22 17.89 20.33 21.73 22.54 
Energy  5.92 5.45 5.26 6.82 9.70 11.44 12.28 15.88 14.88 
Note. Percentages shown are based on observed values. 
 
Results of the t-tests, reported on Table 20, revealed that the consumer services 
sector consistently employed a statistically significant larger proportion of women, 
t(582.22) = 18.21, p<.001, than other sectors.  Conversely, during the same period, the 
energy sector had a lower rate of female employment, t(100.55) = -8.15, p<.001, than 
other sectors.  Results for both tests indicated large levels of practical significance 
(dConsumer services=-1.06, dEnergy=.91). Results of the t-tests for the percentages of WOB in 
the 2008 to 2016 periods produced similar results.  The consumer services sector had a 
higher proportion of WOB, t(1157.3) = 7.91, p<.001, than the rest of the sample, while 
the energy sector had a lower proportion of WOB, t(205.12) = -4.86, p<.001, than other 
sectors.   Results for both tests indicated small levels of practical significance (dConsumer 
services=.32, dEnergy=.37).  Therefore, differences in the proportions of WOB in the 
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consumer services and energy organizations may be related to the proportion of women 
working in those industry sectors. Consequently, the variable Sector was included as a 
covariate in the hypotheses of phase II. 
 
Table 20  
Results of t-tests Comparing Female Employment by Sector 
Sector n M t-statistic df 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Women on Boards  
Consumer Services 765 15.75 7.91*** 1157.30 2.69, 4.47 0.32 
All others 2790 12.17     
Energy 180 9.83 -4.86*** 205.12 -4.61, -1.95 0.37 
All others 3375 13.11     
Women Employees  
Consumer Services 379 48.62 18.21*** 582.22 14.38, 17.85 -1.06 
All others 1335 32.50     
Energy 85 25.50 -8.15*** 100.55 -13.81, -8.40 0.91 
All others 1629 36.61        
Note. *** p<.001; n=sample size; M=mean; df=degrees of freedom; CI=confidence interval. 
 
 
The study also explored if the effect of a large increase of WOBPC compared to a 
small increase.  To that end, the sample was split using the variable Increase as the 
forcing variable and the 12% as the cutoff point. Organizations over the cutoff were 
placed in the Large (treatment) group, and organizations below the cutoff were placed in 
the Small (comparison) group.  Table 21 reports the results of the distribution of the 
sample between treatment and comparison groups across several variables.   
Groups were compared on their equivalence across variables FTSE index, board 
size, number of employees, CEO gender, chair gender (Table 22). Fisher’s exact test 
indicated the only variables that were statistically significant were Index, specifically 
FTSE 250 (p=.02), and Board size.  Because most of the organizations that increased 
their percentage of WOB are in the FTSE 250 group, it is expected to find statistical 
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significance.  Board size was an identified covariate, therefore is included as a control in 
the hypotheses tests and to ensure that it did not impact the non-parametric tests, it was 
tested for smoothness at the cutoff.  Index was included as a covariate and standard errors 
were clustered by Index in the tests that used Increase as the forcing variable. 
Table 21  
Distribution of Large (Treatment) and Small (Comparison) Increase Groups for Phase II 
 Small Large  
Variable n % n % 
FTSE Index     
FTSE 100 57 27.27 39 20.97 
FTSE 250 88 42.11 101 54.30 
FTSE Small Cap 64 30.62 46 24.73 
Sector     
Consumer Goods 26 12.44 11 5.91 
Consumer Services 50 23.92 35 18.82 
Energy 10 4.78 10 5.38 
Financials 37 17.70 37 19.89 
Health Care 10 4.78 4 2.15 
Industrials 41 19.62 65 34.95 
Materials 17 8.13 12 6.45 
Technology 8 3.83 8 4.30 
Telecommunications 6 2.87 1 0.54 
Utilities 4 1.91 3 1.61 
Board size     
Large (>9) 112 53.59 62 33.33 
Small (<9) 97 46.41 124 66.67 
Employer size     
Small (<1000) 46 22.01 31 16.67 
Medium (>1000, <5000) 22 10.53 31 16.67 
Large (>5000, <10000) 67 32.06 67 36.02 
Very large (>10000) 74 35.41 57 30.65 
CEOGnd     
Male 203 97.13 178 95.70 
Female 6 2.87 8 4.30 
ChairGnd     
Male 205 98.09 174 93.55 
Female 4 1.91 12 6.45 
Note. Forcing variable = Increase.  
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Table 22  
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution Forcing Variable Increase 




Diff. p-value 95% CI V 
Index       
FTSE 100 27.27 20.97 6.30 0.16 0.86 , 2.32 0.07 
FTSE 250 42.11 54.30 -12.20 0.02 0.40, 0.93 0.12 
FTSE Small Cap 30.62 24.73 5.89 0.22 0.84, 2.15 0.06 
Board        
Large (>9) 53.59 33.33 20.26 <.001 1.50, 3.55 0.20 
Small (<9) 46.41 66.67 -20.26 <.001 0.28, 0.66  
Emp       
Small (<1000) 22.01 16.67 5.34 0.20 0.83, 2.43 0.06 
Medium (>1000,<5000) 10.53 16.67 -6.14 0.08 0,31, 1.10 0.08 
Large (>5000, <10000) 32.06 36.02 -3.96 0.46 0.54, 1.30 0.03 
Very large (>10000) 35.41 30.65 4.76 0.34 0.80, 1.93 0.05 
CEOGnd       
Female 2.87 4.30 -1.43 0.59 0.45, 5.42 0.02 
Male 97.13 95.70 1.43 0.59 0.18, 2.21  
ChairGnd       
Female 1.91 6.45 -4.54 0.04 1.04, 15.26 0.10 
Male 98.09 93.55 4.54 0.04 0.06, 0.96  
Note. CI=confidence interval; V=Cramer’s V. 
 
The sample distribution was analyzed to identify if there were industry sectors 
that were more likely to be in the Large group. Table 23 reports the distribution of the 
sample’s groups by industry sector.  Fisher’s exact different test found that the consumer 
goods sector statistically (p<.04) and practically (V=.10) significantly different than other 
sectors in relation to other industries.  Conversely, the Industrials sector was statistically 
(p<.01) and practically (V=.16) significantly different than other sectors.  Despite the low 
practical significance, the potential bias that those group differences could introduce to 




Table 23  
 












Consumer Goods 12.44 5.91  12.40   0.04   1.04, 5.22  0.100 
Consumer Svcs. 23.92 18.82  23.70   0.22   0.81, 2.28  0.055 
Energy 4.78 5.38  3.96   0.82   0.32, 2.43  0.002 
Financials 17.70 19.89  17.10   0.61   0.51, 1.48  0.021 
Health Care 4.78 2.15  4.60   0.18   0.64, 10.14  0.070 
Industrials 19.62 34.95  19.62   0.00   0.28, 0.73  0.160 
Materials 8.13 6.45  7.57   0.56   0.56, 3.03  0.022 
Technology 3.83 4.30  2.83   1.00   0.28, 2.77  0.000 
Telecommunications 2.87 0.54  2.74   0.13   0.65, 252.55  0.060 
Utilities 1.91 1.61  0.91   1.00   0.20, 8.23  0.000 
n 209 186         
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval. 
 
Table 24 reports an examination of the annual progression of the female board 
representation by sector, which revealed that in 2011, the industrials sector was the 
second industry sector with the lowest percentage of WOB, suggesting that organizations 
in that sector needed to considerably increase their WOBPC in order to achieve 
compliance.  The industrials sector was the one with the highest mean increase.  
Conversely, the consumer goods group had the third lowest mean increase, but since it 
was the largest group of the sectors with a low increase, the difference was statistically 
(p=04) and practically (V=.10) significant.  To account for differences related to industry 
sector, the variable sector was used as a covariate in all phase II analyses.   
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Table 24  
Annual Percentage of WOB by Industry Sector  
Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Consumer Goods 8.86 11.02 10.98 11.97 13.47 15.16 18.12 19.55 19.94 
Consumer Services 9.13 10.42 11.20 13.32 15.22 17.89 20.33 21.73 22.54 
Energy 5.92 5.45 5.26 6.82 9.70 11.44 12.28 15.88 14.88 
Financials 7.01 7.10 9.01 10.67 13.62 15.42 17.51 20.69 21.68 
Health Care 8.11 8.34 10.49 13.86 15.87 17.22 19.90 19.55 20.97 
Industrials 4.17 4.39 5.40 6.59 10.61 12.86 15.53 17.58 18.70 
Materials 4.48 4.11 4.58 6.06 7.11 9.15 12.60 14.41 15.06 
Technology 6.81 7.57 8.25 10.01 14.44 16.90 17.19 18.47 19.71 
Telecommunications 10.16 12.39 13.24 14.16 14.07 13.57 14.09 17.08 16.87 
Utilities 12.75 12.84 13.97 16.20 19.52 22.31 22.13 24.86 26.39 
Note. Mean percentages for full sample 
 
Correlations for phase II variables. Table 25 reports the within group 
correlations that were computed grouped by Index.  As expected, multiple variables were 
correlated.  The variable WOBPC was highly correlated with the variable Increase (r=.62) 
due to the latter one being a generated value computed using the variable WOB.  The 
variable Sector had a moderate correlation with the variables WEmpPC (r=-.38), which 
made logical sense as female employment vary depending on the industry sector.  The 
variable Sector was also correlated with WSMPC (r=-.31), and had very weak 
correlations with WExecPC (r=-.14) and WOBPC (r=-.11), which may be associated with 
a widening gender gap at every step of the organizational hierarchy.  There were no other 
noteworthy within group correlations.  The between group correlations and their 
probability, reported in Table 26 and Table 27, indicated that there were statistically 
significant differences among groups in the relationship of variable PayGapMedian and 
Sector (p<.001).  
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Table 25  
Within Group Correlations of Phase II Variables for the Pooled Sample 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Sector 1.00 
              2. Increase 0.05 1.00 
             3. Board -0.10 0.01 1.00 
            4. WOBPC -0.11 0.62 0.08 1.00 
           5. WExecPC -0.14 0.08 0.03 0.27 1.00 
          6. WSMPC -0.31 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.43 1.00 
         7. WEmpPC -0.38 0.06 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.63 1.00 
        8. CEOGnd 0.00 0.07 -0.07 0.23 0.30 0.11 0.09 1.00 
       9. CEOTenure 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.76 1.00 
      10. ChairGnd -0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.02 1.00 
     11. ChairTenure -0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.82 1.00 
    12. Critical -0.16 0.31 0.35 0.55 0.23 0.20 0.28 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.07 1.00 
   13. Treatment -0.06 0.49 0.01 0.76 0.24 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.01 0.17 0.12 0.53 1.00 
  14. PayGapMean 0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 0.20 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 1.00 
 15. PayGapMedian 0.11 -0.01 0.07 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.07 0.84 1.00 
FTSE 100 - n 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 90 90 
M 4.50 10.92 10.67 25.58 17.97 22.75 35.87 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.18 1.59 0.59 23.41 20.96 
SD 2.47 9.20 2.55 8.44 12.70 8.73 16.40 0.20 0.68 0.14 1.32 0.49 0.49 14.06 13.29 
FTSE 250 - n 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 152 152 
M 4.33 11.55 8.27 20.65 14.27 22.50 36.11 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.28 1.16 0.39 20.22 15.56 
SD 2.26 10.77 1.65 10.10 11.77 10.82 15.44 0.21 1.46 0.22 1.52 0.37 0.49 13.27 13.84 
FTSE Small Cap - n 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 76 76 
M 4.38 6.47 6.96 13.88 16.49 22.09 36.10 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.18 1.03 0.21 18.74 17.11 
SD 2.09 11.79 1.46 10.61 14.34 11.87 17.56 0.10 0.29 0.19 0.98 0.16 0.41 13.50 14.15 
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Table 26  
Between Group Correlations of Phase II Variables for the Pooled Sample 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Sector 1.00 
              2. Increase -0.06 1.00 
             3. Board 0.75 0.61 1.00 
            4. WOBPC 0.51 0.83 0.95 1.00 
           5. WExecPC 0.94 -0.39 0.49 0.20 1.00 
          6. WSMPC 0.45 0.86 0.93 1.00 0.13 1.00 
         7. WEmpPC -0.96 -0.20 -0.90 -0.72 -0.82 -0.67 1.00 
        8. CEOGnd -0.09 1.00 0.59 0.81 -0.42 0.85 -0.17 1.00 
       9. CEOTenure -0.53 0.88 0.17 0.46 -0.78 0.52 0.28 0.90 1.00 
      10. ChairGnd -0.97 0.31 -0.56 -0.28 -1.00 -0.21 0.87 0.34 0.72 1.00 
     11. ChairTenure -0.79 0.66 -0.19 0.12 -0.95 0.19 0.60 0.68 0.94 0.92 1.00 
    12. Critical 0.84 0.49 0.99 0.90 0.61 0.86 -0.95 0.47 0.02 -0.68 -0.33 1.00 
   13. Treatment 0.64 0.72 0.99 0.99 0.35 0.97 -0.82 0.70 0.31 -0.43 -0.04 0.96 1.00 
  14. PayGapMean 0.78 0.58 1.00 0.94 0.53 0.91 -0.92 0.55 0.12 -0.60 -0.24 1.00 0.98 1.00 






Table 27  
Probability of Between Group Correlations of Phase II Variables  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Sector 0.00 
              2. Increase 0.96 0.00 
             3. Board 0.46 0.58 0.00 
            4. WOBPC 0.66 0.38 0.20 0.00 
           5. WExecPC 0.21 0.74 0.68 0.88 0.00 
          6. WSMPC 0.70 0.34 0.24 0.04 0.92 0.00 
         7. WEmpPC 0.17 0.87 0.29 0.49 0.39 0.53 0.00 
        8. CEOGnd 0.94 0.02 0.60 0.40 0.73 0.35 0.89 0.00 
       9. CEOTenure 0.65 0.31 0.89 0.69 0.43 0.65 0.82 0.29 0.00 
      10. ChairGnd 0.16 0.80 0.62 0.82 0.06 0.86 0.33 0.78 0.49 0.00 
     11. ChairTenure 0.42 0.54 0.88 0.92 0.20 0.88 0.59 0.52 0.23 0.26 0.00 
    12. Critical 0.37 0.67 0.09 0.29 0.58 0.34 0.20 0.69 0.98 0.53 0.79 0.00 
   13. Treatment 0.56 0.48 0.09 0.10 0.77 0.15 0.39 0.50 0.80 0.71 0.97 0.19 0.00 
  14. PayGapMean 0.43 0.61 0.03 0.23 0.65 0.27 0.26 0.63 0.92 0.59 0.85 0.06 0.12 0.00 
 15. PayGapMedian 0.00 0.96 0.46 0.66 0.22 0.70 0.17 0.94 0.65 0.16 0.42 0.37 0.55 0.43 0.00 
Note. Sector=industry sector; Increase=increase in the percentage of WOB; Board=board size; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; 
WED=women executive directors; ChairGnd=female chairperson; CEOGnd=female CEO; WExecPC=percentage of female executives; 
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; Emp=total number of employees; WEmpPC=percentage of female employees in the firm; 





Treatment of Missing Data 
Prior to the amendment of the U.K. CGC, organizations were not required to 
disclose their gender metrics; therefore, there is a considerable amount of missing data in 
several variables. Table 28 reports the percentage of data available for each variable for 
every year.  However, as indicated, WExecPC and WSMPC were the only variables with 
missing values needed for the study’s analyses. The percentage of women on executive 
boards (WExecPC) had 107 (27%) missing values, and the variable for the percentage of 
women in senior management (WSMPC) had 63 (16%) missing values.  Variables that 
represented the mean and median gender pay gap values (PayGapMean, PayGapMedian) 
had 77 (20%) missing values each. Therefore, the following data imputation process was 
followed to generate imputed data for the missing values for those variables. 
Despite the mandatory pay gap data reporting requirement, 77 organizations in the 
sample did not comply with this requirement, which represents about 20% of missing 
data for the pay gap variable.  Some of these organizations did not comply with the 
requirement because they were below the 250-employee threshold, and others did not 
provide a reason for not reporting.  In the FTSE 350 group, 242 out of 285 firms reported 
their gender pay gap.  Their average median pay gap was 17.57%, which indicates that in 
average, in those organizations, men earn 17.57% more than women.   In the FTSE Small 
Cap group, 76 out of 110 firms reported their gender pay gap, which had an average 
median pay gap of 17.10%.  Considering the relatively small sample size for a regression 
discontinuity analysis, a data imputation method was suggested by the dissertation 
committee; therefore, the Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) R package 
was used to generate missing values.   
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Table 28  
Data Collected by Variable by Year as a Percentage of the Total 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FTSE 100 
Board  98.0   99.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WOB  98.0   99.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WOBPC  98.0   99.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WED  98.0   99.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
ChairGnd  98.0   99.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
CEOGnd  98.0   99.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WExecPC  49.0   57.3   88.6   88.6   62.5   59.4   77.1   82.3   83.4  
WSMPC  9.4   14.6   20.9   23.0   33.4   78.2   92.8   80.3   91.7  
Emp  98.0   98.0   99.0   98.0   96.9   100.0   100.0   64.6   100.0  
WEmpPC  7.3   9.4   19.8   21.9   32.3   83.4   95.9   59.4   100.0  
FTSE 250 
Board  95.8   98.5   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WOB  95.8   98.5   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WOBPC  95.8   98.5   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WED  95.8   98.5   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
ChairGnd  95.8   98.5   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
CEOGnd  95.8   98.5   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WExecPC  26.5   26.5   39.7   38.1   35.5   35.0   62.0   35.5   75.7  
WSMPC  2.7   3.8   10.6   10.1   13.3   56.7   75.2   41.8   84.7  
Emp  94.8   97.4   99.0   99.5   97.4   99.0   99.0   58.8   100.0  
WEmpPC  2.2   4.3   16.5   17.0   23.3   77.3   94.8   55.6   100.0  
FTSE Small Cap 
Board  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WOB  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WOBPC  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WED  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
ChairGnd  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
CEOGnd  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
WExecPC  30.0   35.5   40.0   39.1   31.9   27.3   61.9   50.0   56.4  
WSMPC  1.0   1.9   12.8   11.9   11.0   70.0   92.8   81.9   100.0  
Emp  96.4   98.2   95.5   97.3   98.2   100.0   100.0   91.0   100.0  
WEmpPC  1.0   1.9   12.8   11.9   11.0   70.0   92.8   81.9   100.0  
Note. Percentages of total population for each year; Board=board size; WOB=women on boards; 
WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WED=women executive directors; ChairGnd=female 
chairperson; CEOGnd=female CEO; WExecPC=percentage of female executives; 
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; Emp=total number of employees; 
WEmpPC=percentage of female employees in the firm. 
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 Identification of Missing Data Mechanism 
Scholars (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010) suggest that identifying the 
process that created the missing data impacts the way in which data should be examined. 
Often, the cause of missing values in a dataset is unknown; therefore, assumptions must 
be made in order to help determine the reasons for missingness. Additionally, tests for 
identifying data patterns of missing values can help in the process (Van Buuren, 2018).  
First, to identify if data appeared to be missing at random, and select the 
appropriate method of data imputation, first, a function for identifying the missing data 
pattern was used.  Figure 4 shows the pattern of missing data for the WExecPC variable, 
and Figure 5 shows the pattern for the WSMPC variable.  The blue boxplots represent the 
marginal distribution of the variable on the axis. The red boxplots represent the 
distribution of missing data compared across the variable on the axis. For data missing 
completely at random (MCAR) both boxplots must be equal. However, for data missing 
at random (MAR), distributions on both boxplots should be similar.   
The variable WExecPC contained 107 missing values.  Although missing values 
for the variable were concentrated in the lower end of the variable WOBPC, missing 
values were distributed across the range of values; therefore, it is plausible that data were 
missing at random.  Missing values for the WExecPC variable were distributed in a 
similar way to the observed values for the variable across the variables WSMPC, 
WEmpPC and the PayGap variables.  Similar results were obtained for the variable 
WSMPC. The 63 missing values of WSMPC showed a comparable distribution to its 




Figure 4. Margin plot for WExecPC vs WOBPC, WSMPC, WEmpPC, and PayGapMedian.  
Note. Observed data in blue, missing data in red. WExecPC=percentage of women executives; 
WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed in the firm; PayGapMedian=gender pay 
gap median. 
 
Figure 5. Margin plot for WSMPC vs WOBPC, WExecPC, WEmpPC, and PayGapMedian.  
Note. Observed data in blue, missing data in red. WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WExecPC=percentage of women 































































































































































The distribution of missing values for the PayGap variable appeared to be similar 
to the distribution of observed values across the variables WExecPC, WEmpPC, and 
WSMPC (Figure 6).  However, the distribution of missing values across the variable was 
on the right side of the distribution, with the majority of missing values below the mean 
of the WOBPC variable.  This pattern suggests that missing values for the gender pay gap 
variables may not be missing at random, as the missingness pattern concentrates on the 
group of organizations with a lower proportion of WOB.    
 
Figure 6. Margin plot for PayGapMedian vs WOBPC, WExecPC, WSMPC, and WEmpPC.  
Note. Observed data in blue, missing data in red. PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median; 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WEmpPC=percentage of women 
employed in the firm. 
 
Taking into account the nature of the gender pay gap data, it is likely that the 
missing values did not happen randomly.  Previous studies have found that the most 
problematic type of missing data are missing not at random (MNAR), for which non-
response or missingness is related to the value that would have been observed (Sinharay, 
77
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Stern, & Russell, 2001).  A common example of missing values is income, because 
individuals with high or low income choose tend to not disclose their income on surveys.  
The gender pay gap data may present a similar problem.  The disclosure requirement 
mandated by the U.K. Government may have acted as a deterrent for organizations that 
would not have reported their gender pay gaps voluntarily.  However, the 77 missing 
values for the PayGap variables represent a 20% non-response rate, which appears to not 
be missing at random.  
When missing data are MNAR, there is no universal method of handling the 
missing values (Donders, Van Der Heijden, Stijnen, & Moons, 2006).  Existing literature 
provides multiple techniques for imputation of MNAR models (Albert & Follmann, 
2009; Little, 2009).  Under MNAR, the model fitted to the observed cases is only correct 
for the observed cases and incorrect for the missing cases, thus, it cannot be used for the 
imputation.  Additionally, estimating the amount of error would be impossible without 
the use of external data.  Although it is possible to use the predictive information in the 
observed data to impute missing values and perform post-processing imputations, it is not 
possible to test MNAR data because data needed for such tests are, by definition, missing 
(Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010).  Snijders and Bosker (2012) stated that in 
the case of MNAR data, assumptions are not completely testable; thus researchers need to 
make assumptions that go beyond the available data.  They also indicated that any data 
analysis using MNAR imputed data leaves bigger questions than when data are missing 
at random and are testable (p. 133).  Therefore, while data for all missing values were 
imputed; imputed values for the pay gap variables, which were found to be MNAR, were 
not used in the RD tests to avoid the uncertainty of the conclusions drawn from the data.  
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Data Imputation  
The key variables for the study’s analyses that contained missing values were 
WExecPC2016, WSMPC2016, PayGapMean and PayGapMedian.  The two latter ones had 
the same missing pattern. The study’s database containing all observations for the pooled 
sample with values for organizational variables included in Table 4 were uploaded into R.  
Following the recommendations in Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2010) for 
data MAR and MNAR imputation, and taking into account the clustered nature of the 
data, a multilevel imputation method was used to generate data for missing values. The 
variables WExecPC and WSMPC were imputed using two different methods.  The two-
level Bayesian linear regression, with heterogeneous within-group variances, method 
(2l.norm), and the predictive mean matching method (2l.pmm).  The variables 
PayGapMean and PayGapMedian were imputed using a two-level Bayesian linear 
regression, with heterogeneous within-group variances, with post-processing adjustment.  
While it is recommended to include as many predictors as possible in order to 
have minimal bias in the imputation, Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (1999) 
suggest that for imputation purposes, no more than 15 to 25 variables be used.  Therefore, 
predictor variables for data imputation were used based on their predictive relation to the 
selected outcomes.  Regressions and correlations were performed on the outcome 
variables to identify the most significant predictors.  Predictor selection was initially done 
using the covariates identified in existing literature; therefore, non-statistically significant 
covariates that were included in the equations for hypothesis tests were not removed from 
the predictor matrix.  The predictor matrix indicated the dependent variable, class 
variable, and predictors for fixed and random effects for each variable to be imputed.  
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Five datasets were generated and each one was tested to compare the fit of the 
original data set to the generated data sets using the same regression model.  The 
Bayesian regression imputation method generated values for the WExecPC variable 
(percentage of female executives) that included negative numbers; therefore, post-
processing imputations were performed to add boundaries to the data to not exceed the 0 
to 100 range.  After post-processing imputations, each of the five data sets were tested. 
No large deviations from the original data set were noted.  The predictive mean matching 
imputation method is a partially parametric method that combines the linear regression 
method and the nearest neighbor imputation approaches. One of the advantages of this 
method is that it imputes missing values from the observed data preserving the 
distribution of the observed values in the missing values; therefore, it does not require 
post-processing.   
However, the Bayesian imputation results were kept because they were more 
appropriate for the data.  The 2l.norm allows the imputation of data that fit a multivariate 
mixed effects model.  The inclusion of random effects provided more precise estimates, 
which are essential for the non-parametric RD analyses.  Figure 7 shows box and whisker 
plots of results of the data imputation process.  The subset of variables included in the 
imputation of values for the variables WExecPC, WSMPC, PayGapMean and 
PayGapMedian are shown in the figure.  The blue boxes represent the distribution of 
observed values and the red boxes represent the five imputed data sets.  The test indicated 
that the imputed values did not significantly change the mean or distribution of the 
variables.   
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Figure 7. Box and whisker Plot of the Imputation Variables and Generated Datasets.  
Note. Observed data in blue; imputed data in red. WExecPC=percentage of women executives; 
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; PayGapMean=gender pay gap mean; 
PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median. 
 
Convergence of the imputation algorithm was assessed by plotting the imputed 
parameters against the iteration number (Figure 8).  Inspection of the streams were used 
to identify problems with the imputation model.  The plot showed that the different 
streams were freely intermingled with each other without showing any specific trends.  
The variance between the different sequences were no larger than the variance with each 
individual sequence; therefore, healthy convergence was supported.  The next step in 
diagnosing problems with the data imputation was to plot the densities of the observed 
and imputed values to assess if the imputations were reasonable.  Figure 9 shows that, 
with a few explainable deviations, the imputed values have similar densities than the 
observed values.  Deviations can be explained by the missingness pattern.  For example, 
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is due to the fact that the missingness pattern for that variable suggests that missing 
values are distributed evenly.  Consequently, imputed values peak at that point.   
 
Figure 8. Healthy convergence of the imputation algorithm 
Note. Imputed values for WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of 
women in senior management; PayGapMean=gender pay gap mean; PayGapMedian=gender pay 
gap median. 
 
Figure 9. Kernel density estimates for the marginal distribution imputed variables. 
Note. Observed data (blue) and 5 densities per variable calculated from imputed data (red). 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
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The final test for assessing the imputation results was to examine the probability 
that WExecPC, WSMPC, PayGapMean and PayGapMedian were missing by plotting 
observed and imputed values against the propensity score, where the propensity score 
was equal to the average over the imputations.  Raghunathan and Bondarenko (2007) 
suggest that conditional distributions should be similar if the assumed model for creating 
the multiple imputations is a good fit; therefore, comparing the distributions of the 
observed and imputed values to their propensity scores is a good diagnostic tool.  As 
shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, observed data (blue) and imputed values (red) had 
similar patterns, providing evidence that the imputations were reasonable.   
 
Figure 10. Conditional distributions of WExecPC against their propensity scores 
Note. Observed data in blue; imputed data in red. WExecPC=percentage of women on executive 
boards. 
 






















Figure 11. Conditional distributions of WSMPC against their propensity scores. 
Note. Observed data in blue; imputed data in red. WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management. 
 
Imputed results were pooled using the pooling function of the MICE package. 
The pooling function uses the set of rules for combining separate estimates and standard 
errors from each imputed dataset into an overall estimate with standard errors and p-
values (Rubin, 1987) based on asymptotic – large sample – theory.  The pooled dataset 
was used for model testing and comparison.  Results of the regression tests with the 
imputed pooled data set were similar to those with observed data.  The pooled dataset 
was extracted and values for the four imputed variables were merged with the study’s 
main dataset.  The reason for adding them as additional variables was to be able to run 
tests with observed values (listwise deletion) and imputed values separately.   





















 Statistical Assumptions Results 
This section presents the results of statistical assumptions tests for both phases of 
the study.  Phase I tests will test assumptions for the full sample (parametric) and non-
parametric tests (i.e. at different bandwidths) using variable WOBPC2011 as the forcing 
variable. Tests for phase II use forcing variables WOBPC2016 and Increase.  Parametric 
tests for the full sample used the pooled FTSE All Share sample, and non-parametric tests 
are performed at optimal bandwidths for each forcing variable.  
Phase I 
The sample of 3541 year-firm observations representing nine years of 345 
treatment group subjects and 50 comparison group subjects, representing the 395 total 
baseline sample subjects were formatted as a csv file for input as panel data into R.  The 
formatted csv file was examined for consistency by comparing each year with the 
previous year to identify deviations and by comparing the total numbers of WOB by 
organization with the number of individual names on the database containing information 
about each female board member.  No discrepancies were noted.   
The data were evaluated for statistical assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity. Analyses were performed on the pooled data and for each group, FTSE 
350, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap, and results are presented on Table 29.  
The assessment of the linear model assumptions for the FTSE 350, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 
and FTSE Small Cap groups were non-significant at the alpha level .05.  The p-values for 
global statistics ranged from .20 to .54, suggesting that the relationships among variables 
were linear.  Values for skewness ranged from .02 to .88 and their p-values ranged 
from .35 to .88 indicating an acceptable distribution of the data. Kurtosis values ranged 
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from .36 to 1.60, and their respective p-values ranged from .19 to .55, suggesting an 
acceptable distribution of the data.  The p-values for heteroscedasticity tests ranged 
from .06 to .55, suggesting that the model residuals were constant across the range of the 
forcing variable. Therefore, the data satisfied all statistical assumptions for Phase I. 
Table 29  
Results of Normality Tests by Index for Phase I  
  FTSE 350 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap 
Statistic Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  
Global statistic  5.95   0.20   4.23   0.38   3.13   0.54   4.19   0.38  
Skewness  0.46   0.50   0.02   0.88   0.86   0.35   0.62   0.43  
Kurtosis  1.67   0.20   1.69   0.19   0.36   0.55   1.27   0.26  
Heteroscedasticity  3.54   0.06   1.14   0.28   0.43   0.51   0.35   0.55  
Note. Parametric test for the full sample for each index. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011  
 
 
Although, literature recommends the removal of outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; 
Judd & McClelland, 1989); the removal of legitimate outliers has arguments for and 
against (Osborne & Overbay, 2004).  As shown on Figure 12 and Figure 13, data for the 
FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap were linear, homoscedastic, and despite the presence of 
outliers, their distance from the Cook’s line indicated that outliers were not influential to 
the regression line.  However, to ensure accuracy, identified outliers were examined 
against the original source of the data, and it was determined that those were legitimate 
outliers; therefore, they were not removed from the sample. It is noteworthy to mention 
that in non-parametric regression discontinuity designs, the extreme parts of the range of 
the forcing variable are not used in the effect estimation, therefore, the impact of outliers 
is minimized (Visser & de Leeuw, 1984).   
Subsequently, a graphical representation of the distribution of the of the 
assignment variable (Figure 14) and linear regressions of the data were performed to 
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observe if the relationship of the forcing and outcome variables followed the same 
direction.  Figure 15 shows how the regression lines for all groups follow the same 
pattern.  Literature indicates that when the regression lines have the same shape, pooling 
observations into one sample may be appropriate (Lee & Munk, 2008). 
 
Figure 12. Residuals for FTSE 350 Phase I Variables 
Note. Parametric test; n=285; forcing variable=WOBPC2011, percentage of women on boards. 
 















































































Figure 13. Residuals for FTSE Small Cap Phase I Variables 
Note. Parametric test; n=110; forcing variable=WOBPC2011, percentage of women on boards. 
 
 
Figure 14. Assignment variable distribution by Index - Phase I 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; forcing variable=WOBPC2011, percentage of 
women on boards. 


























































































































Figure 15. Linear regressions of outcome and forcing variable by Index 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; forcing variable=WOBPC2011, percentage of 
women on boards. 
 
Phase II 
For the second phase of the study, post-Davies Review measures were used.  The 
baseline sample of 395 observations was split into treatment and comparison groups 
using two different forcing variables.  Using the WOBPC in 2016 and a threshold of 25 
(c=25), the sample was divided into a Compliant (WOBPC2016>c) and Non-compliant 
(WOBPC2016<25) groups. Similarly, for alternative explanations, phase II used the 
variable Increase to split the data into treatment and comparison group.  Using a 
threshold of 12 (c=12), the sample was split into a Large increase group (Increase>c) and 















































Linear Regressions of Pre and Post WOB % by FTSE Group
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Using the regression models for the outcomes WExecPC, WSMPC and WSMPC 
of phase II of the study, data were evaluated the global and directional tests for assessing 
modeling assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Analyses were 
performed using the gvlma package in R (Pena & Slate, 2014) on the pooled data and for 
each group, FTSE All Share, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap. Results are 
presented on Table 30. 
Global statistics p-values for the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap 
ranged from .053 to .908, suggesting that the relationship of the covariates with the 
outcome for each group were linear.  However, p-values for the global statistic for the 
pooled sample for the outcomes WExecPC (p=.01) and WSMPC (p=.03) indicated that 
there were deviations from linearity.  The p-values for skewness were not statistically 
significant for any particular group, except for the pooled sample, indicating that the data 
were not normally distributed. Kurtosis values ranged from .07 to 1.22, and their 
respective p-values ranged from .26 to .79, suggesting an acceptable distribution of the 
data.   The p-values for heteroscedasticity tests ranged from .06 to .96, suggesting that the 
model residuals were constant across the range of X.  
Although not all statistical assumptions were satisfied, as shown on Figure 16 to 
18, the residuals vs. fitted plots indicated that with the exception of couple of outliers, 
residuals are spread around the horizontal line without a distinct pattern, which is a good 
indication of a linear relationship.  The norm Q-Q plot shows that, with the exception of 
two outliers, standardized residuals follow the diagonal line. The scale-location plot 
shows a horizontal line with most residuals randomly spread, suggesting 
homoscedasticity.  The residuals vs. leverage plot shows that no observations were 
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beyond the Cook’s distance line, which indicated that despite the presence of outliers, 
they were not influential to the regression line.  The data were considered sufficiently 
normal, linear, and homoscedastic to continue the analyses with a pooled sample.  
Table 30  
Results of Normality Tests by Index for Phase II   
  FTSE All Share FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap 
Statistic Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  
WExecPC         
Global statistic 14.60 0.01 9.36 0.05 6.14 0.19 1.01 0.91 
Skewness 9.42 <0.01 2.34 0.13 2.52 0.11 0.01 0.91 
Kurtosis 0.07 0.79 0.52 0.47 0.26 0.61 0.93 0.33 
Heteroscedasticity 3.70 0.06 0.74 0.39 0.95 0.33 0.00 0.96 
WSMPC         
Global statistic 10.83 0.03 4.12 0.39 6.19 0.19 5.74 0.22 
Skewness 9.07 <0.01 3.57 0.06 2.06 0.15 0.43 0.51 
Kurtosis 0.84 0.36 0.28 0.60 0.38 0.54 1.22 0.27 
Heteroscedasticity 0.87 0.35 0.11 0.74 0.63 0.43 3.20 0.07 
WEmpPC         
Global statistic 8.60 0.07 4.10 0.40 1.64 0.80 49.54 <0.01 
Skewness 1.92 0.17 2.72 0.10 0.02 0.90 26.94 <0.01 
Kurtosis 6.46 0.01 0.39 0.53 1.05 0.31 22.48 <0.01 
Heteroscedasticity 0.16 0.69 0.19 0.66 0.00 0.99 0.04 0.84 
Note. Parametric tests for the full sample by index; forcing variable=WOBPC2016. 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed in the firm. 
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Figure 16. Residual plots for WExecPC for the Pooled Sample - Phase II  
 Note. n=395; WExecPC=women on executive boards; forcing variable=WOBPC2016 
 
 
Figure 17. Residual plots for WSMPC for the Pooled Sample – Phase II 
Note. n=395; WSMPC=women in senior management; forcing variable=WOBPC2016 




























































































































































Figure 18. Residual plots for WEmpPC for the Pooled Sample - Phase II   
Note. n=395; WEmpPC=women employed in the firm; forcing variable=WOBPC2016 
 
Next, a graphical representation of the distribution of the of the assignment 
variable WOBPC (Figure 19) and linear regressions of the data were performed to 
observe if the relationship of the forcing and outcome variables followed the same 
direction.  Figure 20 to 22 show how the regression lines for all groups follow the same 
pattern.  Literature indicates that when the regression lines have the same shape, pooling 
observations into one sample is an appropriate approach for RD (Lee & Munk, 2008).   



















































































Figure 19. Density of Forcing Variable WOBPC2016 by Index  
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards. 
 
 
Figure 20. Linear Regressions of WExecPC and Forcing Variable by Index 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards; 


















































































































Figure 21. Linear regressions of WSMPC and forcing variable by Index 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards; 
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management. 
 
 
Figure 22. Linear regressions of WEmpPC and forcing variable by Index 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards; 



























































































































Linear Regressions of WEmpPC by WOBPC
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As mentioned previously, the forcing variable Increase was used to split the 
sample into treatment and comparison groups.  The relationship between the forcing 
variable, covariates and PayGap outcome was also tested for linearity, normality and 
homoscedasticity.  Table 31 reports the results of the tests, which suggested that the 
pooled sample (FTSE All Share) (p=.07), FTSE 100 (p=.76), and FTSE Small Cap 
(p=.06) groups satisfied the assumption of linearity.  The p–values for skewness for the 
pooled sample (p=.01) and the FTSE 250 (p=.001) groups indicated that the data were 
not normally distributed.  The p-values for the skewness statistics for FTSE 100 (p=.30) 
and FTSE Small (p=.59) groups indicated that data for those groups were normally 
distributed.  The p-values for kurtosis ranged from .21 to .36, indicating that along the 
vertical axis, data were normally distributed across all groups.  The p-values for 
heteroscedasticity ranged from .30 to .59, which suggested that data were homoscedastic.   
Diagnostic plots were generated to help evaluate the assumptions. As shown in 
Figure 23, the residuals vs. fitted plot indicated that residuals were linearly distributed 
across the zero line with no other discernable pattern.  Although outliers were identified, 
the residuals vs. leverage plot suggested that they were not influential to the regression 
line.  Therefore, the data were considered sufficiently normal, linear, and homoscedastic 
for further testing. 
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Table 31  
Results of Normality Tests by Index for Phase II  
  FTSE All Share FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap 
Statistic Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  
Global statistic 8.65 0.07 1.85 0.76 14.68 0.01 9.22 0.06 
Skewness 6.60 0.01 1.06 0.30 10.11 0.00 0.29 0.59 
Kurtosis 0.85 0.36 0.31 0.58 0.93 0.34 1.55 0.21 
Heteroscedasticity 1.07 0.30 0.47 0.49 0.94 0.33 0.29 0.59 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample for each index. Forcing variable=Increase  
 
 
Figure 23. Residual plots for PayGapMedian for the Pooled Sample - Phase II  
Note. n=395; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median; forcing variable=Increase 
Graphical representations of the distribution of the of the assignment variable 
Increase (Figure 24) and linear regressions of the data were performed to observe if the 
relationship of the forcing and outcome variables followed the same direction.  Figure 25 
shows how the regression lines for all groups follow the same pattern, which provided 
evidence that supported a pooling approach for the RD tests. 

















































































Figure 24. Density of Forcing Variable Increase by Index 
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; Increase= increase in percentage of women on 
boards from 2011 to 2016. 
 
 
Figure 25. Linear Regression of PayGapMedian and forcing variable Increase  
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median; 













































































































Linear Regressions of PayGapMedian by Increase
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Internal Validity of the RD Approach 
First, to test exogenous variation in the percentage of WOB in relationship with 
the Davies Review, a panel study was done to identify the effects of time the outcome 
variable and to identify if there were differences in the interaction of time and FTSE 
Index.  As noted previously, although slow, women’s participation on corporate boards 
followed an upwards trend.  Therefore, to ensure that the increase in the percentage of 
WOB was not simply the effect of time, the pooled FTSE All Share sample was used.  
Since the Davies Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, differences between FTSE 350 
and FTSE Small Cap boards after the announcement of the Davies Review were expected.  
Longitudinal data from 2008 to 2016 were analyzed in a mixed effects regression model 
for repeated measures data.  Results were reported Table 32.  To identify the effect of 
each year on the percentage of WOB of observed organizations, the regression used the 
variable Year as a factor rather than a numeric variable.  Equation 17 was used to 
estimate the effects of time for each FTSE group.  
 !"#$% = 	() + 	(+	,-./0))120)+3 + 	(0456-7+20 + 	(89-:;</+21 + (=#<./6
+ (>,-./0))120)+3 ∗ 456-7+20 + @ 
 
(17) 
where WOBPC is the percentage of WOB in an organization, b0 is the intercept, 
which uses as reference the Index group FTSE 100, and Year 2008. b1 is the coefficient 
for each year from 2009 to 2016. Year is the coefficient for each year {Yes=1, No=0}, as 
the coefficient for each year was estimated as a factor. b2 is the coefficient for FTSE 
Index.  Index indicates FTSE Index, which should be entered into the equation as a 
dummy {Yes=1, No=2} as Index coefficients were estimated as factors. b3 is the 
coefficient for each industry sector. Sector represents coefficients for the 10 sectors, for 
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which 0, the reference group is consumer goods. b4 is the coefficient for board size, 
Board is the board size, which is represented by the total number of members on a board. 
b5 is the coefficient for the interaction of Year and Index, Year and Index indicate the 
index of a given organization for the year in the observed period.  
The coefficients reported in the model indicated that an average board size in the 
reference group had an estimated 10.66% of female representation on their board, t(3121) 
= 6.643, p < .001; 95% CI(7.32, 13.40).  Results revealed that with the exception of year 
2009 (p=.396), time had a statistically significant positive effect on the percentage of 
WOB.  The p-values ranged from less than .001 to .034 for every observation year, with 
coefficients ranging from 1.65 for year 2010 to 14.35 for year 2016.  The effects of FTSE 
Index were statistically significant (p<.001) for FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap groups, 
with coefficients of -5.86 and -5.90, respectively.  In the 2008 to 2011 period, the 
interaction of the effects of time and FTSE index were not statistically significant, with p-
values ranging from .378 to .899, which suggested that prior to the Davies Review there 
were no distinctions in the annual increase of WOB that could be attributed to FTSE 
index. However, in the 2012 to 2016 period, the interaction of time and FTSE index 
indicated statistically significant differences for FTSE Small Cap boards, with 
coefficients ranging between -2.69 (p=.042) and -5.57 (p<.001).   The interaction effect 
of time and FTSE index was not statistically significant for FTSE 250 boards in any year 
in the 2008 to 2016 year-observations, with p-values ranging from .151 to .699.  The p-
values for the interaction effect of time and FTSE Small Cap firms through Year 2011 
ranged from .386 to .909, indicating that there were not statistically significant 
differences in changes in the percentage of WOB explained by the interaction of time and 
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FTSE Index for FTSE 100 and FTSE Small Cap firms prior to the Davies Review 
announcement.  The interaction effect of time and FTSE Small Cap from 2012 to 2016 
yielded statistically significant p-values that ranged from .044 to less than .001 for 
estimates that ranged from -2.68 for year 2012 to -5.55 for year 2016.   
Results provided evidence that despite differences in percentages of WOB 
explained by FTSE index, differences in the annual rate of change by FTSE index were 
not statistically significant until after the announcement of the Davies Review. These 
results suggest that prior to the announcement of the Davies Review, changes in gender 
composition across all FTSE All Share organizations were similar and provide evidence 
that variation in the increase of WOB is related to the Davies Review, as the effect was 
statistically significantly higher for target organizations (i.e., FTSE 350) than for 
organizations that were not targeted by the initiative (i.e., FTSE Small Cap).  
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Table 32  
Results of Panel Study to Estimate the Effect of Time and Index on the Pooled Sample  
Variable 
 
Coefficient   SE  df  t-value  p-value 
Fixed effects 
     Intercept 10.67 1.61 3121 6.643 0.000 
Time 
     Year2009 0.50 0.59 3121 0.849 0.396 
Year2010 1.65 0.78 3121 2.123 0.034 
Year2011 3.30 0.89 3121 3.699 0.000 
Year2012 6.39 0.97 3121 6.568 0.000 
Year2013 8.03 1.03 3121 7.802 0.000 
Year2014 11.44 1.07 3121 10.685 0.000 
Year2015 13.91 1.10 3121 12.634 0.000 
Year2016 14.35 1.12 3121 12.771 0.000 
Index 
     FTSE 250 -5.86 1.13 383 -5.163 0.000 
FTSE Small Cap -5.90 1.29 383 -4.583 0.000 
Sector 
     Consumer Services 1.53 1.26 383 1.216 0.225 
Energy -6.14 1.79 383 -3.436 0.001 
Financials -1.24 1.29 383 -0.957 0.339 
Health Care -0.11 2.01 383 -0.056 0.956 
Industrials -2.23 1.23 383 -1.818 0.070 
Materials -6.74 1.59 383 -4.231 0.000 
Technology -0.39 1.91 383 -0.203 0.839 
Telecommunications -2.33 2.64 383 -0.882 0.378 
Utilities 1.19 2.66 383 0.446 0.656 
Board 0.21 0.08 3121 2.669 0.008 
Interaction Time: Index 
     Year2009: FTSE 250 0.37 0.72 3121 0.512 0.609 
Year2010: FTSE 250 0.40 0.96 3121 0.415 0.678 
Year2011: FTSE 250 0.42 1.10 3121 0.386 0.699 
Year2012: FTSE 250 0.60 1.20 3121 0.498 0.618 
Year2013: FTSE 250 1.82 1.27 3121 1.435 0.151 
Year2014: FTSE 250 0.96 1.32 3121 0.727 0.467 
Year2015: FTSE 250 0.72 1.35 3121 0.530 0.597 











Coefficient   SE  df  t-value  p-value 
Year2009:FTSE Small Cap -0.09 0.80 3121 -0.115 0.909 
Year2010:FTSE Small Cap -0.73 1.06 3121 -0.694 0.488 
Year2011:FTSE Small Cap -1.06 1.22 3121 -0.868 0.386 
Year2012:FTSE Small Cap -2.68 1.33 3121 -2.019 0.044 
Year2013:FTSE Small Cap -3.05 1.41 3121 -2.167 0.030 
Year2014:FTSE Small Cap -5.53 1.46 3121 -3.784 0.000 
Year2015:FTSE Small Cap -6.55 1.50 3121 -4.354 0.000 
Year2016:FTSE Small Cap -5.55 1.53 3121 -3.620 0.000 
Random Effects 
     Firm 2.85 
    Residual variance 8.17         
n 3541     
Note. Dependent variable=percentage of women on boards; n=sample size; SE=standard error; 
df=degrees of freedom; Board=board size; Index=FTSE index. 
 
Internal Validity Results for Phase I 
Integrity of the assignment variable. To test the integrity of the assignment 
variable, the McCrary density tests were performed to detect manipulation.  Results of 
the McCrary density tests that were performed on the pooled sample and on each 
individual group are reported on Table 33.  Due to the small sample size, there was not a 
high concentration of observations around the cutoff; therefore, bandwidths for the FTSE 
100 group was widened in order to find enough observations around the cutoff.  Log 
differences in height (theta) indicated a discontinuity at the cutoff point; however, those 
estimates were not statistically significant.  The p-values of the McCrary density tests 
ranged from .083 to .397 indicating that there was no evidence of manipulation of the 
assignment variable (McCrary, 2006).  After satisfying the assumption of integrity of the 
assignment variable, its continuity was tested.   
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Table 33  
Results of the McCrary Density Tests for Phase I Forcing Variable by Index 
Index Bin size h  Theta SE z-value p-value 
FTSE All Share 0.91  4.70  4.807 2.773 1.734 0.0829 
FTSE 350 1.04  3.00  5.534 4.846 1.142 0.2535 
FTSE 100 1.71  9.20  3.931 2.179 1.804 0.0711 
FTSE 250 1.30  6.77  0.532 0.629 0.847 0.3972 
FTSE Small Cap 1.84  13.00  0.839 0.713 1.177 0.2391 
Note. h=bandwidth; SE=standard error; Theta indicates log differences in height of the 
distributions at each side of the cutoff point. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011   
  
  
Continuity assumption. Following McEwan and Shapiro’s (2008) 
recommendations, the continuity of the assignment variable assumption was tested by 
regressing baseline covariates on the forcing variable and examining their smoothness 
around the cutoff point.  Table 34 reports estimates of the smoothness of baseline 
covariates across groups.  These tests estimated the probability of a discontinuous jump at 
the cutoff related to the baseline covariates.  Bandwidth selection was calculated using 
the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2012), which calculated an optimal bandwidth of 9.4 for the 
FTSE 350 group.  For consistency, the 9.4 bandwidth was used across groups. With the 
exception of the variable WOB (number of female directors) for the FTSE Small Cap 
group (p=.006), none of the tests were statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.  The 
p-values associated with the tests ranged from .276 to .901, which indicated that 
observations in the regression lines to the left and right of the cutoff point were not 
statistically significantly different from each other with respect to the variables tested.  A 
visual representation of the tests is presented on Figure 26 to Figure 29.  
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Figure 26. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate Board by Index 
Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; Board=board size 
 
 
Figure 27. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate WOB by Index 
Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; WOB=number of women on boards. 












































































































































































Figure 28. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate CEOGnd by Index 
Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; CEOGnd=female CEO. 
 
Figure 29. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate Emp by Index 
Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; Emp=total number of employees. 












































































































































































































Table 34  





n Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|) 
FTSE All Share  
Board 98 39 0.477 0.846 0.564 0.573 
WOB 98 39 0.221 0.203 1.088 0.276 
CEOGnd 98 39 -0.063 0.105 -0.595 0.552 
Emp 98 39 -36203 34675 -1.044 0.297 
FTSE 350  
Board 67 28 0.239 1.031 0.232 0.817 
WOB 67 28 0.239 0.243 0.983 0.326 
CEOGnd 67 28 0.163 0.264 0.616 0.538 
Emp 67 28 20235 18896 1.071 0.284 
FTSE 100  
Board 30 13 0.404 1.928 0.209 0.834 
WOB 30 13 0.066 0.448 0.147 0.883 
CEOGnd 30 13 0.035 0.067 0.526 0.599 
Emp 30 13 -36334 58783 -0.618 0.536 
FTSE 250 
Board 37 15 -1.016 1.224 -0.830 0.407 
WOB 37 15 -0.171 0.276 -0.619 0.536 
CEOGnd 37 15 -0.027 0.217 -0.013 0.901 
Emp 37 15 -1493 8716 -0.171 0.864 
FTSE Small Cap  
Board 31 11 -0.065 0.151 -0.433 0.665 
WOB 31 11 -0.230 0.083 -0.272 0.006 
CEOGnd 31 11 -0.080 0.076 -1.054 0.292 
Emp 31 11 -2315 3488 -0.664 0.507 
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error. Bandwidth size for every index= 9.4. Board=board size; 
WOB=number of women on boards; CEOGnd=female CEO; Emp=number of employees. 
 
 
Internal Validity Results for Phase II 
Integrity of the assignment variable. Results of the McCrary (2006) density 
tests that were performed on the pooled sample using assignment variables WOBPC and 
Increase are reported in Table 35. Log differences in height (theta) indicated a 
discontinuity at the cutoff point (Figure 30); however, they were not statistically 
significant at the .05 alpha level.  The p-values for the forcing variables WOBPC 
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(p=.052) and Increase (p=.065) indicated that there was no evidence of manipulation of 
the assignment variable.  Therefore, its continuity with baseline covariates was tested.   
Table 35  
 
Results of the McCrary Density Tests for Phase II Forcing Variables for the Pooled 
Sample 
 
Forcing variable Bin size h  Theta SE z-value p-value 
WOBPC2016 1.80  6.00  5.85 3.009 1.944 0.052 
Increase 1.10  6.62  0.48 0.258 1.845 0.065 
Note. h=bandwidth; SE=standard error. Theta indicates log differences in height of the 
distributions at each side of the cutoff point.  
 
    
 
Figure 30. McCrary Density Tests for Phase II Forcing Variables  
Note. WOBPC2016 = percentage of women on boards in 2016 (left) and Increase = increase in the 
percentage of women on boards (right). 
 
Continuity assumption. As shown in Table 36, the smoothness of baseline 
covariates tests for the forcing variable WOBPC returned p-values that ranged from .172 
to .854, which provided support for the continuity of the assignment variable at the cutoff 
point across the covariates tested.  The RD plot in Figure 31 shows a smooth regression 
at the 25% cutoff point for covariables WEmpPC, Critical, CEOGnd and ChairGnd.  
Similarly, Figure 32 shows smooth regression lines for covariates Increase and WED.  
  























Table 36  
 







n Estimate SE z-value p-value 
WEmpPC 102 129 -0.896 4.881 -0.184 0.854 
Increase 102 129 2.687 2.214 1.214 0.225 
Critical 102 129 -0.174 0.139 -1.252 0.210 
WED 102 129 0.045 0.120 0.372 0.710 
CEOGnd 102 129 -0.074 0.053 -1.367 0.172 
ChairGnd 102 129 0.036 0.050 0.690 0.490 
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error. bandwidth size = 9.0; WEmpPC=percentage of female 
employees; Increase=increase in percentage of WOB; Critical=[1=3+ women directors; 0=<3 





Figure 31. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample 
Note. Covariates: WEmpPC=percentage of female employees, Critical=three or more women 
directors, CEOGnd=female CEO, and ChairGnd=female chairperson; Forcing variable 
=WOBPC2016. 






































































































Figure 32. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample 
Note. Covariates=Increase and WED; Forcing variable=WOBPC 
 
Table 37 reports the results of smoothness tests for forcing variable Increase 
returned p-values that ranged from .066 to .906, which indicated that the regression lines 
for the covariates tested did not have a statistically significant jump at the cutoff point.  
However, it is noteworthy to point out that variable WExecPC was approaching statistical 
significance (p=.066), which could suggest a competing explanation for the findings.  
Figure 33 shows that the regression lines for covariates WOBPC, WEmpPC were 
smooth threshold; however, covariates WExecPC and WSMPC show a discontinuous 
jump at the threshold. The p-value for covariate WSMPC (p=.602) suggests that the 
variable is not a cause of concern; conversely, the discontinuous jump shown on the 
regression line of covariate WExecPC (p=.066) appears to be a competing explanation to 
findings; therefore, it is further explored in the hypotheses testing section.   
Figure 34 shows plots of smoothness tests for CEOGnd, ChairGnd, CEOTenure 
and ChairTenure.  Although the plots show a discontinuous jump at the threshold, they 
do not represent a real discontinuity because it is caused by the very limited number of 
observations around the cutoff, thus the p-values for those covariates range from .348 
to .908, indicating that they are not statistically significantly different at the threshold.  






































Table 37  
 







n Estimate SE z-value p-value 
WOBPC 75 112 -2.018 1.649 -1.224 0.221 
WExecPC 75 112 -8.227 4.482 -1.836 0.066 
WSMPC 75 112 -1.819 3.485 -0.522 0.602 
WEmpPC 75 112 2.541 4.206 0.604 0.546 
CEOGnd 75 112 0.009 0.024 0.384 0.701 
ChairGnd 75 112 0.034 0.058 0.577 0.564 
CEOTenure 75 112 -0.015 0.126 -0.118 0.906 
ChairTenure 75 112 0.366 0.390 0.938 0.348 
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error. Bandwidth size = 6.62.WOBPC=percentage of women 
on boards; WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employees; CEOGnd=female CEO; 
ChairGnd=female chair; CEOTenure=number of years of female CEO in her position; 
ChairTenure=number of years of chairperson in her position.  
 
 
Figure 33. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample  
Note. Covariates: WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards; WExecPC=percentage of women 
executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of 
women employees. Forcing variable =Increase 










































































Figure 34. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample 
Note. Covariates: CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd= female gender, CEOTenure=female CEO 
tenure; ChairTenure= female chairperson tenure; Forcing variable= Increase 
 
Hypotheses Test Results 
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition 
Phase I of the study examined the effects of the Davies Review on board 
composition of its target organizations.  The hypotheses tested in this phase aim to test 
the effects of the Davies Review at the micro (individual level).   
Hypothesis H1a and H1b. These hypotheses predicted that Davies Review 
would have a statistically significant (α =.05) increase in the percentage of WOB of non-
balanced FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards. Hypotheses H1a and H1b were tested using a 
non-parametric sharp RD design. The Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method for 
optimal bandwidth selection calculation was used to estimate the best bandwidth for the 






























































































FTSE 350 group.  Literature suggests that when the choice of kernel has little impact to 
the subsequent analyses, the preferred method for selecting bandwidth choice is using 
triangular kernel, as theory has identified it as the preferred type (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010); however, to avoid biased estimates it is a good practice to test different kernel 
types to identify which one fits the data best. Therefore, different kernel types were tested.   
Table 38  
Estimates for Bandwidth Selection Based on Kernel Type  
Kernel type h n Estimate1 SE p-value R2 p-value2 
Epanechnikov 8.753 95 -14.342 7.071 0.039 0.3005 0.043 
Cosine 8.914 95 -14.139 7.070 0.039 0.3006 0.046 
Triangular 9.403 95 -13.742 6.978 0.033 0.3055 0.049 
Quartic 9.994 110 -13.749 6.897 0.006 0.3062 0.046 
Tricube 10.087 110 -14.092 6.697 0.008 0.3018 0.044 
Triweight 11.107 137 -13.476 6.680 0.000 0.3123 0.044 
Rectangular 7.391 176 -3.777 3.608 0.000 0.2471 0.295 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. 1Listwise deletion used. 2p-value for F-
tests. 
  
Table 38 reports the estimated bandwidths for the group using different kernels.  
With the exception of the rectangular kernel type, which produced a non-statistically 
significant (p=.295) estimate of -3.77, all other kernel types resulted in statistical 
significant results with p-values ranging from .043 to .049, for estimates that ranged from 
-13.476 to -14.342.  All kernel types with statistically significant results also returned 
practically significant results, with R2 that ranged from .3005 to .3123.    
Following recommendations for identifying the correct functional form of the 
regression (Chambers, 2016; Jacob et al., 2012), higher order polynomials were tested in 
addition to the linear regression function. Table 39 reports results of the linear, quadratic, 
and cubic non-parametric RD tests on a calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.40.  The 
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quadratic model’s p-value (p=.07) and its F-statistic’s p-value (p=.09) indicated that it 
was the best functional form.  Therefore, the full model with all identified baseline 
covariates was performed using a quadratic functional form.  Equation 18 describes the 
linear regression model that predicts the Increase in the percentage of WOB for FTSE 
350 boards. 
 45:/-.A- = 	() + 	(+	!"#$%0)++ + 	(0B +	(8!"#$%0)++0 + (=#<./6
+ (>%C"D56 + (3%ℎ.F/D56 + (G9-:;</+21 + (H456-7 + @ 
 
(18) 
Table 39  
 
RD Test Results for Increase of WOBPC (H1a, H1b) – Unconditional Model 
 
Functional form Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear -4.44 3.93 0.25 2.48 0.10 0.10 0.06 
Quadratic -9.98 5.53 0.07 2.40 0.09 0.12 0.07 
Cubic -10.07 6.04 0.09 1.98 0.15 0.12 0.06 




Table 40 reports the estimates of the regression discontinuity tests for four 
different models. The first model tested was model M1, the non-parametric RD estimated 
at an optimal bandwidth of 9.40.  Model M1 used a heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error estimation.  Estimates for model M1 returned a statistically significant large 
treatment effect of -13.69 (p=.05). Model M2 added cluster-robust standard error 
estimation to model M1 by clustering the standard error by Index.  Consistently, 
estimates for the treatment effect and coefficients for model M2 were identical to model 
M1, with the exception of the standard error for the model, which was reduced from 6.85 
to 5.68.   Model M3 narrowed the bandwidth of model M2 to 8.3 (n=89). Estimates in 
model M3 returned a large statistically significant effect, -14.09 (p<.01).  Model M4 
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widened the bandwidth of the previous model to 11 (n=136).  The model returned a 
statistically significant large treatment effect of -12.59 (p=.08).  
 
Table 40 
RD Test Results for Increase of WOB (H1a, H1b) –Full Model Different Bandwidths  
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 9.40 95 -13.69 6.85 0.05 1.99 0.04 0.30 0.15 
M2 9.40 95 -13.69 5.68 0.02 1.99 0.04 0.30 0.15 
M3 8.30 89 -14.09 4.28 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.32 0.16 
M4 11.00 136 -12.59 7.28 0.08 2.94 0.00 0.30 0.20 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Estimates were computed using a 
triangular kernel. Dependent variable=Increase. Models M1 used a heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard error; models M2, M3 and M4 used a cluster-robust standard error by Index. 
 
 
Although models M2 and M3 provided a good fit for the data, model M2 had a 
smaller standard error for the treatment effect and was considered the optimal bandwidth 
using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman calculation; therefore, model M2 is interpreted.  Model 
M2 was statistically significant, F(17,92)=1.99, p=.04, for a local average treatment 
effect of -13.69 (p=.02) percentage points using the calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.40.  
Results of this test provided support for Hypotheses H1a and H1b, which predicted that 
the Davies Review would have a statistically significant effect on increasing the 
percentage of WOB of non-balanced organizations.  In the five-year duration of the 
Davies Review, organizations that were below the gender-balance threshold for WOB set 
by the Davies Review in 2011 had an average increase of 13.69 percentage points higher 
than organizations that were already gender-balanced in 2011. With the exception of the 
energy sector (p=.01), and telecommunications sector (p=.03), covariates included in the 
regression were not statistically significant, with p-values that ranged from .23 to .94.   
Equation 19 estimated the effect of the Davies Review targets on the increase of WOBPC 
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as the difference in the mean increase of WOBPC between the observations 9.40 points to 
the left and 9.40 points to the right of the cutoff point.  Table 41 reports coefficients for 
covariates included in the full model. 





Figure 35 provides a visual representation of the effect of the Davies Review on 
the Increase of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations.  Although the discontinuous jump on 
the regression line indicates that observations in the non-balanced group had a higher 
increase of WOB than organizations that were already gender-balanced, the effect size 
did not appear to be nearly as high as the estimated -13.69 points.  Therefore, an 
examination of the estimates The effective bandwidth size of 9.40 indicates that the 
estimate only used observations up to 9.40 points to the left and up to 9.40 points to the 
right of the cutoff.  The total number of effective observations was 95, 67 to the left and 
28 to the right.      
  
Figure 35. RD Plot for Increase of WOB - FTSE 350.  
Note. Discontinuity detected, LATE = -13.69 (p=.01); bandwidth=9.40 (n=95). 























Parameter Estimates for Increase of WOBPC for FTSE 350 (H1a, H1b) – Full Model  
Variable Estimate SE t-value p-value Estimate SE t-value p-value Estimate SE t-value p-value 
  M2* - h=9.40 (n=95) M3 - h = 8.30 (n=89) M4 - h= 11 (n=136) 
β0 - Intercept 26.16 8.62 3.04 0.00 26.76 9.14 2.93 0.00 25.38 6.84 3.71 0.00 
β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced 4.79 2.41 1.99 0.05 5.16 2.74 1.88 0.06 3.96 1.58 2.52 0.01 
β1 - WOBPCBalanced -2.50 1.46 -1.72 0.09 -2.70 1.60 -1.69 0.10 -2.15 1.10 -1.95 0.05 
β2 -Treatment -13.69 5.22 -2.62 0.01 -14.09 5.46 -2.58 0.01 -12.59 4.07 -3.09 0.00 
β3 - WOBPC2 0.48 0.26 1.86 0.07 0.54 0.32 1.66 0.10 0.38 0.15 2.62 0.01 
β4 - Board -4.42 4.46 -0.99 0.32 -4.11 4.78 -0.86 0.39 -5.20 3.53 -1.47 0.14 
β5 - CEOGnd 0.49 2.86 0.17 0.86 0.58 2.94 0.20 0.84 0.28 2.40 0.12 0.91 
β6 - ChairGnd -8.47 7.65 -1.11 0.27 -8.95 7.84 -1.14 0.26 -7.82 6.42 -1.22 0.23 
β7 - Sector 
            β7-1 Consumer Services -0.24 3.29 -0.07 0.94 -0.45 3.36 -0.13 0.89 -0.04 2.74 -0.02 0.99 
β7-2 Energy -17.90 6.31 -2.84 0.01 -17.90 6.35 -2.82 0.01 -18.68 5.12 -3.65 0.00 
β7-3 Financials -0.26 3.45 -0.07 0.94 -0.36 3.55 -0.10 0.92 0.01 2.86 0.00 1.00 
β7-4 Health Care -1.00 4.85 -0.21 0.84 -1.26 4.98 -0.25 0.80 -0.78 4.06 -0.19 0.85 
β7-5 Industrials -4.43 3.65 -1.22 0.23 -4.59 3.73 -1.23 0.22 -3.93 3.01 -1.31 0.19 
β7-6 Materials -2.20 5.42 -0.41 0.69 -2.85 5.78 -0.49 0.62 -1.26 4.34 -0.29 0.77 
β7-7 Technology -6.86 5.34 -1.29 0.20 -7.78 5.53 -1.41 0.16 -6.91 4.24 -1.63 0.11 
β7-8 Telecommunications -10.16 4.64 -2.19 0.03 -10.52 4.66 -2.26 0.03 -9.60 3.90 -2.47 0.02 
β7-9 Utilities -6.42 5.10 -1.26 0.21 -8.49 5.27 -1.61 0.11 -4.70 4.23 -1.11 0.27 
β8 – IndexFTSE 250 -3.53 2.30 -1.53 0.13 -3.90 2.42 -1.61 0.11 -3.34 1.88 -1.78 0.08 
Residual SE 0.84 
   
0.86 
   
0.69 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.30 (0.15)       0.32 (0.16)       0.28 (0.18)       
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. Dependent variable=Increase. WOBPC2011=percentage of women on boards; Board=board 
size; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female chairperson. 
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Robustness Tests 
To strengthen their causal claim, following Ludwig and Miller’s (2007) example, 
the predictors were regressed on pseudo outcomes.  The pseudo outcomes Board and 
Emp were tested at their calculated optimal bandwidth, as well as at the bandwidth 9.40, 
to examine the treatment using the same number of observations of the tests for 
hypotheses H1a and H1b. Four models for pseudo-outcome robustness tests were 
performed.  As reported on Table 42, the p-values of the four initial robustness tests 
ranged from .29 to .63 indicating that none of the models were statistically significant.  
Equation 20 describes the regression models for pseudo-outcome Board.  Equation 21 
describes the regression models for pseudo-outcome Emp.  
 !"#$% = 	() + 	(+	,-!./ +	(01 +	(2,-!./0 + (3!"#$% + (45678"$+9:
+ (;<=%6> + ? 
(20) 
 @AB = 	() + 	(+	,-!./ +		(01 + (2@AB + (35678"$+9: + (4<=%6> + ?	 (21) 
Table 42 
 
Robustness Tests - RD Test Results for Pseudo-Outcomes (H1a, H1b) 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Pseudo-Board 5.02 58 -1.44 1.67 0.38 6.26 0.00 0.69 0.58 
Pseudo-Board 9.40 95 -0.44 0.92 0.63 10.84 0.00 0.67 0.61 
Pseudo-Emp 13.41 166 2755 3762 0.46 665.10 0.00 0.98 0.98 
Pseudo-Emp 9.40 95 6619 6276 0.29 370.40 0.00 0.99 0.98 
Note. h=Bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. 
 
 
Pseudo-outcome 1. At a bandwidth of 5.02, the estimated -1.44 (p=.38) treatment 
effect estimate for the pseudo-outcome board size was not statistically significant, F(15, 
42)=6.26, p<.001.  Another test was performed on the same pseudo-outcome, widening 
the bandwidth to the 9.40 to use the same observations that provided support for 
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hypotheses H1a and H1b.  The results of the test returned a non-statistically significant 
treatment effect of -.44 (p=.63) for the model, F(15, 79)=10.84, p<.001.  Results for the 
pseudo-outcome Board provided evidence that the Davies Review did not have an effect 
on the treatment group causing a change in their number of board members at the 
threshold.  Figure 36 provides a visual representation of the RD test for the pseudo-
outcome Board, which confirms the absence of a discontinuous jump at the cutoff. 
Coefficients of the regressions are reported in Table 43.   
Table 43 
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Outcome Board (H1a, H1b) 
Variable Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
  h=5.02 (n=58) h=9.40 (n=95) 
β0 - Intercept 8.24 2.65 3.11 0.00 6.58 1.51 4.37 0.00 
β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced 1.33 1.32 1.00 0.32 -0.03 0.42 -0.06 0.95 
β1 - WOBPCBalanced -0.99 0.84 -1.19 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.38 0.71 
Β2 -Treatment -1.44 1.66 -0.87 0.39 -0.44 0.90 -0.49 0.63 
Β3 - WOBPC2 0.34 0.27 1.27 0.21 -0.01 0.04 -0.18 0.86 
β4 – Board* 0.49 0.13 3.74 0.00 0.51 0.08 6.43 0.00 
β5 - Sector 
        β5-1 Consumer Services -1.89 0.74 -2.55 0.01 -1.78 0.58 -3.07 0.00 
β5-2 Energy -2.94 1.40 -2.10 0.04 -2.70 1.11 -2.43 0.02 
β5-3 Financials -1.72 0.77 -2.23 0.03 -1.38 0.61 -2.27 0.03 
β5-4 Health Care -0.29 1.22 -0.24 0.81 -0.61 0.85 -0.72 0.47 
β5-5 Industrials -2.30 0.81 -2.83 0.01 -2.02 0.64 -3.14 0.00 
β5-6 Materials -0.87 1.27 -0.68 0.50 -1.05 0.95 -1.10 0.27 
β5-7 Technology -2.70 1.32 -2.05 0.05 -1.49 0.94 -1.58 0.12 
β5-8 Telecomm. 0.25 0.91 0.27 0.79 0.64 0.81 0.79 0.43 
β5-9 Utilities -2.09 1.12 -1.87 0.07 -2.10 0.90 -2.33 0.02 
β6 - FTSE 250 -1.12 0.57 -1.97 0.06 -1.03 0.40 -2.55 0.01 
Residual SE 0.19       0.15       
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth.  Dependent variable=Board2016.  *The 
variable Board that appears on the table as a covariate is the baseline covariate taken from the 
2011 sample. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards in 2011. 
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Pseudo-outcome 2. At the estimated optimal bandwidth of 13.41, the non-
parametric RD on pseudo-outcome Emp estimated a non-statistically significant 
treatment effect of 2755 (p=.46) (F[14,151]=665.1, p=.98).  The second model for 
pseudo-outcome Emp, F(14, 42)=626, p<.001, estimated the treatment effect for 
observations in the 9.40 bandwidth.  The p-value of the treatment effect indicated that the 
treatment was not statistically significant, 6619 (p=.29).  Results for the pseudo-outcome 
Emp provided evidence that the Davies Review did not cause a change in the total 
employee population at the threshold.  Figure 37 provides a graphical depiction of the RD 
test for the pseudo outcome Emp, which provides evidence of the absence of a 
discontinuity at the cutoff. Coefficients of the regressions are reported in Table 44. 
Table 44 
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Outcome Employees (H1a, H1b) 
Variable Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
  h=13.41 (n=166) h=9.40 (n=95) 
β0 - Intercept 1220 3670 0.33 0.74 -2830 5870 -0.48 0.63 
β1 – WOBPCNon-balanced -185 317 -0.58 0.56 -768 771 -1.00 0.32 
β1 - WOBPCBalanced -658 650 -1.01 0.31 -2220 1350 -1.65 0.10 
β2 -Treatment 2750 2770 0.99 0.32 6620 4440 1.49 0.14 
β3 – Emp* 0.91 0.01 83.47 0.00 0.91 0.01 61.55 0.00 
β4 - Sector 
        Consumer Svcs 3460 2990 1.15 0.25 5150 4320 1.19 0.24 
Energy -1900 5310 -0.36 0.72 444 7960 0.06 0.96 
Financials -6190 3130 -1.98 0.05 -6330 4510 -1.40 0.16 
Health Care 6760 4540 1.49 0.14 9480 6350 1.49 0.14 
Industrials 1860 3270 0.57 0.57 3540 4830 0.73 0.47 
Materials -2790 4600 -0.61 0.55 736 7020 0.10 0.92 
Technology -597 4600 -0.13 0.90 -938 6780 -0.14 0.89 
Telecom. 1440 4560 0.32 0.75 -777 6030 -0.13 0.90 
Utilities -1690 4790 -0.35 0.72 -1540 6780 -0.23 0.82 
β5 - FTSE 250 -1220 1920 -0.64 0.52 328 2810 0.12 0.91 
Residual SE 791.70       1110.00       
Note. SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. Outcome=Emp (2016).  *The variable Emp that appears 
on the table as a covariate is the baseline covariate taken from the 2011 sample. 
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Figure 36. RD plot for Pseudo-Outcome Board – FTSE 350 
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.38). Board=board size. 
 
 
Figure 37. RD plot for Pseudo-Outcome Emp – FTSE 350.   
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.46).  Emp=total number of employees. 
 
Pseudo-cutoffs. Additionally, following recommendations in the literature for 
robustness checks (e.g. Coviello & Marinello, 2014; Lee & Lemieux, 2010) the RD 
model was tested using simulated thresholds above and below the true threshold.  To that 



























































end, the model described in Equation 18 was tested using the 15% and 28% cutoff points 
to split the sample into treatment and control groups.  As shown in Table 45, the linear 
model for cutoff 15 resulted in a larger F-statistic, lower p-value of the F-statistic, and a 
smaller standard error than the quadratic model, indicating that the linear model was a 
better fit. At a calculated optimal bandwidth of 8.10, the linear model, F(16,150)=1.43, 
p=.27, estimated a non-statistically significant effect of -1.32 (p=.69). Figure 38 shows a 
smooth regression line at the cutoff, which provides evidence of the absence of a 
discontinuity.  
Results of the non-parametric RD tests for cutoff 28 indicated based on the p-
values of the F-statistics, the quadratic (p=.003) and the linear (p=.01) regression models 
fit the data.  However, the smaller p-value of the linear model indicated that the linear 
model had a more normal distribution for the observations in the bandwidth.  An 
inspection of the plotted regression lines, presented in Figure 39, provided evidence for a 
curve within the bandwidth for the right side of the regression.  That finding suggested 
that the quadratic model would be a better fit for the data; therefore, results for the 
quadratic model are interpreted.   
At a bandwidth of 10.02, the quadratic regression model, F(17,54)=.2.84, p=.003, 
returned a non-statistically significant effect of 4.01 (p=.58).  Table 46 reports 
coefficients for the best fitting models of the robustness tests at pseudo cutoffs 15 and 28.  
Overall, results of the robustness tests provided strong support of a valid regression 





Robustness Tests – RD Test Results for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H1a, H1b) 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Cutoff 15 - Quadratic 8.10 167 -1.35 3.39 0.69 1.34 0.35 0.13 0.03 
Cutoff 15 - Linear 8.10 167 -1.32 3.24 0.69 1.43 0.27 0.13 0.04 
Cutoff 28 -Quadratic 10.02 71 4.01 7.31 0.58 2.84 0.00 0.48 0.31 
Cutoff 28 - Linear 10.02 71 7.76 9.30 0.40 2.56 0.01 0.43 0.26 




Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H1a, H1b) 
 






β0 - Intercept 8.57 3.01 2.85 0.01 24.04 8.05 2.99 0.00 
β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced -0.45 0.51 -0.89 0.38 3.39 1.92 1.77 0.08 
β1 - WOBPCBalanced -0.47 0.68 -0.69 0.49 -6.18 2.32 -2.66 0.01 
β2 -Treatment -1.32 3.09 -0.43 0.67 4.01 10.18 0.39 0.70 
β3 - WOBPC2 
    
0.40 0.19 2.14 0.04 
β4 - Board -0.09 0.32 -0.29 0.77 -5.04 5.68 -0.89 0.38 
β5 - CEOGnd 1.43 3.70 0.38 0.70 -2.32 2.95 -0.79 0.43 
β6 - ChairGnd 9.45 15.19 0.62 0.54 -6.51 6.17 -1.05 0.30 
β7 - Sector 
        β7-1 Consumer Svcs. 4.01 2.72 1.47 0.14 -6.30 3.30 -1.91 0.06 
β7-2 Energy -6.59 3.99 -1.65 0.10 -21.44 6.72 -3.19 0.00 
β7-3 Financials 4.19 2.80 1.50 0.14 -3.95 3.77 -1.05 0.30 
β7-4 Health Care 4.10 6.17 0.66 0.51 -8.92 3.98 -2.24 0.03 
β7-5 Industrials 2.61 2.85 0.91 0.36 -10.75 3.88 -2.77 0.01 
β7-6 Materials 1.02 3.83 0.27 0.79 -6.21 7.17 -0.87 0.39 
β7-7 Technology -0.67 3.89 -0.17 0.86 -13.39 6.44 -2.08 0.04 
β7-8 Telecommunications -1.30 5.05 -0.26 0.80 -12.46 4.68 -2.66 0.01 
β7-9 Utilities 5.23 4.20 1.25 0.21 -14.08 5.31 -2.65 0.01 
β8 - FTSE 250 -1.51 1.66 -0.91 0.37 -4.75 2.80 -1.70 0.10 
Residual SE 0.68       0.87       
Note. n=sample size; h=bandwidth; SE=standard error; Dependent variable=Increase.  





Figure 38. RD Plot for Pseudo-Cutoff 15 – FTSE 350  
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.69).  
 
 
Figure 39. RD Plot for Pseudo-Cutoff 28- FTSE 350  
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.58). 
 
  


















































Hypothesis H1c. predicted that the Davies Review not have a statistically 
significant effect (α =.05) on the percentage WOB of non-balanced FTSE Small Cap 
organizations.  To test this hypothesis, a non-parametric RD approach was employed.  
Results of the RD analyses for testing hypothesis H1c found support for the hypothesis.   
First, regression tests were performed on the unconditional model to identify the 
functional form of the RD tests for the full model.  Table 47 reports results of the first 
three models that were tested, linear, quadratic and cubic regression models.  The p-
values for the treatment effect of the unconditional models ranged from .34 to .88 
indicating that the regression lines to the left and right of the cutoff point were not 
statistically significantly different.  The linear model appeared to be the best fitting model, 
based on the model’s p-value (p=.34), which was lower than the quadratic and cubic 
models’ p-values.  Additionally, the p-values for the quadratic (p=.22) and cubic (p=.73) 
terms in their models indicated that the terms were not statistically significant. Therefore, 
the linear regression model was used to test the full model. Equation 22 describes the 
linear regression model for predicting the Increase of WOBPC in the duration of the 
Davies Review (2011-2016) for FTSE Small Cap boards. 
 <=7$6#C6 = 	() + 	(+	,-!./ +	(01 + (2!"#$% + (3/@-D=% + (4/ℎ#F$D=%





RD Test Results for Increase of WOB (H1c) – Unconditional Model 
 
Model h n Estimate* SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 11.85 45 -5.08 5.29 0.34 1.84 0.31 0.12 0.05 
Quadratic 11.85 45 -0.71 4.70 0.88 1.80 0.30 0.15 0.07 
Cubic 11.85 45 -3.04 7.87 0.70 1.43 0.23 0.16 0.05 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. *Estimates were computed using a 
triangular kernel. Dependent variable=Increase. 
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Using a linear regression model for testing the full model including identified 
covariates, Table 48 provides test results at different bandwidths. Figure 40 shows the 
graphical representation of the RD test for the optimal bandwidth of 11.85, which 
returned a non-statistically significant treatment effect of -.14 (p=.99).  Bandwidth size 
was narrowed to 8.5 and widened to 20.  Results for the narrow bandwidth, which 
included 31 effective observations, returned a non-statistically significant effect of 1.74 
(p=.85).  Similarly, the wide bandwidth of 2, which included the entire sample, returned a 
non-statistically significant effect of -.06 (p=.99).  Results of the tests provided support 
for hypothesis H1c that predicted a non-statistically significant treatment effect for FTSE 
Small Cap boards.  Table 49 presents coefficients for the model at different bandwidths.  
Table 48 
 
RD Test Results for Increase of WOB (H1c) – Full Model Different Bandwidths 
  
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1-Optimal 11.85 45 -0.14 8.12 0.99 1.55 0.31 0.39 0.14 
M2-Narrow 8.50 39 1.74 9.26 0.85 1.23 0.63 0.39 0.07 
M3-Wide 20.00 109 -0.06 5.63 0.99 4.77 0.00 0.42 0.33 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=Increase 
 
Figure 40. RD Plot of Increase of WOBPC- FTSE Small Cap 
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.98). h=11.85. 





























Parameter Estimates for Increase of WOB (H1c) – Full Model 
 
Variable Coeff. SE. t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
  *h=11.85 (n=45) h= 8.50 (n=30) h = 20 (n=109) 
β0 - Intercept 0.48 8.07 0.06 0.95 -2.78 9.02 -0.31 0.76 0.51 3.07 0.17 0.87 
β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced -0.48 1.46 -0.33 0.75 -1.35 1.75 -0.77 0.45 -0.54 0.23 -2.34 0.02 
β1 - WOBPCBalanced -1.17 1.44 -0.82 0.42 -0.81 2.67 -0.30 0.77 -1.42 0.47 -3.05 0.00 
β2 -Treatment -0.14 7.23 -0.02 0.98 1.74 8.34 0.21 0.84 -0.06 3.63 -0.02 0.99 
β3 - Board 1.18 2.04 0.58 0.57 0.63 2.42 0.26 0.80 0.66 0.72 0.92 0.36 
β4 - CEOGnd 23.24 11.12 2.09 0.04 24.03 14.47 1.66 0.11 24.57 6.65 3.69 0.00 
β5 - ChairGnd 7.97 5.86 1.36 0.18 7.49 5.90 1.27 0.22 5.02 3.76 1.34 0.19 
β6 - Sector 
            β6-1 Consumer Services 0.53 4.94 0.11 0.91 -0.71 5.53 -0.13 0.90 0.92 2.98 0.31 0.76 
β6-2 Energy -16.86 11.02 -1.53 0.14 -18.91 13.73 -1.38 0.18 -15.16 6.38 -2.38 0.02 
β6-3 Financials -1.72 5.95 -0.29 0.77 0.16 6.61 0.02 0.98 -0.91 3.66 -0.25 0.81 
β6-4 Health Care -5.31 10.82 -0.49 0.63 -7.52 23.52 -0.32 0.75 -3.48 5.45 -0.64 0.52 
β6-5 Industrials 0.00 5.22 0.00 1.00 -0.09 5.90 -0.02 0.99 -0.49 3.11 -0.16 0.87 
β6-6 Materials 16.72 9.68 1.73 0.09 15.68 10.24 1.53 0.14 13.12 6.11 2.15 0.03 
β6-7 Technology 2.86 8.46 0.34 0.74 3.31 8.94 0.37 0.71 1.90 5.11 0.37 0.71 
β6-8 Telecommunications 
       
4.32 23.19 0.19 0.85 
Residual SE 1.38 
   
1.49 
   
0.85 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.39 (0.14)     0.39(0.07)     0.42(0.33)     
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; Board=board size; CEOGnd=female CEO; 
ChairGnd=female chairperson. Dependent variable=Increase.
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Hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. These hypotheses predicted a statistically 
significant increase in the proportion of non-executive directors in relation to the 
proportion of executive directors for FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap boards. 
To test these hypotheses, a panel study was performed on the pooled sample to estimate 
the effect of time on changes in the share of WEDPC and WNEDPC in the population of 
WOB for the 2011 to 2016 period.  Data from 2008 to 2010 were excluded from the 
analyses.  A total of 2370 observations nested within six years were analyzed in a series 
of longitudinal regression models.   
The variables WEDPC (percentage of female executive directors of the total of 
WOB) and WNEDPC (percentage of female non-executive directors of the total WOB) 
were the outcome variables. Although it may seem unnecessary to test both variables, as 
WNEDPC is the difference between 100 and WEDPC, estimates for both outcome 
variables were estimated and results are provided on Table 50 and Table 51.  However, 
only results for WEDPC are explained in detail and interpreted.   
A total of eight models were tested for the WEDPC variable.  The first model 
tested, M0, was the unconditional growth model in which the variable Time was 
regressed on the outcome WEDPC, using a random intercept for each subject. The second 
model, M1, estimated the effect of time on the on the outcome adding a Time random 
slope to model M0.  The third model, M2, added the variable Index to model M1.   The 
fourth model, M3, added a quadratic term to the effect of time to model M2.  The fifth 
model, M4, was the first conditional model, which added the conditional effect of Index 
as an interaction with Time.  The sixth model, M5, removed the random slope and added 
a temporal correlation to the previous model.  Model M6 added the random slope for 
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Time that was removed in model M5.  The final model, M7, extended the previous model 
by allowing a different level 1 residual variance by Index to control for heteroscedastic 
residuals. Results of the eight (including null) models are presented in Table 50.  Across 
the eight models tested, model M7 was the best fit for the data according to the deviance, 
AIC and BIC statistics. Changes in deviance statistics from each model to the next were 
statistically significant at the .05 alpha level, with the exceptions of models M1 to M2 
and M3 to M4, that were not statistically significant, with p-values of p=.48 and p=.16, 
respectively. Given that all fit indices indicated that model M7 provided the best fit for 
the data, its results are interpreted.  
 !"#$% = '( + '*+,-. + '/+,-.2 + '1234.5 + '6234.5 ∗ +,-. + 8 
 
!"#$%9:;<1=( = 9.56 − 1.5 +,-. + 0.23 +,-./ + 8 
 




Equation 23 indicates that at time 0 (2011), organizations in the FTSE 100 boards 
had in average a 9.56% of WED of the total population of WOB.  Organizations in the 
FTSE 250 index were not statistically significantly different than those in the FTSE 100 
(p=.42).  However, organizations in the FTSE Small Cap index had an additional 10.08% 
of WED compared to FTSE 100 boards (p=.03).  In support of the study’s predictions, 
Time had an effect of -1.50% on the outcome variable, indicating that the percentage of 
WED in relation to the population of WOB decreased every year by 1.50 percentage 
points.  However, the statistical significance of the quadratic term coefficient (0.23) for 
the Time variable (p=.03) indicates that the relationship of Time and the outcome is 
curved rather than linear.  Furthermore, the difference in the sign of the Time and Time2 
coefficients indicates that the decrease gets smaller by .46% every year, and changes 
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direction by the fifth year.  The interaction effect between Time and Index yielded 
negative coefficients for the FTSE 250, -.49 (p=.50) and FTSE Small Cap, -1.87 (p=.05); 
however, the p-value for the Time and FTSE 250 interaction indicated that it was not 
statistically significant. This suggested that over time, FTSE 250 boards did not decrease 
their proportion of female executive directors in a different way than FTSE 100 boards. 
The interaction coefficients indicated that boards in the FTSE Small Cap group decreased 
their percentage of WED an additional 1.87% every year compared to FTSE 350 boards.  
Therefore, hypothesis H2c was not supported.  Overall, the tests performed found support 
for hypotheses H2a, and H2b.
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Table 50 
Results of Panel Study for WEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards 
 
Model M0 M1 M2 M3 
Fixed effects Coeff. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coeff. SE p-value Coeff. SE p-value 
β0 – Intercept 12.58 1.27 0.00 12.03 1.57 0.00 10.42 2.42 0.00 11.39 2.46 0.00 
β2 – Time -0.92 0.19 0.01 -0.81 0.32 0.01 -0.81 0.32 0.01 -1.96 0.58 0.00 
β3 – Time2 
         
0.21 0.09 0.02 
β4 – IndexFTSE 250 
      
1.47 2.68 0.58 1.49 2.68 0.58 
β4 – IndexFTSE Small 
      
3.82 3.18 0.23 3.84 3.18 0.23 
β4 – Time:FTSE 250 
            β4 – Time:FTSE Small  
  
 
        Random effects 





















  Fit indices 




















Results of Panel Study for WEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards (Continued) 
 
Model M4 M5 M6 M7 
Fixed effects Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value 
β0 - Intercept 9.85 2.97 0.00 10.36 2.63 0.00 9.87 3.03 0.00 9.56 2.85 0.00 
β2 - Time -1.52 0.75 0.04 -1.71 0.80 0.03 -1.45 0.81 0.07 -1.50 0.77 0.05 
β3 - Time2 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.03 
β4 – IndexFTSE 250 2.30 3.68 0.53 2.27 3.30 0.47 2.45 3.77 0.52 2.95 3.65 0.42 
β4 – IndexFTSE Small 9.43 4.46 0.04 10.36 3.99 0.01 9.56 4.57 0.04 10.08 4.58 0.03 
β5 - Time:FTSE 250 -0.24 0.74 0.74 -0.40 0.66 0.54 -0.36 0.73 0.62 -0.49 0.72 0.50 
β5 - Time:FTSE Small -1.62 0.91 0.07 -2.02 0.80 0.01 -1.71 0.90 0.06 -1.84 0.94 0.05 
Random effects 





















  Fit indices 
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Results of Panel Study for WNEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards 
 
Model M0 M1 M2 M3 
Fixed effects Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value 
β0 – Intercept 87.40 1.27 0.00 87.90 1.57 0.00 89.50 2.42 0.00 88.57 2.46 0.00 
β2 – Time 0.90 0.19 0.00 0.80 0.32 0.01 0.80 0.32 0.01 1.90 0.59 0.00 
β3 – Time2 
         
-0.20 0.09 0.02 
β4 – IndexFTSE 250 
      
-1.40 2.67 0.60 -1.41 2.68 0.60 
β4 – IndexFTSE Small 
      
-3.70 3.18 0.24 -3.76 3.18 0.24 
β4 – Time:FTSE 250 
            β4 – Time:FTSE Small  
  
 
        Random effects 





















  Fit indices 




















Results of Panel Study for WNEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards (Continued) 
 
Model M4 M5 M6 M7 
Fixed effects Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value Coef. SE p-value 
β0 - Intercept 90.06 2.97 0.00 89.61 2.63 0.00 90.07 3.03 0.00 90.29 2.87 0.00 
β2 - Time 1.47 0.76 0.05 1.67 0.81 0.04 1.41 0.81 0.08 1.44 0.78 0.06 
β3 - Time2 -0.20 0.09 0.03 -0.24 0.12 0.05 -0.20 0.11 0.08 -0.21 0.11 0.05 
β4 – IndexFTSE 250 -2.14 3.68 0.56 -2.30 3.30 0.49 -2.35 3.77 0.53 -2.71 3.66 0.46 
β4 – IndexFTSE Small -9.29 4.46 0.04 -10.31 3.99 0.01 -9.47 4.57 0.04 -9.89 4.57 0.03 
β5 - Time:FTSE 250 0.22 0.74 0.77 0.39 0.66 0.55 0.35 0.73 0.63 0.44 0.72 0.54 
β5 - Time:FTSE Small 1.60 0.91 0.08 2.01 0.80 0.01 1.70 0.90 0.06 1.81 0.93 0.05 
Random effects 





















  Fit indices 
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Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3c, and H3d.  The third set of hypotheses H3a, H3b, 
and H3c predicted a statistically significant increase in the mean increase of CEOs as 
compared to the increase of executive directors. To test these hypotheses, a t-test was 
performed.  Table 52 reports results for the t-tests, which provided support for hypotheses 
H3a.  In the duration of the Davies Review, FTSE 350 boards decreased their average 
number of female CEOs from 4.2% in 2011, t(567.17) = -.20, p = .84; 95% CI(-0.04, -
0.03), to 4.6% in 2016.  Despite the lack of statistical significance, the mean difference of 
0.35% was low compared to the 2.81% mean difference in the population of executive 
directors.  The average percentage of female executive directors in 2011 was 15.44% in 
2011, t(560.06) = -.76, p = .45; 95% CI(-0.10, -0.04), compared to 18.25% in 2016.  
Results of the tests also provided support for hypothesis H3b, the mean increase 
in female chairpersons in FTSE 350 boards had a statistically significant increase from 
1.05% in 2011, t(421.51) = 2.36, p = .02; 95% CI(-0.06, -0.01), to 4.21% in 2016.  
However, the increase was significantly lower than the 94.74% increase of non-executive 
directors, for which the average number in 2011 was .94, t533.22) = -11.73, p < .001; 
95% CI(-1.11, -0.79), compared to 1.88 in 2016. 
Predictions for the FTSE Small Cap boards also found support in the study’s tests, 
in the duration of the Davies Review, FTSE Small Cap boards had a non-statistical 
significant decrease of 0.91% in their share of female CEOs from 1.8% in 2011, 
(t[196.68] =.58, p = .56; 95% CI[-0.02, 0.04]), to 0.9 % in 2016.  The decrease was lower 
than the 3.63% decrease of female executive directors in the same period, which 
averaged 0.13 per board in 2011, t(217.61) =.80, p=.45; 95% CI(-0.05, -0.12), and .10 in 
2016.  In support of Hypotheses H3d, the number of female chairpersons for FTSE Small 
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Cap boards did not change in the Davies Review period, the 3.64% population in 2011, 
t(218) =0, p = 1; 95% CI(-0.05, 0.05), remained at 3.64% in 2016.  Conversely, the 
number of female non-executive directors in FTSE Small Cap boards had a statistically 
significant mean increase of .46, resulting from an average .43 per board in 2011, 
t(212.65) =-4.87, p < .001; 95% CI(-0.64, -0.27), to .88 in 2016. 
To further understand the transformation of corporate boards in relation to the 
increase of female CEOs in relation to female executive directors, and female 
chairpersons in relation to female non-executive directors a series of longitudinal 
regression models were performed using data from 2011 to 2016 for the pooled sample. 
Table 53 reports the results of the five growth models that were performed to identify the 
effects of time, FTSE index, and number of women executive directors on dependent 
variable CEO. The first model, M0 was the unconditional growth model with a random 
intercept by firm.  Model M1 added a random slope to the previous model. Model M2 
added the variables index and female executive directors to the previous model, which 
conditioned the growth over time on the variable index.  The fourth model, M3, added a 
temporal correlation to the previous model.  The fifth model, M4, conditioned the growth 
of the dependent variable on the variable WED.  Based on fit statistics, models M3 and 
M4 provided the best fit for the data. However, estimates across all models were very 
similar. The lower AIC and BIC fit statistic for Model M4 suggested that it provided the 
best fit for the data; therefore, it is interpreted.  The intercept for dependent variable CEO 
was .036 (p=.03).  The effect of time was near zero and non-statistically significant, 
<.001 (p=.89), which indicated that in the 2011 to 2016 period, there was no growth in 
the representation of female CEOs across the sample.  The p-values for the variables in 
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the model were not statistically significant, ranging from .23 to .89, which suggested the 
FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap boards were not statistically significantly different from 
FTSE 100 boards in their increase of female CEOs.  Similarly, the increase of executive 
directors, in the Davies Review period, did not have a statistically significant effect in 
changing the population of female CEOs.   
It is noteworthy to mention that, models M2 and M3, indicated that number of 
female executive directors had a statistically significant effect on the variable CEO, .021 
(ps=.03); which indicates that each additional executive director increases likelihood of 
having a female CEO.  However, that effect became non-statistically significant when the 
variable WED was used to condition the growth overtime.  
Similar models were computed for the dependent variable female chairperson. 
Table 54 reports the results of the five growth models for the dependent variable female 
chairperson. The first model, M0 was the unconditional growth model with a random 
intercept.  The second model, M1 allowed random slopes for time.  Model M2 added 
variables index and WNED directors to the previous model, and conditioned the growth 
by FTSE index. Model M3 added a temporal correlation to the previous model. Model 
M4 conditioned the annual growth of the dependent variable on the variable WNED.  Fit 
indices indicated that models M3 and M4 were the best fit for the data.  However, Model 
M4 is interpreted as it is of interest to see how the growth of female non-executive 
directors impacted the female number of chairs.   
The intercept for model M4 was approaching statistical significance, .027 (p=.06). 
The model suggested that time had statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable, .007 (p=.01), indicating that the population of female chairpersons increased 
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by .007 every year in the 2011 to 2016 period.  The number of non-executive directors 
had a statistically significant negative effect on the dependent variable, -.012 (p=.01); 
however, the interaction of time and non-executive directors was not statistically 
significant, .000 (p=.92). The p-values for the effect of index indicated that FTSE 250 
(p=.79) and FTSE Small Cap (p=.61) boards were not statistically significantly different 
than FTSE 100 boards in the observed relationships.  
Table 52 
Results of T-tests for Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3c, and H3d   
Variable n 
Mean 
difference t-statistic  p-value df 95% CI Cohen’s d 
FTSE 350  
Fem. CEOs 285 0.004 -0.20 0.84 567.17 -0.04, -0.03 -0.017 
Fem. exec directors 285 0.028 -0.76 0.45 560.06 -0.10, -0.04 -0.063 
Fem. Chairperson 285 0.032 -2.36 0.02 421.51 -0.06, -0.01 -0.198 
Fem. Non-exec 
directors 285 0.947 -11.73 0.00 553.22 -1.11, -0.79 -0.983 
FTSE Small Cap  
Fem. CEOs 110 -0.009 0.58 0.56 196.68 -0.02, 0.04 0.078 
Fem. exec directors 110 -0.036 0.80 0.45 217.61 -0.05, -0.12 0.108 
Fem. Chairperson 110 0.000 0.00 1.00 218.00 -0.05, -0.05 <0.001 
Fem. Non-exec 
directors 110 0.455 -4.87 0.00 213.85 -0.64, -0.27 -0.657 
Note. n=sample size; df=degrees of freedom; CI=confidence interval 
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Table 53 
Results of Panel Study – Conditional Growth model for Female CEOs on FTSE All Share Boards – Hypotheses H3a and H3c 
Model M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fixed effects Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p 
β0 – Intercept 0.031 0.01 <0.01 0.031 0.01 <0.01 0.032 0.02 0.07 0.036 0.02 0.05 0.036 0.02 0.03 
β1 – Time 0.003 0.00 0.80 0.003 0.00 0.89 0.000 0.00 0.98 0.000 0.00 0.96 0.000 0.00 0.89 
β2 – FTSE 250 
      
0.007 0.02 0.75 0.004 0.02 0.86 0.007 0.02 0.73 
β2 – FTSE Small Cap 
     
-0.024 0.02 0.31 -0.023 0.00 0.36 -0.026 0.02 0.23 
β3 – WED 
      
0.021 0.01 0.03 0.021 0.01 0.03 0.015 0.01 0.31 
β4 – Time:FTSE 250 
     
0.001 0.01 0.91 0.001 0.00 0.81    
β4 – Time:FTSE Small Cap 
    
-0.001 0.01 0.93 -0.001 0.01 0.79    
Β5 – Time:WED 
      
      0.002 0.00 0.62 
Random effects 




























  Fit indices 


















  BIC -3229     -3921     -3890     -4175     -4183     







Results of Panel Study – Conditional Growth model for Female Chairperson on FTSE All Share Boards – Hypotheses H3b and H3d   
Model M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fixed effects Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p 
β0 – Intercept 0.018 0.01 0.02 0.018 0.01 0.01 0.029 0.02 0.01 0.030 0.01 0.04 0.027 0.01 0.06 
β1 – Time 0.005 0.00 <0.01 0.005 0.00 0.02 0.006 0.00 0.18 0.005 0.00 0.20 0.007 0.00 0.01 
β2 – FTSE 250 
      
-0.009 0.02 0.64 -0.010 0.02 0.55 -0.004 0.02 0.79 
β2 – FTSE Small Cap 
     
0.015 0.02 0.46 0.012 0.02 0.52 0.010 0.02 0.61 
β3 – WNED 
      
-0.013 0.00 <0.01 -0.013 0.00 <0.01 -0.012 0.02 0.01 
β4 – Time:FTSE 250 
     
0.005 0.01 0.31 0.006 0.00 0.20    
β4 – Time:FTSE Small Cap 
    
-0.005 0.01 0.41 -0.004 0.01 0.47    
β5 – Time:WNED 
     
      0.000 0.00 0.92 
Random effects 


















  Residual 









  Fit indices 


















  BIC -3498     -4518     -4500     -4746     -4749     
Note. SE=standard error. Dependent variable=female chairperson; WNED=women non-executive directors; Includes year-observations from 2011 
to 2016 (n=2370). 
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Effects of Davies Review on Opportunities for Women 
Phase II of the study examined the effects of the Davies Review on opportunities 
for other women in the organization and on the gender pay gap.  For this phase, 
observations in the sample were re-classified into treatment and comparison groups using 
the percentages of WOB in 2016.  Organizations that achieved the 25% target set by the 
Davies Review were placed in the compliant (treatment) group, and organizations that 
were below the 25% threshold were placed in the non-compliant (comparison) group. 
Hypothesis H4a. Hypothesis H4a predicted that the Davies Review would result 
in a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of women in executive boards in 
FTSE All Share organizations compliant with the 25% WOB targets. Analyses were 
performed on the pooled sample using two different methods for handling missing data, 
listwise deletion and with data imputation. Following recommendations in the literature 
(Frolich & Huber, 2017), prior to testing the model with the identified covariates, the 
unconditional model was tested.   
Table 55 reports the estimates of the RD tests for the unconditional models.  The 
linear model returned a statistically significant effect estimate of -7.56 (p=.05). Adding a 
quadratic term of the forcing variable WOBPC to the linear model, the quadratic model 
estimated a treatment effect of -11.47 (p=.01).  Although the quadratic model was 
statistically significant, the quadratic term’s p-value was not statistically significant 
(p=.16).  Similarly, adding a cubic term to the quadratic model, the cubic model 
estimated a statistically significant treatment effect of -17.38 (p=.02); however, the cubic 
term was not statistically significant (p=.36).  After confirming that the unconditional 
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model had a statistically significant treatment effect on the outcome, the linear model was 
kept, identified covariates were added, and hypothesis tests were performed.  
Table 55 
 
RD Test Results for WExecPC (H4a) – Unconditional Model 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 8.91 174 -7.56 3.94 0.05 2.41 0.14 0.04 0.02 
Quadratic 8.91 174 -11.47 4.57 0.01 2.31 0.12 0.05 0.03 
Cubic 8.91 174 -17.38 7.52 0.02 2.02 0.16 0.06 0.03 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women 
executives. 
 
To identify a discontinuous jump in the regression line at the cutoff, six virtually 
identical non-parametric regression discontinuity linear models were computed. These six 
models differed only in bandwidth selection and treatment of missing data.  Models M1, 
M2, and M3 tested hypothesis H4a using listwise deletion, and models M4, M5, and M6 
used the values generated by the data imputation method described in the Missing Data 
section. Equation 24 was used in the six models for predicting the percentage of women 
in executive boards for the compliant and non-compliant groups based on the 25% 
threshold set by the Davies Review.  
 !"#$%&' = 	*+ + 	*-	!./&' + *01 +	*234%5$67$ + *8'59:9%6; + *<!"=
+ *>'".?4@ ∗ *B'".1$4C5$ + *D'ℎ695?4@ ∗ *F'ℎ6951$4C5$
+ *-+!GH&' + *--!"IJ&' + *-0G$%:K5-LF + *-234@$#-L0 + M 
 
(24) 
Table 56 reports the LATE estimates for the six models.  Model M1 used the 
calculated optimal bandwidth for the WExecPC variable (h=8.34), which included 148 
effective observations. Model M2 narrowed the bandwidth to 6.5 (110 effective 
observations), and model M3 widened the bandwidth to 11.0 (168 effective observations).  
Model M1 returned an estimated effect size of -10.25 that was statistically significant at 
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the .10 alpha level (p=.06), and the R2 indicated a large effect size (R2=.37).  Model M2 
returned a statistically significant treatment effect of -13.85 (p=.05), and model 3 yielded 
a non-statistically significant estimate of -5.79 (p=. 13).   
Similar models were calculated using imputed values for missing data. At a 
calculated bandwidth of 5.85, model M4 returned a statistically significant treatment 
effect estimate of -10.57 (p=.05).  Model M5 estimated a treatment effect of -13.55 
(p=.02) at a 2.78 bandwidth, and model M6 estimated a treatment effect of -6.66 (p=.09).  
All of the six models tested estimated a negative treatment effect of the Davies Review 
on the percentage of women in executive boards, five of which were statistically 
significant at the .10 alpha level.  Estimates for the optimal bandwidth models, M1 and 
M4, were very similar at different bandwidths. Including imputed data for missing values 
made it possible to estimate the treatment effect at a much narrower bandwidth, which 
provided more precise estimates.   
Table 56 
 
RD Test Results for WExecPC (H4a) – Full Model at Different Bandwidths 
 
Model* h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 - Optimal  8.34 148 -10.25 5.55 0.07 3.14 0.00 0.37 0.25 
M2 - Narrow 6.50 110 -13.85 7.06 0.05 2.35 0.00 0.39 0.22 
M3 - Wide 11.00 168 -5.79 3.86 0.13 2.96 0.00 0.32 0.21 
M4 - Optimal  5.85 162 -10.57 5.50 0.05 3.02 0.00 0.34 0.22 
M5 - Narrow  4.85 126 -38.44 13.98 0.01 2.92 0.00 0.40 0.26 
M6 - Wide 8.50 231 -6.66 4.01 0.09 4.04 0.00 0.31 0.23 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women 
executives. *All models were calculated using variables in Equation 11.  Models 1, 2 and 3 use 








Parameter Estimates for WExecPC (H4a) – Full Model 
 
Variable Estimate SE t-value p-value Estimate SE t-value p-value 
  M1 (h=8.34) M4 (h=5.85) 
β0 - Intercept 18.86 6.74 2.80 0.01 18.20 6.84 2.66 0.01 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant 3.15 1.25 2.52 0.01 3.17 1.67 1.91 0.06 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant 0.53 0.66 0.80 0.43 0.79 0.65 1.22 0.23 
β2 -Treatment -10.25 4.45 -2.31 0.02 -10.57 5.32 -1.99 0.05 
β3 - Increase -0.18 0.13 -1.43 0.16 -0.17 0.10 -1.67 0.10 
β4 - Critical -2.29 2.51 -0.92 0.36 -1.81 2.51 -0.72 0.47 
β5 - WED 4.32 2.48 1.74 0.08 3.24 1.89 1.72 0.09 
β6 - CEOGnd 66.11 25.36 2.61 0.01 7.03 21.34 0.33 0.74 
β7 - CEOTenure -5.22 2.58 -2.02 0.05 -0.47 2.38 -0.20 0.84 
β8 - ChairGnd -0.07 8.04 -0.01 0.99 -9.35 5.81 -1.61 0.11 
β9 - ChairTenure -2.97 2.61 -1.14 0.26 0.61 1.03 0.59 0.56 
β10 - WSMPC 0.31 0.11 2.73 0.01 0.28 0.11 2.54 0.01 
β11 - WEmpPC -0.04 0.09 -0.47 0.64 0.06 0.08 0.78 0.44 
β12 - Sector 
        β12 -1 Consumer Svcs. 1.74 4.06 0.43 0.67 0.70 3.34 0.21 0.83 
β12 -2Energy -1.60 5.89 -0.27 0.79 -6.76 5.34 -1.27 0.21 
β12 -3Financials 5.63 3.59 1.57 0.12 2.63 3.20 0.82 0.41 
β12 -4Health Care -3.03 6.07 -0.50 0.62 -2.74 5.60 -0.49 0.63 
β12 -5Industrials 0.51 3.39 0.15 0.88 -0.07 3.04 -0.02 0.98 
β12 -6Materials 5.75 4.41 1.30 0.20 4.07 4.13 0.99 0.33 
β12 -7Technology -1.03 5.62 -0.18 0.85 -4.80 4.91 -0.98 0.33 
β12 -8Telecom. -1.92 8.21 -0.23 0.82 -1.05 6.38 -0.17 0.87 
β12 -9Utilities 20.63 6.15 3.36 0.00 20.86 6.37 3.27 0.00 
β13 - Index 
        FTSE 250 0.61 2.15 0.28 0.78 0.01 2.13 0.01 0.99 
FTSE Small Cap 1.84 3.47 0.53 0.60 2.25 2.93 0.77 0.44 
Residual SE 0.79 
   
0.79 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.37 (0.25)     0.34 (0.22)     
n 148 
   
162 
   Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; 
Critical=3 or more women directors; WED=women executive directors; CEOGnd=female CEO; 
ChairGnd=female chairperson; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female 
chairperson tenure; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage 
of women employed; dependent variable=percentage of women executives. 
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A closer inspection at the coefficients for each of the variables included in the 
models M1 and M4 (Table 57) suggested that the results were virtually identical despite 
the 2.49 bandwidth difference. However, unlike model M1 (p=.07), the p-value for model 
M4 was statistically significant (p=.05)   The F-statistics for both models, M1, F(23, 
124)=3.14, p<.001, and model M4, F(23,138)=3.02, p<.001, indicated that both models 
were good fits for the data.  The inspection of the coefficients of both models also hinted 
the presence of multicollinearity due to the high R2 despite the high p-values for the 
majority of coefficients.  Therefore, following recommendations in the literature to assess 
multicollinearity in the model (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 196-197), 
variance inflation factors were calculated. 
Table 58 reports the multicollinearity diagnostic results for the full model 
described in Equation 24.  Overall multicollinearity diagnostic measures indicated that 
multicollinearity had been detected in the model.  The determinant of the correlation 
matrix was within recommended guidelines, greater than 0 and smaller than 1 (Farrar & 
Gaubler, 1967). However, it was very close to zero (|X’X|=.0031), which suggested some 
degree of multicollinearity (Cooley & Lohnes, 1971). The Farrar Chi-Square test statistic 
was computed.  As a rule of thumb, the value of the Farrar Chi-square should not be 
higher than the critical value of Chi-square for the desired level of significance (Farrar & 
Gaubler, 1967).  The value Farrar c2value of 2265 was higher than the critical value 
(c2=441.28, a=.05), which suggested the presence of significant multicollinearity in the 
model specification. Therefore, multiple tests were performed to detect the location of the 




Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test Results for Hypothesis H4a 
 
Diagnostic Full Model Respecified Model 
Determinant |X'X| 0.003 0.031 
Farrar Chi Square 2265.41 1359.78 
Red Indicator 0.27 0.27 
Sum of Lambda Inverse 30.58 20.40 
Note. Test performed on model for dependent variable=percentage of women executives. 
 
Table 59 reports the results of the multicollinearity diagnostic tests for individual 
variables in the model. Values for the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistic were above 
1 indicating that variables were correlated; however, every value was below the 
recommended threshold of 10 (Schumacker, 2008), and below the more stringent 
threshold of 5 (Curto & Pinto, 2011), indicating that the test did not detect a high degree 
multicollinearity. Similarly, tolerance values were within .24 and .82, indicating that 
variables were correlated but a high degree of multicollinearity was not detected (Hair et 
al., 2010, p. 197).  Corrected variance inflation factor (CVIF) indices for the variables 
WOBPC, CEOGnd, and ChairGnd were close to the threshold of 10 (Curto & Pinto, 
2010), indicating the presence of multicollinearity.  The variables CEOGnd and 
ChairGnd were dummy variables, which multiplied by the Tenure result in the same 
value as the variables CEOTenure and ChairTenure, thus, they could be removed without 
impacting the outcome.  The variable WOBPC being the main predictor could not be 
removed; therefore, tests were run removing the variables CEOGnd and ChairGnd.  After 
removing those variables, multicollinearity indices improved and remained within the 
aforementioned guidelines.  Therefore, the regressions for the model were re-computed 




Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test Results for Hypothesis H4a Individual Parameters 
 
  Full Model Respecified Model 
Parameter VIF Tolerance Leamer CVIF VIF Tolerance Leamer CVIF 
WOBPC 4.14 0.24 0.49 11.96 4.10 0.24 0.49 8.75 
Increase 1.76 0.57 0.75 5.09 1.76 0.57 0.75 3.75 
Critical 2.00 0.50 0.71 5.77 2.00 0.50 0.71 4.27 
WED 1.66 0.60 0.78 4.79 1.35 0.74 0.86 2.88 
CEOGnd 3.21 0.31 0.56 9.25 
    CEOTenure 2.55 0.39 0.63 7.35 1.19 0.84 0.92 2.54 
ChairGnd 3.17 0.32 0.56 9.13 
    ChairTenure 3.11 0.32 0.57 8.96 1.04 0.96 0.98 2.22 
WSMPC 1.72 0.58 0.76 4.96 1.72 0.58 0.76 3.66 
WEmpPC 1.92 0.52 0.72 5.54 1.92 0.52 0.72 4.09 
Sector 1.21 0.82 0.91 3.50 1.21 0.83 0.91 2.58 
Index 1.42 0.71 0.84 4.08 1.41 0.71 0.84 3.00 
Treatment 2.72 0.37 0.61 7.85 2.71 0.37 0.61 5.78 
Note. VIF=variance inflation factor. CVIF=corrected variance inflation factor. 
Table 60 
 
RD Test Results for WExecPC (H4a) – Respecified Model 
 
Model* h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M4 - Optimal  5.85 162 -10.57 5.50 0.05 3.02 0.00 0.34 0.22 
Respecified 5.85 162 -11.56 5.28 0.03 3.17 0.00 0.32 0.22 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. *All models were calculated using 
variables in Equation 11. Models 4 and 4a used imputed values for missing data.  
 
Table 60 reports the results of the non-parametric RD tests for the adjusted model 
compared to the re-stated results of the full model.  The adjusted model removed the 
variables that were causing significant multicollinearity in the full model.  The smaller 
standard error, smaller p-value, and larger F-statistic for the adjusted model indicated a 
better fit, F(21,140)=3.17, p<.001.  In support of the study’s predictions, the estimated 
effect for the model was large and statistically significant, -11.56, p=.03. Coefficients for 




Parameter Estimates for WExecPC (H4a)  – Respecified Model  
 
Variable Estimate SE t-value p-value 
β0 – Intercept 19.44 6.80 2.86 0.00 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant 3.34 1.67 2.00 0.05 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant 0.87 0.64 1.36 0.18 
β2 –Treatment -11.56 5.30 -2.18 0.03 
β3 – Increase -0.18 0.10 -1.76 0.08 
β4 – Critical -1.74 2.51 -0.69 0.49 
β5 – WED 3.43 1.88 1.82 0.07 
β6 – CEOTenure 0.24 0.83 0.29 0.77 
β7 – ChairTenure -0.69 0.65 -1.07 0.29 
β8 – WSMPC 0.28 0.11 2.56 0.01 
β9 – WempPC 0.05 0.08 0.66 0.51 
β10 – Sector 
    β10-1 Consumer Services 0.96 3.31 0.29 0.77 
β10-2 Energy -6.85 5.33 -1.29 0.20 
β10-3 Financials 2.79 3.17 0.88 0.38 
β10-4 Health Care -2.87 5.34 -0.54 0.59 
β10-5 Industrials 0.18 3.00 0.06 0.95 
β10-6 Materials 2.68 4.02 0.67 0.51 
β10-7 Technology -4.72 4.89 -0.97 0.34 
β10-8 Telecom. -1.09 6.36 -0.17 0.86 
β10-9 Utilities 20.92 6.35 3.30 0.00 
β11 – Index 
    FTSE 250 -0.40 2.11 -0.19 0.85 
FTSE Small Cap 1.84 2.91 0.63 0.53 
Residual SE 0.75 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.32 (0.22) 
   n 162       
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; Critical=3 or 
more women; WED=women executive directors; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; 
ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; 




Figure 41. RD Plot of WExecPC - FTSE All Share Boards.  
Note. Discontinuity detected, LATE = 11.56 (p=.03). h=5.85.  WExecPC=percentage of women 
executives 
 
Figure 41 provides a visual representation of the effect of Compliance to the 25% 
target set by the Davies Review on the percentage of women on executive boards for the 
adjusted model.  The discontinuous jump on the regression line indicates that 
observations to the right of the cutoff point, the compliant group, had a higher percentage 
of WOB than observations to the left of the cutoff point, the non-compliant group.   
Using a bandwidth of 5.85, the Davies Review had a statistically significant 
treatment effect of -11.56 (p=.03) percentage points.  This indicates that based on their 
percentage of WOB in 2016, the group of organizations that lie within the 25 to 30.85 
mark had in average a 11.56 percent fewer women in their executive boards than the 
group of organizations within the 19.15 to 25 range on the running variable.  The 
percentage of women employed in the organization did not have a statistically significant 
effect (p=.51) on the outcome; however, the variable WSMPC indicated that for each 
percentage point of women in senior management, there was a positive effect on the 






























outcome of 0.28 (p=.01).  Industry sectors did not produce statistically significant 
coefficients, with the exception of the utilities sector, which had a statistically significant 
effect of 20.92 percentage points (p<.001).  The p-values for Index indicated that FTSE 
250 (p=.85) and FTSE Small Cap (p=.53) were not statistically significantly different 
than the FTSE 100 group.  







Equation 25 indicates that, controlling for sector, female CEO tenure, female 
Chair tenure, number of women executive directors, and percentage of women in senior 
management, percentage of women in the organization, and Index, the -11.56 estimated 
effect of Davies Review on the WExecPC variable is calculated as the difference between 
the mean effect on WExecPC in the non-compliant and compliant groups.  
Robustness Tests 
To strengthen the causal claim of the results, the effect of the forcing variable was 
tested by changing the cutoff point that was used to assign participants to treatment and 
comparison groups.  To that end, the model for hypothesis H4a was tested at thresholds 
20 and 30.  Figure 42 shows the regression line for the test at the 20 cutoff point. Test 
results, reported on Table 62, indicated that at a bandwidth of 7.61 (n=228), the estimated 
treatment effect of 1.06 (p=.78) was not statistically significant.  Figure 43 shows the 
regression line for the test at the 30 cutoff point.  Results for the test indicated that a 
calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.04 (n=177), the estimated treatment effect of -1.50 
(p=.69) was not statistically significant.  Both robustness tests provided additional 
evidence for the causality claim of the test results of hypothesis H4a.  Table 63 reports 
coefficients for both pseudo-cutoff models. 
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Figure 42. RD Plot of WExecPC at Pseudo-Cutoff 20 -  FTSE All Share.  
Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.79). 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives. 
 
Figure 43. RD Plot of WExecPC at Pseudo-Cutoff 30 -  FTSE All Share. 
Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.84). 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives. 
 
Table 62 
Robustness Tests – RD Test Results for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H4a) 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Cutoff 20 7.61 228 0.98 3.76 0.79 3.58 0.00 0.27 0.19 
Cutoff 30 9.04 177 -0.78 3.78 0.84 4.94 0.00 0.42 0.33 
Note. n=sample size; h=bandwidth; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women 
executives. 




























































Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H4a) 
		 Estimate SE t-value p-value Estimate SE t-value p-value 
Variable Pseudo-cutoff=201 Pseudo-cutoff=303 
β0 - Intercept 5.11 4.35 1.18 0.24 8.07 5.82 1.39 0.17 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant -0.21 0.80 -0.27 0.79 0.37 0.56 0.66 0.51 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant 0.75 0.45 1.67 0.10 0.05 0.81 0.06 0.95 
β2 -Treatment 0.98 3.49 0.28 0.78 -0.78 3.58 -0.22 0.83 
β3 - Increase 0.05 0.08 0.66 0.51 -0.05 0.11 -0.49 0.63 
β4 - Critical -2.37 2.60 -0.91 0.36 -0.03 2.68 -0.01 0.99 
β5 - WED 0.82 2.04 0.41 0.69 8.19 1.93 4.23 0.00 
β6 - CEOTenure 0.53 0.66 0.80 0.42 2.51 0.85 2.96 0.00 
β7 - ChairTenure -0.03 0.54 -0.05 0.96 0.54 0.49 1.10 0.28 
β8 - WSMPC 0.18 0.10 1.88 0.06 0.41 0.11 3.85 0.00 
β9 - WEmpPC 0.16 0.07 2.37 0.02 -0.08 0.09 -0.90 0.37 
β10 - Sector 
        Consumer Svcs. -3.37 2.50 -1.35 0.18 5.87 4.15 1.42 0.16 
Energy -5.79 3.17 -1.82 0.07 -3.82 7.16 -0.53 0.59 
Financials -0.20 2.67 -0.07 0.94 4.06 3.94 1.03 0.30 
Health Care -4.75 6.70 -0.71 0.48 -3.24 5.26 -0.62 0.54 
Industrials -3.08 2.37 -1.30 0.20 0.11 3.82 0.03 0.98 
Materials -2.11 3.71 -0.57 0.57 3.51 4.99 0.70 0.48 
Technology -5.96 3.24 -1.84 0.07 -3.00 6.26 -0.48 0.63 
Telecom. 2.07 4.64 0.45 0.66 -2.64 8.26 -0.32 0.75 
Utilities 3.68 5.96 0.62 0.54 10.60 5.81 1.83 0.07 
β11 - Index 
        FTSE 250 -2.88 1.76 -1.64 0.10 0.84 2.36 0.36 0.72 
FTSE Small Cap 1.16 2.09 0.56 0.58 1.02 3.20 0.32 0.75 
Residual SE 0.62 
   
0.83 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.27 (0.19) 
  
0.40 (0.32) 
  n 148.00       162.00       
Note. SE=standard error. 1Estimated using an optimal bandwidth of 7.61.  2Estimated using an optimal 
bandwidth of 9.04. 
 
Alternative hypothesis H4a.  Taking into account that the variable Increase was 
found to be significant, it cannot be discounted as an alternative explanation to the critical 
mass of WOB hypotheses.  Consequently, using the variable increase as the running 
variable, the model was tested to identify if the effect of critical mass of WOB at 25% 
could be explained by the increase.   
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Table 64 reported the results of the unconditional model for alternative hypothesis 
H4a using linear, quadratic and cubic functional forms. Results indicated that at an 
optimal bandwidth of 8.77, the linear model was the best fit for the data, based on the 
lowest p-value for the F-statistic for the three models.  Following the identification of the 
functional form of the regression, the full model described in Equation 26 was run at 
several bandwidths.  
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RD Test Results for WExecPC (Alternative H4a) – Unconditional Model 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 8.77 221 -6.15 3.52 0.08 2.46 0.12 0.03 0.02 
Quadratic 8.77 221 -6.68 3.65 0.07 2.25 0.13 0.04 0.02 
Cubic 8.77 221 -9.19 4.89 0.06 2.08 0.14 0.05 0.02 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. 
 
The full model was tested at three different bandwidths.  Estimates for the optimal 
bandwidth of 7.03, a narrow bandwidth of 3.51, and a wide bandwidth of 14.06 are 
reported on Table 65.  All three models were statistically significant .05 alpha level.  
Although the wide bandwidth model suggested that it was the best fit for the data, the 
bandwidth was so wide that it represented almost the parametric form, which literature 
advices against.  Therefore, coefficients for the optimal and wide bandwidth models are 





RD Test Results for WExecPC (Alternative H4a) – Full Model Different Bandwidths 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Optimal 7.03 192 -6.78 2.11 0.00 5.05 0.00 0.36 0.29 
Narrow 3.51 133 -7.47 3.80 0.04 4.82 0.00 0.45 0.36 
Wide 14.06 327 -4.90 0.58 0.00 7.12 0.00 0.31 0.26 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. 
 
 
At an optimal bandwidth of 7.03, the LATE was statistically significant, -6.78 
(p<.01), which indicates that organizations that had a large increase of WOB had 6.78 
percentage points lower representation of women on their executive boards.  The 
percentage of women in senior management was statistically significant, indicating that 
for each percentage point of women in senior management, the percentage of women on 
executive boards increased by .48 (p=.01) of a percent.  The statistical significance of the 
variable CEOTenure indicated that for every year a female CEO was in her position, the 
percentage of women on executive boards increased by 3.98 percentage points (p<.001).  





Parameter Estimates for WExecPC (Alternative H4a) - Full Model 
		  Optimal (h=7.03) Wide  (h=14.09) 
Variable Estimate SE t-value p-value Estimate SE t-value p-value 
β0 – Intercept 10.87 6.58 1.65 0.10 11.59 5.12 2.26 0.02 
β1 - IncreaseSmall 1.85 0.90 2.06 0.04 0.40 0.26 1.57 0.12 
β1 - IncreaseLarge 0.57 0.71 0.79 0.43 0.62 0.31 2.00 0.05 
β2 -Treatment -6.78 2.75 -2.46 0.01 -4.90 2.00 -2.45 0.01 
β3 - Board -0.06 0.50 -0.12 0.90 -0.37 0.37 -0.99 0.32 
β4 - WSMPC 0.48 0.09 5.12 0.00 0.43 0.08 5.64 0.00 
β5 - WEmpPC -0.04 0.07 -0.49 0.62 0.04 0.06 0.66 0.51 
β6 - CEOTenure 3.98 1.12 3.57 0.00 2.54 0.72 3.52 0.00 
β7 - ChairTenure 0.28 0.46 0.61 0.54 0.32 0.42 0.77 0.44 
β8 - Sector 
        β8-1 Consumer Svcs 0.34 3.29 0.10 0.92 0.50 2.49 0.20 0.84 
β8-2 Energy -5.19 4.33 -1.20 0.23 -4.01 3.35 -1.20 0.23 
β8-3 Financials 3.67 3.35 1.10 0.27 1.60 2.52 0.63 0.53 
β8-4 Health Care 6.30 5.27 1.20 0.23 1.75 4.11 0.43 0.67 
β8-5 Industrials 0.00 3.09 0.00 1.00 -1.09 2.34 -0.47 0.64 
β8-6 Materials -2.17 3.82 -0.57 0.57 -1.59 2.93 -0.54 0.59 
β8-7 Technology -5.18 5.54 -0.93 0.35 -5.53 3.88 -1.43 0.16 
β8-8 Telecom. 8.30 7.56 1.10 0.27 4.47 5.50 0.81 0.42 
β8-9 Utilities 13.63 7.31 1.87 0.06 6.10 5.10 1.20 0.23 
Β9 - Index 
        FTSE 250 -2.49 2.10 -1.18 0.24 -3.89 1.66 -2.35 0.02 
FTSE Small Cap 1.42 2.77 0.51 0.61 0.45 2.21 0.20 0.84 
Residual SE 0.74 
   
0.59 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.36 (0.29)     0.31 (.026)     
n 192   327   
Note. n=sample size; h=bandwidth; SE=standard error; Increase=increase in percentage of 
women on boards; Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; 
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; 





Figure 44. RD Plot of WExecPC by Increase - FTSE All Share.   
Note. Discontinuity detected. LATE=-6.78 (p<.01). WExecPC=percentage of women executives. 
 
Hypothesis H4b.  Hypothesis H4b predicted that the Davies Review would result 
in a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of women in senior management in 
FTSE All Share organizations compliant with the 25% WOB targets.  Analyses were 
performed on the pooled sample using two different methods for handling missing data, 
listwise deletion and with data imputation. Following recommendations in the literature 
(Frolich & Huber, 2017), prior to testing the model with the identified covariates, the 
unconditional model was tested.  
Table 67 
 
RD Test Results for WSMPC (H4b) – Unconditional Model 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 7.42 149 0.74 3.72 0.84 2.20 0.18 0.04 0.02 
Quadratic 7.42 149 -2.08 5.53 0.71 1.71 0.30 0.05 0.02 
Cubic 7.42 149 -2.50 8.10 0.76 1.36 0.48 0.04 0.01 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women 
in senior management. 




























Table 67 reports the LATE estimates for the unconditional models tested at a 
calculated optimal bandwidth of 7.42.  The linear model estimated a non-statistically 
significant treatment effect of 0.74 (p=.84).  Adding a quadratic term for the predictor 
WOBPC to the linear model, the quadratic model estimated a non-statistically significant 
treatment effect of -2.08 (p=.71).  The cubic model added a cubic term of the variable 
WOBPC to the quadratic model, which returned a non-statistically significant treatment 
effect of -2.50 (p=.76).  Standard errors and p-values of the F-statistic got larger with the 
added higher-order polynomials; therefore, despite the lack of statistical significance, the 
linear model was kept for further testing.   
The lack of statistical significance of the unconditional model indicated there was 
not much variance between the Compliant and Non-compliant group that could be 
explained by the treatment (compliance to the 25% WOB), which suggested that no 
further testing was needed.  However, in order to understand how the identified 
covariates may influence the outcome, the linear model was tested at different 
bandwidths.  Equation 27 was used to predict the percentage of women in senior 
management for the Compliant and Non-compliant groups based on the 25% threshold 
set by the Davies Review.  
 !GH&' = 	*+ + 	*-	!./&' + *01 +	*234%5$67$ + *8'59:9%6; + *<!"=
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In a similar way than the previous hypothesis tests, six models were initially 
tested.  Highly correlated predictors CEOGnd and ChairGnd were removed, as they were 
already included as interactions with variables CEOTenure and ChairTenure.  First the 
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optimal bandwidth calculation indicated that the optimal bandwidth for the listwise 
deletion model for the WSMPC variable was 8.98 (148 observations).  The bandwidth 
was widened to 12 (170 observations) and narrowed to 4.5 (88 observations) to estimate 
the effect.  A similar process was employed for the analyses using data imputation for 
missing values.  The optimal bandwidth resulting from the imputed dataset was 6.42 (162 
observations), which was narrowed to 3.21 (96 observations) and widened to 9 (231 
observations).  Table 68 reports the effect estimates for the six models. The p-values of 
the six models ranged from .24 to .89, indicating that the regression lines for the 
Compliant and Non-compliant groups were not statistically significantly different from 
each other.  Figure 45 provides a graphical representation of the regression, which 
provides evidence of the absence of a discontinuous jump at the threshold.  Therefore, 
hypothesis H4b was not supported. Coefficients for the optimal bandwidth models M1 
and M4 are reported on Table 69. 
 
Figure 45. RD Plot for WSMPC - FTSE All Share.  
Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.29). WSMPC=percentage 
of women in senior management. 































RD Test Results for WSMPC (H4b) – Full Model Different Bandwidths  
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 - Optimal  8.98 148.00 1.49 3.19 0.64 6.22 0.00 0.51 0.43 
M2 - Narrow 4.50 88.00 5.33 12.26 0.66 2.75 0.00 0.47 0.30 
M3 - Wide 12.00 170.00 1.43 2.54 0.57 7.21 0.00 0.51 0.44 
M4 - Optimal  6.42 162.00 3.82 3.25 0.24 6.91 0.00 0.51 0.44 
M5 - Narrow  3.21 96.00 2.47 17.27 0.89 4.00 0.00 0.53 0.40 
M6 - Wide 9.00 231.00 2.61 2.31 0.26 10.20 0.00 0.51 0.46 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Models M1, M2, and M3 used listwise 
deletion; models M4, M5, and M6 used imputed data.  Dependent variable=percentage of women 






Parameter Estimates for WSMPC (H4b) – Full Model 
		 Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
Variable M1 (h=8.98) M4 (h=6.42) 
β0 - Intercept 3.40 4.80 0.71 0.48 2.44 5.01 0.49 0.63 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant -0.53 0.79 -0.68 0.50 -1.31 1.12 -1.17 0.25 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant 0.73 0.42 1.75 0.08 1.04 0.46 2.25 0.03 
β2 -Treatment 1.49 3.06 0.49 0.63 3.82 3.77 1.02 0.31 
β3 - Increase 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.08 0.01 1.00 
β4 - Critical 0.81 1.89 0.43 0.67 0.44 1.88 0.23 0.82 
β5 - WED -0.89 1.84 -0.48 0.63 0.78 1.45 0.53 0.59 
β6 - CEOTenure -0.05 0.61 -0.09 0.93 0.51 0.62 0.82 0.41 
β7 - ChairTenure -0.52 0.86 -0.60 0.55 -0.19 0.48 -0.39 0.70 
β8 - WExecPC 0.17 0.06 2.68 0.01 0.16 0.06 2.60 0.01 
β9 - WEmpPC 0.36 0.06 5.72 <0.01 0.37 0.05 7.07 
<0.0
1 
β10 - Sector 
        β10-1 Consumer Services -0.89 3.03 -0.29 0.77 -2.22 2.49 -0.90 0.37 
β10-2 Energy -0.35 4.47 -0.08 0.94 -1.71 3.91 -0.44 0.66 
β10-3 Financials -1.75 2.74 -0.64 0.52 -4.51 2.37 -1.90 0.06 
β10-4 Health Care 8.30 4.43 1.87 0.06 5.17 4.01 1.29 0.20 
β10-5 Industrials -2.58 2.55 -1.01 0.31 -2.98 2.25 -1.33 0.19 
β10-6 Materials 0.70 3.24 0.22 0.83 1.12 3.05 0.37 0.71 
β10-7 Technology 1.73 4.30 0.40 0.69 -1.45 3.64 -0.40 0.69 
β10-8 Telecommunications 7.24 5.91 1.23 0.22 -0.70 4.88 -0.14 0.89 
β10-9 Utilities -0.81 4.82 -0.17 0.87 -3.72 5.03 -0.74 0.46 
β11 - Index 
        FTSE 250 0.21 1.64 0.13 0.90 -0.45 1.57 -0.29 0.78 
FTSE Small Cap 1.28 2.55 0.50 0.62 0.26 2.17 0.12 0.91 
Residual SE 0.61 
   
0.56 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.51 (0.43) 
  
0.51 (0.44) 
  n 148       162       
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Model M1 estimated using listwise 
deletion;  Model M4 estimated with data imputation for missing values. WOBPC=percentage of 
women on boards; Increase=increase in percentage of women on boards; Critical=3 or more 
women on boards; Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; 
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure. Dependent 
variable=percentage of women in senior management. 
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Alternative hypothesis H4b.  Despite not finding any indication of an effect of 
critical mass of WOB, the statistical significance of the increase of WOB indicated that it 
may provide an alternative explanation for the hypothesized relationships; therefore, 
using the variable increase as the forcing variable.  Table 70 presents the results of the 
unconditional model in the linear, quadratic, and cubic regression functional forms.  The 
smaller standard error and larger F-statistic indicated that the linear model was the best fit 
for the data, therefore, the linear model described in Equation 28 was used tested at 
different bandwidths. 
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RD Test Results for WSMPC (Alternative H4b) – Unconditional Model  
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 6.85 188 -1.77 3.33 0.60 1.04 0.76 0.02 0.00 
Quadratic 6.85 188 -1.94 3.43 0.57 0.83 0.99 0.02 0.00 
Cubic 6.85 188 -2.33 4.65 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.02 0.01 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Running variable=Increase; dependent 
variable=percentage of women in senior management.  
 
 
The full model was tested at three different bandwidths.  Estimates for the optimal 
bandwidth of 6.85, a narrow bandwidth of 3.43, and a wide bandwidth of 13.71 are 
reported on Table 71  None of the models were statistically significant .05 alpha level.  
Consistent with the hypothesis test that indicated that the percentage of WOB did not 
have an effect on the percentage of women in senior management, this test indicated that 
the increase of WOB did not have an effect on the percentage of women in senior 
management.  Coefficients for the optimal bandwidth model are presented on Table 72.  
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A graphical representation of the regression showing the non-statistically significant 
discontinuity is presented in Figure 46.  
Table 71 
RD Test Results for WSMPC (Alternative H4b) – Full Model Different Bandwidths 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Optimal 6.85 188 0.28 2.50 0.91 7.82 0.00 0.47 0.41 
Narrow 3.43 133 1.24 4.01 0.76 5.19 0.00 0.47 0.38 
Wide 13.71 326 -0.13 3.69 0.97 14.50 0.00 0.47 0.44 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Forcing variable=Increase; dependent 
variable=percentage of women in senior management. 
 
 
Figure 46. RD Plot for WSMPC by Increase – FTSE All Share  
Note. Non-statistically significant discontinuity at cutoff for alternative hypothesis H4b; 
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management. 
 
  




























Parameter Estimates for WSMPC (Alternative H4b) – Full Model  
Variable Estimate SE t-value p-value 
β0 - Intercept 6.60 5.11 1.29 0.20 
β1 - IncreaseSmall -0.41 0.72 -0.56 0.57 
β1 - IncreaseLarge -0.17 0.56 -0.30 0.77 
β2 -Treatment 0.28 2.17 0.13 0.90 
β3 - Board -0.08 0.38 -0.21 0.84 
β4 - WExecPC 0.28 0.06 5.07 0.00 
β5 - WEmpPC 0.31 0.05 5.95 0.00 
β6 - CEOTenure -0.94 0.89 -1.05 0.29 
β7 - ChairTenure -0.17 0.35 -0.49 0.63 
β8 - Sector 
    β8-1 Consumer Services 1.82 2.54 0.72 0.48 
β8-2 Energy 0.73 3.36 0.22 0.83 
β8-3 Financials 0.27 2.61 0.10 0.92 
β8-4 Health Care 2.33 4.09 0.57 0.57 
β8-5 Industrials -2.96 2.38 -1.24 0.22 
β8-6 Materials 1.82 2.95 0.62 0.54 
β8-7 Technology 0.12 4.33 0.03 0.98 
β8-8 Telecommunications -6.93 5.83 -1.19 0.24 
β8-9 Utilities -1.93 5.74 -0.34 0.74 
β9 - Index 
    β9-1 FTSE 250 2.46 1.62 1.52 0.13 
β9-1 FTSE Small Cap 1.22 2.13 0.57 0.57 
Residual SE 0.57 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.47 (0.41)       
n 188    
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; 
Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WExecPC=percentage 
of women executives; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; CEOTenure=female CEO 





Hypothesis H4c. Hypothesis H4c predicted that the Davies Review would not 
have a statistically significant effect on the percentage of women employed in FTSE All 
Share organizations compliant with the 25% WOB targets.  To test this hypothesis, a non-
parametric RD analysis was performed on the pooled dataset.  Prior to testing the full 
model including covariates, the unconditional model was tested.   
Table 73 reports the estimates of the RD tests for the unconditional model, at a 
calculated optimal bandwidth of 8.59.  The linear model returned a non-statistically 
significant effect estimate of -1.29 (p=.80). Adding a quadratic term of the forcing 
variable WOBPC to the linear model, the quadratic model estimated a treatment effect of 
-8.61 (p=.15).  The quadratic model considerably reduced the standard error, p-value of 
the treatment effect, and p-value of the F-statistic (p=.16).  Therefore, a cubic term to the 
quadratic model was added to test if model fit would continue to improve.  The cubic 
model estimated a non-statistically significant treatment effect of -11.49 (p=.23).   The 
quadratic model was the best fit for the data based on the lower p-value associated with 
the F-statistic and smaller standard error for the estimates.  Therefore, the quadratic term 




RD Test Results for WEmpPC (H4c) – Unconditional Model 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 8.59 231 -1.29 5.19 0.80 1.74 0.32 0.02 0.01 
Quadratic 8.59 231 -8.61 6.01 0.15 2.10 0.16 0.04 0.02 
Cubic 8.59 231 -11.49 9.48 0.23 1.70 0.27 0.04 0.01 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Forcing variable=Increase; dependent 
variable=percentage of women employed. 
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Although the p-values associated with the unconditional models tested indicated 
that the treatment was not statistically significant, scholars indicate that the inclusion of 
covariates in RD specifications could increase precision of estimates (Calonico, Cattaneo, 
Farrell, & Titiunik, 2016).  Therefore, the full model including all covariates was tested. 
Using the guidelines for assessing the strength of correlations (Evans, 1996),  
correlations performed for the study’s phase II variables (Table 25 and Table 26) 
indicated that the outcome variable, WEmpPC, had a strong correlation with the variable 
WSMPC (r=.63), and weak correlations with the variables sector (r=-.38), and WExecPC 
(r=.37). Although, the potential issue of multicollinearity arose when considering the 
inclusion of highly correlated variables in the analyses, a finding that they are statistically 
significant covariates in the regression may provide competing explanations to the 
treatment effect.  Therefore, those variables were included in the full model.  
Table 74 reports results of non-parametric RD analyses at the calculated optimal 
bandwidth, as well as narrow and wide bandwidths, which were tested using listwise 
deletion and data imputation methods for observations with missing values. Equation 29 
includes all the covariates used in the prediction of the WEmpPC variable. 
 
 !"IJ&' = 	*+ + 	*-	!./&' + *01 + *234%5$67$ + *8'59:9%6; +
∗ *<'".1$4C5$ + *>'ℎ6951$4C5$ + *B!"#$%&' + *D!GH&'
+ *FG$%:K5-LF + *-+34@$#-L0 + M 
 
(29) 
The Imbens-Kalyanaraman calculation indicated that the optimal bandwidth for 
the model was 6.02, which included 110 effective observations. When model M1 was run, 
coefficients indicated a deficient fit for the quadratic model.  The treatment estimate was 
-4.90, with a large standard error of 8.58.   The p-value for the intercept coefficient 
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(p=.97) and the p-value of the quadratic term coefficient (p=.97) indicated that the 
quadratic term did not fit the narrower bandwidth.  It was likely that the curve that caused 
the quadratic model to provide a better fit for the unconditional model was outside the 
limit of the 6.02 bandwidth.  Therefore, regression lines were plotted to confirm that 
assumption.  Figure 47 confirmed that at a wider bandwidth, the quadratic model 
provided a better fit; however, the narrower bandwidth favored the linear model.  
Therefore, multiple models were run to find the best fitting model for the data.   
 
Figure 47. RD Plot for Unconditional Model of WEmpPC - FTSE All Share. 
 Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.15); h=8.59; forcing 
variable=WOBPC2016; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed. 
 
Model M2 removed the quadratic term from model M1, and returned a non-
statistically significant treatment effect of -4.60 (p=.43).  Although the smaller standard 
error and p-values indicated that model M2 fit the data better than model M1, an 
inspection of the coefficients for the variables included in the model indicated that there 
were several variables that were not statistically significant.  Model M3 was the first 
model that included imputed values for missing data generated from the data imputation 






















process.  The inclusion of the full set of observations in the bandwidth resulted in a 
smaller standard error and p-value for the estimate-7.33, Z=1.57, p=.12.  The larger 
statistically significant F-statistic suggested a better fit for model M3, F(22,139)=11.49, 
p<.001. Model M4 widened the bandwidth model M3 to 8.59, which was the optimal 
bandwidth for the data.  The estimated treatment effect of model M4 was not statistically 
significant, -4.84, Z=1.42, p=.16; however, the F-statistic indicated that the model was a 
better a fit for the data, F(20,210)=17.93, p<.001.  Model M5 narrowed the bandwidth of 




RD Test Results for WEmpPC (H4c) – Full Model Different Bandwidths  
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 -Quadratic 6.02 110 -4.33 8.48 0.61 9.36 0.00 0.70 0.62 
M2 -Linear 6.02 110 -3.86 5.88 0.51 9.94 0.00 0.69 0.62 
M3 –Linear – Imp. 6.02 162 -7.01 4.61 0.13 12.65 0.00 0.64 0.59 
M4 -Wide  8.59 231 -4.84 3.41 0.16 17.93 0.00 0.63 0.60 
M5 -Narrow  5.00 126 7.73 14.18 0.59 9.52 0.00 0.64 0.58 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent 
variable=percentage of women employed. Models M1 and M2 used listwise deletion; models M3, 
M4, and M5 used imputed data. 
 
 
The p-values for the five models ranged from .13 to .61 indicating that none of the 
models were statistically significant; thus providing support for hypothesis H4c. Table 75 
provides coefficients for all the variables included in models M3 and M4.  Although the 
models were not statistically significant, sectors consumer services (p<.001), financials 
(p<.001), and materials (p=.01) were statistically significant; which suggests that that the 
variance in women’s representation in organizations is better explained by sector than 
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percentage of WOB.  Those findings are consistent with total female employee 
population for those particular sectors nation-wide (Office for National Statistics, 2018).  
Figure 48 shows visual representation of the regression, which confirmed that there were 
no discontinuities at the threshold.  
Table 75 
Parameter Estimates for WEmpPC (H4c) – Full Model 
		 Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
Variable M3 (h=6.02) M4 (h=8.59) 
β0 - Intercept 26.52 6.76 3.93 0.00 24.84 4.47 5.56 0.00 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant 2.83 1.67 1.70 0.09 2.10 0.81 2.61 0.01 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant -1.00 0.64 -1.56 0.12 -0.69 0.46 -1.49 0.14 
β2 -Treatment -7.01 5.42 -1.29 0.20 -4.84 3.30 -1.47 0.14 
β3 - Increase -0.02 0.11 -0.21 0.83 -0.05 0.09 -0.58 0.56 
β4 - Critical -2.00 2.55 -0.79 0.43 -1.99 2.06 -0.96 0.34 
β 5 - CEOTenure -0.39 0.84 -0.47 0.64 -0.40 0.67 -0.60 0.55 
β 6 - ChairTenure 0.08 0.67 0.11 0.91 -0.08 0.53 -0.15 0.88 
β 7 - WExecPC 0.05 0.09 0.62 0.54 0.06 0.07 0.80 0.42 
β 8 - WSMPC 0.72 0.10 7.12 0.00 0.70 0.08 8.42 0.00 
β 9 - Sector 
        β9-1 Consumer Services 14.02 3.23 4.34 0.00 13.39 2.68 5.00 0.00 
β9-2 Energy 1.58 5.52 0.29 0.78 2.53 4.14 0.61 0.54 
β9-3 Financials 12.82 3.13 4.10 0.00 12.97 2.62 4.95 0.00 
β9-4 Health Care 6.01 5.55 1.08 0.28 6.47 4.66 1.39 0.17 
β9-5 Industrials -0.84 3.10 -0.27 0.79 -0.67 2.60 -0.26 0.80 
β9-6 Materials -11.64 4.09 -2.84 0.01 -11.53 3.48 -3.31 0.00 
β9-7 Technology -0.72 5.05 -0.14 0.89 -1.77 4.06 -0.44 0.66 
β9-8 Telecommunications -1.07 6.67 -0.16 0.87 -0.22 5.55 -0.04 0.97 
β9-9 Utilities -1.60 6.89 -0.23 0.82 -2.50 5.66 -0.44 0.66 
β10 - Index 
        β10-1 FTSE 250 -1.37 2.19 -0.63 0.53 -1.24 1.76 -0.71 0.48 
β10-2 FTSE Small Cap -0.31 2.96 -0.11 0.92 -0.21 2.38 -0.09 0.93 
Residual SE 0.62 
   
0.64 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.64 (0.59) 
  
0.63 (0.60) 
  n 162       231       
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; 
Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; Increase=increase of 
WOB; Critical=3 or more women directors; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; 
ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage of women executives; 




Figure 48. RD Plot for WEmpPC – FTSE All Share 
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.16); 
h=8.59. Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed. 
 
Alternative hypothesis H4c.  Despite not finding any indication of an effect of 
critical mass of WOB, the statistical significance of the increase of WOB indicated that it 
may provide an alternative explanation for the hypothesized relationships; therefore, 
using the variable increase as the forcing variable. Table 76 presents the results of the 
unconditional model in the linear, quadratic, and cubic regression functional forms.  The 
smaller standard error and larger F-statistic indicated that the linear model was the best fit 
for the data, therefore, the linear model described in Equation 30 was used tested at 
different bandwidths. 
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RD Test Results for WEmpPC (Alternative H4c) – Unconditional Model 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 6.81 188 2.52 4.25 0.55 0.67 0.86 0.01 0.00 
Quadratic 6.81 188 2.23 4.22 0.60 0.59 0.65 0.01 0.00 
Cubic 6.81 188 1.72 5.40 0.75 0.47 0.41 0.01 0.00 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. 
 
The full model was tested at three different bandwidths.  Estimates for the optimal 
bandwidth of 6.81, a narrow bandwidth of 3.41, and a wide bandwidth of 13.62 are 
reported on Table 77.  None of the models were statistically significant .05 alpha level.  
Consistent with the hypothesis test that indicated that the percentage of WOB did not 
have an effect on the percentage of women in senior management, this test indicated that 
the increase of WOB did not have an effect on the percentage of women in senior 
management.  Coefficients for the optimal bandwidth model are presented on Table 78.  
A graphical representation of the regression showing the non-statistically significant 
discontinuity is presented in Figure 49.  
Table 77 
RD Test Results for WEmpPC (Alternative H4c) – Full Model Different Bandwidths 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 -Optimal 6.81 188 4.72 3.01 0.12 10.39 0.00 0.54 0.49 
M2 -Narrow 3.41 133 3.20 4.32 0.46 6.39 0.00 0.52 0.44 
M3 -Wide 13.62 324 2.30 2.17 0.29 20.75 0.00 0.56 0.54 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent 





Parameter Estimates for WEmpPC (Alternative H4c) – Full Model  
Variable Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
β0 - Intercept 14.91 6.78 2.20 0.03 
β1 - IncreaseSmall -0.89 0.97 -0.92 0.36 
β1 - IncreaseLarge -0.24 0.75 -0.32 0.75 
β2 -Treatment 4.72 2.89 1.63 0.10 
β3 - Board 0.49 0.51 0.96 0.34 
β4 - WExecPC 0.05 1.20 0.04 0.97 
β5 - WSMPC -0.26 0.47 -0.55 0.58 
β6 - CEOTenure -0.04 0.08 -0.56 0.57 
β7 - ChairTenure 0.56 0.09 5.95 0.00 
β8 - Sector 
    β8-1 Consumer Services 8.42 3.35 2.51 0.01 
β8-2 Energy -11.08 4.43 -2.50 0.01 
β8-3 Financials 8.41 3.43 2.45 0.02 
β8-4 Health Care 4.05 5.47 0.74 0.46 
β8-5 Industrials -0.21 3.21 -0.07 0.95 
β8-6 Materials -13.12 3.83 -3.43 0.00 
β8-7 Technology -8.71 5.77 -1.51 0.13 
β8-8 Telecommunications 4.02 7.83 0.51 0.61 
β8-9 Utilities 1.66 7.69 0.22 0.83 
β9 - Index 
    β9-1 FTSE 250 -1.72 2.18 -0.79 0.43 
β9-2 FTSE Small Cap -0.51 2.86 -0.18 0.86 
Residual SE 0.76 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.54 (0.49)       
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Increase=increase in percentage of WOB; 
Board=board size; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; 
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior 




Figure 49. RD Plot for WEmpPC by Increase – FTSE All Share 
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=12). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.12). 
Forcing variable=Increase; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed. 
 
Effects of Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap 
Hypothesis H5a.  Hypothesis H5a predicted that the Davies Review would not 
significantly decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations 
compliant with the 25% WOB targets.   To test this hypothesis, a non-parametric RD 
analysis was performed.  First, the unconditional model was estimated.  Table 79 reports 
the results of the unconditional model to identify the correct functional form of the 
regression.  Linear, quadratic and cubic forms were tested.  At a calculated optimal 
bandwidth of 8.49 (n=204), the linear model appeared to be the best fit for the data.  As 
shown on Figure 50, a visual inspection of the regression provided evidence of no 
discontinuities at the cutoff.  Despite no evidence of an effect at the cutoff on the 
unconditional model, the three functional forms of the regression were compared.   























Although the cubic model seemed to be the best fit for the data, literature advices 
against using anything higher than a quadratic model in practice (Gelman & Imbens, 
2018).  Therefore, taking into account that when testing the full model, the bandwidth 
may change, which may eliminate the need for a cubic model, the second best option was 
selected, the linear model. Equation 31 was used to predict the gender pay gap mean for 
organizations compliant with the 25% of WOB set by the Davies Review. 
 &6\?6JH$64 = 	*+ + 	*-	!./&' + *01 + *234%5$67$ + *8'59:9%6;
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Figure 50. RD Plot for Unconditional Model of PayGapMean – FTSE All Share 
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE=2.57 (p=.62). 
Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent variable=gender pay gap mean. 
Table 79 
 
RD Tests for PayGapMean (H5a) – Unconditional Model  
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 8.49 204 2.57 5.25 0.62 0.36 0.44 0.01 0.00 
Quadratic 8.49 204 1.41 6.64 0.83 0.29 0.23 0.01 0.00 
Cubic 8.49 204 5.78 9.75 0.55 0.29 0.17 0.01 0.00 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent 
variable=gender pay gap mean. 

















Imputed values for the predicted outcome were not used.  The missing data 
pattern analyses indicated that data for the PayGapMean and PayGapMedian variables 
were missing not at random (MNAR); therefore, results of data imputation process are 
not testable against the observed data.  For that reason, and to ensure that the estimates 
from the non-parametric RD analyses were are as unquestionable as possible, only 
observed values for the gender pay gap variables were used.  Imputed values for the 
WExecPC and WSMPC were used, as they satisfied the assumptions for MAR imputation.  
The regression model described in Equation 31 was used on a non-parametric RD 
test for the pooled sample.  Three models were tested.  First, the optimal bandwidth, M1, 
and two additional models narrowing and widening the bandwidth. Table 80 reports 
results for the three models.  The non-parametric RD test indicated that at a calculated 
optimal bandwidth of 8.49 (n=204), results for model M1 detected a non-statistically 
significant effect, 4.76, Z=1.10, p=.26. Figure 51 shows that the tests did not result in a 
discontinuous jump at the cutoff.  
 
Figure 51. RD Plot for PayGapMean – FTSE All Share 
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.24); 
h=8.49. Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; PayGapMean=gender pay gap mean 

















The bandwidth was narrowed to 5.9 for model M2.  Tests for model M2 did not 
produce statistical significant treatment effect, 6.08, Z=1.06, p=.29.  Model M3 widened 
the bandwidth to 13.  Model M3 produced a non-statistically significant treatment effect 
of 4.74, Z=1.56, p=.12. It is noteworthy to mention that despite the lack of statistical 
significance, the effect sizes found in models M1, M2, and M3 ranged from 4.91 to 6.08 
percentage points, which represent large effects.  Due to the large standard errors 
associated with the estimates in the models, a large effect on increasing the gender pay 
gap resulting from compliance to the Davies Review cannot be ruled out. Therefore, 
hypothesis H5a was supported.   However, in an effort to understand how the different 
covariates in the model impacted the outcome, a closer examination of the coefficients 
was performed.   
Table 80 
RD Test Results for PayGapMean (H5a) – Full Model Different Bandwidths  
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 – Optimal  8.49 204 4.91 4.47 0.28 5.58 0.00 0.39 0.32 
M2 – Narrow 5.90 143 6.08 5.73 0.29 4.12 0.00 0.42 0.32 
M3 – Wide 13.00 262 4.74 3.03 0.12 6.54 0.00 0.36 0.31 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent 
variable=gender pay gap mean. 
 
 
Table 81 reports coefficients for all the predictors in the model M1 and alternative 
model M1a.  Model M1a, modified model M1 by removing covariates that were highly 
correlated with the forcing variable WOBPC.  The variables Critical (r=.55) and Increase 
(r=.62) were strongly correlated with the predictor WOBPC.  Those strong correlations 
made logical sense because the dummy variable Critical indicates the presence of three 
or more female directors, and the variable Increase represents the increase in the 
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percentage of WOB.  Those variables were removed from the model and estimates were 
re-computed.  Although removing the correlated predictors improved model fit, the 
model was not statistically significant. Consequently, hypothesis H5a was supported.   
Table 81 
Parameter Estimates for PayGapMean (H5a) – Full Model 
		 Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
Variable M1 (h=8.49) M1a (h=8.49) 
β0 - Intercept 7.60 6.44 1.18 0.24 7.86 5.80 1.35 0.18 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant -0.82 1.12 -0.73 0.46 -0.79 1.09 -0.72 0.47 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant 0.19 0.62 0.31 0.75 0.21 0.56 0.39 0.70 
β2 -Treatment 4.91 4.49 1.09 0.28 4.76 4.41 1.08 0.28 
β3 - Increase -0.01 0.12 -0.12 0.91     
β4 - Critical 0.47 2.59 0.18 0.86     
β5 - CEOTenure 1.74 0.81 2.14 0.03 1.73 0.79 2.19 0.03 
β6 - ChairTenure -0.14 0.71 -0.20 0.85 -0.16 0.70 -0.23 0.82 
β7 - WExecPC -0.15 0.09 -1.71 0.09 -0.15 0.09 -1.72 0.09 
β8 - WSMPC -0.36 0.13 -2.90 0.00 -0.36 0.12 -2.91 0.00 
β9 - WEmpPC 0.36 0.09 4.01 0.00 0.35 0.09 4.03 0.00 
β10 - Sector         
β10-1 Consumer Services 4.03 3.59 1.12 0.26 4.04 3.56 1.14 0.26 
β10-2 Energy 16.98 5.56 3.05 0.00 16.87 5.50 3.07 0.00 
β10-3 Financials 18.70 3.66 5.11 0.00 18.78 3.61 5.20 0.00 
β10-4 Health Care -2.26 5.72 -0.40 0.69 -2.08 5.58 -0.37 0.71 
β10-5 Industrials 6.21 3.31 1.88 0.06 6.06 3.22 1.88 0.06 
β10-6 Materials 12.47 4.74 2.63 0.01 12.34 4.67 2.64 0.01 
β10-7 Technology 13.19 5.34 2.47 0.01 13.10 5.17 2.54 0.01 
β10-8 Telecommunications 3.46 6.81 0.51 0.61 3.68 6.70 0.55 0.58 
β10-9 Utilities -0.81 6.95 -0.12 0.91 -0.90 6.88 -0.13 0.90 
β11 - Index         
β11-1 FTSE 250 -1.54 2.20 -0.70 0.49 -1.79 1.89 -0.94 0.35 
β11-2 FTSE Small Cap -5.58 3.26 -1.71 0.09 -5.77 3.01 -1.92 0.06 
Residual SE 0.82    0.81    
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.39 (0.32)   0.39 (0.33)   
n 204 		 		 		 204 		 		 		
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB; 
Increase=increase in percentage of WOB; Critical=3 or more women directors; 
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage 
of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; 
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay gap mean. 
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Hypothesis H5b. Hypothesis H5b predicted that the Davies Review would not 
significantly decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations 
compliant with the 25% WOB targets.   To test this hypothesis, a non-parametric RD 
analysis was performed.  First, the unconditional model was estimated.   
Table 82 reports the results of the unconditional model to identify the correct 
functional form of the regression.  Linear, quadratic and cubic forms were tested.  The 
quadratic term in the quadratic model was not statistically significant (p=.87).  Similarly, 
the p-values of the quadratic (p=.75) and cubic terms (p=.76) in the cubic model were not 
statistically significant. At a calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.33, the linear model 
appeared to be the best fit for the data. Therefore, the linear model was kept for further 
analyses. Equation 32 was used to predict PayGapMedian for the sample. 
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RD Test Results for PayGapMedian (H5b) – Unconditional Model 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 9.33 204 1.52 4.83 0.75 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Quadratic 9.33 204 2.03 5.69 0.72 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Cubic 9.33 204 4.21 10.09 0.68 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent 
variable=gender pay gap median. 
 
 
Three full models were tested using the pooled FTSE All Share sample.  The 
optimal bandwidth model, M1, and two additional models narrowing and widening the 
bandwidth.  Table 83 reports results for the three models.  The non-parametric RD test 
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indicated that at a calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.33, results did not yield a 
statistically significant effect, 4.32, Z=1.11, p=.27. Figure 52 plots the results of model 
M1.  The smooth line at the cutoff indicates that a treatment effect was not detected.    
 
Figure 52. RD Plot for PayGapMedian – FTSE All Share 
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.27); 
h=9.33 Forcing Variable=WOBPC2016; dependent variable=gender pay gap median. 
 
The bandwidth was narrowed to 6 for model M2.  Tests for model M2 did not 
produce a statistical significant treatment effect, 3.76, Z=.65, p=.52.  Model M3 widened 
the bandwidth to 13.  Model M3 produced a non-statistically significant treatment effect 
of 4.75, Z=1.50, p=.13. Therefore, hypothesis H5b was supported. It should be noted that 
despite the lack of statistical significance, the effect sizes found in models M1, M2, and 
M3 ranged from 3.76 to 4.75 percentage points, which represent large effects.  Due to the 
large standard errors associated with the estimates, an effect on the gender pay gap 
median resulting from compliance to the Davies Review cannot be ruled out. Coefficients 
for the full model were reported in Table 84.  The p-values of sectors energy, financials, 
materials, technology and telecommunications ranged from <.001 to .04, indicating that 
the gender pay gap can be better explained by sector than by critical mass of WOB. 




















RD Test Results for PayGapMedian (H5b) – Full Model Different Bandwidths  
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 9.33 204 4.32 3.90 0.27 5.48 0.00 0.36 0.30 
M2 6.00 143 3.76 5.79 0.52 4.27 0.00 0.40 0.30 
M3 13.00 262 4.75 3.16 0.13 6.34 0.00 0.33 0.28 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; 
dependent variable=gender pay gap median. 
 
Table 84 
Parameter Estimates for PayGapMedian (H5b) – Full Model 
Variable Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
β0 - Intercept 4.71 5.51 0.86 0.39 
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant -0.94 0.87 -1.08 0.28 
β1 - WOBPCCompliant 0.17 0.48 0.35 0.72 
β2 -Treatment 4.32 4.00 1.08 0.28 
β3 - CEOTenure 1.18 0.82 1.45 0.15 
β4 - ChairTenure 0.32 0.70 0.46 0.65 
β5 - WExecPC -0.03 0.09 -0.31 0.76 
β6 - WSMPC -0.26 0.13 -2.07 0.04 
β7 - WEmpPC 0.23 0.09 2.57 0.01 
β8 - Sector 
    β8-1 Consumer Services 2.46 3.63 0.68 0.50 
β8-2 Energy 24.20 5.62 4.30 0.00 
β8-3 Financials 18.88 3.71 5.09 0.00 
β8-4 Health Care 0.27 5.73 0.05 0.96 
β8-5 Industrials 5.73 3.31 1.73 0.09 
β8-6 Materials 13.67 4.82 2.84 0.01 
β8-7 Technology 15.12 5.25 2.88 0.00 
β8-8 Telecommunications 13.52 6.77 2.00 0.05 
β8-9 Utilities 0.85 6.80 0.13 0.90 
β9 - Index 
    β9-1 FTSE 250 -3.05 1.95 -1.56 0.12 
β9-2 FTSE Small Cap -5.57 3.04 -1.83 0.07 
Residual SE 0.84 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.36 (0.30) 
  n 204       
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB; 
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage 
of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; 
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay gap median. 
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Hypothesis H5c.  Hypothesis H5c predicted that an increase of more than 12% in 
the percentage of WOB in the duration of the Davies Review would result in a 
statistically and practically significant increase in the gender pay gap median in FTSE All 
Share organizations.  To test this hypothesis, the increase in the percentage of WOB in 
the 2011 to 2016 period was used as the forcing variable.  Using 12% increase as the 
cutoff point, organizations that were above the cutoff were placed into the Large increase 
(treatment) group, and organizations that were below the cutoff were placed into the 
Small increase (comparison) group. 
First, the unconditional model was run starting with the linear model and adding 
higher degree polynomials to identify the best functional form for the RD analyses.  
Results of the unconditional models are reported on Table 85.  The p-values for the three 
models were statistically significant.  The linear model estimated a large treatment effect, 
9.27, Z=2.27, p=.02).  The quadratic model estimated a large statistically significant, 9.34, 
Z=2.29, p=.02; however, the p-value for the quadratic term was not statistically 
significant (p=.84).   The cubic model returned a statistically significant effect, 11.22, 
Z=2.15, p=.03; however, estimates for the quadratic (p=.54) and cubic (p=.56) 
coefficients were not statistically significant.  The p-value of the F statistic in the linear 






RD Test Results for PayGapMedian (H5c) – Unconditional Model 
 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Linear 6.62 155 9.27 4.08 0.02 1.76 0.31 0.03 0.01 
Quadratic 6.62 155 9.34 4.08 0.02 1.32 0.53 0.03 0.01 
Cubic 6.62 155 11.22 5.22 0.03 1.12 0.70 0.04 0.00 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent 
variable=gender pay gap median.  
 
 
A similar linear regression model than the one used for hypothesis H5b was used 
to test hypothesis H5c.  The tests were performed on the pooled sample using the linear 
regression equation for the full model presented in Equation 33.  Four models were tested.  
The first model, M1, used the calculated optimal bandwidth of 6.62.  The second model, 
M2, added cluster-robust standard error estimation. The third model, M3, narrowed the 
bandwidth of model M2 to 4.2.  The fourth model, M4, doubled the bandwidth of model 
M3 to 8.4.  
Literature indicates that when a regressor is correlated with a group, which in this 
case is Index, the model systematically could over predict or underpredict the outcome in 
that given group (Cameron & Miller, 2015).  Therefore, taking into account that results of 
the first set of hypotheses indicated that the increase of WOB was predicted by FTSE 
index, a cluster-robust error estimation was included in the equation.   
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Table 86 reports the non-parametric RD treatment estimates for the four models.  
Model M1 was the full model using a heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error type 
estimation, which is recommended for small sample sizes (Long & Ervin, 2000). Model 
M1 estimated a statistically and practically significant treatment effect of 7.88, Z=1.95, 
p=.05. Model M2’s cluster-robust estimation produced a similar estimate to model M1; 
however, the p-value decreased from .05 to .01 and standard error decreased from 4.04 to 
2.92; however, the effect size remained unchanged, 7.88, Z=2.70, p=.01. Using 123 
observations within a 4.2 bandwidth, model M3 estimated a statistically and practically 
significant effect of a large increase of WOB on increasing the gender pay gap median, 
9.27, Z=2.29, p=.02. Doubling the bandwidth of model M3, model M4 estimated a 
statistically and practically significant effect, 5.10 Z=1.97, p=.05.  Although all models 
were statistically significant, model M2, the optimal bandwidth model, had the lowest p-
value and had a small standard error for the estimate.  Model M2 was the best fitting 
model, therefore, its results are interpreted.  Table 87 reports coefficients for all the 
variables of the model. The model can be expressed as follows:  
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Figure 53. RD Plot for PayGapMedian by Increase – FTSE All Share 
Note. Discontinuity detected at cutoff (c= 12). Statistically and practically significant LATE=7.88 
(p=.01); h=6.62. Forcing variable=Increase; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median 
 
Table 86 
RD Estimates for PayGapMedian (H5c) – Full Model at Different Bandwidths 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-stat p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
M1 6.62 155 7.88 4.04 0.05 3.64 0.00 0.34 0.25 
M2 6.62 155 7.88 2.92 0.01 3.64 0.00 0.34 0.25 
M3 4.20 123 9.27 4.06 0.02 3.01 0.00 0.36 0.24 
M4 8.40 182 5.10 2.59 0.05 4.04 0.00 0.32 0.24 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent 
variable=gender pay gap median. 
 
  




















Parameter Estimates for PayGapMedian (H5c) – Full Model  
  
Variable Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
M2  (h=6.62) 
β0 - Intercept 12.65 6.92 1.83 0.07 
β1 - IncreaseSmall -2.08 1.30 -1.60 0.11 
β1 - IncreaseLarge -0.89 1.03 -0.87 0.39 
β2 -Treatment 7.88 3.76 2.10 0.04 
β3 - WOBPC -0.14 0.19 -0.71 0.48 
β4 - WExecPC 0.10 0.11 0.95 0.35 
β5 - WSMPC -0.53 0.14 -3.83 0.00 
β6 - WEmpPC 0.28 0.10 2.75 0.01 
β7 - CEOTenure 4.33 2.14 2.02 0.05 
β8 - ChairTenure 0.78 0.79 0.98 0.33 
β9 - Critical 2.59 3.42 0.76 0.45 
β10 - Sector 
    β10-1 Consumer Services 0.21 4.21 0.05 0.96 
β10-2 Energy 19.99 5.92 3.38 0.00 
β10-3 Financials 11.83 4.44 2.66 0.01 
β10-4 Health Care 5.16 7.07 0.73 0.47 
β10-5 Industrials -0.11 3.97 -0.03 0.98 
β10-6 Materials 5.84 5.64 1.04 0.30 
β10-7 Technology 4.52 7.40 0.61 0.54 
β10-8 Telecommunications 8.61 9.52 0.91 0.37 
β10-9 Utilities 2.03 9.18 0.22 0.83 
Residual SE 1.01 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.34 (0.25)       
n 155    
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB; 
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage 
of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; 
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay gap median. 
 
Results of the model indicate that organizations that increased their percentage of 
WOB by more than 12% had an average gender pay gap 7.88 percentage points higher 
than organizations that increased their percentage of WOB by less than 12%. In addition 
to a statistically significant treatment effect, coefficients for the WSMPC, and WEmpPC, 
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CEOTenure, and sector were statistically significant.  The p-values for the coefficients 
for the variables WOBPC (p=.48) and WExecPC (p=.35) indicated that those variables 
did not have a statistically significant effect on the gender pay gap.  The variable WSMPC 
had a negative effect of -.53 (p<.001) percentage points on the gender pay gap, indicating 
that for each percentage point in the representation of women in senior management the 
gender pay gap decreases by half of a percent.  Conversely, the variable WEmpPC had a 
positive effect of .27 (p=.01) on the gender pay gap, indicating that for each percent point 
of female employees in the organization, the pay gap increases by .27 points of a percent.  
Similarly, the variable CEOTenure had a positive effect of 4.33 (p=.05) on the gender 
pay gap, indicating that compared to organizations with male CEOs, in organizations 
with a female CEO, the gender pay gap increases by 4.33 percentage points every year 
she is in that position.  The p-values for the coefficients of the variables ChairTenure 
(p=.33) and Critical (p=.45) were not statistically significant.  
The industry sectors Energy and Financials had a statistically significant positive 
effect on the gender pay gap.  Organizations in the Energy sector had a median pay gap 
19.99 (p<.001) percentage points higher than other industries.  Similarly, the Financials 
sector had a median pay gap 11.83 (p=.01) percentage points higher than other industries.  
The p-values for the estimates of other industry sectors ranged from .30 to .98, indicating 
that were not statistically significantly different than the reference group.  Figure 53 plots 
the discontinuous regression line at the cutoff, which provides a graphical representation 
of the large effect that a large increase of the percentage of WOB had on the gender pay 
gap median.  Consequently, hypothesis H5c was supported. 
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Robustness Test 
To strengthen the causal claim of the results, the threshold of the forcing variable 
was changed to 8 and 16.  Participants were assigned to treatment and comparison groups 
based on those thresholds to test if discontinuities were identified at those cutoff points.  
To that end, the same regression used on the model used for testing hypothesis H5c was 
performed. Results for the test indicated that at a bandwidth of 8.49, which included 207 
observations, the estimated treatment effect of the Cutoff 8 model, 4.39, Z=1.14, p=.38, 
was not statistically significant.  Similarly, results for the test at the 16% cutoff point 
indicated that at a calculated optimal bandwidth of 5.72, including 131 observations, the 
estimated treatment effect was not statistically significant, -1.75, Z=-3.25, p=.76).  Table 
88 reports the results of the robustness tests, which provided additional evidence for the 
causality claim of the test results.  Coefficients are reported on Table 89. 
Table 88 
Robustness Tests – RD Test Results for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H5c) 
Model h n Estimate SE p-value F-statistic p-value R2 R2 Adj. 
Cutoff 8 8.49 207 4.39 4.99 0.38 4.34 0.00 0.31 0.24 
Cutoff 16 5.72 131 -1.75 5.70 0.76 2.97 0.00 0.34 0.22 
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent 







Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H5c) 
 
  Coeff. SE t-value p-value Coeff. SE t-value p-value 
Variable h=8 h=16 
β0 - Intercept 12.81 6.27 2.04 0.04 17.03 7.03 2.42 0.02 
β1 - IncreaseSmall 0.43 0.74 0.58 0.56 0.14 1.21 0.12 0.91 
β1 - IncreaseLarge -0.67 0.62 -1.08 0.28 -0.71 1.60 -0.45 0.66 
β2 -Treatment 4.39 3.71 1.18 0.24 -1.75 4.51 -0.39 0.70 
β3 - WOBPC -0.11 0.18 -0.62 0.54 -0.25 0.22 -1.17 0.24 
β4 - WExecPC 2.71 0.99 2.74 0.01 3.05 5.97 0.51 0.61 
β5 - WSMPC 4.66 2.84 1.64 0.10 -0.51 3.52 -0.14 0.89 
β6 - WEmpPC 0.25 0.91 0.28 0.78 0.40 0.86 0.47 0.64 
β7 - CEOTenure -0.07 0.09 -0.75 0.45 0.06 0.13 0.50 0.62 
β8 - ChairTenure -0.50 0.12 -4.03 0.00 -0.36 0.17 -2.11 0.04 
β9 - Critical 0.30 0.10 3.07 0.00 0.31 0.11 2.80 0.01 
β10 - Sector 
        β10-1 Consumer Services 2.74 3.53 0.78 0.44 -0.54 4.50 -0.12 0.90 
β10-2 Energy 23.58 5.07 4.65 0.00 20.29 7.15 2.84 0.01 
β10-3 Financials 14.74 3.80 3.88 0.00 13.41 4.62 2.91 0.00 
β10-4 Health Care 5.90 5.42 1.09 0.28 2.03 12.81 0.16 0.87 
β10-5 Industrials 6.89 3.37 2.04 0.04 0.48 4.07 0.12 0.91 
β10-6 Materials 11.59 4.91 2.36 0.02 4.58 6.42 0.71 0.48 
β10-7 Technology 13.03 6.47 2.02 0.05 11.72 6.00 1.95 0.05 
β10-8Telecommunications 11.22 6.73 1.67 0.10 18.89 11.48 1.65 0.10 
β10-9Utilities -2.73 6.97 -0.39 0.70 8.89 8.66 1.03 0.31 
Residual SE 0.90 
   
1.08 
   R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.31 (0.24)     0.34 (0.22)       
n 207    131    
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB; 
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; Critical=3 or more 
female directors; WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in 






A total of 16 hypotheses, contained within five sets, were tested. Overall 14 of the 
16 hypotheses were supported, and two hypotheses were not supported.  The quasi-
experimental RD analyses provided evidence of a causal effect of the Davies Review on 
board composition, opportunities for women, and the gender pay gap. The hypotheses 
and testing results are summarized in Table 90.  
Hypotheses H1a – H2c hypothesized that the Davies Review would change the 
composition of FTSE 350 boards. Hypotheses H1a and H1b predicted a causal effect of 
the Davies Review on increasing the percentage of WOB of non-balanced FTSE 350 
boards.  The results of the non-parametric RD tests provided evidence a statistically 
significant treatment effect of 13.72 (p=.04) on non-balanced boards compared to gender-
balanced boards, F(17,92)=2.384, p=.004. Robustness tests performed on the pseudo-
outcome Board Size and at different cutoffs provided additional evidence of the causal 
claim of the results.  Hypothesis H1c hypothesized that the Davies Review would not 
have a statistically significant effect on increasing the percentage of WOB of FTSE Small 
Groups.  Results of the non-parametric RD tests provided support for the hypothesis by 
returning p-values that ranged from .53 to .88, indicating that, at different bandwidths, the 
treatment effect on FTSE Small Cap boards was not statistically significant. 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b predicted that in the duration of the Davies Review, 
there would be statistically significant increase of female non-executive directors 
compared to the increase of non-executive directors for FTSE 350 boards. Conversely, 
H2c predicted that the increase would not be statistically significant for FTSE Small Cap 
boards.  Results of a mixed-effects time series regression analysis provided support for 
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hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c.  In the duration of the Davies Review, Time had a 
statistically significant effect of -3 (p=.01) percentage points per year on the percentage 
of female executive directors as a proportion of the total population of female directors.  
However, the statistically significant quadratic effect of Time of .23 (p=.01) indicated that 
there was acceleration and deceleration in the linear rate of change.  The change in sign 
indicated that the initial decrease on the percentage of female executive directors slowed 
down every year at a rate of .46 percentage points, which suggested that the curve would 
reach a turning point.  The interaction effect of Time and FTSE 250 indicated that the 
FTSE 250 boards were decreasing their percentage of female executive directors at a rate 
that was not statistically significantly different than FTSE 100 boards.  Therefore, 
hypotheses H2a and H2b were supported.  
Although the interaction effect of Time and FTSE Small Cap was not statistically 
significant at the .05 alpha level, the p-value for the coefficient was approaching 
statistical significance -1.28 (p=.08).  However, counter to the study’s prediction, the 
coefficient indicated that FTSE Small Cap boards were decreasing their percentage of 
female executive directors at a faster rate than organizations in the FTSE 350 group.  
Therefore, hypothesis H2c was not supported.      
Hypotheses H3a-H3d predicted a statistically significant disproportionate increase 
in the share of female executive directors compared to the increase in the share of CEOs, 
and a disproportionate increase in the share of female non-executive directors compared 
to female chairpersons in FTSE 350 boards.  Conversely the prediction for FTSE Small 
Cap boards was that the tests would not find statistically significant differences.  Results 
of the t-tests and growth models provided support for hypotheses H3c and H3d.   
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Hypotheses H4a-H4c predicted the effect of Compliance to the Davies Review on 
opportunities for other women at the executive board, senior management, and company-
wide levels.  Results of the non-parametric RD tests on the pooled sample provided 
support for the hypothesis H4a. Organizations that had more than 25% of WOB had a 
statistically significant lower proportion of women on their executive boards, 10.62 
(p=.02) percentage points lower than organizations that had less than 25% of WOB. 
Hypothesis H4b predicted that compliance with the Davies Review would decrease the 
percentage of women in senior management. The p-values for RD tests at different 
bandwidths, using listwise and data imputation methods for missing data, ranged 
from .22 to .85, indicating that the treatment was not statistically significant. Therefore, 
hypothesis H4b was not supported.  Hypothesis H4c predicted a non-statistically 
significant effect of compliance with the Davies Review on the increase of the population 
of women employed in the organization.  Results of the RD tests provided support for the 
hypothesis.  The p-values of the multiple models tested ranged from .16 to .57, 
demonstrating that the Davies Review did not have a statistically significant effect on 
increasing employment opportunities for women in FTSE All Share organizations. 
The final set of hypotheses, H5a, H5b, and H5c tested the effects of the Davies 
Review on the gender pay gap.  Hypothesis H5a and H5b predicted that compliance with 
the 25% of WOB set by the Davies Review would not have an effect on the gender pay 
gap mean and median.  The hypotheses were tested using a non-parametric RD approach 
on the pooled sample. Results of the RD tests at different bandwidths provided support 
for both hypotheses.  At different bandwidths, the p-values for the treatment effect ranged 
from .11 to .24, indicating that the treatment was not statistically significant. Hypothesis 
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H5c examined the effect of a large increase on the percentage of WOB resulting from the 
Davies Review on the gender pay gap median.  Results of the RD tests indicated that 
organizations that had a large increase in their percentage of WOB (>12%) had a 
statistically significantly higher pay gap median.  The treatment effect was 7.88 (p=.001) 
percentage points.  Therefore, hypothesis H5c was supported.  Robustness tests tested the 
relationship of the variables in the H5c model using different cutoffs; however, they were 
not statistically significant, which provided evidence of the causal claim of the findings.  
Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter 4 presented the results for the study.  The chapter was organized in five 
distinct sections.  The first section provided a description of the collected data, 
participants of the study, group comparisons, and correlations. The second section 
presented a description of the treatment of missing data, identification of the missing data 
mechanism and data imputation process.  The third section reported the results of the 
tests of statistical assumptions and internal validity. The fourth section reported the 
hypotheses test results and robustness tests for the validity of causal claims.  The fifth 
section provided a hypotheses summary and chapter summary. The upcoming Chapter 5 
of the document provides a discussion of findings, a set of recommendations for future 




Results of Predicted Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Description Population Test Supported? 
Effects of Davies Review on board composition 
   H1a Increase WOBPC (2011-2016) FTSE 100 Non-parametric RD Yes 
H1b Increase WOBPC (2011-2016) FTSE 250 Non-parametric RD Yes 
H1c No effect on WOBPC (2011-2016) FTSE Small Cap Non-parametric RD Yes 
H2a Increase of WNED vs NED (2011-2016) FTSE 100 
Panel - longitudinal 
regression Yes 
H2b Increase of WNED vs NED (2011-2016) FTSE 250 
Panel – longitudinal 
regression Yes 
H2c No effect on WNED vs NED (2011-2016) FTSE Small Cap 
Panel - longitudinal 
regression No 
H3a Increase of WED vs Female CEOs (2011-2016) FTSE 350 T-test, panel No 
H3b Increase of WNED vs Female Chairs (2011-2016) FTSE 350 T-test, panel No 
H3c Increase of WED vs Female CEOs (2011-2016) FTSE Small Cap T-test, panel Yes 
H3d Increase of WNED vs Female Chairs (2011-2016) FTSE Small Cap T-test, panel Yes 
Effects of Compliance to Davies Review on Opportunities for Women 
  H4a Decrease WExecPC FTSE All Share Non-parametric RD Yes 
H4b Decrease WSMPC FTSE All Share Non-parametric RD No 
H4c No effect on WEmpPC FTSE All Share Non-parametric RD Yes 
Effects of Compliance to Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap 
   H5a No effect on PayGapMean FTSE All Share Non-parametric RD Yes 
H5b No effect on PayGapMedian FTSE All Share Non-parametric RD Yes 
H5c Increase of PayGapMedian FTSE All Share Non-parametric RD Yes 
Note. WOBPC=percentage of WOB; WNED=women non-executive directors; WED=women executive directors; WExecPC=percentage of women 
executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; PaygapMean=gender pay gap 
mean; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median.
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Chapter 5 - Discussion 
Introduction 
This chapter contains five sections.  The first section presents a discussion of the 
results from Chapter 4 and the relationships to relevant literature.  The second section 
discusses implications for research, theory, policy, and practice.  The third section 
describes the limitations of the study. The fourth section provides recommendations for 
future research.  The chapter concludes with a summary.  
Discussion of the Results 
This section provides a discussion of the results of the study’s research 
hypotheses.  In line with the study’s hypotheses, this section is divided into three parts (a) 
effects of Davies Review on board composition (H1a – H3d), (b) effects of the Davies 
Review on opportunities for women (H4a, H4b, H4c), and (c) effects of the Davies 
Review on the gender pay gap (H5a, H5b, H5c).  Each section compares the study’s 
findings to the existing literature, and discusses their similarities and differences.  
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition   
The first set of hypotheses predicted a causal effect of the Davies Review 
initiative on increasing the percentage of female directors on the boards of FTSE 350 
organizations that were below the compliance threshold.  Given the extensive worldwide 
debate related to the implementation of quotas for increasing female representation on 
corporate boards (Reding, 2012), scholars have examined the effectiveness of the 
multiple approaches for achieving gender parity on boards. Prior literature has shown that 
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government initiatives are effective ways for increasing female representation on 
corporate boards (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Fortin et al., 2017).  However, most of the 
literature (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bozhinov et al., 2017; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Tinsley 
et al., 2017) had mainly focused on the effects of hard law approaches (i.e. quotas).  The 
current study contributes by extending literature focused on soft law initiatives by 
providing evidence of the effects of the comply or explain approach in the United 
Kingdom, that is, the Davies Review.  However, the special circumstances around the 
Davies Review that made the achievement of its targets feasible were that as an EU 
member state, the United Kingdom was faced with the imposition of gender quotas if the 
comply or explain approach was not successful.  Consequently, the threat of much larger 
imposed quotas may have acted as a deterrent to non-compliance in produced effects 
more similar to gender quotas.   
In line with those previous findings of the effects of government initiatives as a 
way to increase female representation on corporate boards, this study’s findings 
confirmed that the Davies Review initiative caused an increase in the proportion of 
women on FTSE 350 boards. Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) provided evidence that, 
compared to organizational, industry, or country-level factors, government-led initiatives 
generate the most significant change with regard to increasing the proportion of WOB.  
Similarly, Fortin and colleagues (2017) found that, compared with countries that did not 
implement any type of initiative for increasing WOB, legislative quotas and comply or 
explain approaches resulted in increases of 5.48 and 2.31 percentage points, respectively.  
However, prior to the introduction of the Davies Review, female membership in 
FTSE boards was increasing.  Studies that examined gender composition of FTSE 100 
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boards prior to the Davies Review initiative indicated that although slow, there was an 
upward trend in the appointment of female directors (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; 
Grosvold et al., 2007). When the Davies Review was rolled out (Davies, 2011, p. 3), Lord 
Davies indicated that women made up only 12.5% of the members of FTSE 100 boards, 
which was an increase from 9.4% in 2004. Therefore, despite the slow pace, the 
increasing rate of female membership in FTSE boards suggests that the total increase 
cannot be attributed to the Davies Review.  
This study found that in the 2011 to 2016 period, the Davies Review accelerated 
the rate of increase of female participation on corporate boards for FTSE 350 firms by 
5.55 percentage points compared with FTSE Small Cap firms in the same period.  
Findings of the study’s longitudinal regression using data from 2008 to 2016 for the 
pooled sample revealed that prior to the Davies Review there was a statistically and 
practically significant upwards trend across organizations in the FTSE All Share sample.  
To isolate the effect of the Davies Review, the longitudinal analysis examined annual 
variation pre and post announcement of the initiative.  The increase of WOB from 2008 
to 2011 was 3.3 percentage points (p<.001).  From that point forward, the differences in 
the increase of the percentage of WOB in FTSE 350 boards compared to FTSE Small 
Cap boards were statistically and practically significant.  In the 2011 to 2016 period, 
FTSE 350 boards increased their percentage of WOB by 11.02 percentage points 
(p<.001) and FTSE Small Cap boards increased their percentage of WOB by 5.47 
percentage points (p<.001).  These differences are practically significant due to the large 
differences in the rate of increase after the Davies Review, which caused FTSE 350 
boards to double the rate of increase compared to FTSE Small Cap boards.  
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Results of this study’s hypotheses tests also revealed that there was a 
discontinuity in the increase of WOB at the threshold set by the Davies Review, which 
indicated that organizations that were above the Davies Review threshold did not have 
the same rate of increase as organizations that were below the threshold.  Results of the 
quasi-experimental RD approach provided evidence of a statistically significant treatment 
effect of 13.69 (p=.04) on FTSE 350 boards that were below the threshold set by the 
Davies Review.  The multiple robustness tests performed using pseudo-outcomes and 
pseudo-cutoffs provided additional evidence of the causal claim of the results.  More 
conservative estimates of the unconditional model, indicated that the Davies Review had 
a negative effect of 9.98 (p=.07) percentage points on the increase of WOB of 
organizations that were over the threshold.   
These findings indicate that the Davies Review had an effect on increasing the 
percentage of WOB on its targeted organizations only to the compliance levels 
established by the initiative.  Furthermore, the compliance effect of the initiative was 
confirmed by testing the model on the FTSE Small Cap group.  Findings provided 
evidence of a smooth regression line without discontinuities, which indicated that the 
treatment effect on FTSE Small Cap boards was not significant statistically or 
practically, .14 (p=.99). Those findings suggested that the Davies Review had a treatment 
effect on the intended population as a compliance initiative.  Findings also indicate that 
the initiative negatively impacted board opportunities for women in organizations that 
were above the threshold established by the Davies Review, which is discussed in the 
section of effects of the Davies review on opportunities for other women.   
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The second and third sets of hypotheses predicted disproportionate appointments 
of female directors to non-executive positions compared to executive positions, and fewer 
appointments of women to CEO and chairperson positions.  Results of the panel study 
revealed changes on the type of board membership for the increased population of female 
directors, which confirmed that gender composition was not the only change FTSE 
boards experienced in the Davies Review duration.  Ferreira (2015) stated that studies 
related to the effects of board legislation and policies for WOB were not mentioning 
changes in board independence.  Therefore, this study tested the effects of the Davies 
Review on board independence.  Previous studies have found that board independence 
increases when female board membership increases through government initiatives 
(Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Bohren & Staubo, 2013).  In line with those findings, this 
study found that board independence in FTSE firms increased in the Davies Review 
period.   
The conditional growth model used to estimate the annual variance in the type of 
director positions occupied by women provided evidence of a statistically significant 
increase in the proportion of women non-executive (independent) directors compared to 
executive directors.  The model indicated that the proportion of women executive 
directors of the total population of WOB in FTSE All Share boards decreased at an 
annual rate of 1.50% (p=.05).  Additionally, the statistically significant quadratic effect of 
Time of .23 (p=.01) indicated that the decrease on the percentage of female executive 
directors slowed down every year at a rate of .46%.   
Although the results provide support for the study’s hypotheses, it is unclear if 
these changes were caused by the Davies Review because FTSE Small Cap boards 
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experienced an additional annual decrease of 1.84% (p=.05) in their population of women 
executive directors.  These findings indicate that the majority of appointments of female 
directors to FTSE All Share boards is to non-executive positions. This finding is in line 
with previous studies that found that female directors are appointed to less influential 
positions (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bozhinov et al., 2017; Bohren & Staubo, 2013).  
Previous studies have found that women are less likely to sit on executive committees 
(Peterson & Philpot, 2007); however, they did not find evidence of a systematic bias.   
Consistent with studies that found that organizations are less likely to appoint 
women to executive committees, it is the interpretation of this study, through a resource 
dependence lens, that boards appointed women to non-executive positions because that 
was enough for compliance.  While this study found evidence of a disproportionate 
appointment of women to non-executive positions, a causal relationship of the Davies 
Review and biased assignment to non-executive positions cannot be confirmed.  The 
confounding effect of the U.K. corporate governance reform of 2012, which stated that 
boards of public firms were required to have at least 50% of board independence makes 
the examination of a causal link between the Davies Review and board independence 
problematic.  However, in the duration of the Davies Review women’s appointment to 
non-executive roles considerably increased, FTSE boards reduced their percentage of 
female executive directors by 3 percentage points, the percentage of female non-
executive directors increased by 10 percentage points.  
Additionally, consistent with findings of studies that evaluated the effects of 
quotas for WOB that indicated that gender quotas did not have an effect on increasing the 
proportion of female CEOs (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), and female chairpersons (Seirstad 
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& Opshal, 2011).  The findings of this study provided evidence that despite doubling the 
number and proportion of women on FTSE boards, the proportion of female CEOs did 
not increase in the 2011 to 2016 period.  However, taking into account that CEOs are part 
of the executive committee, the growth in the population of CEOs was compared to the 
growth of the population of executive directors.  Findings indicated a very small positive 
effect of the increase of executive directors on the number of CEOs, 0.002 (p=.62); 
however, it was not statistically, nor practically significant.  Similarly, the population of 
female chairpersons was compared to the population of non-executive directors over the 
2011 to 2016 period.  Findings indicated that over time, there the growth rate of the 
proportion of female chairpersons was very small, 0.007 (p=.06). However, the effect of 
appointments of female non-executive directors over the duration of the Davies Review 
was near zero and not statistically significant, <.001 (p=.92).   
Although it has been suggested that WOB will open doors for other women, this 
study did not find evidence to support that claim.  While WOB do not always have 
influence in the selection of members of the executive board, or senior management, 
members of the board are responsible for selecting the organization’s CEO.  
Consequently, failure to increase the number of female CEOs on corporate boards 
indicates that despite considerable increase in the percentage of WOB, the distribution of 
power on boards remains unchanged. A competing explanation for that finding would be 
that the Davies Review resulted in a reduced supply of female executive directors who 
can take on CEO roles.  Counter to existing literature that indicated that the likelihood of 
appointing a female CEO increased as the percentage of WOB increased (Elsaid & Ursel, 
2015), this study found no evidence to support those findings.  Findings of this study 
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were more in line with findings from the Norway quota law (Ahern & Dittmar, 2011), in 
which despite the increase of WOB, appointment of women to CEO roles remained 
stagnant.   
Effects of the Davies Review on Opportunities for Other Women 
The fourth set of hypotheses tested the effects of WOB on opportunities for other 
women.  This study’s findings provided evidence of the effects of compliance to Davies 
Review WOB on opportunities for women in executive boards and senior management.  
Although this study does not explicitly or implicitly suggest that it is the responsibility of 
WOB to advocate on other women’s behalf, it suggests that the assumption deserves to 
be tested.  Multiple studies have found a positive association of women in leadership and 
increased opportunities for women in lower ranks (Kurtulus & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; 
Matsa & Miller, 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012; Stainback et al., 2016).  However, as Adams 
and Kirchmaier (2014) indicated that literature often ignores that female directors who 
are appointed to boards as the result of a government initiative may be different than 
those appointed to boards without an external intervention.  
Scholars (Bierema, 2017) have indicated that that while it is important to 
understand women’s standing in the world, it takes more than knowing the statistics to 
change it.  Changing requires further examination to understand the factors contributing 
to the gender gap.  To that end, this study’s examination of the effects of the Davies 
Review on opportunities aimed to increase the understanding of the effects of WOB 
beyond the numerical measure of female participation at the board level, which is one 
used by policy-makers to evaluate the success of WOB initiatives. 
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Previous research (Ahmed & Swan, 2006) had identified the potential risks to the 
achievement of equality when diversity and equality are transformed into a performance 
measure.  One of the risks is that inequality can be concealed behind that measure if it 
represents good performance.  Although the Davies Review promoted gender diversity on 
boards, women’s numerical representation on boards does not necessarily indicate 
equality.  However, in multiple instances gender equality seems to have been replaced by 
the indicator of female representation on boards (Davies, 2015, p. 27).  Furthermore, the 
interest that the WOB initiative has had in the British media may also be transforming 
WOB into a public relations issue rather than an inequality issue, as companies are 
praised for “leading the way” (Hampton-Alexander, 2016) or shamed for staying in the 
“dark ages” (Parliament, 2018) in terms of their board gender diversity metrics.  This 
superficial assessment of gender equality in organizations may threaten its achievement. 
The promotion of the business case for WOB has contributed to the numerous 
studies that examined the relationship of WOB and organizational and financial 
performance.  Conversely, despite being a gender equality effort, outcomes related to 
gender equality have very seldom been evaluated.  In fact, only a handful of studies have 
examined the effects of legislation and initiatives for the promotion of WOB on gender 
equality outcomes.  Scholars have suggested that there is a belief that women in top 
leadership positions will reduce gender inequality in lower levels (Ferreira, 2015; Skaggs 
et al., 2012).  This belief is founded on the assumption that inequality is perpetuated by 
men but not women; thus, the expectation that women in leadership will help their juniors 
(Derks et al., 2016).  Consequently, the promotion of WOB initiatives as gender equality 
efforts are rarely challenged.   
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One of the objectives of the study was to discover if 25% of WOB constituted 
critical mass, in a sense that it would allow women to influence a board and result in 
improved opportunities for other women in their organizations.  Studies that examined 
the effects of quota laws found that in France, the quota law amplified gender segregation 
(Reberioux & Roudaut, 2016) and did not increase management opportunities for women 
other than at the board level (Fortin et al., 2017).  In line with those findings, this study 
found no evidence of critical mass at the 25% of WOB set by the Davies Review on 
opportunities for women in executive leadership, senior management, or company-wide.   
Testing the assumption that WOB initiatives result in improved opportunities for 
other women, this study found the negative effect of compliance to the Davies Review on 
opportunities for other women at the executive (C-suite) board level.  Results of the non-
parametric RD tests on the pooled FTSE sample provided evidence of the negative effect 
of compliance to the 25% WOB target set by the Davies Review on opportunities for 
women at the executive level. The treatment effect was -11.56 (p=.03) percentage points.  
Considering that the mean percentage of women in executive boards for the pooled 
sample was 15.79%, the treatment effect was very large.  The treatment effect was 
significant on the unconditional model and the full model including a number of 
covariates.  Two of the covariates included in the full model were statistically significant, 
percentage of women in senior management and the industry sector Utilities.  However, 
they did not provide a competing explanation for the discontinuous jump at the threshold 
because the robustness tests were performed using the same model at different thresholds, 
and there were no discontinuities detected at the threshold.   
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Although the findings of the study were robust and provided strong evidence of a 
decrease in opportunities for women on executive boards resulting from compliance to 
the Davies Review, findings do not imply that WOB are blocking the advancement of 
other women to executive roles.  This finding could be interpreted as WOB are not in a 
position to impact the selection of candidates to executive boards.  Consistent with the 
decline of women in executive director roles, this finding could be related to changes in 
board independence, which suggest that the majority of WOB are independent board 
members and therefore not responsible for the operation.  This finding suggests the 
existence of a gap in the development of women that may be eligible for taking on roles 
of more responsibility, like CEO.  This is a very significant finding as it provides 
evidence of a very important issue that may contribute to the pervasiveness of a gender 
disparity on boards.  This finding also indicates that the focus of diversity efforts on 
corporate boards may be threatening the achievement of sustainable gender parity at the 
board level.  
A non-statistically significant finding would have provided evidence that 25% of 
female board membership did not constitute critical mass.  However, counter to the 
assumption that at some point in the representation spectrum, a minority percentage of 
WOB will improve opportunities for other women in the workplace, this study provided 
robust causal evidence of the negative effect of targeting corporate boards to promote 
opportunities for other women in the organization.   
Robustness tests provided strong evidence of the causal claim. One of the pseudo-
cutoffs used on the robustness checks was 30%, which according to existing literature 
constitutes critical mass.  However, at 30% of female membership on FTSE boards, the 
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effect on opportunities for women at the executive level was not statistically significant (-
.78, p=.84).  Counter to previous findings in the literature that suggested that critical mass 
for WOB was reached at 30% (Isidro & Sobral, 2014; Joecks et al., 2013) and that a 
higher proportion of WOB was associated with a higher proportion of female executives 
(Matsa & Miller, 2011). The present study found no evidence of critical mass at three 
WOB either (Kramer et al., 2007).  Although these findings do not indicate that female 
directors hindered opportunities for other women at the executive level, they indicate that 
achieving the target set by the comply or explain approach caused a lower proportion of 
women at the executive level. 
This study predicted the negative effect of compliance to the Davies Review on 
opportunities for women in senior management.  This hypothesis was developed based on 
the assumption that the focus on diversity efforts at the board level would negatively 
impact senior management. however, this hypothesis was not supported. Previous 
empirical evidence had examined the relationship of WOB and women in senior 
management at the country level.  Countries with higher presence of WOB were more 
likely to have women in senior management and equal ratios of male to female pay 
(Terjesen & Singh, 2008).  This study examined a direct relationship of those variables 
by examining the effect of higher female representation on corporate boards that resulted 
from the Davies Review on the percentage of women in senior management.  Contrary to 
existing literature that suggested that a higher presence of WOB increased managerial 
representation (Skaggs et al., 2012), this study found no evidence to support that at 25% 
representation, the increased proportion of WOB had a 3.82 percentage points effect on 
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the proportion of women in senior management; however, the effect was not statistically 
or practically significant, 3.82, Z=1.18, p=.24.   
To confirm the findings, robustness tests were performed at 30% and 33% of 
female board membership.  Findings did not find support for the effect of critical mass of 
WOB at 30% on the percentage of women in senior management. At 30% of female 
participation on corporate boards, a decrease of 1.29 percentage points on the population 
of women in senior management was found, 1.29, Z=-.42, p=67.  At 33%, the new target 
set by the Hampton-Alexander Review (2016), a decrease of 4.58 percentage points on 
the population of women in senior management was found; however, they were neither 
statistically, nor practically significant, -4.58, Z=-.82, p=.41. 
In support of the study’s predictions related to the effects of compliance to the 
25% of WOB set by the Davies Review, findings provided no evidence of an effect on the 
percentage of women in the organization, indicating that there were no differences 
between organizations that were compliant to the targets and organizations that were not.  
The study’s prediction that the 25% of WOB not would have a statistically significant 
effect on the percentage of women employed in the organizations of the pooled sample, 
served as a falsification test for other hypotheses related to opportunities for women in 
the organization. Compliance to the Davies Review was not expected to increase the total 
percentage of women employed in the organization as there is no theoretical or empirical 
link that associates WOB and female employment. Women and men have had similar 
participation in the workforce (Office for National Statistics, 2018); therefore, an effect 
from the increase of WOB was not hypothesized. 
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Effects of Davies Review on the Gender Pay Gap 
The promotion of the business case for WOB creates an expectation of higher 
profitability from gender-diverse boards.  Coupling that expectation with the board’s duty 
of generating value for shareholders results in the performance of WOB to be assessed 
primarily in function of their contribution to the bottom line.  In order to distribute as 
much as possible to shareholders, the board, collectively, makes decisions that keep costs 
down and increase profits.  However, pay equality involves raising wages, and raising 
wages raises costs, it does not reduce them (Acker, 2006).  In fact, previous research in 
the United Kingdom (Bell & Machin, 2016; Draca, Machin, & Van Reenen, 2008) found 
that firm profitability and firm value, were significantly reduced by the increase of wages. 
Therefore, WOB are caught in this paradox, challenged with achieving two conflicting 
tasks, increase profits and promote pay equity.  Consequently, the expectation that WOB 
will improve pay equity for other women is perhaps less than reasonable and fair.  
The fifth set of hypotheses predicted that compliance to the 25% of WOB set by 
the Davies Review would not decrease the gender pay gap mean and median.  Multiple 
studies have examined the link between women leaders and the pay gap for other women 
(Cohen & Huffman, 2007; Flabbi et al., 2014; Srivastava & Sherman, 2015).  However, 
research that evaluates the effects of the gender pay gap that results from WOB initiatives 
is very scarce.  Among the studies that have examined the effects of WOB initiatives on 
pay differentials by gender (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2014; Roberioux 
& Roudaut, 2015), findings have been consistent in that they have not been able to 
support the assumption that WOB initiatives reduce the gender pay gap.  In line with 
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those findings, this study provided additional evidence of the limitations of WOB policies 
on reducing the gender pay gap.  
Additionally, the way in which the Davies Review treated compliance to the 
WOB targets may have created an illusion of gender neutrality or good diversity 
performance.  The Davies Review ranked organizations in function to their percentage of 
WOB and publicly praised the exemplars as “leading the way” in gender equality efforts.  
The superficial level of treatment in the celebration of diversity efforts of some 
organizations, without much regard to what lies beneath the surface (Prasad & Mills, 
1997), indicated that compliance to the Davies Review became the measure of good 
diversity performance.  Therefore, by uncovering the effects of the compliance to the 
Davies Review targets as a measure of diversity performance on the gender pay gap, this 
study provides evidence of how the same measure can become the mechanism for 
concealment and reproduction of inequality (Deem & Morley, 2006). 
At 25% female representation on FTSE boards, a non-statistically significant 
effect of 4.76 percentage points on the gender pay gap mean was found, 4.76, Z=1.14, 
p=.26.  Similarly, at 25% female representation on FTSE boards, a non-statistically 
significant effect of 4.32 percentage points on the gender pay gap median was found, 
4.32, Z=1.11, p=.27.  However, despite the lack of statistical significance, the standard 
errors for the pay gap mean and median models were large enough that a significant 
adverse effect on the female population could not be ruled out.  
The study tested examined differences between organizations that had increased 
their percentage of WOB more aggressively and those who did not have large increases.  
Tests were performed using the pay gap median rather than the pay gap mean to ensure 
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that findings are not impacted by high earners in the upper layers, which are still male 
dominated.  Consistent with findings of the effects of gender quotas for corporate French 
boards on the gender pay gap (Reberioux & Roudaut, 2016), the findings of this study 
provided evidence of significantly different pay gaps for both group, Z=2.70, p=.01.  
Organizations that increased their percentage of WOB more aggressively (i.e. an increase 
greater than 12%) had a statistically significant gender pay gap of 7.88 percentage points 
higher than organizations that had smaller increases in their female board representation 
during the Davies Review.  Considering that at the threshold the pay gap was 12.65, and 
for organizations to the right of the regression line the average effect was 20.53, the 
effect was very large.  The study’s robustness tests provided evidence of the causal claim 
of the treatment.  
These findings do not imply that the women who were appointed to corporate 
boards are the ones causing the pay gap for other women.  Findings indicated that a large 
increase of WOB had an effect on the gender pay gap, which may suggest that the results 
were likely caused by the focus on increasing gender diversity at the board level.  As 
literature has previously indicated, the adding and stirring strategy is not likely to 
produce results due to the fact that organizational structures remain unchanged (Bierema, 
2017).  Previous research had found that when diversity is replaced by a measure of 
performance, inequalities can remain hidden.  Findings also indicate that organizations 
that were farther from the target prior to the Davies Review; may not have prioritized 
gender equality in their organizational strategy.  Consequently, as the Davies Review set 
targets exclusively for WOB, everything else remained intact; thus, their gender pay gap 
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continues to show their low commitment to diversity. These findings provide evidence of 
the limitations of top-down approaches to gender diversity.   
Notably, for every year of tenure of a CEO the pay gap increased by 4.33 
percentage points, t=2.02, p=.05.  However, these findings should be taken with caution 
because the sample of female CEOs was very small (n=14).  Nonetheless it was 
statistically and practically significant, which may have several interpretations as 
described below.   
Focus on financial performance. Literature suggests that women who rise to 
positions of power are the object of continuous scrutiny (Fitzsimmons, Callan, & Paulsen, 
2013). Consequently, it would make logical sense that their focus is profitability, which is 
how their performance is measured.  Furthermore, at those levels women tend to be more 
agentic than men (Luckerath-Rovers et al., 2013) which coupled with the scrutiny placed 
on their performance may cause them to prioritize other organizational outcomes rather 
than the advocacy of equality.  This could also explain the increase in the gender pay gap 
every year a woman is in a CEO position.  Pay equality for men and women would 
involve raising women’s wages, which would increase costs.  Therefore, promoting pay 
equality would be counter to their primary goal of maintaining or increasing profitability.  
Denial of inequality. The study’s historical review provided evidence that at the 
highest decision-making levels, women have not always helped other women.  In fact, in 
the highest political position in the United Kingdom, Ms. Thatcher denied the existence 
of discrimination against women (Campbell & Heath, 2017) and did not advocate on 
women’s behalf.  Denial of the existence of discrimination and the barriers that women 
face in the workplace hinder women’s advancement in society (Stephens & Levine, 
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2011).  Research has demonstrated that gender consciousness level is critical; however, 
not all women acknowledge the existence of discrimination (Crosby, 2017).  Denial of 
the barriers that women face is dependent on women’s own experiences (Radke, Hornsey, 
& Barlow, 2016).  The experiences that WOB may be very distinct from the experiences 
of the majority of women in the workforce (Stroebe, Ellemers, Barreto, & Mummendey, 
2009).  
Stronger identification with a different social group. Interaction with people 
from different social groups has been associated with reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006); however, it also reduces group identification of members of the historically 
disadvantaged group, as well as their perceptions of injustice and hinder their collective 
action (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).  Scholars 
(Ferreira, 2015) have suggested that to a great degree, directors are not representative of 
the population. Furthermore, occupational roles are more salient and override gender 
roles (Eagly & Wood, 2011), which results in men and women leaders’ behavior to be 
more similar than different (Keshet, Kark, Pomerantz-Zorin, Koslowsky, & Schwarzwald, 
2006).  Consequently, it is plausible that WOB interaction with other members, their 
similarities in position and behavior, may increase their identification with other 
members of the board than with other women in the organization. This in turn, would 
reduce their perception of discrimination against women, causing them to not advocate 
on their behalf.  
Legitimacy of inequality. Scholars (Ahmed & Swan, 2006) have indicated that 
the legitimacy of inequality differs in function of the situation of the observer.  In that 
regard, despite their gender, WOB have other advantages that most women in the 
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workforce do not have.  This is particularly true in positions of high power, in which 
individuals need to believe that their accomplishments are based on their merit.  
Therefore, their rationalization that their advantage is fair and deserved causes them to 
see inequality as legitimate (McCoy & Major, 2005).  When WOB believe that the 
organization’s merit system is fair; they may rationalize that women’s lower standing in 
the workforce is deserved, as they could have accomplished success in the same way they 
did.   
Existing literature has provided evidence of successful women’s tendency to have 
more gender-biased perceptions of other women’s commitment to their careers (Ellemers 
et al., 2004; Faniko et al., 2016), and their tendency to differentiate themselves from 
other women (Stroebe et al., 2017).  Therefore, their differentiation from other women 
caused by their belief that women’s lower position in the workforce is legitimate, can 
help them justify inaction in addressing gender inequality despite being able to act on it.  
In fact, research found that in developed societies, the gender pay gap exists because both 
men and women find lower earnings for women to be fair (Auspurg, Hinz, & Sauer, 
2017). 
Intersectionality versus gender. Another issue in targeting WOB to address 
gender inequality and the gender pay gap is that despite the communal traits associated 
with egalitarianism, other more significant predictors have been identified in the literature 
and may be better predictors of pay differentials by gender.  This study provided 
evidence that the gender of directors did not have an effect on the gender pay gap.  
Empirical research had demonstrated that compared to men, women tend to have 
attitudes that favor values-driven and egalitarian practices such as environmentalism 
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(Dietz, Kalof, Stern, 2002) conservative moral issues (Clawson & Oxley, 2012), and 
benevolence (Schwartz & Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009).  However, when it comes to women’s 
issues, including views of men and women having an equal role in business, government, 
and industry, women and men’s opinions were found to be quite similar (Clawson & 
Oxley, 2012, p. 205).   
Research on intersectionality has found that the intersections of multiple identities 
of an individual (e.g. gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion, etc.) can explain 
oppression and opportunity, disadvantage and privilege (Shields, 2008).  For example, 
although the female directors of British FTSE boards are disadvantaged on the basis of 
gender; however, they are privileged in their class and race (white majority) social groups. 
With regard to advocacy, literature (Campbell, Childs, & Lovenduski, 2010; Kittlison, 
2006; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; Norris, 1986) has found that political party appeared 
to be more important than gender.  However, data for political affiliation of board 
members was not available.  Also, racial and ethnic minorities have been shown to have 
more egalitarian attitudes (Clawson & Oxley, 2012).  However, the racial homogeneity of 
the sample was not conducive to an analysis of the intersection of gender and race. 
Implications 
The implications of this study’s findings are categorized into the following 
sections: implications to research, implications to theory, implications to policy, and 
implication to practice. 
Implications to Research 
This had four implications to research.  First, this study fills a considerable 
shortcoming in the literature by examining the effects of the British comply or explain 
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approach for WOB gender equality indicators.  It is known in business that the 
examination of the effectiveness of an initiative is done in function of its objectives, 
therefore, the theoretical framework that links an intervention or program to the outcome 
should not be ignored (Michie & Prestwich, 2010).  However, the promotion of the WOB 
initiatives simultaneously using arguments that are antithetical with each other had made 
their evaluation challenging. Despite the fact that WOB initiatives have been promoted as 
part of the equalities agendas across countries (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; HM 
Government, 2010), and advocates of these initiatives promote them as gender equality 
efforts (California Senate, 2017).  There had been a disconnect between the rationale to 
promote them, the agenda they are part of, and their evaluation.  Consequently, despite 
the abundant literature focused on examining the effects of WOB on financial measures, 
examinations on gender-equality related outcomes had been overlooked.  This study 
provided evidence that despite the apparent success of WOB initiatives, an examination 
could uncover unintended consequences.   
Second, the study tested critical mass theory by exploring what constitutes critical 
mass of WOB in relation to improved opportunities for other women in the organization.  
Although policy and legislation for WOB usually cites critical mass and minimum targets 
of female representation are implemented, critical mass of WOB had not been tested in 
relation to the assumption that WOB would improve opportunities for other women.  This 
study fills that gap.  This study explored what percentage of WOB constitute critical mass 
by testing the effects of 20%, 25%, and 30% of WOB on opportunities for women in the 
organization.  Findings did not provide support for critical mass of WOB at any of the 
thresholds tested.   
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In examining diversity initiatives, success cannot be associated with one singular 
measure of performance.  In the case of WOB initiatives, it may seem counterintuitive to 
question the appropriateness of the initiative when the pre-determined thresholds are 
being met. However, research should not ignore that the problem that causes women’s 
underrepresentation on boards is caused by other problems that need solutions as well.  
Inequality issues are so entwined with the fabric of society that solutions are complex.  
What may be fixing something on the surface, may be allowing the growth of the 
problem that lies beneath. To find those problems, research should continue to evaluate, 
examine, and challenge the solutions that aim to fix the problem.  Although this study 
contributes to the literature using the context of the United Kingdom, multiple other 
contexts have implemented similar initiatives that remain unexamined. 
This is the first study that provides evidence of a causal effect of changes in board 
composition caused by the Davies Review on opportunities for other women in the 
organization, and the gender pay gap.  The Norway quota reform played a major role in 
putting gender inequality on corporate boards in the political agendas in European 
countries, and is now spreading across the globe.  Scholars (Ferreira, 2015) have 
expressed their skepticism with regard to top-down approaches to gender equality in the 
workplace.  This study contributes to the gender on corporate boards body of research by 
providing evidence that top-down approaches for achieving gender equality in 
organizations only contribute to the increase of women’s numbers at the top and do not 
produce equality at any level.  
This study contributes to research of critical mass of WOB and its impact on 
gender equality in organizations. One of the key premises of this study was that 
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representation in numbers ignores the influence of status and power associated with 
gender. The focus on increasing the numbers of women on corporate boards as a way to 
reduce discrimination on lower layers ignores the gender differences and asymmetrical 
power relations that a simple increase in numbers does not resolve.  Evidence of previous 
studies related to critical mass of WOB examined women’s influence on organizational 
performance; however, critical mass of WOB in relation to their advocacy for women’s 
issues and gender equality had not been explored in the context of the Davies Review.  
 
Third, the study tested the effects of compliance to the Davies Review on the 
gender pay gap with rigorous research methodology that allows claims of causality. The 
rigor in the study allowed a thorough examination of the effects of the Davies Review on 
changes in board composition.  Although different institutions have been tracking 
changes in board composition of publicly listed organizations in the United Kingdom, 
this study went beyond the surface to uncovered the effects that the top-down approach to 
gender equality.  The causal effects uncovered by the study design were further tested 
using robustness tests of pseudo-outcomes, and pseudo-cutoffs, to strengthen the causal 
claim.   This is the first study that tests the effects of the British comply or explain 
initiative for WOB with this kind of rigor.  
Similarly, the effects of the increase of WOB on the gender pay gap had not been 
examined with rigorous methodologies, as the only other existing study available is a 
report from Cranfield (2018); however, the report only listed the top and bottom ten 
organizations and their gender pay gaps, which is informative but does not contribute to 
the understanding of a relationship between the two variables.  This study filled that 
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shortcoming in the literature and provided evidence that despite increased representation 
of WOB, the gender pay gap is not likely to decrease.  
Fourth, this study used the most rigorous methods to arrive at its conclusions, 
which are described throughout this paper in such detail that allow for this study to serve 
as a template for replicability in the multiple contexts in which WOB initiatives have 
been implemented. The data collection process used multiple sources to ensure accuracy 
and re-calculated figures that had been erroneously reported. For example, organizations 
that reported the company secretary in their percentage of WOB would not allow a fair 
comparison with other boards.  Therefore, to ensure that the study compared “apples to 
apples”, figures were re-calculated based on accurate data.  The database (available upon 
request) that resulted from the data collection process allowed the most accurate findings 
possible.  The syntax used in the study’s analyses is provided in Appendix E.   
Implications to Theory 
The findings of this study contribute to the critical mass theory, which was 
essential to this study. The introduction of gender quotas and initiatives for increasing the 
representation of WOB has contributed to the growing body of literature that examined 
the effects of critical mass of WOB on a number of outcomes, including: information 
sharing and perceived influence (Elstad & Ladegard, 2010), firm innovation (Torchia et 
al., 2011), firm performance (Joecks et al., 2013), firm reputation (Bear et al., 2010), 
sustainability (Galbreath, 2011), and sustainability reporting (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, 
& Ruiz-Blanco, 2014). However, the relationship of critical mass of WOB and 
opportunities for other women had not been explored, despite their assumed relationship. 
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This study filled that gap in the literature by testing critical mass of WOB on 
opportunities for women in FTSE organizations.   
Findings of this study’s tests of critical mass at 20%, 25%, and 30% 
representation did not provide support for the relationship of WOB and increased 
opportunities for women.  On the contrary, at 25% of female representation, this study 
found negative effect of WOB on female representation at the executive level.  This 
finding is of particular significance because it suggests that in a context of WOB, critical 
mass needs to be refined in relation to three important assumptions behind it that may be 
erroneous.  First, that the idea behind numerical representation ignores differences in 
power and status that favor men in leadership roles.  Second, the idea of strength in 
numbers implies solidarity and advocacy, which may negatively impact a woman’s career. 
Third, that as whole individuals, WOB have multiple social identities for which gender 
may not always be the most salient. 
Numerical representation, power and status. The assumption behind numerical 
representation as a way to overcome disadvantages overlooks the additional barriers that 
women who are appointed to boards as a result quotas or government-led initiatives that 
promote equality must overcome. Numerical minority representation of WOB ignores 
differences in power and status associated with women. Counting women does not 
necessarily mean that women count.  Women appointed as a result of an external 
initiative may be seen as outsiders, which could reduce their influence and voice.  In that 
context, even at high levels of representation, women may not want to bring up issues 
related to their gender.   
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One of the fundamental flaws of Kanter’s (1977) liberal feminist perspective is 
that it ignores that organizations are socially situated practices in which gendered 
relations are deeply rooted and continually enacted (Halford, Savage, & Witz, 1997).  
Consequently, critical mass’ focus on numerical representation, overlooks the existence 
of a gender bias that favors masculinity and masculine traits in leadership positions, 
which previous literature has identified (Eagly & Karau, 2002).  Moreover, critical mass 
ignores that numerical representation does not equate with equality due to social and 
cultural factors that have historically privileged men (Childs & Krook, 2008; Gustafson, 
2008).  
Strength in numbers. The idea behind strength in numbers implies solidarity, 
which is an assumption that has been disputed (Ellemers et al., 2004; Mavin, 2008). 
Existing research has demonstrated that equal opportunity strategy causes women’s 
performance to be highly scrutinized. As members of the board, WOB’s performance is 
measured in function to how much value they generate for the organization’s 
shareholders, which may be contradictory to advocacy for other women, particularly in 
relation to the gender pay gap.  Therefore, despite numerical representation, women who 
are appointed as a result of quotas or targets may not want to be seen as advocates of 
women because it is not in their best interest.  Previous research has indicated that for 
different reasons, women who have risen to positions of power differentiate themselves 
from other women.  Rather than being seen as members of a group, they others to focus 
on their individual contributions (Ellemers et al., 2004; Faniko et al., 2016).   
Social identities.  An overlooked assumption of critical mass of WOB as it relates 
to outcomes for other women is that it would require gender identification.  However, 
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previous research has demonstrated that gender identification varies and that it can be 
overridden by a more salient identity, such as race, ethnicity, or occupational identity.  
This study tested critical mass of WOB at 20%, 25% and 30% and found no evidence that 
women improved outcomes for other women. The majority of female directors of FTSE 
boards were white and graduates from elite schools, similar to their male counterparts.   
The experiences of women of color, or women of lower socio-economic 
backgrounds may differ from the experiences of the women who occupy board seats. 
Therefore, their perceptions of fairness of the gender system may differ based on the 
intersection of their multiple identities that provide privileges and disadvantages to each 
person. For example, Sheryl Sandberg, a prominent female leader has shared her thoughts 
on what she believes is the problem for women in the workforce.  Sandberg has stated 
that women’s subordinate position in the workforce can be explained by their lack of 
assertiveness.  Academic literature, similarly, has provided evidence that demonstrates 
women in positions of power tend to legitimize the inequality.  In this case, the privileges 
that race and class allow an individual may not be recognized as privileges, instead, they 
may be perceived as well-deserved and help individuals rationalize injustice systems. 
Previous literature has indicated that in relation to egalitarian attitudes, race is a better 
predictor than gender.  Consequently, in refining critical mass, the intersectionality of 
identities must not be overlooked.  
Implications to Policy 
One of the major contributions of this study is that it provides evidence of the 
effects of an initiative that is widely discussed by policy-makers across the world and 
may inform future policy.  The assumptions behind the increase of women’s board 
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representation as a way to increase gender equality are rarely challenged.  Based on the 
study’s findings, it is likely that the promotion of policies and legislation for WOB, as a 
stand-alone gender equality effort, will negatively impact gender equality in 
organizations.  Although WOB initiatives are effective tools for increasing women’s 
participation on corporate boards, it does not solve the problem of gender inequality in 
the workplace.  
This study provided evidence that increasing gender diversity in the boardroom 
does not increase women’s participation in executive positions or senior management.  
Consequently, while removing barriers for women to top leadership roles is the right 
thing to do, it is not enough.  Theoretical (Eagly & Wood, 2000) and empirical evidence 
provide support for the need for role models in the long-run as role structures and 
behavioral expectations are malleable.  However, role structures take time to change; 
therefore, in conjunction with WOB initiatives, other measures must be implemented in 
order reduce discrimination, uphold women’s rights, and contribute to a better, more 
egalitarian society.  
This study argues that it may be better to address the underlying problems that 
create the gender gap on corporate boards.  After Norway implemented the quota law for 
corporate boards, the success of their initiative on increasing opportunities for women at 
the top layers of business had a diffusion effect.  However, despite the apparent success 
of Norway’s quota law, Norway’s corporate leadership is still male-dominated, and their 
pay gap statistics are similar to countries that do not have quota laws.  Consequently, the 
assumption that WOB initiatives will result in gender equality does not make logical 
sense, as even in the context where quotas were first implemented, trickle down effects 
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have not been observed.  While it is early to see the full impact of the Davies Review on 
gender equality in organizations, the findings of this study were consistent with findings 
of the Norwegian quota law. Consequently, in the absence of evidence that would support 
a top-down approach, it is more reasonable to explore the implementation of different or 
additional approaches.  
The way in which initiatives are communicated and implemented will impact 
their outcome.  The arguments used for promoting WOB, business case and the equality 
case, are grounded on two opposing moral perspectives (van Dijk et al., 2012).  Equality 
is a universal principle; therefore, it cannot be supported by a conditional argument based 
on financial gain.  Moreover, an unsubstantiated conditional argument, that provides 
moral justification for discrimination. If the objective of increasing the proportion of 
WOB is the business case, that is, increased profitability and financial performance, the 
initiative should not be part of an equalities agenda (HM Government, 2010), nor should 
it be advertised as having the potential banish inequality in the workforce.  
Promoting WOB initiatives with support of the business case creates the 
expectation of increased financial performance and increases scrutiny on the performance 
of WOB.  The promotion of WOB initiatives should not rely on the business case.  
Although this study does not challenge the legitimacy of initiatives through their potential 
benefit to the bottom line, it argues that the potential financial benefit of WOB initiatives 
has not been compellingly established.  The most methodologically rigorous studies have 
provided evidence that the relationship of WOB and measures of financial performance 
are near zero.  However, instead of promoting rigorous research and advertise that 
women are just as capable as men at the highest positions of leadership, advocates 
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continue to promote the idea that more WOB increase profits, which is untrue.  Scholars 
(Eagly, 2016) have indicated that in pursuit of their goals, advocates sometimes 
misinterpret findings and ignore scientific research.   
Policy-makers should take into account that the promotion of WOB initiatives 
through the business case is misleading, unethical, and more importantly, it threatens the 
achievement of equality, as it opens the door to the perpetuation of discrimination against 
women.  If the business case continues to be used to promote WOB initiatives, opponents 
of WOB initiatives may use evidence of negative financial performance to justify 
discrimination, and they would be morally justified to do so, as the business case is an 
equality argument with a contingency on financial performance.  
Policy should stop relying on correlational studies related to women and financial 
performance, irrespective of how favorable they may seem for the promotion of diversity 
initiatives, because they are misleading and distract the focus from the real benefits of 
diversity.  The promotion of WOB initiatives should be done honestly, citing the real 
benefits of equality to society, acknowledging that women’s standing is the result of 
discrimination, and upholding women’s rights.  Ignoring that women’s lower status and 
position in society and the workplace are the result of discrimination does not help create 
awareness and does not help improve women’s future standing.  Failing to see that 
women’s different experiences related to their gender gives them a different perspective 
that would be beneficial to the organization will not contribute to seeing gender diversity 
as an asset.  
This study has demonstrated that initiatives for WOB do not produce gender 
equality; therefore, initiatives for WOB should not be introduced with the expectation 
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that they will improve opportunities for other women in the organization or that they will 
help close the gender pay gap.  Removing barriers for women is not be the responsibility 
of women but of society as a whole.  The sole expectation that gender issues should be 
fixed by women is sexist and will not contribute to the achievement of equality because it 
removes half of the population responsible and able to contribute to fixing the problem.  
Throughout history, there have been men that have used their influence, power and voice 
to help women in the fight toward the achievement of equality.  Those alliances are 
critical and should not be overlooked.  A problem associated with women championing 
gender-related issues in the organization is that women already embody diversity; 
therefore, if they bring up a gender issue, others may not see it, as their sole presence may 
weaken the argument. Equality and diversity work should be equally distributed in an 
organization.  
Although the examination of perceptions of WOB was out of the scope of this 
study; findings that indicated that women executive directors had decreased during the 
Davies Review period and that there had not been an increase in the appointment of 
female CEOs provides some evidence that despite the increase in numbers on corporate 
boards, women’s status and asymmetrical power remain intact.  Consequently, policy 
makers should be aware that while providing women with equal opportunity to board 
positions is the right thing to do, as it upholds women’s human rights; it may not result in 
equality for women in the organization or even at the board level, as numerical 
representation at the board level is only part of the problem.    
Legislation should not only consider numerical representation.  In addition to 
numerical representation, policy could set minimum limits for executive and non-
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executive female board members.  Although it is important that women are offered 
opportunities as non-executive directors, those women are usually already serving on 
other boards or are in executive boards in some organization.  Therefore, opportunities 
are not truly being created for women, but the same elite group of women get more 
opportunities.  Setting minimum limits for executive committees would act as an 
incentive for organizations to include women in the pipeline for those roles, and to 
include them in succession plans.   
Transparency and standardization of reporting are fundamental to the examination 
of an initiative.  In the preparation of the database for the present study, it became 
apparent that when an initiative is rolled out, a definition of the metrics to be reported 
should be included in the documentation that details the initiative.  When reporting their 
board metrics, some organizations included the corporate secretary when calculating the 
percentage female participation.  When reporting senior management metrics, some 
organizations considered senior management to be anyone in management, others 
considered only their executive board, and others anyone above director levels.  
Consistently, some organizations reported more than 20% of their population in senior 
management, and others included only 1% of their population as senior management.  
Although, this study separated each hierarchical level and re-calculated their metrics, 
standardization in reporting would facilitate the evaluation and examination of WOB 
initiatives.  
One final implication to policy from this study is that as the findings of this study 
have demonstrated, WOB are not the solution to the problem.  Although opportunities for 
WOB are just and fair, boards only represent a very small number of opportunities.  
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Advocating for the rights of a few while ignoring the existing inequality for millions of 
women in the workforce does not serve the vast majority of constituents of a society and 
do not adhere to the world’s commitment to universal ideals of human dignity.  
Acknowledging that WOB will not improve opportunities for other women, policy-
makers should look into ways to address inequalities in opportunity and participation.   
Implications to Practice 
The following section describes the implications that the study’s findings suggest 
for practice within organizations affected by initiatives for WOB, the broader business 
context, and for HRD. 
In business, instrumental aspects cannot be dismissed, as organizations have a 
responsibility to their shareholders.  Consequently, this study does not challenge the 
legitimacy of examining the effects of WOB initiatives on the bottom line.  However, the 
value that women bring to organizations is not directly related to the financial value of 
the firm.  In fact, recent studies have found that the relationship of WOB and financial-
related outcomes is near zero.  Practitioners should promote that women as just as good 
as men when it comes to generating value for the organization.  Misleading claims of 
superior profitability are not only untrue, but they place high scrutiny on women’s 
performance. Additionally, diversity work should focus on the value that everyone brings 
to an organization, not in creating a competitive environment in which one is recognized 
as superior to the other. 
Gender diversity as a resource that brings value to an organization should not be 
overlooked.  Women, and minorities, bring different experiences to an organization that 
add value that goes beyond the bottom line.  Therefore, organizations that appoint women 
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to boards should keep their expectations of financial outcomes resulting from increased 
female board representation realistic and conservative.  
Practitioners should be aware that claims that indicate that adding women to a 
board causes organizations to outperform others may alienate board male members and 
male executives.  Consequently, as organizations prepare to appoint female board 
members, HRD practitioners should prepare the organization and foster awareness of the 
benefits of having women on boards. One of those benefits is that it moves the 
organization and society toward a fairer, more egalitarian system, in which men and 
women have equal access and opportunities to contribute.  Creating a gender diverse 
workforce at every level is the right thing to do because it contributes to the achievement 
of equality, which is a basic human right.  A society in which everyone’s rights are 
respected is a better society for all.  
Although it has been argued that women will open doors for other women; 
support for those claims is not strong.  This study’s findings provided conflicting 
evidence to that claim. Although women who aspire to board roles may have those 
intentions going in, the extreme scrutiny on their performance, coupled with the 
unrealistic promises resulting from misinterpreted data (e.g. 42% higher returns on sales, 
Davies, 2011; 45% higher earnings per share, CA Senate Bill 862), may cause them to 
put their advocacy aside in order to perform to the unrealistic standards that were 
promised.  
This study found that that an increase in opportunities for WOB are not 
necessarily related in increased for opportunities for other women in the organization.  
Research has previously suggested that the belief that organizational practices are gender 
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neutral can have negative implications for women. With respect to the population of 
organizations in the context of this study, special attention may be warranted, as the 
visibility on these organizations’ WOB efforts may give the appearance of gender 
equality.  Practitioners should be aware that this could create blindness around gender-
issues and negatively impact other women in the organization.  Although increasing 
opportunities for women on corporate boards is important, this study did not find 
evidence that supports the notion that targeting boards will have trickle down effects and 
improve opportunities at other levels of the organization.   
Furthermore, this study found a causal relationship of the increased proportion of 
WOB and decreased opportunities for women on executive boards.  This finding suggests 
that the long-term success of gender diversity on corporate boards could be threatened by 
a decreased supply of women in executive levels.  HRD professionals should be aware 
the visibility of corporate boards could create an illusion of gender neutral practices.  In 
order to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, women at every level should be 
developed in the same proportion as men.  
Findings of this study indicated compliance to the targets set by the Davies 
Review decreased the proportion of women in the executive board. Although that finding 
does not necessarily indicate that female directors hinder other women’s advancement, it 
would be misleading to rule that as a possibility.  In fact, previous studies have indicated 
that in different contexts some women do have gender-biases, and actively prevent the 
career progression of women.  Discrimination is not perpetuated only by men.  Vilifying 
men and blaming them for women’s situation would ignore that many men have been 
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women’s allies and continuously fight alongside women for the achievement of more 
egalitarian society.   
Much of the recent media coverage related to gender and power has put a negative 
light on the relationship of men and women in the workplace.  Practitioners should be 
aware that men may be more cautious about mentoring female juniors.  This study found 
a lower supply of women on executive boards as a result of the increase of WOB.  The 
lower supply of female executives may widen the gap of women that go up the career 
pipeline as they may not be able to take on multiple junior women to mentor them in how 
to develop their careers.  Practitioners should come up with creative solutions to this 
problem if it is found in their organizations.  Online mentoring sessions may be an 
alternative to face-to-face sessions.  In large organizations, mentor/mentee relationships 
can be matched across the globe.  That may increase the likelihood of executives to 
accept female mentees. 
Fostering awareness of the systematic biases that have put women in a 
subordinate position should be done throughout the organization, not only at the highest 
levels.  Research has shown that gender-based gaps in the workplace start at the time 
individuals enter the workforce.  This indicates the existence of conscious or 
subconscious gender biases that should be discussed in organizations that are truly 
committed to achieving gender equality.  Exercises for creating awareness of existing 
subconscious biases can be the first step in moving an organization closer to gender 
equality.  
Some argue that increasing gender diversity on corporate boards should be based 
on merit rather than quotas or targets; however, organizations are not the meritocracies 
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we would like to believe they are (Castilla & Benard, 2010).  In fact, scholars have found 
that all things being equal, gender has been found to cause the variance in the disparities 
in leadership positions (Bosak & Sczesny, 2011).  Merit appears to be the word that 
organizations use to justify unfair practices or perhaps their implicit bias.  Therefore, 
when designing initiatives to address gender inequality, policy-makers should be aware 
of the inclination organizations have for citing merit when they are not meeting their 
targets.  Furthermore, it should be noted that women can also have those beliefs 
(Ellemers, Van Den Heuvel, Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004; Mavin, 2008) and may be 
unwilling to promote measures to support other women (Faniko, Ellemers, & Derks, 
2016). Therefore, adding women to leadership roles does not solve the problem for other 
women.  
When developing an intervention for the creation of awareness of gendered 
practices, practitioners should take into account men and women have biases against 
women that they may not be aware of.  For example, female managers who spend long 
hours in the workplace may link their time spent at work with commitment to 
differentiate themselves from other women and justify their higher position.  Gender-
neutral practices require an evaluation of the practices that put women at a disadvantage.    
The study’s findings also indicated that an increase in the percentage of WOB 
increased the gender pay gap, which suggests that efforts for increasing women’s 
participation on corporate boards are taking a forefront in the diversity efforts.  The 
gender pay gap impacts every employee in the organization, therefore, it cannot be 
ignored.  Practitioners should evaluate their organizational gender pay gaps and develop a 
strategy to close them.  The United Kingdom’s example to evaluate the organization’s 
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gender pay gap and make the information public is an example to follow.  Research has 
suggested that accountability can help reduce gender bias (Foschi, 1996), and it can help 
reduce discriminatory behavior (Castilla, 2008).  However, organizations that are not 
subject to the pay gap disclosure requirement should rely in their HRD professionals to 
keep the organization accountable and honest with regard to their equal pay practices. 
Limitations 
Seven limitations should be contemplated when considering the contributions 
found in this study.  First, this study limited the sample of participants to organizations 
that were indexed in the FTSE All Share from 2011 to 2016; any organizations that 
entered or exited the index in that time frame were not included in the study.  This 
precludes from generalizing the results outside the publicly listed British organizations. 
However, findings in this study should inform policy in countries with similar corporate 
governance systems (e.g. United States, Canada and Australia).  The particular 
circumstances at the time of the Davies Review, including the potential imposition of 
higher gender quotas to member states of the EU, made compliance to the initiative more 
likely than non-compliance; therefore, it may not allow generalizations of the findings to 
comply or explain approaches.  The environment around the time of initiative may make 
it more similar to quotas than comply or explain approaches; therefore, findings should 
be used taking that into account.   
Second, the study was not able to include organizational characteristics related to 
diversity strategies and diversity policies that may have an impact in future gender 
equality outcomes.  Multiple scholars have suggested that the relationship of women in 
leadership and their contribution to the organization is moderated by organizational 
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characteristics. Ellemers and colleagues (2012) indicated that women’s perceptions of 
gendered leadership beliefs in their organizations can cause them to distance themselves 
from other women. Bierema (2017) argued that initiatives that focus on adding women to 
positions previously unavailable to them is not effective because the organizational 
hierarchy and structure remains unchanged. Considering the importance of the 
organizational structure, and strategy with regard to the impact WOB could have on the 
organization, the absence of organizational characteristics variables in this study 
represents a limitation. 
The third limitation of this study is that it does not examine the intersections of 
gender, race, ethnicity, and class (socio-economic background).    Although race and 
ethnicity data were collected for each female director, the sample was very homogenous, 
with about 95% being reported as white.  Perhaps a contributing factor to that 
demographic was that in the United Kingdom, the population is predominantly white, 
accounting for 86% of the total population according to the latest census of 2011, which 
was a decrease from 91.3% in 2001 (Office for National Statistics, 2011).  Therefore, the 
homogeneous racial characteristics do not seem to deviate much from the population, 
suggesting that due to the sample characteristics, it is a limitation of this study. However, 
studies done in other contexts in which populations are more racially diverse should 
include the variable in their studies, as literature has identified a bias against racial and 
ethnic minorities (Carton & Rosette, 2011; Rosette et al., 2011).  Therefore, the 
intersection of the gender and race may impact the influence women of color have on the 
board, which may hinder their ability to advocate for equality causes.  
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Socio-economic background was not one of the individual characteristics of 
directors used in this study.  Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons theory 
provided the framework for the link between managers’ socioeconomic background and 
approach to management. Their conceptualization of the organization as a reflection of its 
leaders may be used to provide some understanding of what characteristics may 
contribute to differences in WOB. Nevertheless, this study did not collect data for those 
variables, which may limit the understanding of the findings.  Basing that assumption on 
the fact the majority of directors attended the same elite universities, the sample of 
female directors collected for this study appeared to be socioeconomically homogeneous. 
However, assuming that directors come from a particular socioeconomic background 
based on the university they attended is perhaps not the best way to measure 
socioeconomic background; therefore, it is a limitation of this study.  
The fourth limitation of this study was that it did not include the political 
affiliation of the directors included in the sample. Political affiliation has been found to 
been found to explain more than gender on policies related to social justice and equality 
causes for women in politics (Campbell, Childs, & Lovenduski, 2010; Kittlison, 2006; 
Lloren, 2015; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; Norris, 1986). Research has identified that 
liberalism is strongly associated with advocacy for women’s rights (Cramer-Walsh, 2002, 
p. 177).  Although an effort was made to identify the political affiliation of the directors 
in the study’s sample, attempts were not successful; therefore, it is a limitation of this 
study. 
The fifth limitation of this study is that it did not collect data related to the 
organization’s merit policy for the full sample.  Multiple organizations stated that the 
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reasons they were not more gender diverse was that they had a merit policy.  However, 
fairness and merit have been identified as the most salient counter-argument to WOB 
initiatives (Leszczynska, 2017; Storvik & Teigen, 2010).  Therefore, an analysis of 
organizations that believe, and explicitly announce, that their appointments are based on 
merit, may provide some insight into a gap in the organizational understanding of and 
acknowledgement of the disadvantages that women face, which in turn may be 
contributing to the gender gap.  
The sixth limitation of this study is related to the reliance on the quality of data 
supplied by FTSE organizations on their annual reports.  In building the study’s database, 
the possibility of a systematic bias in reporting was found.  During the data collection 
process, it was noted that multiple organizations included the corporate secretary in their 
board gender metrics, when the corporate secretary was a woman.  Similarly, 
organizations reported incorrect percentages.  Percentages for this study were 
recalculated to include board metrics including only board members; however, in 
retrospect, analyzing the characteristics of organizations in relation to the quality of their 
reporting may provide some insight to the relationship of governance and business ethics 
(Labelle, Gargouri, & Francoeur, 2010). Although every effort was made to ensure the 
accuracy of data, the findings of this study are limited to the truthfulness of metrics 
reported by FTSE organizations. 
The final limitation of this study is that although it used a data imputation method 
to avoid the bias associated with listwise deletion, hypotheses tests related to the gender 
pay gap did not use imputed data, which suggests that the full magnitude of the effect of 
WOB on the gender pay gap is not completely understood.   
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Recommendations for Future Research 
This study creates five directions for future research.  First, organizational culture 
has been associated with policies that promote gender equality and aid women’s career 
progression. Depending on the organizational culture, some women directors may not 
want to raise issues that impact other women.  Ellemers and colleagues (2012) found that 
in organizations with gendered leadership expectations, women leaders chose to distance 
themselves from other women.  Therefore, future research should evaluate the impact of 
organizational culture on the impact of WOB and their advocacy of gender-related causes.   
Future research should include socio-economic background of directors. Previous 
studies have suggested that interaction with people from different social groups reduces 
prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and also reduces identification with members of a 
historically disadvantaged group (Dixon et al., 2012). Consequently, women who have 
been members of a privileged socio-economic group may not identify with women as 
much as they identify with the men of their same socio-economic background.  
Furthermore, women who have not faced the same barriers other women have faced may 
find it difficult to identify with them (Stroebe et al., 2009).  Women leaders who do not 
acknowledge the disadvantages others face may not be willing to promote policies to help 
other women (Faniko et al., 2016).  Previous studies have found that directors of 
corporate boards were not representative of the general population (Ferreira, 2015), 
moreover, they appear to be a very homogeneous group.  Therefore, exploring the effects 
of socio-economic background of directors of corporate boards on gender equality may 
increase the understanding of the personal characteristics of WOB that may impact 
gender equality.  
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The third recommendation for future research is including the political affiliation 
of board members.  There is significant body of research that indicates that political 
affiliation is more related to social justice and equality advocacy than gender (Campbell, 
Childs, & Lovenduski, 2010; Kittlison, 2006; Lloren, 2015; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; 
Norris, 1986). Liberal political inclination is strongly associated with advocacy for 
women’s rights (Cramer-Walsh, 2002, p. 177).  Therefore, including political affiliation 
in the relationship of WOB and gender equality in the organization may provide a better 
understanding of what type of woman on corporate boards would have the biggest impact 
in promoting gender equality in their organizations.   
The fourth recommendation for future research relates to the identification of 
systematic bias in reporting.  Multiple organizations report their gender metrics with 
errors and several have failed to report their gender pay gap.  Previous research has 
identified that the quality of reporting may be related to business ethics (Labelle et al., 
2010). Therefore, an examination of mistakes and omissions in the reporting of gender 
metrics may provide some insights as to the characteristics of organizations ethics and 
commitment to diversity.   
The fifth recommendation for future research relates to the examination of WOB 
initiatives in other contexts.  Hard law and soft law approaches for WOB have been 
implemented in multiple countries.  This study serves as a template for examining the 
effects of WOB initiatives in other contexts.  Although this study tested the concept of 
critical mass, more research is needed to see under which conditions critical mass of 
WOB may be reached.  Non-profit organizations may also be a good context for future 
research, as the nature of non-profit institutions is advocate for a social cause; therefore, 
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with the profit contingency aside, the effect of gender in the WOB and opportunities for 
women relationship may be easier to isolate. 
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter contained five sections.  The first section presented a discussion of 
the results from Chapter 4 and the relationships to relevant literature.  The second section 
discussed implications for theory, policy, and HRD practice.  The third section described 
the limitations of the study. The fourth section provided recommendations for future 
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Appendix A. Initiatives for increasing WOB by Country 
Country Type Regulating body/code Sanctions Date Target Target organizations Description 






2011 2015 Publicly listed FTSE 350 FTSE 100 targets - 25% WOB, 
FTSE 250, around 20% 
    2016 2020  33% WOB, 33% Executive 
Committee 
Norway Legislation The Norwegian Public 
Limited Liability 
Companies Act  
Dissolution 2003 2008 All public listed Companies 
and state-owned enterprises, 
intermunicipal companies, 
large cooperatives, and 
companies that are more 
than two-thirds municipally 
owned. 
40% WOB 
U.S. Comply or 
explain  





No 2010 None Public listed companies California: In 2018 CA Senate 
Bill 826 was passed. Minimum 1, 
3 for boards of 9+ 
Massachusetts: 2015 resolution 
calling for companies with boards 
of 9. Minimum 3. 
Illinois: 2015 target to have at 
least three women directors in the 
following 3 years. Minimum 1, 2 
for boards 5-9. 
Pennsylvania: Set a 30% target for 
women representation on boards 
by 2020. 












2007 2020 Both listed and non-listed 




Appendix A. Initiatives for increasing WOB by Country (Continued) 
Country Type Regulating body/code Sanctions Date Target Target organizations Description 
Germany Legislation for 
executives 




2015 2016 Private and public listed 
companies as well as state 
owned enterprises. 
30% WOB executive positions 
Italy Legislation 
(Limited to first 
three board 
terms)  
The prime minister and 
the minister for equal 
opportunities oversee 
compliance with the 




Fines 2011 By 3rd 
board 
renewal. 
 All listed companies and 
public companies 
20% WOB for first term to target 
of 33% WOB after 3 terms 
Canada There are no 
gender quotas in 
Canada for 
women on the 
boards of public 
companies 
Government legislation 
for government owner 
enterprises. 
No 2016 2019 Government owned 
enterprises and public 
owned not for profit 
enterprises 
The Province of Ontario 40% 
WOB by 2019 
A 50 % gender quota for boards 
came into effect in 2011 for 
government-owned enterprises in 
Quebec. 







No 2015 2018 ASX 200 companies The Australian Institute of 
directors recommended a target 
of 30% WOB. 
Iceland Legislation Act on equal status of 
men and women 
Yes 2010 2013 All companies with more 
than 50 employees 
40% WOB. Boards consisting of 
three members must have both 
sexes represented.  
Belgium Legislation The Gender Act 2007 Yes 2011 2017/2019 Listed companies and some 






Appendix A. Initiatives for increasing WOB by Country (Continued) 
















Listed companies 30% WOB 
France Legislation The Quota Law of 
2011 
Yes 2011 2017 Corporate boards of 
publicly listed 
companies, public bodies, 
public administration, 








No 2010 None Private and public listed 
companies 
An equal distribution among the 





Appendix B. Examples of Diversity Statements 
Man Group, Annual Report 2016, p. 28: 
 
 




Fidessa Group, Annual Report 2016, p. 46: 
 
Fresnillo, 2016, p. 126: 
 
GKN, Annual Report 2016, p.72: 
 
Morgan Advanced Materials, 2016, p. 69: 
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Appendix E. R Syntax for Analyses Replication 





library(tseries) # for `adf.test()` 
library(dynlm) #for function `dynlm()` 
library(vars) # for function `VAR()` 
library(nlWaldTest) # for the `nlWaldtest()` function 
library(lmtest) #for `coeftest()` and `bptest()`. 
library(broom) #for `glance(`) and `tidy()` 
library(PoEdata) #for PoE4 datasets 
library(car) #for `hccm()` robust standard errors 
library(sandwich) 











































#Read data - This file has complete data before data imputation - NAs 
in 2008 =10, NAs in 2009=4 
d<-read.csv("WOB Dataset - Vertical.csv") 
 
 
#Set to data frame and identify factors and levels 
d <- data.frame(d) 
d$Year<-as.factor(d$Year) 
 
#Compare baseline variables for Phase I 
d2011<-subset(d,Year=="2011") 
 
#Identify treatment and control groups based on thresholds on the 
forcing variable 
d2011$Women<-ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 100"& (d2011$WOBPC<25), 
"Yes", ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 250"& (d2011$WOBPC<22), "Yes", 




#Alternatively, data laid out in vertical form can be used and may be 
easier for several analyses. Everitt (2005) explains how to rearrange 
data from horizontal to vertical format (p. 179), each arrangement's 
use depends on the analysis.  Follow those steps or use this format: 
 
#Read data 
ds<-read.csv("WOB Dataset - Horizontal.csv") 
ds <- data.frame(ds) 
summary(ds) 
 
#Using 2011 as baseline, we start creating and centering variables 
ds$Increase<-(ds$X2016WOBPC-ds$X2011WOBPC)  #percentage points of 
increase in the Davies period 
 ds$Index2011<-as.factor(ds$Index2011) 
 ds$WOB2011<-ds$X2011WOBPC  
 ds$Post16<-ds$X2016WOBPC 
 ds$Critical<-ifelse(ds$X2016WOB<3,"No", "Yes") 
 ds$Critical<-as.factor(ds$Critical) 
 
#For Testing pseudo outcomes 
  ds$BoardInc<-(ds$X2016Board-ds$X2011Board)  
 
  #Subset data by group 
  d100<-subset(ds, ds$Index2011 == "FTSE 100") 
  d250<-subset(ds, ds$Index2011 == "FTSE 250") 
  dSmall<-subset(ds, ds$Index2011 == "FTSE Small Cap") 
   
#Center at Target by group 
 d100$Pre<-scale(d100$X2011WOBPC, center=25, scale=FALSE) 
 d100$Pre2<-(d100$Pre^2) 
 d100$Pre3<-(d100$Pre^3)  
 d100$Pre4<-(d100$Pre^4) 
 






dSmall$Pre<-scale(dSmall$X2011WOBPC, center=19, scale=FALSE)  # 
estimated IF they were following Davies recommendations 
 dSmall$Pre2<-(dSmall$Pre^2) 
 dSmall$Pre3<-(dSmall$Pre^3) 
 dSmall$Pre4<-(dSmall$Pre^4)   
 









#Group Differences by Industry sector for pooled sample 
 Sector<-table(d2011$Sector, d2011$Women) 
 
#Fisher's test is more precise than chi-square in small samples.  It 
takes longer than chi square, if workspace is not big enough, increase 
workspace using "fisher.test(d2011, workspace=2e8)".  If it still takes 
too long to return a result, simulate the p-value by including 
"simulate.p.value", which is the logic for computing p-values by monte 
carlo simulations, "B" is the number of replicates. The default is 2000, 
but it can be set to whatever you need it to be. 




#Group Differences by FTSE for pooled sample 





#Group Differences by CEO for pooled sample 





#Group Differences by Chair for pooled sample 





#Any variable can be compared using the logic above.  To test the exact 
difference in the likelihood of organizations being in one particular 
sector compared to all other sectors, a matrix can be used with the 
results of the Sector test that done before 
 





##Use those results to test each sector's likelihood of being in an 
organization more than the others. These results are computed using a 































































#Correlations should be done by group.  Compute within and between 
correlations including the probability of between group correlations, 
and intraclass correlations to see how different the groups are.  For 
this test, it is easy to use the vertical format of the dataset because 
it uses the computed value for Increase, which is the difference 
between 2016 and 2011. 
 
#I run correlations prior to data imputation to observe the strength of 
the bivariate relationships, which should help for the data imputation 
process. Run correlations again after data imputation. 
 
 
#Correlations Phase 1 - with baseline covariates 
 
Correlations1<-dsT1[,c("SectorN","Increase", "X2011Board", 
"X2011WOBPC", "X2011WOB","X2011WED", "X2011WNED","X2011Total", 
"X2011CEOGnd","X2011ChairGnd", "Index2011", "TreatPhase1" )] 
 
CorPhase1<- statsBy(Correlations1,c("Index2011"),cor=TRUE, 
cors=TRUE)   #group by one or two grouping variables. For the 
longitudinal sample use "c("Year", "Index") 
 
print(CorPhase1,short=FALSE) 
lowerMat(CorPhase1$pbg)  #get the probability values for between- 
the lowerMat function makes it look nicer showing only the lower 
part of the matrix 
lowerMat(CorPhase1$pwg)  #get the probability values for within 
lowerMat(CorPhase1$ICC2)  #get the probability values 
round(CorPhase1$etawg) 





#show intraclass correlation - total variance associated with 
grouping variable  
round(CorPhase1$ICC1, 2) 







#Correlations Phase 2 
 
dsT1$TreatPhase2<-ifelse(dsT1$X2016WOBPC<25, 0, 1) 
 500 
Correlations2<-dsT1[,c("SectorN", "Index2011", "Increase", 
"X2016Board","X2016WOBPC","WExecPCImp", "WSMPCImp", "X2016WEmpPC", 
"X2016CEOGnd","CEOTenure", "X2016ChairGnd", "ChairTenure", 
"Critical", "TreatPhase2", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian")] 
 
names(Correlations2)<-c("Sector", "Index", "Increase", 
"Board16","WOBPC16","WExecPC16", "WSMPC16", "WEmpPC16", 
"CEOGnd","CEOTenure", "ChairGnd", "ChairTenure", "Critical", 
"Treatment", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian") 
 
CorPhase2<- statsBy(Correlations2,c("Index"),cor=TRUE, cors=TRUE, 
method="pearson")   #group by grouping variables 
print(CorPhase2,short=FALSE) 
lowerMat(CorPhase2$pbg)  #get the probability values 
lowerMat(CorPhase2$rwg)  #pooled correlations values 










#show intraclass correlation - total variance associated with 
grouping variable  
round(CorPhase1$ICC1, 2) 
#show intraclass correlation - how much groups differ  
round(CorPhase1$ICC2, 2) 
 




#Data imputation - This can be done one variable at a time or all at 
the same time.  
 
#Datasets with too many variables do not do well. Select no more than 
15-20 variables that can help predict the outcome.  Use results of 
correlations and run regressions to choose the best predictors. 
 
Frame<-dsT[,c("Firm", "X2016WOBPC", "X2016WSMPC", 
"X2016WExecPC","X2016CEOGnd", "X2016WEmpPC", "SectorN", "Group", 
"X2016WED", "Increase", "Critical", "X2016ChairGnd", "CEOTenure", 
"ChairTenure", "Sector", "Index2011", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian")] 
 




#Observe marginplots to try identify the missingness mechanism - This 
should be done qualitavely based on existing literature and using 
researcher's judgement. Marginplots are a helpful supplement. 
marginplot(Frame[, c("X2016WOBPC", "X2016WSMPC")]) 
marginplot(Frame[, c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC")]) 
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marginplot(Frame[, c("X2016WEmpPC", "X2016WSMPC")]) 
marginplot(Frame[, c("PayGapMedian", "X2016WSMPC")]) 
 
 
#Test using multiple methods. 2l.norm for level 1 heteroscedastic 
variance using Bayesian regression, 2l.pan for homoscedastic variance. 
2l.pmm for 2level predictive mean matching 
## Use -2 for grouping variable, 2 for random effects (2 includes 
random AND fixed), 1 is for fixed effects, and 0 for variables that are 
in the dataset but are not predictors in the imputation. 
 
  ini<-mice(Frame, maxit=0) 
  pred<-ini$pred 
  meth<-ini$meth 
 
  meth["X2016WSMPC"]<-"2l.pmm"     
  meth["X2016WExecPC"]<-"2l.pmm" 
  meth["PayGapMean"]<-"2l.norm" 
  meth["PayGapMedian"]<-"2l.norm" 
 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian"), "Group"]<--2 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean"), 
"Sector"]<-0 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian"), "Firm"]<-0 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian"), "X2016WOBPC"]<-2 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian"), "SectorN"]<-1 
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"), 
"Increase"]<-2 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC"), "Increase"]<-0 
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"), 
"X2016WEmpPC"]<-2 








pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC"), "PayGapMean"]<-0 
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC"), "PayGapMedian"]<-0 
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean"), "Critical"]<-1 
pred[c("PayGapMedian"), "Critical"]<-0 





ini<-mice(Frame, pred=pred, meth=meth, seed=35922, 
maxit=20) 
ini1<-mice(Frame, pred=pred, meth=meth, seed=35922, 
maxit=1)   
  a<-runif(10) 
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  ini2<-mice.mids(ini1, maxit=3, print=FALSE) 
  all(ini$ini$X2016WExecPC==ini2$ini$X2016WExecPC) 
 
#Visualize your imputations 
  stripplot(ini, pch=20, cex=1.2) 







plot(ini, c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian"), layout=c(2,4)) 
 
##Testing with additional imputations to visualize convergence 
imp40 <- mice.mids(ini, maxit=35, print=F) 
plot(imp40, c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean", 
"PayGapMedian"), layout=c(2,4)) 
 
#Post-processing imputation - If 2l.norm or 2l.pan are used, it is 
possible that imputed data will need post-processing.  In this case, 
data for the percentage of female executives had negative numbers, 
indicating that adjustments were needed as it exceeded the range of 0 
to 100.  Similar adjustments can be done for MNAR data. 
 
  Frame2<-cbind(Frame, X2016WExecPC2=NA) 
  ini<-mice(Frame2, max=0, print=FALSE) 
   
  meth<-ini$meth 
meth[c("X2016WExecPC2", "X2016WExecPC")]<-
c("~log(X2016WExecPC)", "norm") 
  pred<-ini$pred 
pred[c("Firm", "Sector", "Index2011","X2016WOBPC", 
"X2016WExecPC", "X2016WEmpPC", "SectorN", "Group", 
"X2016WED", "Critical", "X2016ChairGnd", "CEOTenure", 
"ChairTenure",  "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"), 
"X2016WExecPC2"]<-0 
  pred["X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC"]<-0 
   
  post<-ini$post 
post["X2016WExecPC"]<- "imp[[j]][,i]<-squeeze(imp[[j]][,i], 
c(0,100))" 
imp<-mice(Frame2, meth=meth, pred=pred, post=post, 
seed=25922, maxit=10, print=FALSE) 
  imp$imp$X2016WEmpPC 
 
 






















ini.kendall<-mice(Frame, m=m, meth=ini$meth, pred=ini$pred, 
maxit=0, print=FALSE) 
tau<-matrix(NA, nrow=T, ncol=m) 
for (i in 1:T){ if (i==1)set.seed(9212) 
ini.kendall<-mice.mids(ini, maxit=1, print=FALSE) 
x<-complete(ini.kendall, "repeated")[, paste("Increase", 
1:m, sep=".")] 
y<-complete(ini.kendall, "repeated")[, paste("X2016WExecPC", 
1:m, sep=".")] 
 xn<-as.data.frame(lapply(x, as.numeric)) 
 yn<-as.data.frame(lapply(y, as.numeric)) 






















#Extract all 5 imputations into 1 file 
Com<-complete(ini, "long", include=TRUE) 
summary(Com) 




##Assuming file has already been uploaded and all. 
 
###Observe density/distributions of the assignment variable - WOBPC16 
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Den1<-ggplot2.density(data=dsT1, xName='WOBPC16', 














mainTitle="FTSE Small Cap", fillGroupDensity=TRUE, 
addMeanLine=TRUE,  
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray") 
    
grid.arrange(Den1, Den2, Den3, Den4, ncol=2, nrow=2, 
top="Assignment Variable Distribution") 
 
 
###Observe density/distributions of the assignment variable - 
Increase 
   
Den1<-ggplot2.density(data=dsT1, xName='Increase', 





















grid.arrange(Den1, Den2, Den3, Den4, ncol=2, nrow=2, 
top="Assignment Variable Distribution") 
 
 






  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod0) 





  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod0) 





  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod0) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod0)  
 




  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod0) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod0)  
 




  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod0) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod0)  
 
  
 ###Normality tests for running variable Increase 
 ###Normality tests for Increase 
 





  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod0) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod0)  
 
 




data=subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE 250") 
  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod1) 








  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod2) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod2)  
 
dsT1250<-subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE 250")  




  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod3) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod3)  
 
dsT1Small<-subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE Small Cap")  




  par(mfrow=c(2,2)) 
  plot(mod4) 
  gvlma::gvlma(mod4)  
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###Visualizing the linear relationship of the forcing variable and the 
outcome 
 
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian, factor=Index2011)) 
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+ 
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+ 
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5))) 
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share")) 
 








d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian)) 
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap")) 
   
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions 
of PayGapMedian by Increase") 
 
#Same test with loess lines 
a2<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian, factor=Index2011)) 
R1b<-(a2+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+ 




+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share")) 
 
b2<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian)) 
R2b<-(b2+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8)+ggtitle("FTSE 
100")) 
 
c2<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian)) 
R3b<-(c2+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8)+ggtitle("FTSE 
250")) 
 
d2<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian)) 
R4b<-(d2+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8)+ggtitle("FTSE 
Small Cap")) 
    
grid.arrange(R1b,R2b,R3b,R4b, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Regressions of 
PayGapMedian by Increase by FTSE Group") 
 
 ### Look at their residuals 
    
dsT1$R1 <- residuals(mod1) 
RP1<-(ggplot(dsT1, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) + 
geom_point(alpha=0.3) + stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE, 
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span=0.4, method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE All 
Share - Pooled")) 
 
dsT100$R1 <- residuals(mod2) 
RP2<-(ggplot(dsT1100, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) + 
geom_point(alpha=0.3) +  
stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE, span=0.4, 
method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE 100")) 
 
dsT1250$R1 <- residuals(mod3) 
RP3<-(ggplot(dsT1250, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) + 
geom_point(alpha=0.3) + stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE, 
span=0.4,  
method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE 250")) 
 
dsT1Small$R1 <- residuals(mod4) 
RP4<-(ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) + 
geom_point(alpha=0.3) + stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE, 
span=0.4, method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE 
Small")) 
grid.arrange(RP1,RP2,RP3,RP4, ncol=2, nrow=2, 
top="Residuals by FTSE Group") 
    
 
#Observe the relationship of X and Y - By WOBPC 
### Observe linear relationship of X&Y 
#Regression Lines by Group 
 
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, WExecPCImp, factor=Index2011)) 
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+ 
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+ 
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5))) 
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share")) 
 








d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, WExecPCImp)) 
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap")) 
   
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions 




a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, WSMPCImp, factor=Index2011)) 
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+ 




+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share")) 
 








d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, WSMPCImp)) 
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap")) 
   
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions 





a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, X2016WEmpPC, factor=Index2011)) 
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+ 
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+ 
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5))) 
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share")) 
 








d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, X2016WEmpPC)) 
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap")) 
   
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions 





a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, PayGapMean, factor=Index2011)) 
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+ 
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+ 
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5))) 
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share")) 
 









d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, PayGapMean)) 
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+ 
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap")) 
 
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions 
of PayGapMean WOBPC") 
 
 
#Density tests - McCrary - If not enough observations, change bandwidth 
size 
   
 
DCdensity(dsT$Pre, bw=4.7, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE, 
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE) 
 
 
DCdensity(d350$Pre, bw=3, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE, 
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE) 
    
DCdensity(d100$Pre, bw=9.2, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE, 
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE) 
    
DCdensity(d250$Pre, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE, 
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE) 
    
DCdensity(dSmall$Pre, bw=13, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE, 
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE) 
 
 
#Testing smoothness of baseline covariates 
###WOB    
  rd350<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd350) 
   plot(rd350) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350") 
  rd100<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,bw=9.4, 
   data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd100) 
   plot(rd100) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 100") 
  rd250<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre, 
   data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd250) 
   plot(rd250) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 250") 
  rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre, 
   data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdSmall) 
   plot(rdSmall) 
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title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB - 2011") 
  rdT<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdT) 
   plot(rdT) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350") 
    
 
###Identify the effects of time in the percentage of WOB 
 
#Create a variable so that time is in 1 unit increments.  
Reference group is 0, the first year of observations.  
   d$Time<-(d$Year - 2008) 
 
  d$Index<-as.factor(d$Index) 
  d$Year<-as.factor(d$Year) 
 
  #Run null model - Random intercept model 
mod0<-lme(WOBPC~Year+Index+Sector+Board, random=~+1|Firm, 
data=d, method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod0) 
   
#Run random intercept with interaction Year*Index effects 
mod1<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, random=~+1|Firm, 
data=d, method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod1) 
   
#Run random intercept with interaction effects and temporal 
correlation  - Best model based on fit indices from the 
ANOVA below 
mod2<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, random=~+1|Firm, 
cor=corAR1(), data=d, method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod2)  
 
#Run random intercept with interaction effects and temporal 
correlation 
mod2a<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board*Index, 
random=~+1|Firm, cor=corAR1(), data=d, method="ML", 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod2a)    
    
  #Run random intercept and random slope model 
mod3<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, 
random=~1|Index/Firm, data=d, method="ML", 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod3) 
 
  #Run random intercept and random slope model 
mod3<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, 
random=~1|Index/Firm, data=d, method="ML", 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod3) 
 
  #Run random intercept and random slope model 
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mod4<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, 
random=~1|Index/Firm,  cor=corAR1(), data=d, method="ML", 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod4) 
 
#Run random intercept and random slope model 
mod5<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, 
random=~1|Year/Index/Firm,  cor=corAR1(), data=d, 
method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(mod5) 
   
  #Compare models 
  anova(mod0, mod1, mod2, mod3, mod4, mod5) 
 
  
###Internal validity - Smoothness of covariates 
#Testing smoothness of baseline covariates 
###WOB    
  rd350<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd350) 
   plot(rd350) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350") 
 
  rd100<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,bw=9.4, 
   data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd100) 
   plot(rd100) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 100") 
 
  rd250<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre, 
   data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd250) 
   plot(rd250) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 250") 
 
  rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre, 
   data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdSmall) 
   plot(rdSmall) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB - 2011") 
 
  rdT<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdT) 
   plot(rdT) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350") 
    
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates 
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011WOB, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
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summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011WOB, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011WOB, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011WOB, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=dsT$X2011WOB, x=dsT$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
 
    
###Boards 
  rd350<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd350) 
   plot(rd350) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE 350") 
 
  rd100<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre,bw=9.4, 
   data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd100) 
   plot(rd100) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE 100") 
 
  rd250<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre, 
   data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd250) 
   plot(rd250) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE 250") 
 
  rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre, 
   data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=13, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdSmall) 
   plot(rdSmall) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE Small") 
 
  rdT<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdT) 
   plot(rdT) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Board Size - FTSE 350") 
    
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates 
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011Board, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011Board, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011Board, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011Board, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 





  rd350<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd350) 
   plot(rd350) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE 350") 
 
  rd100<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre,bw=9.4, 
   data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd100) 
   plot(rd100) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE 100") 
 
  rd250<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre, 
   data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd250) 
   plot(rd250) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE 250") 
 
  rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre, 
   data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdSmall) 
   plot(rdSmall) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE Small") 
 
  rdT<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdT) 
   plot(rdT) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE All Share") 
    
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates 
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011CEOGnd, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011CEOGnd, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011CEOGnd, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011CEOGnd, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 





  rd350<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd350) 
   plot(rd350) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE 350") 
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  rd100<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre,bw=9.4, 
   data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd100) 
   plot(rd100) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE 100") 
 
  rd250<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre, 
   data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=22, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rd250) 
   plot(rd250) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE 250") 
 
  rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre, 
   data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdSmall) 
   plot(rdSmall) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE Small") 
 
  rdT<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre+Index2011, 
   data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE) 
   summary(rdT) 
   plot(rdT) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE All Share") 
    
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates 
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011Total, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011Total, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011Total, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011Total, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4, 
all=TRUE)) 




##Bandwidth selection by kernel type 
##Calculate bandwidth using Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth 
model 
  IKbandwidth(d350$Pre, d350$Increase, verbose=FALSE, 
  kernel="triangular") 
 
##Calculate bandwidth using Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth 
model 
  IKbandwidth(d350$Pre, d350$Increase, verbose=FALSE, 
  kernel="quartic") 
 
##Calculate bandwidth using Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth 
model 
  IKbandwidth(d350$Pre, d350$Increase, verbose=FALSE, 





#Hypotheses H1a and H1b 
 
##No covariates by index for FTSE 350 
H1abUn<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+Index2011, 
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = FALSE, 
model=TRUE) 
   summary(H1abUn) 
   plot(H1abUn) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 
##Quadratic with baseline covariates for FTSE 350 
H1ab<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+ 
X2011Board+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector+Index2011, 
   data=d350, verbose = FALSE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(H1ab) 
   plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15)) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 




data=d350, cluster=clustervar, verbose = FALSE, 
model=TRUE) 
   summary(H1ab) 
   plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15)) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 




data=d350, cluster=clustervar, bw=8.3, verbose = 
FALSE, model=TRUE) 
   summary(H1ab) 
   plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15)) 
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 








title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
  
##Robustness tests for Pseudo-outcomes 
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title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Pseudo outcome - Board Size") 
 








title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Pseudo outcome - Total Employee 
Population") 
 









title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Pseudo outcome - Total Employee 
Population") 
 












# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - Another pseudo outcome 
at different cutpoints - Test 15 and 20 
rd350<-RDestimate(Increase~Pseudo28| Pseudo282+Board11C + 
X2011CEOGnd+ X2011ChairGnd + Sector+Index2011,   




title(xlab="Distance from Compliance Threshold - Cutoff 
Centered at 28", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - Another pseudo outcome 
at different cutpoints - Test 15 and 20 
rd350<-RDestimate(Increase~Pseudo15|Pseudo152+Board11C + 
X2011CEOGnd+ X2011ChairGnd + Sector+Index2011,   
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(rd350) 
plot(rd350) 
title(xlab="Distance from Compliance Threshold - Cutoff 
Centered at 28", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 
###Hypothesis test H1c 
 ###H1c - First unconditional 
  # Simple RD estimate - Sharp - FTSE Small 
rdSmall<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+Pre3, 




title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 
 
 ###H1c - Full model - Optimal bw 
  # Simple RD estimate - Sharp - FTSE Small  
rdSmall<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre| 
Board11C+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector, 




title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
 
 
 ###H1c - Full model - Narrow bw 
  # Simple RD estimate - Sharp - FTSE Small 
rdSmall<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Board11C+ 
X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector, 




title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance 
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards") 
    
#Use the vertical version of the dataset 
#Read data - This file has complete data before data imputation - NAs 
in 2008 =10, 2009=4 
d<-read.csv("Panel database for testing9.csv") 
    
###Hypotheses tests - H2    
  H2<-d 
  summary(H2) 
  H2$Year<-as.numeric(H2$Year) 
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#Get time in 1 increment units and subset the data from 2011 to 
2016 
  H2$Time<-(H2$Year - 2011)  















 #Unconditional Growth Model  - Random intercept 
m0<-lme(WEDRatio~Time, random=~1|Firm,data=H2Test, 
method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m0) 
  vc<-VarCorr(m0) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m0) 
 




  vc<-VarCorr(m1) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m1) 
 
 
 #Conditional Growth model  
m2<-lme(WEDRatio~Time+Index, random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test, 
method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m2) 
  vc<-VarCorr(m2) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m2) 
  




  summary(m3) 
  vc<-VarCorr(m3) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m3) 
 





  summary(m4)  #Best model 
  vc<-VarCorr(m4) 




#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and 
Interaction - Random intercept 
m5<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~1|Firm, 
data=H2Test, method="ML", cor=corAR1(), 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m5)   
  vc<-VarCorr(m5) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m5) 
 
 
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and 
Interaction + Temporal correlation 
m6<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm, 
data=H2Test,method="ML", cor=corAR1(), na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m6)   
  vc<-VarCorr(m6) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m6) 
 
 
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and 
Interaction + Temporal correlation  
 ## controling for Heteroscedasticity at level 1 
m7<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm, 
weights=varIdent(form=~1|Index), cor=corAR1(), data=H2Test, 
method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m7)  #Best model 
  vc<-VarCorr(m7) 
  vcov<-getVarCov(m7) 
 
anova(m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7) 
 
### Same models for WNED 
 














































#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and 
Interaction - Random intercept 
m5<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~1|Firm, 
data=H2Test,method="ML", cor=corAR1(), na.action="na.omit") 





#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and 
Interaction + Temporal correlation 
m6<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm, 






#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and 
Interaction + Temporal correlation  
## controling for Heteroscedasticity at level 1 
m7<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm, 
weights=varIdent(form=~1|Index), cor=corAR1(), data=H2Test, 
method="ML", na.action="na.omit") 




anova(m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7) 
 
 
##Hypotheses Tests H3 
 
   d2011<-subset(d, Year==2011) 
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   d2016<-subset(d, Year==2016) 
    
   dH3<-rbind(d2011, d2016) 
    
   dH3350<-subset(dH3, dH3$Index!="FTSE Small Cap") 
   dHSmall<-subset(dH3, dH3$Index=="FTSE Small Cap") 
   dH3350$Year<-as.factor(dH3350$Year) 
   dHSmall$Year<-as.factor(dHSmall$Year) 
 
    
#Testing statistical significance in mean differences H3a 
   t.test(CEOGnd~Year, data=dH3350) 
   t.test(WED~Year, data=dH3350) 
 
   cohen.d(CEOGnd~Year, data=dH3350) 
   cohen.d(WED~Year, data=dH3350) 
 
#Testing statistical significance in mean differences H3b 
   t.test(ChairGnd~Year, data=dH3350) 
   t.test(WNED~Year, data=dH3350) 
 
   cohen.d(ChairGnd~Year, data=dH3350) 
   cohen.d(WNED~Year, data=dH3350) 
 
    
#Testing H3 in FTSE Small Cap 
   t.test(CEOGnd~Year, data=dHSmall) 
   t.test(WED~Year, data=dHSmall) 
 
   cohen.d(CEOGnd~Year, data=dHSmall) 
   cohen.d(WED~Year, data=dHSmall) 
 
    
   t.test(ChairGnd~Year, data=dHSmall) 
   t.test(WNED~Year, data=dHSmall) 
   cohen.d(ChairGnd~Year, data=dHSmall) 
   cohen.d(WNED~Year, data=dHSmall) 
 
##Growth models - To see if the change of directors has an effect 
on changes in CEO and chair 
dH3<-H2Test 
 
#Since the CEO is an executive director and the Chair a non-
executive, for this hypotheses, I remove them from the total or 





#Optimization method for lme 
ctrl <- lmeControl(opt='optim') 
 
#For FTSE All share 









  summary(m1) 
 











  summary(m3) 
 




  summary(m3) 
 
  




  summary(m4) 
 




  summary(m4) 
 








 #Unconditional Growth Model  - Random intercept 
m0<-lme(CEOGnd~Time, random=~1|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m0) 
 
#Unconditional growth model - random slope and intercept 
m1<-lme(CEOGnd~Time, random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", 
na.action="na.omit") 
  summary(m1) 
 





  summary(m2) 
 




  summary(m3) 
 




  summary(m4) 
 











#Create variables for clustering and for testing quadratic and 










#Unconditional model - Linear 
H4a2<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC,  
cutpoint=25,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
  summary(H4a2) 
  plot(H4a2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 
#Unconditional model - Quadratic 
H4a2<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162,  
cutpoint=25,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
  summary(H4a2) 
  plot(H4a2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 
#Unconditional model - Cubic 
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H4a2<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163,  
cutpoint=25,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a2) 
plot(H4a2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 





cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
  summary(H4a) 
  plot(H4a) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 





cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 




X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=6.5, cutpoint=25, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 




016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose 
= TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 




016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=4.85,cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, 




title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 




016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=8.5,cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, 
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 
###Coefficients do not look right. Few coefficients are 
significant but R2 is large.  Check multicollinearity 
 
dsT1$Treat1<-ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 100"& 
(d2011$WOBPC<25), "Yes", ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 250"& 
(d2011$WOBPC<22), "Yes", ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE Small 











omcdiag(X, Y, na.rm=TRUE, Inter=TRUE) 
imcdiag(X, Y, corr=TRUE) 
mctest(X, Y) 
 
#Removing highly correlated predictors 
















cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a, range=c(15, 35)) 
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title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 
 
###Competing explanation - Forcing variable = Increase 
##Unconditional linear 
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, 
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a, range=c(0,30)) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 




cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a, range=c(0,30)) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 
##Unconditional cubic 
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase| Increase2+Increase3,  
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a, range=c(0,30)) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
on Executive Boards") 
 
#Model M4a - Competing Optimal 
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase|X2016Board+ 
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011,  
cutpoint=12, bw=7.028, cluster=clustervar, data=dsT1, 
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4a) 
plot(H4a, range=c(-5, 30)) 
title(xlab="Increase of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women on 
Executive Boards") 
 
#Testing Hypothesis 4b 
###H4b - Senior management - Not significant 
#Testing with Observed data - Unconditional - Linear  
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC,  
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4b) 
plot(H4b) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Senior Management") 
 
#Testing with Observed data - Unconditional - Quadratic 
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162,  
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4b) 
plot(H4b) 




#Testing with Observed data - Unconditional - Quadratic 
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163,  
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4b) 
plot(H4b) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Senior Management") 
 
##Full model with Observed data 




2011, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4b) 
plot(H4b) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Senior Management") 
 








title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Senior Management") 
 








title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Senior Management") 
    





11, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4b2) 
plot(H4b2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
    









title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
 








title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
 





#Testing Unconditional - Optimal - Linear 
H4bAltU<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase, cutpoint=12, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4bAltU) 
plot(H4bAltU) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
 
#Testing Unconditional - Optimal - Quadratic 
H4bAltU<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase|Increase2, 
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4bAltU) 
plot(H4bAltU) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
 
#Testing Unconditional - Optimal - Cubic 
H4bAltU<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase|Increase2+Increase3, 
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4bAltU) 
plot(H4bAltU) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
 
 
#Testing at different cutoff with Imputed data - Optimal 
H4bAlt<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase| X2016Board+ 
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index20
11, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4bAlt) 
plot(H4bAlt) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
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#Testing at different cutoff with Imputed data - Narrow 
H4bAlt<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase| 
X2016Board+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sec




title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
 
#Testing at different cutoff with Imputed data - Wide 
H4bAlt<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase| X2016Board+ 
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+ 
Sector+Index2011, bw=13.71, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose 
= TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4bAlt) 
plot(H4bAlt) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
in Senior Management") 
    
#Testing Hypothesis H4c 
 
###H4c - Women employed - Unconditional - Linear 
H4c<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC, cutpoint=25, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4c) 
plot(H4c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 
###H4c - Women employed - Unconditional - Quadratic 
H4c<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162, 
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4c) 
plot(H4c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 
###H4c - Women employed - Unconditional - Linear 
H4c<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162+WOBPC163, 
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4c) 
plot(H4c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 




data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4cL) 
plot(H4cL) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 












#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term - Imputed data - 
Optimal 
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+  
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+ 




title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 
#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term - Imputed data - Wide 
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+ 
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+Sector+Index2011, 
cutpoint=25, bw=8.59,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4cL) 
plot(H4cL) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 
#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term - Imputed data - Narrow 
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+ 
CEOTenure+ ChairTenure+ 
WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, bw=5, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4cL) 
plot(H4cL) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 
###H4c - Competing Explanation Women employed  
H4cI<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~Increase| CEOTenure+ 
ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+Sector+Index2011, 
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H4cI) 
plot(H4cI, range=c(10, 40)) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women 
Employed") 
 
### Hypotheses 5 
#Hypothesis H5a - Paygap mean 
#H5a unconditional - Linear 
H5a2<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC, cutpoint=25, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5a2) 
plot(H5a2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean") 
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#H5a unconditional - Quadratic 
H5a2<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162, 
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5a2) 
plot(H5a2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean") 
 
#H5a unconditional - Cubic 
H5a2<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163, 
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5a2) 
plot(H5a2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean") 
 





1, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5a) 
plot(H5a) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean") 
 









title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean") 
 









title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean") 
 
### Hypotheses 5 
#Hypothesis H5b - Paygap median 
#H5a unconditional - Linear 
H5b2<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC, cutpoint=25, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5b2) 
plot(H5b2) 




#H5b unconditional - Quadratic 
H5b2<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162, 
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5b2) 
plot(H5b2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 
#H5b unconditional - Cubic 
H5b2<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163, 
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5b2) 
plot(Hba2) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 




1, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5b) 
plot(H5b) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 




X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, bw=5.9, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5b) 
plot(H5b) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 




WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, bw=13, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5b) 
plot(H5b) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
    
###Hypothesis H5c    
#Unconditional model - Linear 
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase, cutpoint=12, 
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 




#Unconditional model - Quadratic 
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase| Increase2, 
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 
#Unconditional model - Cubic 
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase| Increase2+Increase3, 
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 








data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 








cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 




cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, bw=4.2, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 




cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, bw=8.4, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 








cutpoint=8, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 




cutpoint=16, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE) 
summary(H5c) 
plot(H5c) 
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap 
Median") 
 
 
 
 
 
